Transcript Week 2: United States Foreign Policy

US FOREIGN POLICY AND
EUROPE
READINGS
CARTER CH 14, BEASLEY CH 2-4, KAGAN,
MORAVCSIK, BRZEZINSKI
Guiding Questions
 What unified the transatlantic relationship during
the Cold War era?
 What conceptions of power shape British foreign
policy? French foreign policy? German foreign
policy?
 What is the state of the transatlantic relationship in
the post Cold War era?
 Can the relationship be saved?
Cold War US/Europe Relations
 Acceptance of CW boundaries in
Europe resulted in the creation of
two alliances: NATO and the
Warsaw Pact.

Western Europe was crucial for
US foreign policy goals.
 In theory, relations should have
been relatively easy to maintain.



The US and Europe shared similar
identities.
European governments wanted the
protection of the US nuclear umbrella.
Most governments agreed that
economic cooperation was necessary to
rebuild economies.
 In practice, the relationship was not
always so simple.


Rebuilding Germany, Suez Crisis,
Nuclearization of NATO, Ostpolitik,
French Third Way
Both sides questioned the resolve of
the other
Mutual Tensions
US CONCERNS
 US provision of public
goods promoted shirking.

Once nuclear umbrella
provided Europe unlikely
to pay
 Anti-Washington
position-taking by
European governments.
EUROPEAN CONCERNS
 Dependence on the US
would make Europe a
“junior” partner.

France ‘s “Third Way”
 Fear over US commitment to
fight a continental war over
Europe.


US “Forward Defense”
strategy scared Europe.
Fostered “glass plate/trip
wire” strategy to keep US in
Europe.
The End of the Cold War
 November, 1989


The Berlin Wall came down.
Germany eventually unified
 Neorealists expected Europe
to “return to history”

War would break out in the
absence of a common threat
 Instead, Europe has remained
mostly peaceful.

Integration seen as a way to
“mitigate” the effects of
anarchy
 Raises questions about
whether or not the
transatlantic relationship is
obsolete
Whither the Transatlantic Relationship?
 What is the role of NATO?
 Euro-American antiterrorism alliance?
 Should it be disbanded?
 What is the future of European-American relations?
 Disagreements over the 2003 Iraq War.
 Increasing economic competition
 What is the future of the European Union?
 Increased political integration.
 How far east will it expand? Ukraine? Russia?
 Will it challenge the US as an “alternative soft power” superpower?
 What is the status of ESDF?
 Praline Summit sought to balance NATO.
 Current British, French and German governments seek ESDF that
compliments NATO
Europe as an Idea
Habermas and Derrida 2003
 Protests surrounding second Iraq War prompted authors to determine what constitutes a
“core Europe” mentality
 UK and eastern Europe often not included in any discussion of “core Europe”
 European “political mentality” includes:
 1) Privatization of faith
 2) Acceptance of state/distrust of markets
 State should step in to correct market failures
 3) Limitations on the value of technological progress
 Progress vs. traditional forms of life
 4) Struggle for “social justice”
 Support for the welfare state
 5) “Sensitivity to injuries to personal and bodily integrity”
 Be it on the battlefield or by the state (i.e. ban on death penalty)
 6) Support for multilateralism (via the EU, UN, etc.)

British Foreign Policy
POLITICAL FACTORS
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
Power:
 UK as a middle power
 Suez Incident made this apparent.
 Institutions:
 Globalization has constrained state
autonomy.
 EU membership makes European
institutions key players in the British
policy process.
 Ideas:
 Concept of insularity




Very Eurosceptic
Atlanticism (Special Relationship)
“Bridge building” approach to project a
larger role in the system.
The PM/Government key actor in
shaping foreign policy.
 Blair’s decision to call for a vote in
Parliament over Iraq was precedent
setting; increased role of
Parliament.
 Opposition historically sides with the
Government on issues of national
security.
 EU splits this bipartisan consensus.
 Public opinion:
 Broad support for Atlanticism
 Iraq has strained this to some
extent.

The “Special Relationship”
 First classified as “special” by
Churchill in 1946.

Common language, heritage, etc
often cited as a basis for this
relation.
 Response post Suez Crisis:
repair relations with the US.


Wanted to act like the “older
brother” who could advise the US.
Ended up in the position of “junior
partner”
 With the exception of the Heath
government, maintaining this
relationship has been the top
priority of British foreign
policy.

Although the current coalition has
suggested that the relationship
should be re-calibrated.
Anglo Saxon Consensus?
 Politically, the US and the UK
are not all that similar
 Blair paid a high political
price for maintaining the
relationship.
 Came at a cost: greater
distance between the
UK/EU.
 Brown sought to maintain the
relationship.
 Particularly with Obama
 Re-evaluation occurring under
Cameron.
 Cameron believes the
relationship is special but
should be re-evaluated.
 Clegg believes the UK should
focus more on the EU.
Anglo Saxon Consensus?
French Foreign Policy
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
 Power
 Middle power.
 Suez incident made this
apparent.
 Interdependence
 Boost EU presence to project
influence
 Ideas
 Maintain or boost French
status.


