Transcript Carbon as a Community based Natural Resource

PES and Governance
Brian Child
University of Florida
31 August – 3 September 2009
• Collective action is a response to the benefits
of managing ecosystems at larger scales
• CBNRM requires highly disciplined
institutional design
– If not, extremely difficult
Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of
effective, equitable CBNRM governance
• CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years.
• We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve.
• We have theoretical and practical knowledge to design CBNRM
organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low levels of
financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources well
• However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that:
– Elites tend to benefit from the status quo (oppose changes)
– Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to
aspire), will support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend
them (though they will usually need help/support to do so)
– Tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself.
– Therefore need to protecting the procedural conditions tfor effective function
and evolution of CBNRM.
– i.e. protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.
Principles
• ECONOMIC: The first principle, therefore, is to
maximize the value of wildlife to
landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS)
• POLITICAL: The second principle is that decisionmaking power must originate in the people (not
the committee). The elected committee (e.g.
trust, Conservancy) must be answerable to the
people, and not in charge of them
International
Macro Level
National
State/Provincial
Civil Society
District/Municipal
Cooperative/Multicommunity
Property
rights
push the
locus of
power
towards
the local
level
Meso Level
Local/Community
Micro Level
Household
‘Governance’
is the linkage
between these
different levels of
public and civil
society entities
International
Weak conceptual
understanding,
within historically
and site specific
circumstances.
National
State/Provincial
Civil Society
Governance &
Enabling
Environment
District/Municipal
Cooperative/Multicommunity
Local/Community
Household
Governance
of Local
Collective
Action
Biggest challenges
to success:
• incompetence /
disinterest
• defense of status
quo
Strong, widely
applicable
conceptual and
operational
model/s
High probability
of success
Quality
wildlife
resources
CBNRM in Luangwa:
Institutional Lessons
CBNRM in Luangwa,
Zambia (NORAD
Project)
South Luangwa National Park
•
•
•
•
9,050km2
9,000 elephants
Costs USD1m / year
Income USD850,000
Lupande GMA
South
Luangwa
National
Park
•
•
•
•
•
•
Six chiefs (4,500km2)
50,000 people
Six Community Resource Boards
45 Village Action Groups
Two hunting concessions
Earning USD 230,000 annually
Harsh Climate
• Floods
• Droughts
• Disease
Community Development Programme: Top
Down Phase
• Two powerful co-Directors (“integration”)
• 40% of park and GMA revenue returned to community
• But returned through six Chiefs for projects selected by them
and implemented by LIRDP (“followership” was not
involved)
• Did 36 different projects in community:
–
–
–
–
–
–
Women’s programme (chickens)
Roads
Infrastructure / buildings
Culling
Bus service
Tourism and hunting managed by project
• Not one project was viable or sustainable despite massive
funding
When I arrived in 1996:
• People did not understand the Project
• Very low perception of benefit
• Conflict/suspicion over project
implementation
Agreed to implement “fiscal devolution” to
village level (80%) of income
Resistance to Devolution by “Losers”
Revenue distribution
meetings held in Malama
But chief rejects programme
Success in Chivyololo
Innovations: Mechanisms of Constituent
Accountability
1. Constitutions
2. Accounts
3. Records of decisions
Recognition that devolution
is a RIGOROUS process
“Loose-tight” principles
Constituency Accountability
Ensure that everyone knows what is happening
with the finances (quarterly)
Innovations: Self Managed
Revenue Distribution
Community Projects
Investing in Wildlife Management
Financial Flows in CBNRM
First Generation
CBNRM
Central
Government
Local
Government
Representational
Democracy
PERFORMANCE
METRICS
FIRST
GENERATION
SECOND
GENERATION
Participation
100’s
75-100,000
Benefits
Few, public
20,500 people
got cash
Projects
10?
230+
Accountability
40-80% money
missing
0.8%
-86%
+90%
0%
18% of
income
down
Stable/up
Attitudes to
wildlife
Investment in
wildlife
Wildlife trends
Participatory
Democracy
Second Generation
CBNRM
Single versus Multiple Villages
Defining local regimes
According to Madison/ de
Tocqueville:
 A Democracy – is where
every one meets together
to represent themselves
(Township Government)
 A Republic – is where
people’s interests are
represented by elected
persons
 Single Village
 Direct/participatory
democracy/ accountability
 Multi-Village community
 Indirect or
representational
governance
Real Life Implications
Form of
accountability
Proportion
getting to
individuals
(cash, Projects)
Proportion
consumed by
overheads
(allowances,
salaries, etc.)
Participatory
>60-80%
20%
Representational
<10-20%
>90%
Preliminary data from CBNRM (next slide) is intriguing.
Suggests Madison’s dichotomy is critical to success
Participatory Governance
Representational Governance
Caprivi – Namibia n=8
Luangwa – Zambia n=43
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
-
600,000,000
500,000,000
400,000,000
300,000,000
200,000,000
Cash/Projects
Income
100,000,000
1996
1998
1999
2000
Member's dividends
Projects
Chief's extraction
VAG Administration
Activities
Wildlife management
Kafue – Zambia n=8
45,000,000
40,000,000
35,000,000
30,000,000
25,000,000
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
-
1997
2001
Masoka – Zim n=1
1,400,000
1,200,000
Not accounted for
Chiefs
Projects & Cash
NRM
Administration
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
Red/Pink – gets to people (projects/cash)
public good??
Community projects
Household dividends/
drought relief
Resource
Revenues¹
The effects of full face-to-face participation
Where everyone in the community is
involved in financial decision making
(with full discretionary choice)
• Revenue is allocated to the best
combination of uses (i.e. the
highest valued uses) including
household and community
benefits
• This locates the origin of power in
individuals (Tocqueville)
• Does this gives us a single metric
that can measure both poverty
reduction at HH level and
empowerment (i.e. participation,
accountability, democratization)?
CBNRM 2.0 (second generation)
•
•
This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second
generation model build on the
principles of bottom-up
accountability.
There are several critical changes:
– Money goes to individuals, and then
flows upwards through collective
agreement
– This ensures that committees are
downwardly accountable to their
constituents
– An important role for government is to
protect downward accountability (see
conformance criteria below)
– Communities must be small enough to
meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single
Village communities)
– This structure is much more likely to be
effective than CBNRM 1. However,
structure must be accompanied by
effective information
•
The following slide compares CBNRM
1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide
range of performance metrics
5. Central
Government
4. District Council
3. Community Based Organization
2. Village
(Grass-roots community)
1. Individuals
(Grass-roots community)
Wildlife/Tourism
Sequencing Scale
GLOBAL
REGIONAL
Scaling process is critical:
NATIONAL
Province/State/Department
District/County/Traditional Area
Village
Household
Scaling
Up
Community
Scale Down (devolve rights)
SUB-NATIONAL
• Scale down by devolving
rights
• Scale up through
upward delegation
• Avoid appropriation of
rights
Read Murphree (2000)
I’ve included more detailed notes and recommendations on CBO
governance at the bottom of this Power Point
The Enabling Environment:
some preliminary lessons
Some early hints at what a CBNRM enabling
environment is
• National process work in impersonal states
• May need to rely on projects in personalized (neopatrimonial states) where scaling up is challenging
• Legislated use rights (benefit, manage, allocate, sell)
critical. Can pilot with project agreements
(but vulnerable)
Long-term,
• Continuity of champions
– Protect conditions for emergence
– Inter-disciplinary experience and advice
– Innovation requires trust
persistent,
consistent
facilitation
• Pilots critical (pilots lead policy)
• Learning through communities of practice

