Transcript Politics, States and Social Contracts

Politics, States and
Social Contracts
Paul Nugent, Director of Centre of
African Studies, University of
Edinburgh
The Ubiquity of ‘Good Governance’
‘Good Governance’ and Social
Contracts
• Governance = not simply about the choice and
implementation of policies, but about political
environment. ‘Good policies’ that clash with
political norms are unlikely to get very far
• Social contracts are about the sets of
understandings that underpin the relations
between rulers and ruled… for good or ill
A Few Basic Points
• 1. A social contract does not imply an
inherently harmonious relationship, merely
that those who exercise power and those who
on the receiving end share a common
understanding of what that relationship
entails.
• 2. Social contracts are not necessarily written
down, or are not necessarily found in the
places where you might expect to find them
• >> In many countries, the way that politics is
actually contracted may has little to do with
the formal constitution and much more to do
with deeply-rooted understandings of ‘rules of
the game’
• . 3. Contacts often have an uneven application
across national space>> regions and districts
may relate differently to the centre, and may
be almost forgotten
• .
• 4. social contracts can only exist where there is
communication flow between rules and
ruled>> hence role of media is as crucial for
authoritarian regimes as democratic ones (e.g.
Mobutu)
Four Types of Social Contract
• 1. Coercive: regime claims the right to rule either
through the application (or threat) of coercion, or
the promise of protection [‘Le Guide’, President as
head of family writ large]. These might sound like
opposites, but are actually flip sides of the same coin
because the offer of protection contains an implicit
threat
• >> Note: This has risky foundations. Insurgencies can
weaken the moral authority of the centre and
warlords may stake own competing claims to offer
their own ‘protection’
The Coercive Contract According to
Siyad Barre
• “I, Mohammed Siyad Barre, am singularly
responsible for the transformation of Somalia
and Mogadisho from a bush country and
scruffy hamlet into a modern state and
commodious city, respectfully. Consequently, I
will not allow anyone to destroy me or run me
out of here; and if they try, I will take the
whole country with me.”
• 2. Productive: contract is based on some
conception of active performance. Consent is
traded against the effective delivery of public
goods
• (i) State delivery: roads, schools, hospitals
• (ii) state facilitation: e.g. legal frameworks that
make economic activity possible; currency
• In European & US history, contracts arose out
of a ‘creative friction’ encapsulated in slogan
‘no taxation without representation’
Representation without taxation?
• In African colonial systems, direct taxes typically
borne by subjects, not citizens (e.g. Senegal,
Kenya)>> but taxes on trade were the largest
contributor to revenues (typically import duties)
• At independence, most nationalist parties
embraced versions of social contract forged in late
colonialism >> DEVELOPMENT
• Quest for revenue led to focus of taxes switching to
agricultural exports
•
• Direct taxes effectively died out (seen as
illegitimate), income taxes hardly got off the
ground>> in some countries, aid flows became
more important than domestic revenue
collection (e.g. Tanzania)
• All of this made allocation of resources less
transparent
• … with implications for social contracts
• By the mid 1980s, many countries had arrived at the
worst of worlds: minimal delivery of public goods
coupled with very little transparency. At this time,
there was little chance of redress either because the
one-party state or military regime remained locked
into command mode.
• 3. Permissive: A permissive contract is one in which
those who govern tolerate a range of activity that is
formally illegal in return for being absolved from
scrutiny>> e.g. ‘Article 15’ (débrouillez-vous) in Zaire,
and border trade in micro-states (e.g. Gambia)
• 4. Liberational>> formulated during struggles for
national liberation or against extreme forms of
dictatorship (e.g the Dergue) and became frozen at
the point when success was achieved.
• >> Recurring themes: primacy of the nation and the
movement as the embodiment of the national
interest (e.g. Eritrea, Zimbabwe). >>
Political Tenses….
• 1. Coercive contracts often have a peculiar conception of
political time>> often a dysfunctional or traumatic past that
justifies a suspension of political time for some purposes
• 2. Liberational Contracts begin as forward-looking (the
achievement of liberation), but tend to become backwardlooking
• 3. Permissive contracts are always lived in the present tense
• 4. Productive contracts>> African socialism was all about
progress towards future experienced in hyper-time. These
days still looking to future, but in slow-time (MDGs)
Co-existing contracts
• In particular countries, different modes may co-exist
especially as regimes mutate e.g. Mobutu’s Zaire combined
coercive and permissive; South Africa combines liberational
and productive >> result is often rather confused state
discourses
Back to Good Governance
For those promoting a ‘good governance’ agenda, the
desired end would be gravitation towards
productive contracts
Problems: (1) line of least resistance is towards
permissive contracts which deflect potential conflict
(but prevent traction in other areas) The line of
greatest resistance is in direction of productive
contracts due to (i) high risk of failure and (ii) the
dangers of fuelling expectations
• (2) There may also be certain merits to other forms:
• e.g. coercive contract may be necessary to hold the
ring in the medium term (e.g. South Sudan)
• e.g. given the limitations of the state to provide
employment, permissive contracts may be
expedient
• (3) Depends on which version of the productive
contract one envisions
• - (i) state delivery<> taxation nexus
• - (ii) state intervention
• ‘Good governance’ bears the signature of its SAP
origins>>
• often linked to idea that state should actively
intervene to liberate economic forces e.g. land
titling
• Temptation of state to become more intrusive,
upsetting the understandings that have been forged
over decades.
