Transcript 哲學基本問題 何謂知識？

哲學概論
單元 22：何謂知識？
授課教師：王榮麟
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1
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The nature of Knowledge
Truth
Evidence
The Source of Knowledge
2
一、Knowledge

What is knowledge? What does it mean to
know something? What conditions have to be
fulfilled before we are prepared to say that a
person knows something?
3
「知道」的幾種涵義

日常語言中經常使用到「知道」，但意思
並不相同。
4
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你「知道」怎麼做蛋糕嗎？
5
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你「知道」怎麼幫剛出生的小貓熊催便嗎？
6

你「認識」Lady Gaga嗎？
7
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你「知道」Lourdes嗎？
8

你「知道」Berkeley、Bach、Handel都是
在同一年（1685）誕生的嗎？
9
「知道」的涵義 (1)-1


我「知道」怎麼做蛋糕。首先…（knowing
how. It has to do with an ability to engage in
a certain activity.）
同樣，我「知道」怎麼幫剛出生的小貓熊
催便，這樣的知道也與從事某個活動的能
力有關。
10
「知道」的涵義 (1)-2

Animals know how to do many things that
people don’t, and often—more often than
with human beings—they know how to do
something without having to learn it. Ex.
Almost all creatures know how to swim.
11
「知道」的涵義 (2)


你「認識」那個人嗎？我「認識」，我見
過他！
你「知道」Lourdes嗎？我「知道」，我去
過呢！（acquaintance. This is not the same
as knowing facts about it. A person who has
never been there but has read all about it in an
encyclopedia may know many more facts
about the place than the person who has seen
it but has never learned any facts about it.） 12
「知道」的涵義 (3)



你知道Berkeley、Bach、Handel都是在同
一年（1685）誕生的嗎？（knowing-that）
Knowledge comes only when you have some
statement that is either true or false. We don’t
have knowledge until we are in a position to
claim something as true or false. In short,
knowledge is propositional.
Knowing-that is knowing that some situation
or state of affairs actually occurs or exists. 13
The Analysis of Knowledge

The objective of the analysis of knowledge is
to state the conditions that are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for
propositional knowledge: knowledge that
such-and-such is the case.
14
何謂知識？
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The JTB Analysis of Knowledge:
S knows that p iff
p is true;
S believes that p;
S is justified in believing that p.
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The Truth Condition
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Condition (i), the truth condition, has not
generated any significant degree of
discussion. It is overwhelmingly clear that
what is false cannot be known.
For example, it is false that D. Hume is the
author of Critique of Pure Reason. Since it is
false, it is not the sort of thing anybody can
16
know.
The Belief Condition
 Unlike
the truth condition, condition (ii),
the belief condition, has generated at
least some discussion. Although
initially it might seems obvious that
knowing that p requires believing that p,
some philosophers have argued that
knowledge without belief is indeed
possible.
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The Belief Condition

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Case 1: you’ve just won the million-dollar
jackpot. “I know it’s true, but I still can’t
believe it.”
Case 2: a woman knows that her husband is
dead but she says, “I know it but I still don’t
believe it.”
18
The Belief Condition

What one wishes to convey by saying "I don't
believe it" is not that he really does not
believe what he sees with his own eyes, but
rather that he finds it hard to come to terms
(emotionally) with what he sees.
19

(Belief can also be a matter of degree: you
can believe something but not very strongly.
You have beliefs you would stake your life
on, and others on which you would stake very
little.)
20
這樣就足夠了嗎？
21
The Justification Condition

Why is condition (iii) necessary? Why not
say that knowledge is true belief? The
standard answer is that to identify knowledge
with true belief would be implausible because
a belief that is true just because of luck does
not qualify as knowledge.
22
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Let us refer to a belief's turning out to be true
because of mere luck as epistemic luck. It is
uncontroversial that knowledge is
incompatible with epistemic luck. What,
though, is needed to rule out epistemic luck?
Advocates of the JTB account would say that
what is needed is justification. A true belief,
if an instance of knowledge and thus not true
because of epistemic luck, must be justified. 23

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But what is it for a belief to be justified?
Among the philosophers who favor the JTB
approach, we find bewildering disagreement
on how this question is to be answered.
According to one prominent view, typically
referred to as "evidentialism", a belief is
justified if, and only if, it fits the subject's
24
evidence.

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Evidentialists, then, would say that the reason why
knowledge is not the same as true belief is that
knowledge requires evidence.
Opponents of evidentialism would say that
evidentialist justification (i.e., having adequate
evidence) is NOT needed to rule out epistemic luck.
They would argue that what is needed instead is a
suitable relation between the belief and the mental
process that brought it about.
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The Gettier Problem
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In his short 1963 paper, "Is Justified True
Belief Knowledge?", Edmund Gettier
presented two effective counterexamples to
the JTB analysis. The second of these goes as
follows.
Suppose Smith has good evidence for the
false proposition
26
(1) Jones owns a Ford.