Aborted
devolution
More hints for enabling environments
• Donors – variability in outcomes
– Design (often flawed; locally envisaged programs worked best)
– Tenacity (seldom present)
– But financing, political role, can be used positively
• Associations invaluable:
– Political (e.g. CAMPFIRE Association)
– Technical (e.g. CCG, NACSO)
• Responsible Research adds value (but research often an irritant)
• Need meso-organization (still lots to learn):
– Role of local government (district councils) a two-edge sword
– Sustainability of NGO support organizations
• Capacity-building
– Process often misunderstood and badly designed = wasteful, expensive
– Across-scale, experiential learning highly effective
REDD – opportunity or threat?
REDD
 New resource – limited vested interested allows us to do it
properly
 But objectives very unclear, and seems to be driven top
down with too little listening to landholders and
communities
 If done properly, could contribute to environment,
development, governance:
 Land recovery (biodiversity, productivity, carbon)
 Improve livelihoods in marginal areas
 Incentivize improved governance (build “hollow states” from the
bottom up)
Forest Tenure: Who ‘owns’ the World’s Forests?
M has
M has
Rights critical
to success
but unclear
and disputed
200
120
180
100
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
Latin America
Gov't
Public-Comm
80
Africa
60
Private-Comm
Private-Indiv
40
20
20
0
0
• Gov’t ……………….Owned and Administered by Government
• Public-Comm ……Community has usufruct rights (Gov’t owned)
• Private-Comm ….Owned by communities and indigenous peoples
• Private-Indiv ……..Owned by Individuals or Firms
African data appears to ignore
customary tenure rights?
[Sunderlin, Hatcher and Liddle 2008]
Governance in Countries with 10 largest oil reserves
(The Resource Curse)
100
Canada
90
Governance Rank (%)
80
70
60
Money that
flows top-down
from a single
source
=> governance
problems
50
40
Nigeria
Kuwait
Venezuela
30
UAE
20
Russia
Iraq
10
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Libya
0
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Oil Reserves (billion barrels)
90% of these countries ranked in the lowest 1/3 in terms of Governance
Oil Reserve Data from: http://internationaltrade.suite101.com/article.cfm/top_ten_oil_countries
Governance Indicator Data from: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
How do we avoid a Tragedy of the
Global Carbon Commons?
• Tragedy of the commons occurs in open access situations
• Many of the commons situations envisaged by Hardin are
in fact subject to rules – local, communal and national
• What are the rules and structures that exist to govern
Carbon?
• Governance = structure and processes that link the
macro- with the meso- and micro-levels of NRM
Carbon Governance Mechanisms – Global to Local
International
UNFCCC
Kyoto Protocol
UN Declarations
• human rights
• civil/political rights
• ILO 169
• Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP)
Regional
National
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
Constitution
Social Function Doctrine
Community
CBOs
CAMPFIRE
Conservancies
Case Law
Human Right to Property
(Mabo Case)
Complex – can we
start with very
simple and clear
goals?
[RRI 2008]
Conclusion
• REDD attaches new value to forests
• Threat of elite land speculation
• Governance structures/processes need to be developed for REDD
- transparent, accountable, participatory, legitimate
• Who makes the new rules? Where is the landholder voice?
• Carbon raises all the same concerns and opportunities as CBNRM
Thanks to RRI for their support
GOVERNANCE/SCALE ISSUES
GLOBAL
Accounting
•
•
•
•
REGIONAL
NATIONAL
Baseline
Additionality
Distribution
Monitoring
SUB-NATIONAL
Province/State/Department
District/County/Traditional Area
Village
Household
Scaling
Up
Community
• Projects (low national capacity,
initial pilot startups)
Issues:
•
•
•
•
Size/Pop Density?
tenure security
perverse incentives
capacity building
Summary Results of CBNRM
Assessment and Priority
Recommendations
Overall Findings (2)
• Single Village CBOs work far better than multivillage CBOs
• CBOs lack procedural guidelines
• Large, unsatisfied demand for technical
support / information
• Managers, on the whole, working well (need
technical support, socialization in empowering
communities, protection)
Critical Areas for Improvement
1. Governance, accountability and participation
of people (including finances) is weak
especially in multi-village CBOs
2. Benefits at household level far too low (ratio
of overhead to benefit is FAR too high)
Mababe
Sankoyo


















KALIPA

CECT

OCT
Khwai
Overall Judgment
Fundamental problems with structure and/or
constitution


??
Elite capture and corruption

?

