Transcript Introduction - Pete Mandik

EPM: Chs XIII & XIV
Pete Mandik
Chairman, Department of Philosophy
Coordinator, Cognitive Science Laboratory
William Paterson University, New Jersey USA
Brief overview of the
Philosophy of Mind
Dualism (Two things: minds & bodies)
Monism (One thing)
Idealism (Only minds)
Materialism (Only bodies)
Behaviorism (Mental states =
behaviors)
Psychoneural Identity Theory
(Mental states = brain states)
Functionalism (Mental states = states
that perform certain functions, not
necessarily brain states)
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Dualism
Minds and Bodies are distinct
objects: Minds are necessarily
known and not spatial. Bodies
are spatial and not necessarily
known.
Problems:
1.
Utterly mysterious how minds
and bodies could interact
2.
Leads to skepticism about the
external world
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Idealism
Nothing unknowable exists: only
minds and mental states. The
idea of material bodies is
incoherent
Problems:
1.
It’s whacky
2.
Also: Material concepts are prior
to mental concepts (e.g. the
concept of being a green
physical object is prior to the
concept of seeming like a green
physical object)
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Materialism 1: Behaviorism
Mental state terms really just refer to bodily
behaviors and dispositions toward bodily
behaviors
Problems:
1.
There are an infinite # of behaviors that
could arguably be associated with any
particular mental state
2.
Appeals to thoughts are supposed to
constitute explanations of intelligent
behaviors and cannot due so if they are
merely code for intelligent behaviors
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Materialism 2: Psychoneural
identity theory
Psychological state types are identical to
neurophysiological state types
Problems:
1.
This might turn out to be a true scientific
hypothesis, but it cannot be part of the
meaning of psychological state words
2.
Psychological state types are arguably
multiply realizable: brainless robots and
extraterrestrials may have thoughts and
experiences
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Materialism 3:
Functionalism
Psychological state terms are
theoretical terms that may
or may not be satisfied by
neurophysiological state
types.
Psychological state terms are
are satisfied by whatever
plays the causal roles that
relate an inner state to
inputs, outputs, and other
inner states.
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Problems with
functionalism?
1.
2.
If you really like the given, you won’t like
the idea that mental states terms are
theoretical. Get ready to spend the rest of
your life as a dualist (ghosts! Boo!) or an
idealist (only your mind exists! Hope your
straightjacket is comfy).
If you don’t like analytic truths, the
arguments for functionalism are going to
be a lot less convincing and the successes
so far of cognitive neuroscience much
more impressive. Psychoneural identity
theory is awesome. Only robots with
brains will be robots with minds. (I’m not
biased. Really!)
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Ch XIII:THEORIES AND
MODELS
“Informally, to construct a theory is, in its most developed or
sophisticated form, to postulate a domain of entities which behave
in certain ways set down by the fundamental principles of the
theory, and to correlate -- perhaps, in a certain sense to identify -complexes of these theoretical entities with certain non-theoretical
objects or situations; that is to say, with objects or situations which
are either matters of observable fact or, in principle at least,
describable in observational terms. This "correlation" or
"identification" of theoretical with observational states of affairs is
a tentative one "until further notice," and amounts, so to speak, to
erecting temporary bridges which permit the passage from
sentences in observational discourse to sentences in the theory,
and vice versa. Thus, for example, in the kinetic theory of gases,
empirical statements of the form "Gas g at such and such a place
and time has such and such a volume, pressure, and
temperature" are correlated with theoretical statements specifying
certain statistical measures of populations of molecules. …a good
theory (at least of the type we are considering) "explains"
established empirical laws by deriving theoretical counterparts of
these laws from a small set of postulates relating to unobserved
entities.” pp 94-95
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Two points:
Point 1: “the fundamental assumptions of a theory
are usually developed …by attempting to find a
model, i.e. to describe a domain of familiar
objects behaving in familiar ways such that we
can see how the phenomena to be explained
would arise if they consisted of this sort of thing.
The essential thing about a model is that it is
accompanied, so to speak, by a commentary
which qualifies or limits -- but not precisely nor in
all respects -- the analogy between the familiar
objects and the entities which are being
introduced by the theory.” pp. 96-97
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Point 2:
“…science is continuous with common sense, and
the ways in which the scientist seeks to explain
empirical phenomena are refinements of the
ways in which plain men, however crudely and
schematically, have attempted to understand their
environment and their fellow men since the dawn
of intelligence. It is this point which I wish to
stress at the present time, for I am going to argue
that the distinction between theoretical and
observational discourse is involved in the logic of
concepts pertaining to inner episodes.” pp. 96-97
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Ch XIV: METHODOLOGICAL
VERSUS PHILOSOPHICAL
BEHAVIORISM
Methodoligical behaviorism: scientific
view that all psychological theoretical
terms should be introduced in terms
of overt behavior
Philosophical behaviorism (aka analytic
behaviorism): philosophical view that
psychological terms are not
theoretical terms but pre-theoretical
terms whose real meanings can be
given in terms of behaviors
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“The [methodological] behavioristic
requirement that all concepts should be
introduced in terms of a basic vocabulary
pertaining to overt behavior is compatible
with the idea that some behavioristic
concepts are to be introduced as
theoretical concepts.” p. 100
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“It is essential to note that the theoretical terms of a
behavioristic psychology are not only not defined
in terms of overt behavior, they are also not
defined in terms of nerves, synapses, neural
impulses, etc., etc. A behavioristic theory of
behavior is not, as such, a physiological
explanation of behavior. The ability of a
framework of theoretical concepts and
propositions successfully to explain behavioral
phenomena is logically independent of the
identification of these theoretical concepts with
concepts of neurophysiology.” pp 100-101
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“while it is, I suppose, noncontroversial that
when the total scientific picture of man
and his behavior is in, it will involve some
identification of concepts in behavior
theory with concepts pertaining to the
functioning of anatomical structures, it
should not be assumed that behavior
theory is committed ab initio to a
physiological identification of all its
concepts, -- that its concepts are, so to
speak, physiological from the start.” p.101
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THE END
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