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Suppose further Smith infers from (1) the
following three disjunctions:
(2) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in
Boston.
(3) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in
Barcelona.
(4) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in
Brest-Litovsk.
27
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Since (1) entails each of the propositions (2)
through (4), and since Smith recognizes these
entailments, he is justified in believing each
of propositions (2)-(4).
Now suppose that, by sheer coincidence,
Brown is indeed in Barcelona. Given these
assumptions, we may say that Smith, when he
28
believes (3), holds a justified true belief.
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However, is Smith's belief an instance of
knowledge?
Since Smith has no evidence whatever as to
Brown's whereabouts, and so believes what is
true only because of luck, the answer would
have to be ‘no’.
Consequently, the three conditions of the JTB
account — truth, belief, and justification —
29
are not sufficient for knowledge.

How must the analysis of knowledge be
modified to make it immune to cases like the
one we just considered? This is what is
commonly referred to as the "Gettier
problem".
30
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Epistemologists who think that the JTB
approach is basically on the right track must
choose between two different strategies for
solving the Gettier problem:
The first is to strengthen the justification
condition.
The second strategy is to search for a suitable
further condition, a condition that would, so
to speak, "degettierize" justified true belief. 31


Let us focus on this second strategy.
According to one suggestion, the following
fourth condition would do the trick:
(iv) S's belief that p is not inferred from any
falsehood.
32
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Unfortunately, this proposal is unsuccessful. Since
Gettier cases need not involve any inference, there
are possible cases of justified true belief in which the
subject fails to have knowledge although condition
(iv) is met.
Suppose, for example, that James, who is relaxing on
a bench in a park, observes a dog that, about 8 yards
away from him, is chewing on a bone. So he believes
(5) There is a dog over there.
33
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Suppose further that what he takes to be a dog is
actually a robot dog so perfect that, by vision alone, it
could not be distinguished from an actual dog. James
does not know that such robot dogs exist. But in fact a
Japanese toy manufacturer has recently developed
them, and what James sees is a prototype that is used
for testing the public's response.
34
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Given these assumptions, (5) is of course
false.
But suppose further that just a few feet away
from the robot dog, there is a real dog. Sitting
behind a bush, he is concealed from James's
view.
Given this further assumption, James's belief
35
is true.
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So once again, what we have before us is a justified
true belief that doesn't qualify as an instance of
knowledge.
Arguably, this belief is directly justified by a visual
experience; it is not inferred from any falsehood.
But if (5) is indeed a non-inferential belief, then the
JTB account, even if supplemented with (iv), gives
us the wrong result that James knows (5).
36
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Another case illustrating that clause (iv) won't do the
job is the well-known Barn County case (Goldman
1976).
Suppose there is a county in the Midwest with the
following peculiar feature. The landscape next to the
road leading through that county is peppered with
barn-facades: structures that from the road look
exactly like barns. Observation from any other
viewpoint would immediately reveal these structures
to be fakes: devices erected for the purpose of
fooling unsuspecting motorists into believing in the
37
presence of barns.
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Suppose Henry is driving along the road that leads
through Barn County. Naturally, he will on
numerous occasions form a false belief in the
presence of a barn.
Since Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the
victim of organized deception, these beliefs are
justified.
Now suppose further that, on one of those occasions
when he believes there is a barn over there, he
happens to be looking at the one and only real barn
in the county. This time, his belief is justified and 38

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But since its truth is the result of luck, it is
exceedingly plausible to judge that Henry's
belief is not an instance of knowledge.
Yet condition (iv) is met in this case. His
belief is clearly not the result of any inference
from a falsehood.
Once again, we see that (iv) does not succeed
39
as a solution to the Gettier problem.
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The lesson to be learned from the Gettier
problem is this:
Even a justified belief, understood as a belief
based on good evidence, can be true because
of luck.
40
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So if a JTB analysis of knowledge is to rule out the full
range of cases of epistemic luck, it must be amended
with a suitable fourth condition, a condition that
succeeds in preventing justified true belief from being
"gettiered."
Thus amended, the JTB analysis becomes a JTB+
account of knowledge, where the '+' stands for the
needed fourth condition.
41
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The analysis of knowledge may be approached by
asking the following question: What turns a true belief
into knowledge?
An uncontroversial answer to this question would be:
the sort of thing that effectively prevents a belief from
being true as a result of epistemic luck.
Controversy begins as soon as this formula is turned
into a substantive proposal.
42

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According to evidentialism, which endorses
the JTB+ conception of knowledge, the
combination of two things accomplishes this
goal:
evidentialist justification plus degettierization
(a condition that prevents a true and justified
belief from being "gettiered").
43