Solved?
Strong rumours of problems with JV partner
(corruption, unfair agreements)
?
?

Information gets to people


Benefits

Overall

Performance Criteria
Key Recommendations (1)
A. Institutional Design
1. Break multi-villages up into single villages
2. Set guidelines for constitutions and for
procedural conformance
3. Monitor conformance
Key Recommendations (2)
B. Devolved Capacity
4. Support and oversee marketing (database, facilitation,
training)
5. Develop participatory revenue allocation and
accountability systems
6. Experiment with participatory quota-setting (and set goals
for wildlife monitoring and management responsibilities)
7. Develop stronger national and internal-CBO information
systems
Key Recommendations (3)
C. Enabling Environment and Support Agencies
8.
Develop MET capacity for:


9.
Adaptive policy formulation
Conformance monitoring
Develop producer association/s


right to levy communities
provided they fulfill key functions:



Political representation
Peer-based monitoring (Grameen Bank)
Information (capacity-building)
10. Develop capacity for capacity-building. How?? Who ??
1.
Independent monitoring and research (adaptive management
model?)
Building Capacity through
Procedural Conformance
Government should monitor procedural
conformance to ensure




Full participation and democracy,
Equity,
Transparency and accountability,
Protect the weak against the serious
threat of elite capture
Hence Capacity-building should focus on:
1. Sound constitutions and awareness of
them
2. Information flow
3. Participatory financial allocation and
accountability
Conformance Criteria
1. Budget properly discussed, presented and agreed by
whole community
2. Proper financial and technical general meetings every
quarter, well attended
3. Quarterly financial reports are accurate, follow budget,
low variance, no misuse
4. Annual audit presented to community and approved by
them (as an activity-based budget)
5. Annual/biannual elections
Only approve quota / payments on receipt of conformance
audit (not just a financial one)
Technical Recommendations
for CBO Management
1. Improve participation and transparency in financial
allocation and control
1.
2.
3.
Participatory financial management (budgeting, control)
Use PRA communication techniques to make financial
decisions
Quarterly variance analysis
2. Improve information through carefully planned quarterly
meetings
3. Organize financial information to reflect benefits,
overheads, investments
4. Define roles and procedures in small manuals
Participatory Budgeting
Steps:
1. Define membership
2. Make list of members
(and check it)
3. List animals shot and
values
4. Worked out share per
person
5. Agree on allocation:
HH, projects, wildlife,
management
Format for Budget
Total
Per Household
N=55
3,000,000
54,545
1. Cash benefits
110,000
2,000
2. Local Projects
825,000
15,000
3. Wildlife management
275,000
5,000
4. Administrative overheads
550,000
10,000
1,100,000
20,000
INCOME
EXPENDITURE
5. Investments
Making & communicating budgets
• Community participation
• Visualization
Making sure people Understand
Each Member Gets
Their Full Share in Cash
Each Person Pays Into
Projects (Buckets) As
Agreed by Community
Quarterly Variance Analysis
Ensure that everyone knows
what is happening with the
finances (quarterly)
Expenditure Item
1. Cash benefits
2. Local Projects
3. Wildlife management
4. Administrative overheads
5. Investments
Budget
agreed at
AGM
Actual
Expenditure
Variance
Planned
corrective
Action
Quarterly Report
Agenda
• Value of animals
• Constitution
• Financial report
• Project report
• Wildlife management report
• Report on hunting and tourism
• HIV/AIDS
• Other issues arising of interest e.g. wildlife policy
Notes on Designing Effective
Community Based Organizations
Collective action is a response to the benefits of
managing ecosystems at larger scales
•
•
•
•
Many high value resources in semi-arid savannas are mobile, or fugitive, in space
or time – wildlife, water, grazing, ecological health
Without institutional mechanisms to manage these ecosystems at scale, the
systems tend to be used for those activities that can be owned individually – small
scale agriculture, and privately owned livestock
In other words, because we do not know to manage these ecosystems at the
correct scale, the high value resources tend to be replaced by lower value
resources
However, scale is a complex issue because:
– Human institutions work better when they are small
– Ecological systems work better when they are big
(The principles for dealing with this mismatch will be dealt with separately)
•
Within the southern African region, and particularly in relation to the wildlifetourism resource there are large economic benefits associated with scaling up, and
new institutions are evolving for this purpose. These include:
– Large, private ranches and conservancies
– CBNRM
– TFCAs
•
•
There is considerable evidence to showing that scaling up creates significant
ecological and economic benefits, including job creation.
Scaling up is working well on private land (e.g. Conservancies), and TFCAs are still
in their infancy and have many issues worked out.
CBNRM requires highly disciplined
institutional design
•
However, our interest is in the special case of CBNRM which faces is own
challenges:
–
–
–
–
•
•
•
•
Even at small scale, large numbers of people need to be involved
There are particular problems of poverty, literacy
People have a long history of political and managerial marginalization (disempowerment)
People have limited or no experience with modern organizational development theory and
practice, and tend to default to models less appropriate to the challenges of being competitive
in a global world.
Consequently, many CBNRM programs face serious problems of financial
mismanagement, low levels of participation, and elite capture.
This reflects badly on policy makers, implementers and communities
We do, in fact, understand both the principles and operational practices of CBNRM
sufficiently that we should be able to implement it with a high probability of
success.
There are many parallels with democratization. In the history of mankind,
democratization is a rare process that seems to occur only under a particular and
complicated set of circumstances. Gradual evolution should not be assumed –
even though there is clear evidence that democratic governance is much better for
people (every single country with a per capita GDP of over $20,000 is a democracy,
except for a few oil rich nations), societies usually remain in a non-democratic
status-quo for decades and even centuries.
Putting in place the conditions for the emergence of
effective, equitable CBNRM governance
• This has several lessons for CBNRM:
– CBNRM governance can be locked in an unhealthy state for many years.
– We should not assume that good governance will naturally evolve.
– Fortunately, we now have sufficient theoretical and practical knowledge to
design CBNRM organizations that are participatory, transparent, that have low
levels of financial misappropriation, and that can manage natural resources
well
– However, we may need to impose these conditions in the sense that:
• Elites tend to benefit from the status quo, including dominating Committees and Trusts,
and will strongly oppose such changes, or changes that benefit the majority
• Ordinary people, once they understand these changes (i.e. the capacity to aspire), will
support them strongly and, over time, may even be able to defend them (though they
will usually need help/support to do so)
• Nevertheless, there will be a tendency for negative governance to re-assert itself.
• Therefore supporters of CBNRM, especially government agencies with legal authority,
have an important role to play in protecting the procedural conditions that allow
effective function and evolution of CBNRM.
• This can also be seen as protecting the weak against the predation of the strong.
Aligning CBNRM objectives by locating
discretionary choice with individual landholders
Effective design of CBNRM institutions brings the following principles and practices into alignment:
• It establishes mechanisms for property rights and exchange that allocate scarce resources to the
highest valued uses, i.e. the conditions for a neo-liberal democratic economy
• It locates the right to make decisions with individual community members (not their
representatives), i.e. the conditions for participatory democracy
• It uses communications methods that promote positive social change and transformation
• It uses performance tracking mechanisms that improve the effectiveness and adaptability of
management
• It manages natural resources profitably and sustainably to create jobs and reduce poverty and
vulnerability
Therefore, if CBNRM is not designed properly, managing CBNRM becomes a complicated trail (and
trial)of crisis management.
However, if we follow the single principle that discretionary choice should be located in the individual
landholder, and aggregate institutions upwards from this foundation, it is remarkable how well all these
principles come together.
In this document we present an institutional design for communities that provides a solid foundation for
these objectives. Other designs include fundamental political, economic, or ecological contradictions,
and we are skeptical that they will work.
A Practical Sequence for Implementing CBNRM
IF we assume the government has put in place an enabling environment for CBNRM (the subject of
another chapter), we can view CBNRM as sequentially addressing the following challenges:
1.
Earning money – the first step is to generate benefits by, for example, marketing tourism, hunting or
timber concessions. This is easily achieved using open, competitive marketing and many
communities do this reasonable well (note 1, 2)
2.
Spending money – much less attention is paid to the use of this money, and it is here that many
problems occur. Effective systems will:
1.
Allocate revenue to the most effective uses
2.
Maximize individual benefits and choice (not only collective benefits) as costs are borne by individuals
3.
Avoid serious challenges of corruption and elite capture
However, our research in communities in six countries implementing CBNRM in southern Africa suggests that
serious problems are occurring:

At best, very few individuals are getting benefits, or participating in the program, or have information about
what is happening

At worse, communities face serious problems of financial misappropriation (corruption) and elite capture
3.
Effective natural resource management
Note 1: Nevertheless, benefit streams can be greatly improved. We will address this issue separately
Note 2: While our focus is on high value resources (e.g. wildlife, tourism), which is the fastest and easiest way to develop CBNRM, we
acknowledge that CBNRM is entirely appropriate for other natural resource management challenges such as non-financial ecosystem
services.
Spending money
As noted, earning money from wildlife / tourism is relatively easy. However, effective
natural resource management is only likely to occur when this money generates
individual and communal incentives.
Therefore the key to CBNRM, and its biggest challenge and opportunity, lies in
spending money effectively so that:
1. It is allocated effectively, transparently and honestly
2. It is used to build high levels of participation, accountability, and benefit, and
therefore a commitment to a natural-resource based economy
In other words “spending money” is the key to GOOD GOVERNANCE
However, the serious problems of financial mismanagement and/or elite capture that
currently afflict many CBOs are gravely undermining the concept of CBNRM.
Consequently, the major threat to CBNRM is governance. This more easily corrected
than often supposed but requires that:
 Implementing agencies understand and operationalize the principles of CBNRM
governance
 Policy makers are committed to devolution, and operationalise this by ensuring that
communities have strong rights (and responsibilities) for natural resource management
We will describe the essential principles, and operational practice for effective
governance below.
Reason 1: Individuals determine land
use
•
•
Individual landholders (including community members) are deterministic of land
use and conservation outcomes.
Their decisions are strongly influenced by a personal cost benefit analysis that
compares:
– the value of wildlife (including tangible values like cash and intangible values like
proprietorship and aesthetics),
– to (1) alternative land uses (2) and costs and opportunity costs associated with wildlife
•
•
•
The first principle, therefore, is to maximize the value of wildlife to
landholders/occupiers (i.e. INDIVIDUALS)
The success of commercial wildlife management in southern Africa has been based
on this principle
However, we tend to ignore the importance of maximizing individual landholder
benefit when dealing with communities by:
– Reducing the value of wildlife through bureaucratic constraints, license fees, etc.
– Thinking that community benefits are equivalent to individual benefits when clearly they are
not. Even in communities making a lot of money from wildlife, individuals are often excluded
from direct benefit. CBNRM will not be sustainable unless this is changed.
Reason 2: Individuals determine land
use
•
The second principle is that decision-making power must originate in the people
(not the committee). The elected committee (e.g. trust, Conservancy) must be
answerable to the people, and not in charge of them.
•
Many natural resources, like wildlife, are mobile or fugitive (over time and/or
space), and therefore need to be managed collectively.
Collective management is currently problematic, and the source of the financial
and governance challenges that we are well aware of.
Further, in Africa, elite capture is often more pronounced at local than at national
level. It is a serious problem that arises from a hollow state, i.e. where leaders are
neither controlled by or accountable to the people
•
•
•
•
•
To make CBNRM work, we have to explicitly address this challenge.
The trick to effective CBNRN governance is that individuals (not committees) must
control financial benefits and decision-making
Achieving this requires careful design of community organizations and procedures
to ensure ACCOUNTABILITY and TRANSPARENCY.
Achieving Accountability
• Bottom-up accountability is highly effective in rural
communities.
• However, it is seldom automatic, and has to be
achieved by careful institutional design and role
formulation
• To protect the community, especially women and the
poor, the state needs to protect the conditions for
bottom-up accountability.
• This is achieved by insisting on transparent,
accountable, democratic procedures that are
maintained through the conformance criteria outlined
below.
Central
Govt.
Chiefs
Community
Resource
Board
Village Action Group
Wildlife
6. Illustration of the change from a
top-down to a bottom-up,
democratic, transparent and
accountable policy
Administration and Scale
• To design effective local
organizations, it is
essential to understand
the relationships between
difference layers of
government, and their
respective roles
• In Africa there are often
five layers of organization
(illustrated). A sixth layer,
province is omitted to
simply this explanation
5. Central
Government
4. District Council
3. Community Based
Organization
2. Village
(Grass-roots community)
1. Individuals
(Grass-roots community)
Wildlife/Tourism
Centralized, colonial administration of
wildlife resource
•
•
•
Following the London Convention of
1933, most Africa countries
centralized the control of wildlife
outside protected areas (note that
centralization often increased in post
colonial states)
All benefits (if there were any) were
paid to Treasury, and all decisions
were made by the wildlife/game
department.
The system failed:
– Landholders (and local governments)
were alienated from wildlife and came
to resent its presence
– Wildlife declined rapidly outside
protected areas
5. Central
Government
4. District Council
3. Community Based
Organization
2. Village
(Grass-roots community)
1. Individuals
(Grass-roots community)
Wildlife/Tourism
The lesson of private conservation in
southern Africa
Recognizing that wildlife outside of parks was threatened
primarily by competition for land, southern Africa adopted a
sustainable use strategy. Policy makers:
•
Encouraged commercial use (rather than banning it)
•
Devolved ownership of and benefits from wildlife to private
landholder
•
This led to a rapid increase in wildlife on private land in
southern Africa.
•
3. Community Based
Organization (ICA)
A light touch approach to regulation was used
Regulatory functions were devolved to communities of
landholders (e.g. Intensive Conservation Areas in Zimbabwe,
and more recently Conservancies)
