Fundamentalist Islamic Terrorists and The US in the 21st

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Transcript Fundamentalist Islamic Terrorists and The US in the 21st

Radical Islamic Terrorists
st
and The US in the 21
Century
PO 483: The Politics of Terrorism
History of Radical Islamic
Terrorist Attacks on the USA
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Real Beginning: Takeover of US Embassy in
Tehran, 1979 – signal of animosity
Arab Muslim community
Bombing of US Marine Barracks in Beirut, October
1983
Bombing of Berlin Nightclub, April 1986
Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, December 1988
Truck Bombing of WTC, February 1993
Attack on Khobar Towers, June 1996
Car Bombing of US Embassies in Africa, August
1998
Bombing of USS Cole, October 2000
Patterns Before 9/11/01
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Pan-Arab movement (not confined to one state)
State Sponsorship common at outset, but declines
All attacks perpetrated on US soldiers/citizens
abroad
Casualties often high, but subject to “ceiling”
(about 300)
American ambivalence in response
– Retribution against governments when state sponsorship
suspected
– Prosecution
– Haphazard responses (Embassy bombings), no responses (USS
Cole) common
– Nuisance, not direct threat
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Sense of security (Gulf War)
Al-Queda
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Association with Salafis
– Abandonment of true path by Muslim governments
– Reincarnation of Muhammad’s war to rid Islam of
idolaters
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US as universal enemy
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Prop for illegitimate rulers
Poisoning of traditional society (cultural imperialism)
Presence in Saudi Arabia during Gulf War
Unification of various Salafiyya movements
Organization: Complex (both cell structure and
evidence of strict hierarchy
 Bin Laden – Unifier
– Financial Means
 Fatwas
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Al-Queda (continued)
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OVERALL GOAL: Elicit reversion to traditional
society by targeting sponsor of and influence over
governments embodying flawed Islam (US). They
do not aim for military defeat of the US, but for
one of two outcomes:
Impose enough costs to get US to reconsider
Middle East policy (withdraw), thereby destroying
support for Islamic governments
Force US to engage in war that alienates the
majority of the umma, who will then engage in
terrorist activity to impose enough costs on the
US to get them to stop the war OR rise up and
overthrow existing governments
9/11/01
Obviously, most spectacular attacks
 Highly coordinated (planning, acquiring necessary
skills, dry runs, coordination on day of attack)
 Not all terrorists involved knew it was to be a
suicide mission
 4 planes hijacked with box cutters and knives –
crashed into WTC and Pentagon
 Symbolism evident, but inflicting destruction and
loss of life was the primary motivation
 Establishment of symbiotic relationship with
other groups claiming Islam as secondary
motivation
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The US Response
Fixing the Immediate Problem: Airline Security
 Increase in number of people flying led to confusion, lax security,
flyer-friendly accommodation; allowed terrorists to make dry runs,
get aboard
 No major attack on US planes in 13 years
 Security on Ground:
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Military in airports (deterrent, rapid response)
Security checks/rules changes
More stringent ID, screening, weapons searches for employees
Passenger screening (security risks)
Security in Air:
– Flight Marshals
– Arming Pilots
– Reinforcement of cockpit doors, changes in rules allowing opening of
doors and acquiescence to hijackers
– Transponder/communications automation
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“Panic Button”
Fundamental Shift in Doctrine:
Homeland Security
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Extensive existing counterterrorist system;
though full prevention impossible, could be
improved (augment, not abandon – danger of
instituting ad hoc measures)
9/11 considered intelligence failure; vague
warnings, obscured by other information, fear of
false alarm
Decline of element of surprise, but terrorists are
strategic actors and can act to circumvent
measures
Takes extremely large investments to marginally
decrease probability of large attacks
Homeland Security
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Suggested Measures:
Lower criteria for entry into CT forces
More people who speak vernacular dialects of Arabic
Individuals to map out novel attack schemes (think
outside box)
Better analysis but, more importantly, more efficient
distribution and action upon that analysis
Facilitation of extensive clandestine surveillance
(legal)
Increase security of borders, major
industrial/infrastructure sites, track cargo
Issuance of ID cards, stricter INS implementation
(legal)
Sense of Urgency
No “Silver Bullet”
Legislative Measures
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USA PATRIOT
– Give intelligence/combat functions capacity to succeed
– Implementation of constraints (Betts: not on dissent, but on
privacy)
– Immigration
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Department of Homeland Security
– Elimination of red tape
– Reorganization of all facets under one directorate (overdue
after expansion of community)
– Brings FBI, CIA, State, etc. assets together
– Addresses bureaucratic infighting (primacy of DoD)
– Problems
 Quick fix?
 Prior Experience
 Benefits of Separation
The International Dimension
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Counterterrorist infiltration abroad
Carrot and Stick to gain support
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Sanctions/Withhold Aid
Withhold Political Support
Threat of invasion
Issue linkage: Revising Stances
Use of force abroad: Two main strategies
– Punish/Remove governments harboring terrorists
 More traditional IR response
 Vast extension of traditional retaliatory policy (implication)
 Afghanistan: Signal to others
– Preemptive removal of threats
 WMD – Iraq
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Questions: New Doctrine? Al-Queda’s goal?