However, according to an alternative
approach that has in the last three decades
become increasingly popular, what stands in
the way of epistemic luck — what turns a
true belief into knowledge — is the reliability
of the cognitive process that produced the
belief.
44

Consider how we acquire knowledge of our
physical environment: we do so through
sense experience. Sense experiential
processes are, at least under normal
conditions, highly reliable. There is nothing
accidental about the truth of the beliefs these
processes produce.
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Thus beliefs produced by sense experience, if true,
should qualify as instances of knowledge.
An analogous point could be made for other reliable
cognitive processes, such as introspection, memory,
and rational intuition.
We might, therefore, say that what turns true belief
into knowledge is the reliability of our cognitive
processes.
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This approach — reliabilism, as it is usually called —
can be carried out in two different ways:
First, there is reliabilism as a theory of justification (Jreliabilism).
The most basic version of this view — let's call it
'simple J-reliabilism' — takes knowledge to be justified
true belief but, unlike evidentialism, conceives of
justification in terms of reliability.
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Simple J-Reliabilism:
Part A: S knows that p iff S's belief that p is
(i) true and (ii) justified.
Part B: S is justified in believing that p iff S's
belief that p was produced by a reliable
cognitive process (in a way that degettierizes
S's belief).
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
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Second, there is reliabilism as a theory of
knowledge (K-reliabilism).
According to this approach, knowledge does
NOT require justification. Rather, what it
requires (in addition to truth) is reliable belief
formation.
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
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Simple K-Reliabilism:
S knows that p if, and only if, S's belief that p
(i) is true and (ii) was produced by a reliable
cognitive process (in a way that degettierizes
S's belief).
50

According to Fred Dretske, “Those who think
knowledge requires something other than, or at least
more than, reliably produced true belief, something
(usually) in the way of justification for the belief that
one's reliably produced beliefs are being reliably
produced, have….an obligation to say what benefits
this justification is supposed to confer…. Who needs it,
and why?
51

If an animal inherits a perfectly reliable belief-generating
mechanism, and it also inherits a disposition, everything being
equal, to act on the basis of the beliefs so generated, what
additional benefits are conferred by a justification that the beliefs
are being produced in some reliable way? If there are no
additional benefits, what good is this justification? Why should we
insist that no one can have knowledge without it?” (Dretske 1989,
p. 95)
52
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According to Dretske, reliable cognitive processes
convey information, and thus endow not only humans,
but (nonhuman) animals as well, with knowledge. He
writes:
“I wanted a characterization that would at least allow
for the possibility that animals (a frog, rat, ape, or my
dog) could know things without my having to suppose
them capable of the more sophisticated intellectual
operations involved in traditional analyses of
knowledge.” (Dretske 1985, p. 177)
53

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It does indeed seem odd to think of frogs, rats, or dogs
as having justified or unjustified beliefs. Yet attributing
knowledge to animals is certainly in accord with our
ordinary practice of using the word 'knowledge'.
So if, with Dretske, we want an account of knowledge
that includes animals among the knowing subjects, we
might want to abandon the traditional JTB account in
favor of K-reliabilism.
54

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Can Dretske's version of K-reliabilism escape the
Gettier problem?
Consider again the case of the barn facades. Henry sees
a real barn, and that's why he believes there is a barn
near-by.
Since the barn he is looking at is an actual barn, it
would appear that the perceptual process that causes
Henry to believe this does not relate him to anything
false.
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So if perception, on account of its reliability, normally conveys
information, it should do so in this case as well.
Alas, it arguably does NOT. Since Henry would have believed the
same had he been situated in front of one of the many barnfacades in the vicinity, we are reluctant to judge that Henry knows
there is a barn nearby.
There is reason to doubt, therefore, that Dretske's version of Kreliabilism escapes the Gettier problem.
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In general terms, since reliable faculties can be just as misleading
as a person's evidence, a bare bones reliability condition does little
toward solving the Gettier problem.
When Henry travels through Barn County, surely his vision works
just as well as it would elsewhere. Hence, unless we are told how
to gauge reliability relative to the subject's environment,
reliabilism offers us no reason to judge that Henry fails to know
that there is a barn near-by.
57

