Objectives and Organisation of Aviation Security

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Transcript Objectives and Organisation of Aviation Security

Enhancing Cargo Security:
Moving Forward
David Fielder
- Corporate Security Manager: Asia Pacific, China and S. Asia
- Chairman: FIATA Advisory Body on Security Matters
- FAPAA: Security Advisor
- Director: TAPA Asia
What do you understand by
Cargo Security?
• Government: ensuring nothing is
added in such as WMD (do they exist?)
or drugs
• Carrier: nothing inserted into cargo
which might damage the carrier and
ensure no pilferage
• Forwarder: No theft to our cargo
But are we all on the same page
or & working together?
TSA want clear plastic so that carrier knows
what is on the pallet
Forwarder wants a secure pallet to prevent
theft.
The two are diametrically opposed?
To move forward positively we must
learn from then past: what worked
and what did not work
Without the Road Map for the
future, and without a target there
can only be one result>>
100% Screened cargo on PAX
carrier into USA
First announcement to Forwarders only days before deadline
Confidential data to carriers said to be much earlier
Restriction on data release due to SSI rules
(Secure and Sensitive Information)
Yet we all have interest to protect cargo!!!!
THIS DID NOT WORK WELL
Can we really secure cargo
by regulations alone?
Regulations must be practical to achieve the results
Regulators MUST ensure industry collaboration
ICAO Security Secretariat has established a working
group on Aviation Supply Chain Security which includes
regulators, carriers and forwarders
But what is the definition of a “Supply Chain?”
IATA CONCEPT OF A SUPPLY CHAIN
Secure carrier
Departure Airport
Haulier
Freight
Forwarder
Haulier
Shipper
Ground Handler
Transhipment Airport
What is missing?
?
Destination Airport
Consignee
A chain is a serious of links from one end to the other, but
what defines the ends?
Security initiatives MUST change
from Reactionary to Pro-active
Lockerbie Bombing – enhanced security checks on luggage
9/11 : Various US Acts to enhance aviation security including
amendment 10 to Annex 17
Shoe Bomber: taking shoes off when passing airport security
Bomb in underpants: full body scanners to be introduced
Person found hiding in cargo: ACSIP Rules (Jack in the Box
rules)
So what is next?
The right strategy with the correct linked partners will
bring results
BUT : what if there is a break in the chain?
We Fail and are Exposed to risk,
THE FUTURE: CYNICAL COMMENT WHAT IS THE INCENTIVE TO STOP THE WAR ON TERROR
AND DO GOVERNEMNETS REALLY WANT TO?
The war on terror:
Ensures employment globally for millions of people at
borders
Ensures jobs for millions of people producing Security
Equipment
Helps country’s GDP in developing the Security Business
which was not badly affected by the recession
Helps reduce unemployment
The future is inevitable and Security
enhancement / growth is inevitable,
so where are we going?>>>>>>>>
Further developments in bio chips and even in-bedded chips
Change of cargo types being placed on carriers
Body scanners at aircraft doors
100% screening of cargo
Bigger x-ray equipment
Carriers with built in ETD sniffers in cargo holders
My doomsday Theory on
Aviation Security
• Volcanic issue closed airspace over Europe
• Shippers sought alternatives which worked
• Cargo trialed by train and ship may not return as costs savings
found
• Carbon footprint better with rail than air
• Cost of produce declines so cost of cargo in transit fall
• More buffer storage at destination to compensate for longer transit
times
• Switch to alternative transport to avoid huge security nightmares in
rules and costs
• Carrier lose freight income
• PAX costs increase
• Less Passengers, further reduced revenue
• Carrier go bust
• Regulators revise and reduce rules
With so much pre-advice data being
required and transmitted on
individuals before a flight and with
ever increasing data storage, are we
heading towards a Unique
Passenger Code which one day
might also replace or augment the
passport or be a worldwide
standard ID Card for aviation travel
issued by the UN?
Acceptance by Regulators that forwarders know
best how to secure their cargo against theft (and at
same time intrusion).
Accepting the question: Does the known shipper
process really work?
Will IATA Secure freight program really take off or
be needed in light of likely 100% screening?
Are we tying ourselves in notes
over regulatory compliance that
doesn’t work?
I would like to see:
Less Bureaucracy and rules and regulations.
The more the red tape and rules being clearly Black and
white, the less common sense and initiatives happen by
individuals to thwarting terrorism.
The more solid the rules sets the framework for the terrorist
to breach without hidden surprises.
THANK YOU