Transcript Prospects of Cross-Strait Relations in Ma’s Second Term

Prospects for Cross-Strait
Relations
Week 11
Week 11: Teaching Outline
• Economic and cultural ties
• Continuing Conciliation Without Formal
Political Agreement?
• Preconditions for and Contents of
Political Talks
• Prospects for China’s Peaceful Unification
1. Economic and cultural ties
• Fewer agreements, more cooperation in
implementing previous agreements
– 21agreements (mostly related to economic
issues) signed since 2008, particularly the
first 2 years (4 meetings,12 agreements)
• Old issues left over by the previous
administration because of tension
between the two sides prior to 2008
1. Economic and cultural ties
• Easier things first
• Impact of elections on cross-strait
talks
–One meeting session between
ARATS and SEF in from 2011-2013
with 9 agreements singed
1. Economic and cultural ties
– Further institutionalizing cross-strait
exchange
• New areas for cooperation and
agreements in the coming years
• Possibilities of representative offices of
ARATS and SEF on the other side of the
Strait
• Meetings between Xi and Ma?
2. Continuing Conciliation
Without Formal Political Agreement?
• Priority in Ma’s comments (2012) on the Iron
Triangle
– cross-strait relations, foreign relations, national
defense (as a peace maker)
– No Surprise for Washington
• Institutionalizing cross-strait peace
– Both sides of the strait belong to one China
(creative ambiguity)
2. Continuing Conciliation
Without Formal Political Agreement?
• Distinction between sovereignty and
governance
• Not mutual recognition on sovereignty,
not mutual denial on governance
• Not mutual denial and mutual
recognition
• One country, two areas (toward clarity)
• Comparing with one state on each side
of the strait (clarity on the other end)
2. Continuing Conciliation
Without Formal Political Agreement?
–More words for the first angle than the
2nd and 3rd one
–Tension between M and D, art of
balance
• Arms sales to Taiwan (From F-16 A/B
to F-6C/D, even F-35?)
2. Continuing Conciliation
Without Formal Political Agreement?
– The thorny issue of Taiwan’s international
participation has been resolved case by case since
2008, without a package deal
• Taiwan’s diplomatic allies have surprisingly
remained unchanged for 5 years（Gambia);
Taiwan’s participation in WHA
• Ma’s request in his inauguration speech:
activities in International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
2. Continuing Conciliation
Without Formal Political Agreement?
• Necessity of peace talks as results of
deepening economic, cultural, and social
changes between the two sides
– Political relations between the two prior to
unification needs to be redefined in order to
promote further exchanges in order to following a
clear path rather than muddling through
2. Continuing Conciliation
Without Formal Political Agreement?
• However, peace talks and agreements not
appear in Ma’s new speech
– The idea of peace agreement withdrawn after it
was confronted by the DPP during the elections,
resulting in Ma’s three preconditions
– Peace agreements was redefined to refer to the
16 agreements in Ma’s 2012 speech
2. Continuing Conciliation
Without Formal Political Agreement?
– Is Ma eager to strike a package deal with
the mainland on cross-strait peace?
• Earlier talks would be good for Taiwan,
given the increasing gap between the two
sides, Taiwan should be more eager than
the mainland to strike a deal
• Stronger will, weaker capacity in Ma’s
second term
1. Precondition for
political dialogue
• 92 consensus redefined
• Original meanings
– both sides adhere to the one-China principle
– both sides strive for China’s reunification
– Different at the meaning of one China
• After 2008
– No dependence
1. Precondition for political
dialogue
• Unlike two parties in a real war who must
first give up their territory claim over the
other side in order to sign a peace treaty,
the precondition for the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait to reach a peace agreement
is to insist on the overlapping national
identity that both sides belong to one
China and avoid legal halving of state
sovereignty of China
1. Precondition for political
dialogue
• From 1993-2008, Taipei’s ambition to expand
its international participation through
aggressive pragmatic diplomacy and assertive
pursuit of Taiwan’s de jure independence
deteriorated cross-strait relations, resulting in
four strait crises
• The Ma administration recognizes the 1992
consensus on the basis of “no unification, no
independence and no war,” thus redefining the
original consensus.
