Transcript ICPA 2005 - uni

Greifswald October 2006
The National Offender Management
Service (NOMS): implementation and
evaluation
Peter Raynor
University of Wales, Swansea
What I will talk about:
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Background: the ‘What Works’ experiment in
Britain
The results of research on effective practice
Reasons for developing integrated offender
management
Evidence and politics in penal reform
Proceed with caution
The world’s biggest experiment in
evidence-based rehabilitation
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Probation services and prisons in England and
Wales
Now approximately ten years’ experience
Large scale: targets for completions of offending
behaviour programmes in 2005 were 15,000 for the
Probation Service and 7,000 for prisons.
(Prisons started earlier but numbers expanded more
slowly)
Why did the experiment start?
In the mid-1990s we had:
 Limited evidence of any impact on reoffending
 Politicians who were sceptical about
rehabilitative services
 Some new ideas about effective corrections
from meta-analyses and pilot projects
For example: STOP (Straight Thinking
On Probation)
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Mid Glamorgan 1991-5: evaluated pilot of
‘Reasoning and Rehabilitation’
72-hour cognitive-behavioural group
programme
Implemented for those at high risk of custody
Required consent
Two PO tutors per group
Evaluation showed:
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Probation officers could deliver this
The ‘right’ people were on it
Crime-prone attitudes and personal problems
were reduced
Some reduction in reconviction for
programme completers (and high completion
rate)
Reduction in seriousness and reincarceration
Reconvictions in one year:
STOP completers:
Expected rate
Actual
42%
35%
Custodial comparison:
Expected rate
Actual
42%
49%
Seriousness:
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Stop completers: 8% had a serious
reconviction by 12 months
2% returned to prison on first reconviction
Custodial comparison group: 21% had
serious reconviction within 12 months
15% returned to prison on first reconviction
Other results:
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Crime-prone attitudes decreased
Self-reported problems decreased
Project members described what they had
learned
They reported changes in thinking, e.g. they
had become less impulsive
Exit interview quotes:
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‘It’s helped me to solve problems and get
them through to people better. Prevents me
from jumping off the handle. I listen more, I
think about problems more and discuss
things. It takes a lot of stress off my head
because I Iisten to others.’
More:
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‘It’s made me realise . . It’s learnt me to put
myself in other people’s places if they’d been
burgled . . Guilty’s the word . . It’s out of
order. It’s opened my mind and I look at a
subject from all different angles . . Not just
jumping the gun. With problems I can clear
them up more easily.’
Meanwhile: a crisis for probation
In 1993 the Conservative Government
appointed a new Home Secretary, Michael
Howard, who:
 Announced that ‘prison works’
 Reduced spending on the probation service
 Abolished training for probation officers
 Would the probation service survive?
Why a new probation strategy was
needed
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In 1995 the Home Office issued a circular on ‘critical
success factors’. In 1996 the Inspectorate’s survey
found:
267 ‘effective programmes’ claimed by Chief
Officers, of which:
109 claimed to be evaluated
50 were left after meaning of evaluation explained
33 had some documented results
Only 4 had adequate evaluation and positive results
Something needed to be done!
What we knew by mid-90s: effective
programmes . . .
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Target risk
Focus on criminogenic
need
Are structured
Use direction
Use cognitivebehavioural methods
Are (best) located in the
community
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Are delivered with high
integrity
Have committed
management
Have appropriately
trained staff
Have adequate
resources
Have integral
evaluation
The ‘What Works’ strategy
The ‘New Labour’ government was elected in 1997 and
announced its support for evidence-based policy.
For probation this meant:
 Pathfinder projects
 Integration of areas into national Service (by 2001)
For probation and prisons:
 Some new resources
 Accreditation of programme designs
 Evaluation
Accreditation: promoting quality
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Prison Service General and Sex Offender Treatment
Programme Accreditation Panel set up 1996
Joint Prisons/Probation Services Accreditation Panel
set up 1999
Renamed Correctional Services Accreditation Panel
To approve programme designs and quality control
arrangements
Accreditation criteria for programmes
(In 2002 when evaluated by
Home Office):
 Clear model of change
 Selection of offenders
 Targeting dynamic risk
factors
 Range of targets
 Effective methods
 Skills orientated
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Sequencing, intensity,
duration
Engagement and motivation
Continuity of programmes
and services
Ongoing monitoring
Ongoing (plans for)
evaluation
What the panel did and didn’t do:
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Accredited approx. 28 programmes
Did not control:
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Targets
Timing of roll-out
OASys
National Standards and enforcement
Whether evaluation took place
Relations with sentencers and communities
Resources and management generally
Some results of evaluation so far:
Prisons
Three evaluations of offending behaviour programmes:
 First (2002) shows positive effect for medium risk
 Second (2003) shows no significant effect
 Third (2003) shows positive effects for completers
 All show problems of matching comparison groups
More results: probation
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Programme completers reconvict less than
comparison group offenders
Programme non-completers reconvict more
Low completion rates (21% - 38% in the main
studies) make evaluation difficult, as we cannot
distinguish between programme effects and
selection effects
(completion rates are improving but still only a
minority complete)
More results: resettlement of prisoners
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The resettlement pathfinders (phase 1)
looked at seven projects (ABCDEFG) of
which three (led by voluntary organisations:
EFG) aimed mainly to address ‘welfare
problems’ while the four probation-led
projects (ABCD) aimed also to address
attitudes, thinking, behaviour
Resettlement pathfinder phase 1:
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Seven projects A B C D E F G
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Rank on continuity: + A B C D E F G Impact on attitudes: + C B A D G E F Impact on problems: + C D A G B E F -
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ABCD consistently better: why?