Or consider the example of the Japanese toy-dog.
When James believes that there is a toy-dog before him,
his failure to know this is not due to a sudden
deterioration of his vision. Rather, James fails to know
because an otherwise reliable faculty, vision, is
misleading on this particular occasion. Hence, if
reliabilism is to yield the correct outcome about this
case, it needs to be amended with a further clause.
58
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We need to be told either a principled reason why
James's visual faculty fails to be reliable under the
circumstances, or else why James fails to know even
though his belief is produced by a reliable faculty.
Clearly, then, Gettier cases pose as much of a problem
for reliabilism as for an evidentialist JTB account.
Neither theory, unless amended with a clever
degettierization clause, succeeds in stating sufficient
conditions of knowledge.
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Evidentialists reject both J-reliabilism and Kreliabilism.
Evidentialists reject J-reliabilism because they take
justification to be something that is internal to the
subject.
J-reliabilists, on the other hand, take justification to be
something that is external to the subject.
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J-Internalism:
Justification is directly recognizable. At any time t at
which S holds a justified belief B, S is in a position to
know at t that B is justified.
J-Externalism:
Justification is not directly recognizable. It is not the
case that at any time t at which S holds a justified belief
B, S is in a position to know at t that B is justified.
(There are times at which S holds a justified belief B
but is not in a position to know that B is justified.)
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Why evidentialists reject J-reliabilism?
Consider an example due to Laurence BonJour:
Suppose Norman is a perfectly reliable clairvoyant. At time t, his
clairvoyance causes Norman to form the belief that the US president is
presently in New York. However, Norman has no evidence whatever
indicating that he is clairvoyant. Nor has he at t any way of recognizing
that his belief was caused by his clairvoyance. Norman, then, cannot at t
recognize that his belief is justified.
According to J-Internalism then Norman does not hold at t a justified
belief. However, according to J-Externalism, Norman’s belief could be
justified.
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Evidentialists also reject K-reliabilism. They do so
because, pace Dretske, they think that internal
justification — justification in the form of having
adequate evidence — is necessary for knowledge.
In other words, they deny that a belief's origin in a
reliable cognitive process is sufficient for the belief's
being an instance of knowledge.
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

Now, let us refer to Evidentialist position as
internalism about knowledge, or K-internalism,
and let us define it using the concept of
internal justification: the kind of justification
that meets the direct recognizability constraint.
As opposed to K-internalism, K-externalism
denies that internal justification is a necessary
condition of knowledge.
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
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K-Internalism:
Internal justification is a necessary condition of knowledge. A
belief's origin in a reliable cognitive process is not sufficient for its
being an instance of knowledge.
K-Externalism:
Internal justification is NOT a necessary condition of knowledge.
A belief's origin in a reliable cognitive process is sufficient for its
being an instance of knowledge. Consequently, there are cases of
knowledge without internal justification.
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Internalism vs. Externalism
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Evidentialists say that internal justification is a necessary
condition of knowledge. Evidentialists would support this claim
with examples such as BonJour's clairvoyant Norman.
Recall that Norman has no evidence for thinking that he is a
reliable clairvoyant. Norman's belief B is caused by his
clairvoyance. But Norman has no independent evidence for B.
Now, if one is inclined to say that, since due to the lack of
evidence B is unjustified, B is not an instance of knowledge, then
one is inclined to side with evidentialists and endorse KInternalism.
66
Internalism vs. Externalism

In reply, Dretske would say, of course, that
for the acquisition of knowledge, nobody
needs justification—whether it be internalist
or externalist—because reliable belief
production is sufficient for turning true belief
into knowledge.
67
Internalism vs. Externalism

According to Dretske, animals such as frogs, rats,
apes, and dogs do have knowledge. And this is
surely in line with the way we ordinarily use the
concept of knowledge. The owner of a pet who does
not attribute knowledge to it would be hard to find.
But are animals capable of the sophisticated mental
operations required by beings who enjoy the sort of
justification internalists have in mind? It would seem
not.
68
Internalism vs. Externalism

Another reason for externalism (more specifically, Jexternalism) has to do with the connection between
justification and truth. Internalists conceive of a
justified belief as a belief that, relative to the subject's
evidence or reasons, is likely to be true. However, such
likelihood of truth is compatible with the belief's actual
falsity.
69
Internalism vs. Externalism

Indeed, likelihood of truth as internalists conceive of it
can be exemplified in the evil demon world, in which
your justified beliefs about the world are mostly false.
Hence externalists view the connection between
internalist justification and truth as being too thin and
therefore demand a stronger kind of likelihood of truth.
Reliability is usually taken to fill the bill.
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Internalism vs. Externalism

Internalists would object that a strong link
between justification and truth runs afoul of
the rather forceful intuition that the beliefs of
an evil demon victim are justified even when
they are mostly false.
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Internalism vs. Externalism


In response, externalists might concede that the sort of
justification internalists have in mind and attribute to
evil demon victims is a legitimate concept, but question
the epistemological relevance of that concept.
Of what epistemic value (of what value to the
acquisition of knowledge), they might ask, is internal
justification if it is the sort of thing an evil demon
victim can enjoy, a person whose belief system is
massively marred by falsehood?
72
Internalism vs. Externalism

Internalists would reply that internal
justification should not be expected to supply
us with a guarantee of truth, and that its value
derives (at least in part) from the fact that
internal justification is necessary for
knowledge.
73
小結