1. Precondition for
For Beijing,
the weak principle
of one China
political
dialogue
can still service as a linkage between the two
sides
Taipei’s restraint from unilaterally declaring
Taiwan independence means it has accepted
the weak principle of one China
The two sides therefore can find a common
ground for building mutual trust
This can also be applied to the DPP
1. Precondition for
political dialogue
Beijing will not take Taipei’s acceptance of
unification goal as the precondition for
opening strait political dialogue and reach
peace agreement between the two sides, even
though some scholars in China still think it
should
2. Political Relations Redefined
• Not between the central government and local
government
• Nor between the two sovereign states
• But between two political entities under the
framework of constitutional one China.
Although the two entities govern their
domestic affairs respectively and oppose
against each other politically, they are not split
into two countries
2. Political Relations Redefined
• Since the constitution of the PRC or ROC
considers the territory currently controlled by the
other side as the sphere of its own sovereignty and
the international community respects the principle
of one China—not diplomatically recognizing the
two sides simultaneously nor allowing duel
representation of the two sides in international
organizations that require statehood for
membership—the status quo of one China has not
been changed
2. Political Relations Redefined
• The two sides of the Taiwan Strait continue a
symbolic “state of war” over the issue of
constitution and international law regarding
who should represent China, thus playing a
political game within the one-China
framework
• Culturally, the people on the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait could be considered part of the
Chinese nation
2. Political Relations Redefined
• How to square the principle of one China with
the reality of a non-yet-unified China?
• To separate the concept of foreign sovereignty
form domestic sovereignty (Gabriel Almond)
• To make theoretic distinction among four
dimensions of the concept of sovereignty
(Stephen Krasner)
2. Political Relations Redefined
• Domestic sovereignty
– how public authority is organized within the
state and how it might be effectively exercised
within the state’s borders
• Westphalian sovereignty
– “political organization based on the exclusion
of external actors from authority structures
within a given territory” and having the
absolute right to rule within its domain
2. Political Relations Redefined
• Interdependence sovereignty
– referring to “the ability of public authorities to
regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods,
people, pollutants, or capital across the borders
of their state;”
• International legal sovereignty
– the status of those entities that possess formal
juridical independence and thus a “ticket of
general admission to the international arena.”
2. Political Relations Redefined
• Peer-to-peer political entities
• Separated governance and shared sovereignty
• Any decision involving China’s sovereignty
and territory integrity should be commonly
made by the 1.3 billion Chinese people,
including the 23 million Taiwanese people.
– the decision is a product of unanimous
agreement, rather than a majority rule.
2. Political Relations Redefined
• while the state sovereignty, territory and people
refer to the same sphere, government refers to
only part of them
• This model of “shared sovereignty” is unique in
the world and in the history of cross-strait
relations. It is not only different from the zerosum game of mutual denial and competing for
international space, but also different from the
seemingly win-win game of mutual recognition of
each other’s sovereignty.
3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace
Framework
• The two sides picked up many low-hanging
fruits during the Ma’s first term, as 16
agreements (mostly related to economic issues)
were signed between 2008 and 2011,
particularly the first two years when 12
agreements were reached. Most of them were
old issues left over by the previous
administrations
3. Building a Cross-Strait
Peace Framework
• This suggests that the two sides have resolved
relatively easier problems between them and
been muddling through the “deep water” for
high-hanging fruits
• Economic and easy things first?