• Crucial point: social contracts are not just about
what states do, but what they DO NOT do
Limits of State
• Mot successful examples are those where the state
has been forced to accept its limits e.g. Botswana,
Ghana, Senegal
• Some of the least successful cases are those where
state has attempted to impose its control over
society (e.g. Guinea, Eritrea)
Some Specific Contexts
• 1. Rural Contexts: Over C20 land has become a
crucial factor in configuring state-society relations
• - in some cases, chiefs allocate land and are
important players in their own right (e.g. Ghana) or
have re-gained powers (e.g. Mozambique)
• - in other cases, state agencies intervene in the
context of weak traditional authorities
• State intervention in relation to land is risky>> can
be used to build political constituencies, but can
also become highly divisive (e.g. Kenya)
Chiefs inc.
Rural Contracts
• >>can also sour relations with nomads and
pastoralists (typically the losers in state
interventions)
• What has worked best is state supporting local
agreements between pastoralists and
agriculturalists>>> negotiated arrangements work
better than heavy-handed state intervention
• …>> Limitations of State
Urban Contracts
• 2. Urban Contexts. Cities pose particular
challenges>> increasingly the majority of the
population: often politically volatile
• Striking a productive social contract is difficult>>
states deliver roads, but often struggle to provide
other public goods like housing, good sanitation.
• Hence permissive social contracts continue to
thrive>> necessary to do a deal with people in
informal sector
• …>> Limitations of the state
Levels of Urbanisation
Lagos in by-gone days
Lagos today…. Go slow
Levels and Rates of Urbanisation,
2010
Country
Percentage Urban
Rate of Urbanization
Algeria
92.0
2.4
Djibouti
87.0
2.2
Gabon
85.0
2.1
Republic of Congo
(Brazzav)
61.0
2.7
South Africa
61.0
1.4
Botswana
60.0
2.5
Ghana
50.0
3.5
Nigeria
48.0
3.8
Kenya
22.0
4.0
Malawi
19.0
5.2
Ethiopia
17.0
5.4
Uganda
13.0
4.4
Africa’s Largest Cities, millions
City
2010
1980
1970
1950
Cairo
11.0
7.4
5.6
2.5
Lagos
10.6
4.8
1.4
0.3
Kinshasa
8.8
2.0
1.1
0.2
Johannesburg
& East Rand
6.1
2.8
2.2
1.5
Khartoum/3
city
5.2
1.2
0.7
0.2
Luanda
4.8
1.0
0.5
0.1
Alexandria
4.4
2.5
2.0
1.0
Abidjan
4.1
1.4
0.6
0.07
Nairobi
3.5
1.0
0.5
0.1
Cape Town
3.4
1.6
1.1
0.6
Kano
3.4
1.4
0.5
0.1
Dar es Salaam
3.4
0.8
0.4
0.07
World Development Report 2009
• Bretton Woods institutions are beginning to realize the
downside of state-bashing for urban governance.
• “But the top priority is the set of aspatial policy
instruments that apply universally to all places –
establishing market institutions to regulate land use and
transactions, and delivering such basic services as schools,
streets and sanitation. So in the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa and Central Asia, the role of national government is
pivotal in laying the foundations of inclusive urbanization.”
Traction
• Intelligent urban planning requires enhanced
capacity for state and municipal authorities,
plus an efficient and equitable system for
raising revenues - Traction
• In many cities, the claims of the ‘landowners’
is a real political issue that cannot be ignored
•
social contracts have to involve two-way
bargains in which urban land is freed up in
return for service improvements
3. Borderlands
• 3. Borderlands and Social Contracts: Border
populations have a peculiar relation to state
• (i) often very few public goods other than a road>>
populations left to fend for themselves
• (ii) a perceived security risk may mean heavyhanded state presence.
• Hence frequently a co-existence of coercive and
permissive contracts
• States have capacity to create new productive
contracts based on cross-border agreements>>
• >> shared amenities, agreements guaranteeing
access to land and grazing for pastoralists etc
• But still early days in the development of CBC
• However, the potential for border regions to kickstart new state-society engagements is considerable
• Crucially, around a third of Africa’s capital cities lie
within 40 kilometres of an international boundary
Africa’s Borderland Capitals (15 on
mainland)
REGION
CAPITALS
ON BORDER
WEST AFRICA
BANJUL, BISSAU, LOME
COTONOU
LOME
WEST-CENTRAL
KINSHASA, BRAZZAVILLE,
NDJAMENA,BANGUI
ALL 4
EAST AFRICA AND GREAT
LAKES
BUJUMBURA, KIGALI
BUJUMBURA
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN
AFRICA
LILONGWE, MAPUTO,
MBABANE, MASERU,
GABORONE
GABORONE, MASERU
Kinshasa-Brazzaville
Elections and Social Contracts
• 1. Role of Elections
• How important are they to the promotion of new
social contracts?