知識是否需要證成？
若是，需要什麼樣的證成？
74
三、Truth

To know it is to know it to be
true. 問題是：有真理嗎？
有絕對的真理嗎？

圖片：Jules Joseph Lefebvre:
La Vérité (Truth), 1870
來源：http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Truth.jpg
75
Truth? - 1


Claim：沒有真理。
“I don’t believe there’s any such thing as
truth.”
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Truth? – 1: reply

回應：
“Not even the statement you just made?”
“Do you really mean that all statements are
false? That not only ‘Snow is black’ is false
but also ‘Snow is white’?”
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Truth? - 2

Claim：沒有「絕對的」真理。
78
Truth? – 2: reply

回應：
What exactly does the word “absolute” add? The
word “absolute” gives the utterance a certain
emphasis, but what does it add to the meaning of the
statement?
And when someone protests, “What you say is
absolutely false,” how is this different (except in
emphasis) from saying, “What you say is false”?
Don’t both sentences label the same situation?
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Truth? - 3

Claim：真理都是「相對的」。

莊子，齊物論：「彼亦一是非 此亦一是非 」。
“If I am sitting on one side of the desk and you on the
other, the vase that to you is on the right side of the desk
is to me on the left side. It’s relative to one’s position.”

80
Truth? – 3: reply

回應：
“Right” and “left” are indeed relative terms,
but is the truth they express relative? “From
where Mary sits the vase is on the right”, and
“From where Jerry sits the vase is on the
left”—aren’t both of these propositions just
true, period?
81
Truth? - 4


Claim：真理相對於人。
“Calculus interests you,” and “Calculus bores me,”
can both be true and often are.
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Truth? – 4: reply

回應：
A statement is not true-for-you and false-forme even when it’s about you or about me. It
may be a truth about you that you like to
handle snakes, and it’s a truth about me that I
don’t. It’s not just true-for-you that you like
to handle snakes but true, period.
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Truth? – 5: claim


Claim：真理是短暫的，相對於時間。
Isn’t the statement “New York City has over
6 million inhabitants” relative to the time
about which the statement is made? Isn’t it
true at one time and not at another time?
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Truth? – 5: reply

回應：
Again the relativity disappears when we include the
information that’s needed to complete the statement.
“New York City had more than 6 million inhabitants in
1896” is false, and “New York City had more than 6
million inhabitants in 1996” is true. Neither is relative
to the time; the time is included in the statement, and
must be if we are to give an accurate report about New
York City’s population.
85
何謂真理？


A proposition is true when it tells us what is.
Aristotle: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what
is not that it is, is false; while to say of what is that it
is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.”
The statement that snow is white is true, if and only
if snow is white. A statement is true if it reports the
way some aspect of reality is, and false if it
misreports reality.
86
Correspondence

A statement is true if it corresponds to reality.
87
Correspondence 問題一

What does the word “correspond” mean in
the sentence? There is no resemblance
between words and facts.
88
Correspondence 問題二


事物與事物彼此間有一一對應，例如身份證與人。
Is there such a one-to-one correspondence between a
sentence and a fact? Surely not, for the sentence can be
translated into other languages and still express the
same fact.
回應：It’s the meaning that counts, not the sentence
per se.
89
Correspondence 問題三


有些statements並無所謂對應的事實，因為這樣的
事實根本不曾發生過。
例如，「要是日本沒有偷襲珍珠港的話，美國就
不會參戰了。」或“If Cleopatra’s nose had been
half an inch longer, Egypt would not have become
part of the Roman Empire” (because Marc Antony
wouldn’t have been attracted to her.)
90


回應：但諸如此類的statements，未必為真。
問題是：有些逆實條件句似乎為真，但難以設想
它對應到什麼事實。例如，「要是蘇洵沒有生下
蘇軾的話，就不會有『但願人長久，千里共嬋娟』
的千古名句了。」
91
Correspondence 問題四

有些statements肯定為真，但仍然無所謂對
應的事實。
例如，數學中所談到的statements：
“2+2=4”，或邏輯中所談到的statements：
若A大於B，則B小於A。
92
Coherence

A statement is true if it coheres with a body,
or system of other statements.
93
Coherence 問題一


What is meant by “coherence”?
回應：A proposition is coherent with a body
of other propositions if it is logically
consistent with them; that is, if it doesn’t
contradict any of them.
94
Coherence 問題二-1


這條件太鬆。兩個statements可以是邏輯上consistent，
可是在為真上一點關係也沒有。
例如，「玫瑰的名字的作者是Umberto Eco」和
「H1N1流感的感染源在墨西哥」。如果Eco並沒有
寫玫瑰的名字，難道H1N1流感的感染源就不在墨西
哥了嗎？
95