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Results of the resettlement pathfinders
When projects addressed both practical
problems and thinking:
 Greater positive change in attitudes
 Improvement in self-reported problems
 Greater continuity of contact with helpers
 Higher continuity associated with lower
reconviction
 NB use of cognitive-motivational programme
Why?
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‘In the case of criminal behaviour, factors in the
social environment seem influential determinants of
initial delinquency for a substantial proportion of
offenders . . . but habitual offending is better
predicted by looking at an individual’s acquired ways
of reacting to common situations’ (Zamble and
Quinsey 1997)
Persistent offenders need practical help and
changes in thinking
Overall, the results of first-wave
studies so far are ‘mixed’
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Some good outcomes: correctional services
are now committed to reducing re-offending;
many hundreds of staff now understand
principles of effective practice
What do we learn? Lessons for:
Theory
Research
Implementation
These problems are not unusual –
e.g. Lipsey 1999:
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Compared 205 ‘demonstration’ (pilot) and
196 ‘practical’ (routine) interventions with
young offenders
‘Practical’ interventions were half as effective
(6% decrease compared to 12%)
57% of the ‘practical’ interventions had no
effect
What should we expect from rapid roll-out?
Lessons for theory
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International research continues to support
effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural programmes
UK research suggests need to improve impact
through motivation, negotiating meaningful goals
with offenders and case management
The programme is part of the correctional
experience: the impact comes from the whole
experience
No case for a return to ‘nothing works’
Lessons for research:
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Design pilot projects and early stage roll-outs as
experiments, to be evaluated
Build in proper comparison/control groups by
improving quasi-experimental methodology or, if
feasible, random allocation
Collect fuller information including dynamic risk
factors
Motivate staff to provide good quality information by
building a culture of curiosity
Lessons for implementation I
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Don’t set non-evidence-based targets (high initial
targets of 30,000 led to pressure to fill programmes
regardless of suitability)
Assess risks and needs in correctional populations
before deciding programmes and scale (not possible
because of delays in OASys)
Don’t rely on managerialism to change staff culture
Don’t go too fast
Expect initial reduction in effectiveness of roll-out
(Lipsey 1999)
Don’t over-enforce or drift down-tariff
Lessons for implementation II
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Case management, supervision and follow-up are an
integral part of effective programmes
They require Core Correctional Practices i.e.
Effective authority
Pro-social modelling
Good relationship quality: open, warm,
empathic, optimistic, structuring, motivating
(Dowden and Andrews 2004)
Impact of CCP:
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Mean effect sizes are higher when CCPs are
present
They make significant differences when other
principles of effectiveness (risk, need,
responsivity) are also followed
Effective interventions and staff skills are
mutually beneficial – neither replaces the
other
BUT:
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‘Clearly these CCPs were rarely used in the
human service programs that were surveyed
in this meta-analysis . . . These results
suggest that the emphasis placed on
developing and utilizing appropriate staff
technique has been sorely lacking within
correctional treatment programmes.’
(Dowden and Andrews 2004)
All this suggests that offender
management can work well if we
have:
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Sound assessment of risks and needs
Resources to match needs
‘Relationship skills’ to understand, build trust,
motivate and challenge
‘Structuring skills’ to clarify expectations,
requirements, controls
High continuity
Prisons and probation working together
Lessons for implementation III
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Offender management also needs to address
the full range of problems which offenders
experience.
The Social Exclusion Unit’s report in 2002 on
Reducing Re-offending by Ex-prisoners
identified several areas of concern which
became the ‘Seven Pathways’ in the national
and regional ‘reducing re-offending’ plans:
Seven pathways
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Accommodation
Education, training and employment
Mental and physical health
Drugs and alcohol
Finance, benefits and debt
Children and families of offenders
Attitudes, thinking and behaviour
For example (from SEU report):
prisoners are:
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13 times more likely to have been in care
13 times as likely to be unemployed
15 times as likely to be HIV positive
80% have writing skills, 65% numeracy skills
and 50% reading skills at or below 11 yr old
level
60% to 70% using drugs before
imprisonment
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20% of male and 37% of female sentenced prisoners
have history of suicide attempts
Half had no GP
Twenty times more likely to have been excluded
from school
80% of drug users have never had contact with
treatment services
A third lose accommodation in prison, two-thirds lose
their job, one fifth have money problems and two
fifths lose family contact.
Integrating services:
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced new
sentences, including:
 A single community sentence
 A new hybrid sentence, combining a short
period of prison with a longer period of
supervision in the community (‘Custody
Plus’) to improve resettlement for shortsentence prisoners
Also in 2003:
The Carter Report (Managing Offenders, Reducing
Crime) prepared by Patrick Carter for the Prime
Minister recommended:
 Limiting the prison population (to 80,000)
 End-to-end management of offenders (linking prison
and probation, as in Custody Plus)
 A National Offender Management Service (NOMS)
 ‘Contestability’, market testing, private sector
involvement
But the political context changes:
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2006: New Home Secretary, John Reid,
wants to be seen as ‘tough on crime’
8,000 new prison places
‘Custody Plus’ is cancelled
NOMS is still not running
Staff are unhappy
Private sector involvement is a political
priority
Lessons to learn from the UK:
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Developing evidence-based effective offender
management is a slow and gradual process
Politicians want quick results
Evidence tends to be used selectively to support
policies already chosen for other reasons
We now know more about what to do: will we be
allowed to do it?
Proceed with caution