1. Private Ranchers
The success was based on a triad of principles:
–
–
–
•
To benefit from wildlife
To manage wildlife (e.g. set quotas)
To allocate and sell wildlife
Government retained a regulatory role. This worked most
effectively when:
–
–
•
4. District Council
Landholders received the following rights:
–
–
–
•
5. Central
Government
Price – maximise the value of wildlife
Proprietorship – devolved rights to wildlife (often usufruct) to
landholders
Subsidiarity – ensure that all functions are conducted at the
lowest possible level. They should only move upward through
upward delegation.
The success of this model from the 1960s, led to CBNRM
Wildlife/Tourism
CBNRM 1.0 (first generation)
•
•
•
The first CBNRM program was
WINDFALL in Zimbabwe.
Benefits followed the path illustrated.
District Councils were pressured to
get benefits to communities
producing wildlife, albeit often in the
form of schools, clinics and projects.
WINDFALL only partially modified
the original colonial model, and failed
because:
– The links between wildlife and benefits
were long and unclear to rural people
– People had few rights to manage
wildlife themselves – they were more
the objects of windfall charity than
empowered wildlife producers
5. Central
Government
4. District Council
3. Community Based
Organization
2. Village
(Grass-roots community)
1. Individuals
(Grass-roots community)
Wildlife/Tourism
CBNRM 1.1 (first generation)
•
•
•
Zimbabwe quickly recognized these problems. This led
to CAMPFIRE
Using the Parks and Wildlife Act, “Appropriate
Authority Status” (the same status enjoyed by private
landholders – see above) was devolved to District
Councils.
The Department of National Parks and Wildlife
Management had wanted to establish “Village
Companies” as the appropriate authorities. However,
this was resisted by the Ministry of Local Government
and a strategic compromised was reached whereby:
–
–
•
•
•
•
Rights were legally devolved to District Councils, but
There was a gentleman’s agreement, the “CAMPFIRE
Principles/Guidelines” that rights would be further
devolved to local communities
The closer the CAMPFIRE Principles were followed, the
better the individual programs worked
In some communities, benefits were decided on by
individuals. Some of this money was retained by
households, and some was delegated upwards to the
CBO for collective projects (see blue arrows)
It is probably not a coincidence that these were the
high performing CAMPFIRE communities, and that they
have proven robust even in the face of current
economic and political conditions in Zimbabwe (e.g.
Masoka, Mahenye).
Note that the blue arrow model is actually a prototype
second generation CBNRM model
5. Central
Government
4. District Council
3. Community Based
Organization
2. Village
(Grass-roots community)
1. Individuals
(Grass-roots community)
Wildlife/Tourism
CBNRM 1.2 (first generation)
Recognizing these problems, CBNRM
practioners improved the model.
• Namibia and Botswana, for example,
avoided the problems of passing
benefits through district councils.
• They established communities as
legal entities (Conservancies, Trusts).
Benefits flowed directly to these
CBOs.
However, in most cases, CBOs included
multiple villages.
• Research and anecdotal evidence
indicates serious governance
problems with this model including:
– Low levels of individual participation
and benefit (i.e. high levels of elite
capture)
– Financial impropriety
•
There are some exceptions. These
are nearly always single village
communities. This suggests what we
call a second generation CBNRM
approach
5. Central
Government
4. District Council
3. Community Based
Organization
2. Village
(Grass-roots community)
1. Individuals
(Grass-roots community)
Wildlife/Tourism
Single versus Multiple Villages
Defining local regimes
Implications
According to Madison/ de
Tocqueville:
 A Democracy – is where every
one meets together to
represent themselves
(Township Government)
 A Republic – is where people’s
interests are represented by
elected persons
Preliminary data from CBNRM across the
region (see next slide) is intriguing.
 This correlates to:
 A single Village with direct or
participatory democracy/
accountability
 A multi-Village community with
indirect or representational
governance
Form of
accountability
Proportion
getting to
individuals
(cash,
Projects)
Proportion
consumed by
overheads
(allowances,
salaries, etc.)
Participatory
80%
20%
Representational
<10%
>90%
This confirms the importance of
Madison’s dichotomy
Participatory Governance
Representational Governance
Caprivi – Namibia n=8
Luangwa – Zambia n=43
1,800,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
-
600,000,000
500,000,000
400,000,000
300,000,000
200,000,000
Cash/Projects
Income
100,000,000
1996
1998
1999
2000
Member's dividends
Projects
Chief's extraction
VAG Administration
Activities
Wildlife management
Kafue – Zambia n=8
45,000,000
40,000,000
35,000,000
30,000,000
25,000,000
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
-
1997
2001
Masoka – Zim n=1
1,400,000
1,200,000
Not accounted for
Chiefs
Projects & Cash
NRM
Administration
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
Red/Pink – gets to people (projects/cash)
public good??
Community projects
Household dividends/
drought relief
Resource
Revenues¹
The effects of full face-to-face participation
Where everyone in the community is
involved in financial decision making
(with full discretionary choice)
• Revenue is allocated to the best
combination of uses (i.e. the
highest valued uses) including
household and community
benefits
• This locates the origin of power in
individuals (Tocqueville)
• Does this gives us a single metric
that can measure both poverty
reduction at HH level and
empowerment (i.e. participation,
accountability, democratization)?
CBNRM 2.0 (second generation)
•
•
This leads us to CBNRM 2.0, a second
generation model build on the
principles of bottom-up
accountability.
There are several critical changes:
– Money goes to individuals, and then
flows upwards through collective
agreement
– This ensures that committees are
downwardly accountable to their
constituents
– An important role for government is to
protect downward accountability (see
conformance criteria below)
– Communities must be small enough to
meet face-to-face regularly (i.e. single
Village communities)
– This structure is much more likely to be
effective than CBNRM 1. However,
structure must be accompanied by
effective information
•
The following slide compares CBNRM
1.0 and CBNRM 2.0 using a wide
range of performance metrics
5. Central
Government
