Center for International Trade and Security

Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia

Dr. Igor Khripunov University of Georgia, USA At Conference on Managing Nuclear Material Stockpiles in the 21 st Century, Oslo, Norway, 3-4 March, 2005 The University of Georgia

Definition: Culture

 “A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” Edgar Schein

Properties of Culture

   Cultures are a product of social learning. Therefore, they cannot be shifted without determined effort from national and facility leaders. Orientation sessions that provide an outlet for explanation and discussion can help leaders modify the organizational culture, provided they back up these sessions with daily reinforcement and leadership-by-example.

Cultures are difficult to enforce, but they can be developed, primarily through positive reinforcement and role models.

There is always a security (or safety, or quality, etc.) culture in an organization. The questions are whether the culture is what management needs it to be, and whether it is improving, decaying, or remaining static.

Properties of Culture (2)

   It is often easier to change patterns of thinking in an organization than to change patterns of behavior. New managers can come in brimming with bold new ideas, for example, yet fail to get people to change their old behaviors.

Leaders change the organizational culture by intervening at all levels. With sustained effort, and by deploying the incentives and disincentives at their disposal, they can mold new patterns of thinking, establish new patterns of behavior, and even change the physical environment.

Cultures reduce anxiety for their members by establishing shared patterns of thinking, speaking, and acting. Consequently, cultural change will always increase anxiety within the organization until the new patterns are learned. Leaders must make the anxiety of learning a new culture less than the anxiety of staying in the old culture.

Definition

: Nuclear Security

“The prevention and detection of, and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.” Source: IAEA Advisory Group on Nuclear Security

Definition

: Nuclear Security Culture

  The linked set of characteristics of an organization or institution that together ensure its attention to nuclear security:  shared beliefs and assumptions  principles which guide decisions and actions  management systems and controls  patterns of behavior of leaders and staff  physical state of the security system A healthy nuclear security culture ensures that the organization is aware of threats of malicious acts and is prepared to prevent, detect, and respond to them.

IAEA

: Nuclear Security Culture

 One of the 12 principles underlying fissile material security (Principle F):  “All organizations involved in implementing physical protection should give due priority to the security culture, to its development and maintenance necessary to ensure its effective implementation in the entire organization.” (GOV-2001-41)  IAEA-approved concept and recommendations are expected in 2005.

Global Concept

   Uniformly understood and clearly defined standards of nuclear security culture are needed.

 international exchanges  evaluation  comparison Achieving those standards will vary according to national history, traditions, and professional culture.

Group of countries where raising standards of security culture may be complicated but urgently needed:  transitional societies  countries whose nuclear programs lack transparency   countries instituting nuclear programs from scratch countries where nuclear industry is undergoing ownership reform

Properties of Security Culture

    All personnel, from senior managers and supervisors down to the most junior operators, are aware of and committed to widely understood security requirements and best practices.

Available and affordable security technology is put to use, kept in good working condition, and improved.

Security regulations and procedures are implemented and personnel are motivated to accomplish their security-related tasks.

Personnel respond to any emergency security threats out of carefully nurtured, proactive habit rather than improvised effort.

Applicability of Security Culture



power and research reactors



fuel-cycle facilities



research and academic institutions



users of radioactive sources



transporters of nuclear and radioactive materials

Safety Versus Security

There are several reasons to develop a concept of nuclear security culture as distinct from safety culture.

   The concept of safety culture has been widely applied within the nuclear power industry, but it is not generally familiar to the wider range of organizations involved with nuclear materials and radioactive sources.

Some aspects of security (e.g., controls over access to classified information, or the fact that the threat is purposeful rather than accidental or caused by equipment failure) differ from the safety field.

While objectives or desired outcomes of a nuclear security regime overlap to a substantial degree with those of a nuclear safety regime, they are not identical: It is possible to be safe without being secure.

Model of Nuclear Security Culture

External Factors: International commitment and assistance National policies and leadership attitude Corporate and industry guidelines Design Basis Threat Security equipment Rules and regulations Deterrence through enforcement General public awareness

Goal

: Effective Protection of Nuclear Materials

Tangibles: Security Culture Mechanism

Management Policies Personnel Training

Intangibles: Underlying Assumptions

Theft Sabotage Unauthorized access Illegal transfer Malicious acts

Intangibles: Principles and Values

Honesty, integrity, and responsibility Commitment to equipment maintenance Commitment to procedures Learning and improvement Effective leadership

Model of Security Culture Mechanism: Management, Policies, Personnel, and Training

Leadership

Standards and expectations Use of authority Decisionmaking Good supervision Involvement of staff Open communication Improving performance

Proactive Policies and Procedures

Visible security policy Employee code of conduct Clear roles and responsibilities Performance management Good work environment Reasonable carrot-and-stick approach Work management Information control Material accounting system Cyber-protection Employee screening Quality control Change management Operating experience feedback Contingency plans and drills

Learning and Professional Improvement

Initial training Periodic training Ongoing training Ongoing assessment Quality assurance on training and trainers

Personnel Performance

Professional conduct Personal accountability/ responsibility Following procedures Teamwork and collaboration Questions, whistle-blowing, and reporting

Russia as a Case Study

  Economic and Social Challenges  insufficient funding  aging infrastructure  antisocial behaviors  poor motivation Industry-wide Problems  terrorist threats  risk perceptions  interagency coordination  use of guards

Russia as a Case Study (2)

  Professional and Work Culture  aging of workforce     quality of leadership lack of transparency inadequate job description whistle-blowing Legal and Enforcement Issues  incomplete legal basis     Russian legal culture investigation procedures vague reporting practices poor prosecution

Conclusions

 Security culture is no panacea, but it should be recognized in the prevailing circumstances as an essential ingredient for effectively reducing nuclear security threats in Russia.

 Russia requires not only technical innovation, but also the cultivation of knowledgeable, skilled, and motivated personnel who are trained to use modern equipment and adhere to best practices.

Conclusions (2)

   Unless the Russian government commits itself to augmenting nuclear security culture as part of an improved overall professional culture, the efforts undertaken by the West will yield limited results.

A joint strategy must take into account differences in work culture, traditions, and the unique role played by the human factor in protecting nuclear materials in Russia.

Nuclear security culture is an important prerequisite for “sustainability” in the U.S. MPC&A assistance effort.

Conclusions (3)

 The G-8 should discuss security culture and its global promotion at its annual summit meetings. The U.K. and Russia, which are scheduled to host the next two meetings in 2005 and 2006, should include this as an agenda item.

 International MPC&A assistance to Russia under the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is another vehicle to raise standards of security culture. Western donors should rally behind the U.S. DOE’s focus on security culture and work to optimize Russia’s human factor.

Conclusions (4)

 The IAEA should throw its own weight behind these efforts by accelerating the development of an internationally acceptable concept of and guidelines for nuclear security culture, and by launching appropriate training and information-sharing programs in selected countries. The United States can significantly contribute to this process by providing additional support and/or by establishing a nuclear security culture fund under the Nunn Lugar program.