Nuclear force.
(Pre-Sarkozy) Multipolar
world with a European pillar.
POLITICAL FACTORS
 President is critical in the
field of foreign policy.
 Political elite consensus
on foreign policy goals.
 Focus strongly on
maintaining strong ties
with Germany to boost
EU influence.
French Foreign Policy Emphases
EUROPEAN SECURITY
 Diplomacy key tool in France’s
arsenal
 Budget would not support military
reorganization.
 French national security is tied to its
relationship with Germany, the EU,
and NATO.
 Franco-German relationship key
 Chirac began the debate on a French
“re-think” over NATO
 Pushed the possibility of allowing
European control of some forces
under circumstances where the
US does not want to intervene.
 Expanding ESDI takes place
within this discussion over NATO.
HUMAN RIGHTS
 Chirac publicly accepted
responsibility for the Vichy
collaboration with Nazi Germany.
 Publicly chastised the entrance
into government of the Freedom
Party in Austria.
 Began distancing France from its
colonial ties
 France was often seen as
propping up unsavory dictators
in Africa.
 Often seen as possessing a special
role in African and Middle Eastern
diplomacy.
Evaluating French Foreign Policy
 EU remains fundamental; Franco German relations key despite
personality conflicts with Merkel

Hollande: Talk of “re-evaluating” EU monetary and budgetary policies does not
go down well in Berlin
 Uses connections within the Middle East and Africa to boost French
influence in multilateral negotiations


Chirac: Theoretical rationale for avoiding Iraq conflict well founded
Sarkozy: Criticism between the US and France should be done in the appropriate
manner

Sarkozy: France first state to recognize Libyan rebel forces
 Increased Atlanticism under Sarkozy
 Brought France back into NATO
 Sent French troops to Afghanistan
 EU should not “balance” the US

Hollande has suggested that he will not alter this relationship
 Improving France/US relations a means to the same ends
 Projecting French influence
German Foreign Policy
POLITICAL FACTORS
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
Power
 Germany is too big to ignore.
 Unification was Cold War goal.
 Interdependence
 Strong commitment to alliances.
 Motor of the EU; Accepted
integration and EMU for unification.
 Ideas
 Committed to preservation of
human rights.
 Committed to democracy.
 Collective/cooperative action.
 Germany as a civilian power.

Chancellor and the cabinet shape
foreign policy.
 Party leaders from both the
government and opposition parties play
large roles in shaping public policy.
 Big decisions usually made by
unanimity.
 Basic Law prohibits the mobilization of
the German army outside of regional,
collective security purposes.
 Federal Constitutional Court has
been critical regarding military
intervention.
 Public opinion: pacifism,
humanitarianism, opposition to
nuclear weapons exert a large influence
over policy.

Evolution of Postwar German Foreign Policy
PERSIAN GULF
 Hyde-Price 2003
 US asks Germany to provide troops
for Operation Desert Shield.
 Articles 24 and 87 of the Basic
Law appeared to preclude a
German role within the conflict.
 Forbids military involvement
outside of region
 Changing the Constitution was a
no go as the opposition
controlled the Bundesrat.
 SOLUTION:
 Government agreed to provide
monetary support to states most
effected by the war.
 Refused to send troops or direct
military aid.
SOMALIA
 Hyde-Price 2003
 UN voted for a relief mission to
Somalia to provide humanitarian
aid.
 UN asked for assistance in the
form of financial aid and troops
 Kohl: wanted to send 1,600
troops but was unsure a
consensus could be reached.
 Opposition refused to sign on
without a change to the Basic
Law.
 SOLUTION:
 Start talks to change the Basic
Law (abandoned)
 Commit troops under the UN as
part of a multinational force
 Buy time to allow for support
while dealing with
constitutional issues
Interpreting the Basic Law
 Hancock and Krisch 2009; Hyde-Price 2003
 Case initiated by the SPD/Greens who argued that intervention outside
of the region and that peace enforcement extends beyond the Basic Law
 CDU/CSU/FDP: Collective security missions are allowed under the
Basic Law regardless of location.
 1994: Constitutional Court rules:
 1) German military involvement in peace enforcement and peace
keeping missions is acceptable
 No distinction between the two
 2) German military participation within a collective security
arrangement outside of the region is acceptable
 Necessary to maintain alliance cohesion
 3) Governments require majority support in the Bundestag for
intervention
 Informal agreements codified by parliament in 2004
Evolution of German Foreign Policy
AFGHANISTAN
KOSOVO
 1998: SPD/Greens enter
government.
 Majority in the Bundestag to
allow German forces to deploy
against Serbia
 Air attacks were the first
military offensive since WW2.
 Call for ground troops threatened
the government’s support.
 Support tenuous within the
Green party.
 SOLUTION: Continue the air war
(support NATO) and seek a
diplomatic solution (bring Russia
to the table).
 Bundestag sent troops on a
peacekeeping mission after the
war.
Expressed solidarity with the US
following 9/11
 Schröder proposal to provide German
military support for NATO efforts
created a backlash
 Red/Green backbenchers balk
 Previous support for involvement
depended upon CDU votes
 SOLUTION: Authorization a vote of
confidence
 Willing to use political means to
force desired outcome
 Exposes German soldiers to risks
 Reduced role over time; irritates
others NATO members