回應：Coherence among propositions has to
do with a body of propositions that are not
only consistent with each other but that
mutually support one another; they provide
evidence for each other.
96
Coherence 問題二-2

例子：Suppose we suspect that Mr. Jones killed a certain person.
There were no witnesses, but blood with the victim’s DNA was
found on Jones’s jacket, Jones was seen leaving the victim’s house
a few minutes after the established time of death, Jones abruptly
left his home a mile away an hour before the killing took place,
and so on. The statement that Jones committed the murder is
coherent with all these other statements; the other statements
provide evidential support for it.
97
Coherence 其他的問題 (1)

即使彼此互相融貫、互為支持的一堆命題，
也仍然可能為假。例如，一本在內容上沒
有邏輯不一致的小說。
98

Could coherence be defined without already
presupposing the concept of truth?
99
The pragmatic theory
The pragmatic theory
A proposition is true if it works.
它有實用，則它為真。
例子：「勤能補拙」為真—這句話有實用。
「吸毒對身體百益而無一害」為假—這句
話無實用。

100

問題：What does it mean for a proposition to
work? Can propositions be tested by whether
they work? 如何評判有用沒有用？
101

What exactly is the relation between their being true
and their working?有用的不見得為真，真也不見得
有用。
102

If a king who wanted to put an end to religious strife within his
kingdom passed an edict saying that everyone was from that
moment on required on pain of death to believe in Isis and Osiris,
he might succeed, if he had a large squad of enforcers. Doubters
would be put to death, and everyone else would either believe or
keep quiet about it. Parents would teach their children about Isis
and Osiris, and no other religious belief would gain a foothold,
until finally there would be no competition, and no more strife or
even argument about religion. Did the belief “work”? It did in the
sense that it put a stop to religious wars. But what has that to do
with the belief being true?
103
三種說法總評


關於真理的三種說法，Popper的評論如下:
There is no doubt that correspondence to the facts is what we
usually call “truth”—that in ordinary language it is
correspondence that we call “truth,” rather than coherence or
pragmatic usefulness. A judge who admonishes a witness to speak
the truth and nothing but the truth does not admonish the witness
to speak what he thinks is useful either for himself or for anybody
else. The judge admonishes a witness to speak the truth and
nothing but the truth, but he does not say, “All we require of you
is that you do not get involved in contradictions,” which he would
say were he a believer in the coherence theory. But this is not
what he demands of the witness.
104
The Source of Knowledge






How do we acquire knowledge?
By means of reason and experience.
Introspection
Memory
Testimony
Intuition
105
理性推論與經驗 (1)


靠理性的推論，我們得以擴展所知。
演繹論證
非演繹論證
質疑：演繹論證能夠擴展所知嗎？
106
理性推論與經驗 (2)

回應：我們不是邏輯全能者，當推論過程
相當複雜時，即使結論已包含在前提之中，
我們仍只有等到把結論推出時才得知結論。
107
理性推論與經驗 (3)



靠經驗，我們有所認知。
經驗包括：
Sense-perception
仰賴感官知覺而有的知識是否成立？
108
Introspection (1)

A report of what we feel or think: I know that
I have a toothache at the present. I know that
I feel a bit drowsy.

依賴內省而有的知識成立嗎？
109
Introspection (2)



It’s easy to confuse a report of what we feel or think,
with some interpretation of what we feel or think.
若有人說「我羞愧地無地自容」，或「我暴跳如
雷」，這是對他的之感受的報導，或是加油添醋
地進行詮釋？
然而一旦把感受與詮釋爬梳析理開之後，難道我
們還會不知道我們的心理狀態嗎？這種直接對於
我們之心理狀態的報導怎麼可能出錯呢？
110
Introspection (3)

你或許知道你現在是否牙痛，可是當我問
「你快樂嗎？」而你回答「我很快樂」時，
你真的知道你現在快樂嗎？雖然快樂是你
的心理狀態，可是它並非一時的狀態，而
是長期的狀態。“Call no man happy until
he is dead.”—King Darius of Persia.
111


此外，有些心理狀態—例如，being happy or being in
love—屬於dispositional statements，牽涉到的不只是一
時的感受，同時也是以某種方式來行為表現的傾向。
回想一下你戀愛時，你會有什麼樣的行為表現的傾向
呢？（莫明其妙地傻笑，撕玫瑰花花瓣，儘可能出現
在對方會出現的地方，留意對方的一切訊息，哼歌）
當你沒有諸如此類的行為表現傾向時，人們會說你戀
愛了嗎？你真的處在戀愛的心理狀態嗎？你對你自己
的感受的描述常常並不準確，反而是旁觀者從你的行
為看出你的心理狀態。
112
Introspection (4)


