Transcript Slide 1

MANAGING
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
FOR NUCLEAR POWER
Vienna 9 - 12 February 2010
Capacity Building for Safeguards :
Some Perspectives
Jean Maurice Crete
Division of Concepts and Planning,
Safeguards Training Section
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International Atomic Energy Agency
Outline
• Safeguards:
• An international challenge
• A national challenge
• Preparing for a nuclear industry
• Capacity building
• Support activities
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Safeguards Obligations : why?
NPT preamble (extract)
• “Considering the devastation that would be
visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war
and the consequent need to make every
effort to avert the danger of such a war and
to take measures to safeguard the security
of peoples”
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Safeguards Obligations : why?
In other words:
A legal framework
An historical background A technical challenge
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IAEA Board of Governors March 1995
“...the safeguards system for implementing
comprehensive safeguards agreements
should be designed to provide for
verification by the Agency of the
correctness and completeness of States’
declarations, so that there is credible
assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear
material from declared activities and of the
absence of undeclared nuclear activities.”
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Objectives of National Verification
SSAC obligation:
• account for and control of nuclear material
• collect and maintain information
on nuclear and related activities
• provide information to IAEA
(reports, declarations)
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International Safeguards Implementation
REFERENCE:
State
Reports
HQ
Activities
In field
Activities
Other sources
Inspection
Reports,
Samples,etc
Evaluation
Conclusions
Effectiveness
Evaluation
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Safeguards
Implementation
Report
At a Domestic Level
A possible objective for national purpose:
Making sure that no one in a place under
state’s control is circumventing the national
safeguards requirements “with the full
knowledge of the facts” or “without the full
knowledge of the facts”
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Bridging International and National Safeguards
Compliance with NPT through Safeguards Agreements
imposes a very accurate knowledge of the entire industrial,
research and commercial status and its evolution within the
state, not to mention an adequate knowledge of the
conditions offered to the IAEA inspectors to perform their
duty.
This can only be achieved with a well informed and
powerful state body.
In other words, such a body is the first element of a
continuous chain for successfully fulfilling national and
international commitment towards non proliferation.
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Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry –
Legislation
• Is the national safeguards legislation and regulation
suitable for implementing and regulating safeguards
for a nuclear power industry?
• some safeguards legislations may be tailored to low level of
nuclear activities or e.g. to research reactors, and will need
amending
• Legal framework between operator and regulator is a key issue
• Does the national safeguards legislation cover all
nuclear materials and activities in the state?
• Legislative independence: accepted international
standard for national safeguards authorities is to be
independent of operations of facilities
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Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry – IAEA &
Safeguards
• Early and continued interactions with the IAEA
very important
• Consult at an early stage with the IAEA for
advice on safeguards:
• incorporating safeguards in the design of the facility
is extremely cost effective and resources saving
(including safeguards requirements in the licensing
process may be considered)
• some reactor types may require more intensive
safeguards verification activities than others
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Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry – Training
• Preparing and training national safeguards regulators
and inspectors
• training takes many years
• more national inspectors will probably be required throughout
the project
• Preparing and training reactor operators and managers
in safeguards requirements
• Experience with SSS (safeguards, security, safety) with
running a research reactor provides a good base for
running a nuclear power reactor
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Capacity Building : Synergies
Domestic “safeguards” verification
activities may build on or contribute to
other domestic control regimes:
• control of radioactive materials
• radiation safety
• physical protection
• export/import control system
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Capacity Building : Safeguards and National
Infrastructure
Three-floor building:
Policy makers :
Reference and Objective, Law, Resources, Vision
Managerial level :
Organization, Allotment of resources,
Regulations, Control
Technical/Working level :
Collecting/Processing/Reporting information
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SSAC’s Skills, Knowledge and Abilities
ACCESS
ACTIVITIES
LEGAL
REPORTING
SSAC
NMAC
EXPORT
NM MEASUREMENT
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1st Pu
core
Three Sets of Skills, Knowledge, Abilities
DECISION
ACTION
Expertise
Decision making
and action line
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Control loop
Support provided by the IAEA
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Advisory service
Legal assistance (Office of Legal Affairs)
Technical support
Guidance Publications (examples)
• Nuclear Material Handbook
• “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features That
Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards”,
STR 360, dated February 2009
• Other technical reports
• Training
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Member States Training : Highlights
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In 2009: 245 PARTICIPANTS FROM 77 COUNTRIES TRAINED
Basic training:
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International SSAC course in US
International SSAC course for countries with Small Quantity Protocols (SQP) in the USA
Regional SSAC courses in Brazil, China, Japan, Uzbekistan
National Training Course in Turkmenistan
Regional Technical Meeting on AP and SQP Implementation in Asia and the Pacific Region (held In the Republic of
Korea in cooperation with KINAC)
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As more oriented training:
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“SSAC Advisory Service” Missions
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Romania, Niger, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Azerbaijan,
As follow-ups of ISSAS Missions:
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National Training Course on DIQ in US for Indonesia
regional SSAC course in Namibia in 2008 (2010: Burkina Faso) with emphasis on uranium mining
two national training courses in 2008, in Armenia and Switzerland
In close cooperation with other departments or offices of the Agency:
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a SQP Seminar at Headquarters in 2008
Regional Training Course on Nuclear Security, Safety and Nuclear Material Accountancy organized in Ghana
Expert Meeting on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Non-proliferation in Thailand
INIR missions in Jordan and Vietnam, as well as a similar mission in Chile
With Australia and USA : assistance on AP implementation in Malaysia, assistance on national inspectorate
training for Vietnam and Thailand
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As a Summary
• Safeguards have to be considered
• For international purpose
• As well as for national purpose
• The sooner the better
• Safety and Security of course, but also Safeguards.
Take advantage of synergies (e.g. NMAC requirements,
safety design of fuel handling system)
• Currently safeguards are often introduced after a
facility’s design has been frozen which results in costly
redesign and project delays
• Without starting from scratch:
• Radioactive sources management is a sound basis
• Collecting existing information (e.g. customs or
operators data) rather than duplicating or overlapping
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THANK YOU!
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