4. District Council
3. Community Based Organization
2. Village
(Grass-roots community)
1. Individuals
(Grass-roots community)
Wildlife/Tourism
Real data comparing performance of
CBNRM 1 and CBNRM 2
First Generation
CBNRM
Central
Government
Local
Government
Representational
Democracy
PERFORMANCE
METRICS
SECOND
GENERATION
Participation
75-100,000
Benefits
20,500 people
got cash
Projects
230+
Accountability
0.8%
Attitudes to
wildlife
Investment in
wildlife
18% of
income
Wildlife trends
Stable/up
Participatory
Democracy
Second Generation
CBNRM
+90%
Example Policy Statement: Organizational
Structure, Roles and Responsibilities
Recognizing that democratic institutions (e.g. CBOs) that rely on representation (rather than full and direct
participation) are structurally predisposed to problems of accountability, weak participation, and nonperformance:
1.
Single Villages shall be constituted as the building blocks of any CBOs. As the primary level of
implementation, they shall:
1.
2.
2.
This is the DOING level, and all decisions shall ultimately be made by individuals.
Village decision processes shall be structured in such a manner that ordinary people (i.e. members)
control the all activities and budgets, and are responsible for :
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
receive the majority of natural resource revenues (>85%), and
shall be responsible for day-to-day decisions and management.
instructing committees, including setting budgets and work plans through annual general meetings.
(Committees should never make budgets themselves, and should be instructed by (and never instruct) their
constituents
controlling committee activity through regular (quarterly) feedback on financial and technical performance
(variance analysis).
All decisions, including budgets and the control of financial and technical performance (variance),
shall be fully participatory and exercised through regular (quarterly) meetings of the membership.
Communities shall decide on the allocation of funds to alternative uses in a full forum. They shall
have the right to allocate benefits from natural resource benefits to best advantage, including:
• Community projects (e.g. social infrastructure; revenue generating projects; loan funds; food
relief; clubs)
• Natural resource and natural resources management
• Household cash dividends
• Administration.
However, decisions may be implemented by committees that are democratically elected on an annul
basis.
continued
6. Where Multi-Village CBOs are necessary:
1. their primary function shall be COORDINATION (not
management).
2. They shall depend on voluntary payments from
Villages, to which they are accountable. These
functions shall generally be conduct with no more than
5% -15% of natural resources revenues. Multi-Village
CBOs tend to create functions that do not add value if
they get too much money
3. Optimally, all revenues should be allocated to
Villages. Coordinating CBOs then then obtain their
revenues after justifying their plans and performance
to the membership of Villages
Conformance Criteria
•
Recognising that the devolution of (defined) rights and responsibilities is the basis
for institutional evolution and should not be held out as its reward.
• Recognising, further, that institutional evolution always involves experiment, and
without authority such experiments are both methodologically and substantively
defective.
• Recognising that capacity must be created in both the leadership, but especially
the followership, to avoid the problems associated with asymmetric power and
knowledge relationships
• Recognising, by implication, that the route towards effective CBNRM programmes
requires entrusting communities with rights at the scale of face-to-face
participation, and facilitating the followership to learn experientially how to apply
these rights;
• Recognising that “experiential learning” is not trial-and-error but a rigorous
process than includes
• (1) scrupulous monitoring and adaptive management, plus
• (2) insistence on conformance to certain organizational principles (and sometimes
• (3) NRM performance criteria),
the following conformance principles shall apply:
Institutional Conformance Principles
1.
Decision-making: The budget (which reflects key allocation decisions) shall be made by the whole
community. Its allocation between cash dividends, projects, natural resource management and
administration shall be recorded in detail (using a standard format)
2.
Accountability: The variance between financial and technical status (e.g. project implementation)
and the instructions embodied in the budget, shall be carefully and competently presented to,
and accepted by, a minimum of two thirds of the community quarterly
3.
Performance audit: Technical and financial variance analyses shall be audited internally at least
twice a year, and at least once a year by an external agency, and this audit report shall be
presented to the community
4.
Financial management system: Each Village shall have a bank account, and a double-entry cash
book systems with clear filing of invoices and receipts.
5.
Banking: Income owing to a community shall be paid directly into a community bank account and
protected with two panels (signatures) – that of the community, and that of the regulatory
agency or a proxy acting on their behalf.
6.
Release of benefits: Money shall be released in a timely manner for community benefit provided
all conformance criteria and financial problems are resolved. Conformance shall be subject to a
standard analysis (see form **)
7.
Elections: The committee shall face re-election bi-annually subject to performance ratification by
AGM
NR Management Performance Criteria:
National authorities may dictate what monitoring takes place (conformance), but the choice of desired
outcomes are desired shall rest with the community. The following performance metrics should be
monitored:
1.
Protection effort: The community shall undertake a number of patrol days each month as agreed
with the respective authority
2.
Protection effectiveness: Monitoring of patrolling shall ensure that the catch-effort ratio of
poaching incidence per patrol days remains below a pre-determined threshold
3.
NRM status: The number of animals / fish / trees seen per unit effort (e.g. on patrol, per day, per
block covered) shall be monitored
4.
Monitoring offtake: The offtake of all natural resources shall be monitored by Village employees.
An annual summary shall be prepared and presented to the Annual General Meetings in all
Villages. For wildlife this annual summary should list:

all animals hunter,

Name of hunter,

the price paid, and concessions fees.

trophy quality
Data provide by the national authority, the hunting outfitter, and community monitors, and shall be reconcile d.
For fish ….
For trees ….
5.
Zonation Plan: Each community shall make a land use zonation plan and monitor adherence to
plan
Useful checklists
The following slides provide:
1. Chart summarizing roles of each organization
2. Checklist to assess if community has conformed
with CBNRM principles (and to authorize annual
payments)
3. Checklist to assess of principles of accountable
financial management are being followed
4. Checklist to assess of CBNRM principles are
being followed
Central
Govt.
Some of
wildlife
revenue
Community
Trust / Board
All Wildlife
Revenue
(100%)
Village Action Group
6. Illustration of the change from a
top-down to a bottom-up,
democratic, transparent and
accountable policy
5-10%
80-90%
Wildlife
Old Policy
(failed)
New Policy (Second
generation)
Effective CBNRM requires evolution from a First Generation (left) to a truly devolved Second Generation
CBNRM programme (right).
In a First Generation:
Devolution is only partial
People and communities are ‘subjects’. They are not trusted to make sensible decisions, and middle-level
government officials invariably ratify or ‘guide’ their choices.
They invariably evolved into Second Generation projects because they do not really work.
Second Generation CBNRM Projects:
Generate real grass-roots participation and empowerment by devolving revenues to them.
Encompass principles that ensure full participation in a democratic, transparent and account system.
Depend heavily on scale since all members of a community institution should be able to meet face-to-face.
People become citizens
Definition of Roles
Roles
Chiefs
1.
Patron; ideally, protect democratic principles in VAGs.
2.
Overall advisor, and maintain traditional values;
3.
Neutral arbitration;
4.
Guide decisions on broad land-use issues;
5.
Non-executive, non-administrative role.
Board / Trust Conservancy
COMMUNICATION &COORDINATING LEVEL
1.
Maintain bank account and financial records;
2.
Monitor and summarize Village performance and financial records;
3.
Coordinate development plans for area;
4.
Plan, implement and monitor large multi-VAG projects;
5.
Monitor and oversee NRM utilization in the area (e.g. wildlife management and safari hunting,
fishing).
6.
Conflict resolution within and between VAGs
Income
Income share: 5-10 % NR/wildlife income
Purpose: administration and coordination.
Where CRB undertakes project implementation
(e.g. clinic) or activities (e.g. employ gameguards) money must be voted to it from VAGs
Village (VAGs)
DOING LEVEL
1.
Membership shall hold annual, democratic elections, with power to dissolve committees. At any
time
2.
All decision shall be made at general meetings to prepare,, to prioritize and agree all plans and
budgets (no imposition of choices);
3.
NR/wildlife revenues shall be allocated to (1) projects/activities (2) household cash (3) NRM and
(4) administration t general meetings;
4.
Hold quarterly general meetings to report on financial and technical performance andv ariance from
budgets and workplans
5.
Plan, implement and monitor Village projects and activities
6.
Maintain bank account and financial records
7.
Manage NR (wildlife, fish, trees) at the local level (e.g. employ Village Scouts or sanction/prosecute
poachers according to by-laws)
Income share: 90+ % NR/wildlife income
CBNRM Support Agencies