3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework
• The core bargain of a peace agreement is that
Taiwan would pledge not to seek de jure
independence so long as the mainland did not
use (or threaten to use) force (Phillip Saunders
and Scott Kastner)
• The third “If”
– if the danger of Taiwanese independence is
growing, Beijing may be more inclined to consider
the option of using force, thus blurring the subtle
line between opposing independence and
promoting unification
3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace
Framework
• Hu Jintao indirectly responded to Ma’s appeal
of “conciliation and truce” (hejie xiubing) by
saying that the two sides should avoid waste of
resource in the international arena (bimian
bubiyao de neihao), resulting in both sides’
diplomatic allies remaining peculiarly stable
and Taiwan international space being quietly
expanded
– WHA, ICAO, etc.
3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace
Framework
• During 2013 APEC meetings, director of
Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office of State
Council and Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council
of Executive Yuan addresses each other’s
official title
• Will such a precedent be applied to other
ministerial exchanges between the two sides in
the future, except for ministry for foreign
affairs or national defense?
3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace
Framework
• within the one-China framework, the two sides
can treat each other as two equivalent political
entities, public authorities and even
governments, as long as both claim the same
sovereignty (China) constitutionally and
internationally
3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace
Framework
• The two sides can even address each other as
Chinese mainland government and Chinese
Taiwan government when they engage in
formal political dialogue or negotiation,
acknowledging that the other side’s political
and legal system is based on the commitment
to one China, with the same territory and
sovereign claim
3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace
Framework
• Should the two sides should recognize each
other’s overlapping sovereignty (claiming the
same one China) and separated governance?
• Is “brother states” workable?
• Should the peace agreement have a clear
orientation to China’s final unification?
3. Preconditions for
and Contents of Political Talks
• Peace talks depend on the good will of BOTH
sides
– Taiwan cannot be forced to talk
– Ma’s insistence on ROC’s sovereign and value
system
• One country, two areas not a solid basis for
political talks, even though……
• Political relationship between the two
needs to be redefined
3. Preconditions for
and Contents of Political Talks
– DPP’s constraints on the Ma administration
• Su needs to distinguish himself from Tsai in
order to…(Richard Bush)
• DPP’s representative office in the U.S.,
possibly in Japan as well
• Restore the China Affairs Department within
the DPP
• Possibility of regression to former strait
crises
Two Sides, Three Players
Independence
Strategic Clarity
Strategic Ambiguity
One China, ROC on Both sides belong to one
One
Taiwan China
Taiwan
gezi biaoshu vs.
gebu biaoshu
State-toOne country, One
state
two
country,
relations
governments two areas
ROC is
One country, One
Taiwan
two entities country,
1 ball, 2
two areas
surfaces
Unification
Strategic
Clarity
One-China
principle
National
Unifications
Guidelines
One country,
two systems
3. Preconditions for
and Contents of Political Talks
• The U.S. does not support political dialogues
as much as it did in the late 1990s
– Don’t put too much hope on Ma (Bush,
Glaser)
– Realistic expectation is good
– Is peace agreement good for the U.S.?
• Tension between peace agreement and
arms sales
3. Preconditions for
and Contents of Political Talks
• Core bargain in peace agreement
–No war
–Oriented to unification？
–Bottom lines of peaceful unification or
integration
• No regime changes
• Not a new aircraft carrier for the
mainland
4. Prospects for China’s
Peaceful Unification
• Path
– From economic and social integration to political
integration
– Striking a deal via political negotiation
• Formula: One country, two system
– Hong Kong model
– Macau model
– Taiwan model
– Linkage between reality and ideal
MAINLAND CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS
The world is now watching
A global paradigm shift is happening
A transition from the old order to the new
With vibrations felt by many and not a few
Taiwan too is watching
A relationship change is in the offing
US, being debt ridden, is no longer as effective
China, becoming prosperous, is more attractive
MAINLAND CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS
Taiwan is now rethinking
A new scenario worth considering
China as a superpower shall be phenomenal
Taiwan as its partner may be treated special
The world is now watching
China-Taiwan relations warming
Should China and Taiwan be joining hands
What a mighty China will be emerging then.
-- Frank Chin (Malaysia)