A woman claims sincerely that she doesn’t feel
depressed, but after some months of therapy she
says, “I see now that I was depressed all the time,
but I didn’t know what it was like to be happy.
Now that I am finally happy. I see that I was in a
continuous state of depression.”
Some would say, “She wasn’t really depressed,
because she didn’t feel depressed”; others would
say, “She was depressed all the time but didn’t
know it, because she had never experienced
anything (happy) to contrast it with.”
113
Memory (1)

「你怎麼知道當你還小時，你到過淡水？」
「我記得啊！我還吃了阿給哩！」

依賴記憶而有的知識成立嗎？
114
Memory (2)
記錯。
 例如，你對你的朋友說：「我記得我們
出去吃飯時，常常都是我在付錢。」你
的朋友回說：「我怎麼記得付錢的都是
我。」

115

然而從「有些記憶會出錯」，不能誤推「所有記憶都出錯」。
更何況，你怎麼知道有些記憶會出錯？你難道不是憑正確的
記憶來糾正錯誤的記憶嗎？你至少要記得你有一個錯誤的記
憶才行啊！若不仰賴記憶，我連一句話都說不出來。在我說
該句話的最後一字時，如果我不記得第一個字，我怎麼知道
我在說什麼？你又怎麼知道我在說什麼？若不仰賴記憶，就
算你現在說服我說依賴記憶而有的知識不成立，那又有什麼
用呢？只要過一會兒，等到我必須仰賴記憶來重現你的論證
時，你的論證就失效了。難道你要時時刻刻對我做論證嗎？
你做論證時無須仰賴記憶嗎？
116
Memory (3)

Thus we have no good reason to say that some
memory-judgments are false, unless the truth of some
memory-judgments is assumed. Unless we grant that
some memory-judgments are true, our judgment that
some memory-judgments are false can’t even get off
the ground, for there could be no evidence to support
them. All such evidence comes from the past and is
itself derived from memory.
117
Testimony (1)

你知道二二八事件發生過。你知道恐龍曾經
在地球上生存過。你知道Napoleon遠征俄國
卻失敗。「你怎麼知道的？」

仰賴別人作證而有的知識成立嗎？

試著懷疑鄭成功曾在台南登陸並打敗荷蘭人。
118
Testimony (2)

有人剛從醉月湖畔走過，宣稱他看到湖裡
有烏龜。你相信嗎？
119
Testimony (3)

有人剛從醉月湖畔走過，宣稱他看到湖裡
有隻烏龜把周杰倫即將發行的最新專輯牛
仔老到跑不動了馱上來。你相信嗎？
120
Testimony (4)


The longer the chain of testimony, the more chances of
mistakes there can be. We tend, as a result, to accept
the claim unless it conflicts with something else we
know.
Most of what Herodotus tells us in his history can be
checked against other sources, but we don’t believe
him when he says that in Egypt cats jump into the fire,
because this claim conflicts with everything we know
about cats.
121
Testimony (5)

