Transcript 9/11 and US Foreign Policy - University of California, San

9/11 and US Foreign Policy
READINGS:
COX AND STOKES CH 18 AND 20
LAKE, PAPE, BUSH, OBAMA
(OPTIONAL BACKGROUND: SKIM CARTER
CH1)
Guiding Questions
 What is terrorism?
 What should states consider when responding to
terrorist attacks?
 How has the US responded to the 9/11 attacks?
 How has 9/11 shaped US foreign policy?
US and Terrorism
 Rogers 2008
 The US had a different experience with terrorism than
other Western countries

Europe: Brigate Rossi (Italy), Action Direct (France), Baader
Meinhof (Germany), Provisional IRA/Radical Loyalists (UK), ETA
(Spain), etc.

Smaller scale equivalents within the US and on US embassies
 First WTC attack 1993
 Oklahoma City bombing 1995
 Paramilitary attacks on US embassies in the Middle East and North
Africa
 Prior to 9/11, Bush II foreign policy predicated on
reducing entanglement in international institutions to
promote a “New American Century”
Terrorism: al-Qaeda and 9/11
 Rogers 2008
 September 11, 2001

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Attackers were mostly from Saudi Arabia.
Funding and training came from a variety of places, including
Afghanistan.
 Why?

According to Osama bin Laden:

Convince the United States to withdraw its military from the Middle
East, particularly Saudi Arabia.
 Middle East and surrounding regions considered sources
of terrorist organization recruits.

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Recent focus on Afghanistan/Pakistan
Inter-linkage of regional problems seen as exacerbating the problem
Defining Terrorism
 Rogers 2008
 Common definition:
 “the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade,
and gain public attention”
 Another definition:
 “Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by
an individual or group…when such action is designed to create
extreme anxiety and/or fear inducing effects in a target
group…with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding
to the demands of the perpetrators” (Wardlaw 1982)
Is Terrorism Irrational?
 Lake 2002
 Defining terrorism:
“irregular use of violence by non-state groups against non-military
targets and personnel for political ends”
 Defining extremism:
 1) extremists hold preferences which are not widely shared
 2) extremists currently lack the means to achieve their goals.
 Irrational? Not necessarily…
 Pape 2003: Suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic
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
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If suicide attackers are irrational the groups that lead them are not.
Lake 2002: Extremist terrorism can be rational and strategic
What Do Terrorists Want?
 Lake 2002
 Terrorists seek to “shift the bargaining range” today to
produce a better bargain in the future.
 Shifting the bargaining range requires:
 1) Political jujitsu; using the strength of the target state against
itself.
 2) Provoking a disproportionate response from the target to
change the preferences of moderates in terrorist’s society.
 Pape 2003
 Suicide terrorism is strategic and not random
 Attacks occur in clusters.; intention is to show a credible threat
of more pain to come
 Designed to pressure democracies to make concessions
(particularly territory).
 Democracies are more vulnerable to these type of attacks.
How Should States Respond?
 Lake 2002
 Possible target responses :
1) Do nothing; increase internal security.
 2) Capture or eliminate terrorists; define these groups as
criminals.
 3) Capture or eliminate terrorists; war on terror.
Stronger the response  increased likelihood of failure in the
long-term.
Restrained responses are key; absolute security is not attainable.
 Using international institutions can moderate responses.
Pape 2003
Suicide terrorism “works” but there is a limit to what it can
achieve
 States will not sacrifice central goals.
Concessions are too risky; Border and internal security is key
 Military action does not work against this threat.

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Evaluating the “War on Terror” Bush II
 Carter 2011
 11 September 2001: 9/11 attacks occur.
 12 September 2001: Bush asks Congress to grant him
sweeping powers to fight terror
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Congress believed request was too broad.
But Bush’s popularity was over 90%
American public wanted a forceful response.
 14 September 2001: US Senate passes authorization
to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against
those who perpetrated the attacks.

House passes this authorization on a vote of 420-1
Why Afghanistan?
 Rogers 2008, Carter 2011
 15-16 September: Administration meets to decide who to target.
 Divisions within cabinet over whether or not to target Iraq first.
 Eventually, decision made to target Al Qaeda.

Bin Laden was given sanctuary in Afghanistan.
 17 September 2001: Mullah Omar given an ultimatum: give up Bin
Laden or face attack.

Western Europe initially supports this decision
 23 September 2001: CIA realizes Afghanistan will not comply.
 US begins preparing for incursion; Oman, U.A.E., Pakistan, Uzbekistan agree to
assist US troop staging.
 7 October 2001: Operation Enduring Freedom begins.
 7 December 2001: Taliban falls; loses Kandahar.
 Most Al Qaeda operatives “melt away” into other parts of Afghanistan or into
Pakistan

Others detained; some at Guantanamo
Expanding the “War on Terror”: Bush II
 Rogers 2008
 Initial success lead to expansion of the ‘war on terror’
 State of the Union and West Point speeches expanded beyond retaliation
against Al Qaeda
 1) ‘War on terror’ not limited to Al Qaeda, but to other radical
Islamic organizations

Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad


Destroy training camps ‘wherever they might be’
Legitimate states have a responsibility to act against these organizations

Or the US will do it for them (either ‘with us’ or ‘against us’)
 2) Global ‘war on terror’ extends beyond terrorist groups to
rogue states which support or allow these groups