Monitor performance (finances, wildlife/NR, institutional development) of CBNRM;

Develop managerial capacity of community institutions (i.e. design systems and provide training);

Ensure compliance with conditions by which wildlife revenues are devolved including:
o 80% + of income to communities;
o Full community participation in decision-making
o Revenue distribution guidelines
o Auditing
Donors or tax
Purpose: equivalent to income from crops or
livestock except that use must be decided by
the community.
May be used for any purposes decided by the
community including household needs (cash),
projects and activities.
CERTIFICATION OF VAG PERFORMANCE AND APPROVAL OF RELEASE OF FUNDS
We hereby confirm the following:
 This VAG held at least four general meetings during the year at which matters were openly and transparently discussed
and which were well attended. (If not, and you are convinced that there are legitimate reasons for this, please note these
reasons below).
 That the financial accounts of this VAG are accurate, follow the budget, and that no money has been misused, or if
misuse has occurred acceptable corrective action has been taken. (Before approving this, you should be (a) be convinced
that adequate and responsible corrective action has been taken and (b) the problem and actions should be summarized
below).
 That the finances and other matters of this VAG were properly presented and approved by the community at the AGM.
 That a membership list was updated and approved by the general community.
 That elections were freely and fairly held and that a newly approved committee is now in place to receive the
NR/wildlife income.
 That projects and activities were properly presented for the community to choose. Communities were properly
facilitated to choose projects.
 That the choice of projects and approval of the budget was done by the community in a general meeting and was not
forced on them.
 That the VAG reported on protection, monitoring, zonation metrics
 That the VAG has full records of wildlife/NRM offtake and income
Certified by authority (or proxy):
…………… ………………….. ……………….
Approved
Name
Title
…………… ………………….. ……………….
Approved
Name
Title
To be attached following revenue distribution:
AGM minutes
VAG AGM Summary Report (Form 2)
Principles for Revenue Distribution
Conditions
1. Decisions regarding use of
benefits must be democratic,
transparent and participatory.
2. People must have full choice
of the use of their money,
including household dividends
(cash), projects and activities.
3. All finances must be used in
the manner agreed at general
meetings, and must be fully
accounted for by keeping proper
financial records.
4. Each body should report
regularly to its constituents (i.e.
downwards)
5. Villages and CBOs must be
properly constituted and
democratically elected.
6. Money should be allocated
according to the principle of
producer communities.
7. The link between production
and benefit should be immediate
and transparent
Means of verification
Decisions must be made at general
meetings attended by at least 60%
of household heads and confirmed in
written minutes.
Confirmed by minutes and auditing
of General Meetings.
Full financial records will be
compiled and submitted quarterly by
Villages and BCOs to general
meetings (with copies to support
agencies)
Committees must report regularly on
project implementation and finances
at general meetings.
Each Village and CBO must have a
constitution, and hold regular
(annual) elections.
Revenue should be allocated to the
Village which animals are shot or
tourism income earned.
Revenues should be disbursed no
later than May in the year following
that in which it is earned, and should
be accompanied by a full list (and
value) of animals shots and other
fees paid.
Analysis of Congruence of Policy Guidelines with CBNRM Principles and Best Practice
Principles of CBNRM
1. The unit of production should be the unit of management
and benefit.
2. Producer communities should be small enough that all
households can participate face-to-face.



3. Community corporate bodies should be accountable to their 
constituency.
How are these fulfilled by Policy Guidelines
Are all revenues generated in the area returned to these communities
in a bottom-up manner?
Is there good participation in quota-setting and allocation; and law
enforcement?
Are decisions on at least 80-100% of revenues made at VAG-level and
by a quorum comprising 60+% of households?
Do committees report regularly and accurately to general meetings
on financial and technical performance?
4. Functions should be conducted at the lowest appropriate
level.

Are projects, village scouts, etc. done at VAG-level or lower?
5. The link between production and benefit should be
transparent and immediate.

Are wildlife revenues returned to the communities where it was
earned at general meetings?
Is this accompanied by good records of wildlife offtake and income?
6. Communities must have full choice in the use of wildlife
revenues, including household cash.


7. All marketing should be open and competitive and should be 
done by the wildlife producers themselves.

Are revenues allocating at general meetings where members have the
full choice of cash dividends?
Is marketing open and competitive?
Do communities select safari operators themselves? (This
significantly strengthens the important relationship between safari
operators and community).
8. The rates of taxation of wildlife should be similar to that of
other resources.

Do communities get 100% of wildlife revenues?
9. Activities or investment should not be undertaken unless
they can be managed and sustained locally.

Can wildlife activities fund themselves in the near future?
10. Government is the ultimate authority for wildlife.

Does a government agency monitor key process such as institutional
accountability, finances and community wildlife management?
11. Devolving authority and developing community
management capacity is a process.

While enlightened management must accept that there will be
mistakes and misappropriations, does this take place within a
rigorous framework that monitors progress and takes corrective
action?