想像一下可能的社會，其中人們不採
信他人的證言。在那樣的社會裡，生
活會變成什麼樣子？
122

Demanding firsthand verification of everything
is a rather wasteful procedure. Would you want
to verify for yourself every statement you read?
It would take forever, and you couldn’t do
anything else. The motto “I’ll believe it unless
I have some reason not to” pays off better than
“I won’t believe anything until I can see it for
myself.”
123
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1-134
9
WIKIMEDIA COMMONS，作者：不詳，本作品轉載自：
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WIKIMEDIA COMMONS，作者：Elias Gottlob Haussmann
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WIKIMEDIA COMMONS，作者：Thomas Hudson，本作品轉載自：
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14
The objective of …… the
case.
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15
The JTB Analysis of
Knowledge:
……believing that p.
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16
Condition (i), the truth
condition, has not generated
any …… thing anybody
can know.
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Unlike the truth condition,
condition ……without
belief is indeed possible.
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What one wishes to convey
by saying ……with what he
sees.
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22
Why is condition (iii)
necessary? …… qualify as
knowledge
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23
Let us refer to a belief's
turning out to……epistemic
luck, must be justified.
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24
But what is it for a belief to
be justified?
Among the ……it fits the
subject's evidence.
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25
Evidentialists, then, would
say that the
reason……brought it about.
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In his short 1963 paper, "Is
Justified ……(1) Jones
owns a Ford.
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Suppose further Smith
infers from ……Brown is
in Brest-Litovsk.
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Since (1) entails each of the
propositions ……holds a
justified true belief.
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However, is Smith's belief
an instance ……are not
sufficient for knowledge.
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30
How must the
analysis ……to as the
"Gettier problem".
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31
Epistemologists who think
that the JTB approach……,
"degettierize" justified true
belief.
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Let us focus on this second
strategy……that p is not
inferred from any falsehood.
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Unfortunately, this proposal
is unsuccessful……(5)
There is a dog over there.
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Suppose further that what
he takes to be ……testing
the public's response.
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35
Given these assumptions, (5)
is of
course ……assumption,
James's belief is true.
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So once again, what we
have qualify ……gives us
the wrong result that James
knows (5).
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Another case illustrating
that ……unsuspecting
motorists into believing in
the presence of barns.
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Suppose Henry is driving
along the ……county. This
time, his belief is justified
and true.
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39
But since its truth is
the …… to the Gettier
problem.
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The lesson to be ……be
true because of luck.
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So if a JTB analysis of
knowledge ……the needed
fourth condition.
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42
The analysis of knowledge
may be ……turned into a
substantive proposal.
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43
According to evidentialism,
which ……belief from
being "gettiered").
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44
However,
according ……process that
produced the belief.
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45
Consider how we acquire
knowledge of ……these
processes produce.
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46
Thus beliefs produced by
sense
experience……reliability of
our cognitive processes.
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This approach —
reliabilism,
as ……justification in
terms of reliability.
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期：2013/11/6。依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
Simple J-Reliabilism:
Part A: S ……degettierizes
S's belief).
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49
Second, there is reliabilism
as a ……on to truth) is
reliable belief formation.
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期：2013/11/6。依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
50
Simple K-Reliabilism:
…… degettierizes S's
belief).
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期：2013/11/6。依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
51
According to Fred Dretske,
“Those who ……confer….
Who needs it, and why?
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52
If an animal inherits a
perfectly
reliable ……knowledge
without it?” (Dretske 1989,
p. 95)
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53
According to Dretske,
reliable ……knowledge.”
(Dretske 1985, p. 177)
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54
It does indeed
seem ……account in favor
of K-reliabilism.
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Can Dretske's
version ……relate him to
anything false.
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56
So if perception, on account
of its reliability……escapes
the Gettier problem.
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57
In general terms,
since ……there is a barn
near-by.
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58
Or consider the example of
the ……amended with a
further clause.
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59
We need to be told either
a ……sufficient conditions
of knowledge.
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60
Evidentialists reject both Jreliabilism ……external to
the subject.
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61
J-Internalism:
Justification is
directly ……know that B is
justified.)
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期：2013/11/6。依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
Suppose Norman is a
perfectly …… that his
belief is justified.
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63
Evidentialists also reject Kreliabilism. ……being an
instance of knowledge.
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64
Now, let us refer to
Evidentialist ……condition
of knowledge
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65
K-Internalism:
Internal justification is
a ……without internal
justification.
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Evidentialists say that
internal ……K-Internalism.
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In reply, Dretske would say,
of course, ……belief into
knowledge.
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68
According to Dretske,
animals ……It would seem
not.
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Another reason for
externalism ……the belief's
actual falsity.
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70
Indeed, likelihood of truth
as ……usually taken to fill
the bill.
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71
Internalists would object
that a ……when they are
mostly false.
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72
In response,
externalists …… marred by
falsehood?
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73
Internalists would reply
that ……necessary for
knowledge.
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WIKIMEDIA COMMONS，作者：Jules Joseph Lefebvre，本作品轉載自：
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Truth.jpg，瀏覽日期：2013/11/8。
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彼亦一是非 此亦一是非
80
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齊物論，作者：莊子。
本產品已超過著作財產權存續期間，屬公共領域之著作。
但願人長久，千里共嬋娟
《水調歌頭》，作者：蘇軾。
本產品已超過著作財產權存續期間，屬公共領域之著作。
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97
103
Suppose we suspect that Mr.
Jones ……evidential
support for it.
If a king who wanted to
put ……the belief being
true?
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis，作者：Hospers, John，Routledge出版社於1996/05/01出版，頁45。
依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis，作者：Hospers, John，Routledge出版社於1996/05/01出版，頁46。
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104
There is no doubt that
correspondence ……is not
what he demands of the
witness.
109
A report of what we feel or
think: ……know that I feel
a bit drowsy.
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis，作者：Hospers, John，Routledge出版社於1996/05/01出版，頁60。
113
A woman claims sincerely
that ……(happy) to contrast
it with.”
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis，作者：Hospers, John，Routledge出版社於1996/05/01出版，頁61。
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis，作者：Hospers, John，Routledge出版社於1996/05/01出版，頁47。
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117
Thus we have no
good ……itself derived
from memory.
121
The longer the chain of
testimony……we know
about cats.
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis，作者：Hospers, John，Routledge出版社於1996/05/01出版，頁64。
123
Demanding
firsthand ……can see it for
myself.”
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis，作者：Hospers, John，Routledge出版社於1996/05/01出版，頁65。
Introduction to Philosophical Analysis，作者：Hospers, John，Routledge出版社於1996/05/01出版，頁63。
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依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。
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