Rogue states also seeking WMD and must be stopped

“Axis of Evil” Iraq, Iran, North Korea
 Extension welcomes domestically; not internationally
Iraq War Timeline
 2002: Powell posits “Pottery Barn” rule “you break it you bought it”
 If US goes into Iraq, it must take responsibility for it.
 17 March 2003: Bush issues ultimatum
 Hussein and his sons must leave in 48 hours.
 8-9 April 2003: Baghdad falls.
 1 May 2003: “Mission Accomplished” speech.
 No WMD’S found; security difficult to maintain throughout the country.
 2003: Saddam Hussein and his sons captured/killed
 2004-2006: Situation deteriorates; security difficult to maintain.
 Abu Ghraib complicates the mission.
 December 2006: Debate over how to proceed results in the Iraq Study Group’s
report.
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Increase role in training Iraqi troops and push for political reforms.
Negotiate with Iraq’s neighbors (Iran and Syria).
No precipitous exit but begin winding mission down.
 Military: Agreed; No quick increase in troops or pullout.
 10 January 2007: Bush announces a “surge” of more than 20,000 troops to be sent
into Iraq.
Perspectives on Iraq and “The Surge”
Short term: surge reversed an increasingly difficult and
dangerous situation within Iraq.
 Long term: Jury is out…
 Simon 2008
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Surge bought short term stability at the cost of declining long-term
viability of the Iraqi state.
 Kahl 2008
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Surge should have been conditional on continued political
reconciliation
 Fearon 2007
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US cannot prevent the inevitable civil war; surge postponed
inevitable conflict.
Bush Doctrine
 1) Freedom won the Cold War; US has a responsibility to extend
democracy.
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But in some case anti-democratic forces came to power.
 2) Nature of threat has changed; concept of preventive war rather
than pre-emption.
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May set a precedent that is worrisome.
 3) Regime change is a viable option to promote peace; states that
harbor terrorists (rogue states) can be targeted.
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Violates international norms of sovereignty.
 4) Intervention may be necessary; Coalitions of the willing more
flexible than international institutions.
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Appears to undercut international institutions; can spark balancing
 Israeli-Palestine conflict is key; Spoke explicitly of a two state
solution.
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Strong involvement at end of Presidency.
A “Surge” For Afghanistan?
 Conflict dislodged Al Qaeda and the Taliban but has not eliminated either
 Military leaders contend they need a lot more troops to stabilize the
country.
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Counterinsurgency requires that more troops fight in a different way (i.e. more interaction
with the Afghan people and less reliance on weaponry).
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Allies have been reluctant to send more troops.
Public support for the war is declining.
 2009: Obama announces a surge in Afghanistan
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Iraq war a distraction against the war that “matters” for US security
2011: Obama follows Bush agreement to remove all combat troops from Iraq
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Announces that he will send 30,000 extra troops to stabilize Afghanistan
 Will begin to handover security detail to Afghan forces in 2013
• US/NATO forces aim to be out by 2014
 Many still wonder what the objective is in Afghanistan
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Bush wanted to push for democracy; Obama jettisoned this idea.
Déjà vu? Soviets could not hold the territory.
Taliban strength in Pakistan raises questions about whether or not Afghanistan should
continue to be the target.
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Mutual suspicions plague US/Pakistani relations
2011: Osama Bin Laden killed in Pakistan
Identifying an Obama Doctrine?
 Global fight to eradicate Al Qaeda terrorist network
Must avoid military overreach: draw down Iraq, extend Afghanistan
 1) Maintain military edge to preserve international role
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Rejects isolationism
 2) Democracy best method to ensure human security
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Provide support/resources/infrastructure to developing systems
Does not support direct regime change to create democratic regimes
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Libya
US should “model” appropriate behavior (soft power)
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Prevent another Abu Ghraib/avoid use of torture
 3) Seeks a rule based international system
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International institutions require all stakeholders (including rising powers)
to assist in creating global stability
 Non proliferation is key
Rogue states should be isolated internationally
 Force can be used unilaterally as a last resort
Conclusions: Comparing Bush and Obama
Role of power:
 Both “doctrines” emphasize the need to maintain American edge in military power
 Both willing to use force if necessary
 Role of institutions:
 Bush’s concept of preventive war and reliance on “coalitions of the willing” not
consistent with the cultivation of a “rules based system”
 Obama’s emphasis on international institutions and burden sharing consistent with a
liberal institutional approach
 Multilateralism reduces the possibility of overreach and makes the US appear less
threatening
 BUT, use of drones arguably threatens to undermine US appearance as
threatening
 Role of ideas:
 Both emphasize the need for democracy to ensure development
 Differ on the extent to which US forces should be used to promote American ideals
 Inter-linkage of Middle Eastern challenges critical
 Peace process/nuclear non proliferation key for both
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Next Unit
 If You’re Interested…
Sanger. The Inheritance
 Rashid. Descent into Chaos
 Theme: US Foreign Policy and the Middle East
 Readings: Cox and Stokes CH 11
 US-Israeli Foreign Policy
 Beasley CH 9
 Walt and Mearsheimer
 Dershowitz
 US-Iranian Foreign Policy
 Beasley CH 10
 Carter CH 4
 Edelman et al.
 Lindsay and Takeyh
