Transcript Leflar – choice influencing considerations

Wood Bros Homes v Walker Adj Bureau
(Colo. 1979)
• Section 196 applies to contracts for the rendition of
services. It provides:
“The validity of a contract for the rendition of
services and the rights created thereby are
determined, in the absence of an effective choice of
law by the parties, by the local law of the state
where the contract requires that the services, or a
major portion of the services, be rendered, unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship under the
principles stated in s 6 to the transaction and the
parties, in which event the local law of the other
state will be applied.”
• 188 Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice
by the Parties
• (1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect
to an issue in contract are determined by the local
law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties under the principles
stated in s 6.
• (2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties (see s 187), the contacts to be taken into account in
applying the principles of s 6 to determine the law
applicable to an issue include:
• (a) the place of contracting,
• (b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
• (c) the place of performance,
• (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
• (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties
• These contracts are to be evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
• § 6. Choice-Of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional
restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of
its own state on choice of law.
• (2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to
the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.
Leflar – choice influencing
considerations
• predictability of results
• maintenance of interstate and int’l legal
orders
• simplification of judicial task
• advancement of forum interest
• choosing better rule of law
Milkovich v Saari (Minn. 1973)
Kell v. Henderson (NY Sup. Ct. 1965)
• Ontario guest and Ontario host leaves in car
from Ontario to NY
• Accident in NY
• NY law, rather than Ontario guest statute,
applied
• On the consideration of governmental interest,
Professor Leflar found adequate support for the
decision rendered by the New York court. In so
doing, he rejected the concept of the practical
interest of the state in the supervision and safety
of its state highways since the rule in question,
unlike rules of the road and definitions of
negligence, does not bear upon vehicle
operation as such. Instead, he pointed out that
the factor to be considered is the relevant effect
the New York rule has on the duty of host to
guest and the danger of collusion between them
to defraud the host's insurer.
• New York's interest in applying its own law rather than
Ontario law on these issues, he found to be based primarily
on its status as a justice-administering state. In that status, it
is strongly concerned with seeing that persons who come
into the New York courts to litigate controversies with
substantial New York connections have these cases
determined according to rules consistent with New York
concepts of justice, or at least not inconsistent with them.
That will be as true for nondomiciliary litigants as for
domiciliaries. This interest will not manifest itself clearly if
the out-of-state rule does not run contrary to some strong
socio-legal policy of the forum, but it will become a major
consideration if there is such a strong opposing local policy.
Professor Leflar then pointed out that this consideration
leads to preference for what is regarded as the better rule of
law, that New York has such a preference, and that it is a
vigorous one. He concluded that the combination of the last
two items, governmental interest and better rule of law,
called for the application of New York law.
• The compelling factors in this case are the advancement of the
forum's governmental interests and the application of the better
law. While there may be more deterrent effect in our commonlaw rule of liability as opposed to the guest statute requirement
of gross negligence, the main governmental interest involved in
that of any ‘justice-administering state.’ In that posture, we are
concerned that our courts not be called upon to determine issues
under rules which, however, accepted they may be in other
states, are inconsistent with our own concept of fairness and
equity. We might also note that persons injured in automobile
accidents occurring within our borders can reasonably be
expected to require treatment in our medical facilities, both
public and private. In the instant case, plaintiff incurred medical
bills in a Duluth hospital which have already been paid, but we
are loath to place weight on the individual case for fear it might
offer even minor incentives to ‘hospital shop’ or to create
litigation-directed pressures on the payment of debts to medical
facilities. Suffice it to say that we recognize that medical costs are
likely to be incurred with a consequent governmental interest
that injured persons not be denied recovery on the basis of
doctrines foreign to Minnesota.
• In our search for the better rule, we are firmly
convinced of the superiority of the common-law
rule of liability to that of the Ontario guest
statute. We can find little reason for the strict
limitation of a host's liability to his guest beyond
the fear of collusive suits and the vague
disapproval of a guest ‘biting the hand that feeds
him.’ Neither rationale is persuasive. We are
convinced the judicial system can uncover
collusive suits without such overinclusive rules,
and we do not find any discomfort in the
prospect of a guest suing his host for injuries
suffered through the host's simple negligence.
Jepson v. Gen. Casualty Co. of
Wisc. (Minn. 1994)
Dépeçage
• Adams (NY domiciliary) is member of NY
organization
• Enrolls in its nature program
• Truck takes him to Mass
• Breaks down
• Farmer with unregistered truck offers to take them
the rest of way
• Truck hits Adams, but not negligent
• Mass law: driver unlicensed car is outlaw – liability
w/o fault
• NY requires negligence
• Mass has charitable immunity
• NY does not
• Currie: “While Massachusetts has a policy of
deterring the operation of unlicensed vehicles,
it does not extend that policy to charities….
While New York has a policy of requiring
compensation for its injured residents, it has
no policy of imposing liability in the absence of
negligence. To impose liability on this New
York corporation, which has been free from
fault, simply in order to carry out a nonexistent
Massachusetts policy of deterrence, seems to
me to be entirely unjustified….”
• Maryland Cas v Jacek (D.N.J. 1957)
• Suit by MD insurer for declaratory judgment
concerning liability under auto insurance policy
• Issued in NJ to NJ domiciliaries
• D had driven car with wife in NY – accident there
• NJ – Insurer liable for any successful suit against
insured
– BUT spousal immunity
• NY – no spousal immunity
– BUT if spouse is successfully sued, insurer not liable
renvoi
désistement
Pfau v Trent Aluminum Co.
(NJ 1970)