• Certainly not a panacea, but they provide way for
citizens to express their judgement about the
performance of those in office
• >> and they may have cumulative effect (Lindberg)
– a few successful rotations helps!
• << although bad habits catch on quickly (e.g.
governments of national unity)
• Elections force governments to keep track off
their population and to articulate their claims
• Some minimum requirements>>
• (i) autonomous election commission
• (ii) a credible voters’ register
• (iii) a savvy electorate that is prepared to go
shopping
• (iv) a modicum of trust amongst elites (the
difference between Ghana and Kenya?)
Ghana 2008
Popular interest
• Although electoral participation typically falls
after the founding election, the rates of
participation are not bad considering the
conjuncture of logistics and the fact that
governments are doomed to disappoint
• Average turnout for Africa, 1990-2001: 64%
for Africa, vs 65% for North America and
Caribbean, 78% for Western Europe and 79%
in Oceania
Citizenship and Social Contracts
• 2. Citizenship and Belonging>> constitutions often
start from the abstract citizen, whereas popular
discourses of politics often follow different
principles. National differences:
• (a) Francophone states have tended to import a
state-centric model in which the state defines
citizenship>> reflected in the passage of national
domain laws … but does not always over-ride local
conceptions
• (b) in some former British colonies, less uniform
• >> in Ghana a strongly rooted idea of colonial state
having been constructed from the bottom upwards
on the basis of primary units (‘native states’). While
the post-colonial state has elaborated its own rules,
it is an axiom that one cannot really be a citizen
unless one claim identity through membership of a
primary community.
• >> infuses all aspects of national politics and local
administration
• (c) in South Africa, the state has effectively defined
citizenship since apartheid days, but removing the
apartheid legacy has also re-inforced state logics
• (i) internalised in popular conceptions of belonging
defined by international border (hence the
definition of foreigners)
• (ii) spatial claims internally less important than
racial ones
Externality
Externality: Does the externality of the African
states makes productive contracts effectively
unattainable?
Depends on both the degree and nature of the
externality: acute aid dependency is one form,
the dominance of rents from the extractive
sector is another, and remittances are a third.
• The track-record of oil-states is not good, but
Botswana and Cape Verde demonstrate that
some externality can be helpful in sustaining
social contracts
• In Cape Verde, remittances accounted for 12%
of GDP in 2006>> the importance of the
diaspora raises questions of the boundedness
of the national community> diaspora vote?
A final thought: Is small beautiful?
• Why is it that small states, and especially, island
states perform much better in governance indices?
Possible answers:
• (a) the level of demand on the state is more
manageable>> In 2006, there were 145 million
Nigerians (probably!) and only 1.8 million
Botswanans.
• (b) elite tends to be much more compact and interconnected.
Top of Ibrahim Table on
Governance in Africa 2008-9
Country
Overall Governance
Ranking
Participation and Human
Rights Ranking
Mauritius
1
2
Seychelles
2
5
Botswana
3
4
Cape Verde
4
1
South Africa*
5
3
Namibia
6
8
Ghana
7
6
Tunisia
8
35
Egypt*
9
39
Lesotho
10
7
Sao Tome and Principe
11
9
Benin
12
10
Bottom of Table
Country
Overall Governance
Ranking
Participation and Human
Rights Ranking
Angola*
42
27
Guinea-Bissau
43
26
Cote d’Ivoire
44
46
Guinea
45
42
Equatorial Guinea*
46
52
Sudan*
47
48
CAR
48
30
Zimbabwe
49
44
Eritrea
50
50
DRC
51
45
Chad*
52
49
Somalia
53
53
• (c) closer proximity of borders tends to embed the
economies of smaller countries within regional
economies, creating less pressure on state
• (d) in small countries, the overall influence of
diasporas is likely to be that much greater
• (e) Finally, there is argument that it is simply easier
for the state to ‘broadcast’ its power in small
countries.
Conclusion
• 1. If we take the long view, there is nothing
inevitable about a transition to productive
contracts. Indeed, this is often the line of greatest
resistance>> the preference for permissive
contracts may even be accentuated by governance
reforms that parcellize the state and privatize
resources
• 2. Coercive contracts are more difficult to sustain
these days >> especially military regimes
• 3. Social contracts are grounded in political cultures
than cannot simply be ignored or regarded as
unfortunate obstacles>> in many cases a balance
between group/individual rights and
elected/’traditional’ authorities may be the most
viable option>> institutional pluralism has its
merits.
• 3. Growth of urban population is likely to effect
social contracts, but not necessarily in the direction
of productive ones
• 4. Borderlands are dynamic spaces where states
have the option to re-invent themselves
• 5. Elections are an imperfect means of inscribing
social contracts>> Successful elections tend to build
trust in the process, but failed elections may create
a climate of mutual suspicion that lingers
• BUT main point is that social contracts that work
typically involve a process of negotiation between
states and societal actors>> cannot be parachuted
in from above or read off a governance manual