Evaluating German Foreign Policy
Merkel
Schröder
Willingness to use German foreign policy,
to achieve civilian AND national ends.
 Involvement in multilateral endeavors
promotes collective security (civilian)
while also advancing national goals
(permanent UN seat)
 German-US relations
 Close ties before Iraq war ended after
2002 elections
 German-French relations
 Critical; Push for ESDP that could
balance NATO
 German-Russian relations
 Bridge between EU and Russia
 Dependence on oil creates
vulnerability

Also willing to use German foreign policy
(including military) to achieve civilian
AND national ends.
 Support for Afghanistan mission
(civilian) advances national goals
(permanent UN seat)
 German-US relations
 Sought to repair relations with the US
 ESDP should compliment NATO
 German-French relations
 Personality conflicts exist
 Willing to work with other nations
where necessary
 German Russian relations
 Takes a much tougher line on Russia
(pushes democracy and human rights)

Can This Relationship Be Saved?
 Moravcsik 2003
 Pundits say Iraq killed NATO; both sides realized
something….




Terror is a threat for the US, not for the EU.
Unilateral intervention proves US can act without the EU
But, winning the peace is rougher than winning the war.
Is this a question of diverging ideologies or temporary
differences in domestic political situations?
Mars vs. Venus?
 Kagan 2003
 US and EU view threats in
fundamentally different ways
 US is Mars and the EU is Venus
 US embracing the use of power in an
increasingly anarchic world
(Hobbesian).
 Technological gap in capabilities
boost willingness to fight.
 Prefer to act with others but are
not compelled to do so.
 Sees the world in black and white.
 Strength and perspective make it the
primary target.
 Seeks to share defense burden with
the EU.
 US is BOTH a military and
economic power; EU is not
Mars vs. Venus?
 Kagan 2003
 EU is moving “away from power”
towards international law (Kantian).
 Support UN Security Council
legitimation of conflict.
 Push for universal applicability of
ICC.
 See the world in shades of gray.
 Nuanced view privileges
diplomacy rather than force.
 Do not believe that 9/11 really
targets them directly.
 Strategic dependence on the US for
military resources; unwilling to
spend on defense.
 Economic but not a military
power.
 Domestic politics prevents
increases in defense spending.
Should It Be Saved?
Kagan 2003
 Yes; But be realistic; the nature of the relationship has changed.
 Fundamental worldviews of both sides are unlikely to change.
 BUT, these differences are not as unmanageable as they appeared after the Iraq war.
 Moravcsik 2003
 Yes; Transatlantic cooperation remains the most important diplomatic relationship in
the world.
 Three possible paths: “agree to disagree”, part ways, or good cop/bad cop.
 The latter has the greatest potential for returns; ending the alliance would require
Europe to build its own military.
 Brzezinski 2012
 Yes; A renewed west is key for enhancing the principles of the West
 US must promote unity within the West and be able to balance and conciliate the East
 US/EU connections could pull Russia and Turkey into the orbit of the West
 Critical for US/Asian relations

Conclusions: Repairing the Rift
 Kagan 2003
 US/EU cannot allow the relationship to deteriorate.

US can provide military might while the EU can provide legitimacy.
 EU must realize:

US will sometimes have to act unilaterally.


US hegemony is good for the EU.
Should build up at least a token force; would help EU shoulder some
of the defense burden.
 US must realize:



A strong Europe is a good thing.
Pay respect to multilateral institutions
Needlessly provoking the EU is counterproductive

Build political capital for use when you have to act unilaterally.
Conclusions: Repairing the Rift
 Moravcsik 2003
 Preventive interventions
US should avoid when possible; commit to quiet consultation
without public attacks
 UN Security Council
 EU cannot use UN to restrain the US (UN wasn’t intended to do
this).
 US cannot keep thinking that WW2 gives them a blank check
 Push for EU Defense Force?
 Unlikely; Would just duplicate the US capabilities
 Develop comparative advantage
 US brings military strength and the EU brings civilian strength
(access to economic markets)

Next Unit
If You’re Interested….
 Reid The United States of Europe
 Kagan Of Paradise and Power
 Leonard Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century
 Next Unit: US and Asian Pacific Relations
 Cox and Stokes CH 14
 US/Japanese Foreign Policy
 Beasley CH 7
 Heginbotham et al. (Foreign Affairs-September/October 2011)
 Packard (Foreign Affairs-March/April 2010)
 US/Chinese Foreign Policy
 Beasley CH 6
 Carter CH 12
 Economy and Segal (Foreign Affairs-May/June 2009)
 Pei (Foreign Policy July/Aug 2009) http://bit.ly/zdNFDo
