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Radiological Response:
Myth vs. Reality
James Barnes
Certified Health Physicist
Chairperson, Homeland Security Committee, Health Physics Society
Bobbie Walton
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
State of California
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Health Physics Society
Homeland Security Committee
http://hps.org/hsc/
2
Radiation and the First
Responder
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Visualizing Radiation
For best viewing,
turn brightness
and contrast on
the monitor to
maximum values
http://faraday.physics.uiowa.edu/modern/7D30.60b.htm
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Average Exposures From
Background Radiation
Average Exposure: 0.360 rem/year
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Radiation Risk – High Dose
Syndrome
Subclinical
syndrome
Acute Dose (RAD)
Hematopoietic
syndrome
Gastrointestinal
syndrome
200 – 400
Central Nervous
syndrome
~50 - 200
600 – 1,000
> 1,000
Characteristics
Subclinical signs (blood changes, nausea,
vomiting, weakness, “flu-like symptoms”). May
require treatment, but not necessarily
hospitilization.
Anemia, hemorrhage, infection, electrolytic
imbalance
Lethargy, diarrhea, dehydration, degeneration
of bowel epithelium, death in 10-14 days
Agitation, apathy, disorientation, disturbed
equilibrium, vomiting, convulsions, prostration,
coma, death in 1-2 days.
Without medical intervention, exposure to
doses between 600 and 2,000 rads may result
in death within 3 to 10 days.
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Radiation Risk – Low Dose
In our society, about 20%
of the population will die
of cancer. In 10,000
people, this means that
2,000 will die from
cancer.
2,000 Cancer
Fatalities
10,000 people
If 10,000 people were to
be given 1 REM of
radiation, statistics
suggest that 2,004 will die
of cancer.
1 REM
2,004 Cancer Fatalities
10,000 people
This suggests that the risk
of excess cancer deaths is
increased by a factor of
about 0.0004 per rem.
(4 additional fatalities / 10,000 people) / 1 REM
0.0004 / rem
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Myth 1
Radiation is so deadly that an
attack using radioactive materials
will kill thousands of people.
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The Goiania
Experience
(Sept, 1987)
Rozental, J. J. Radiological Accident in Goiana - An Overview.
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The Goiania Experience
• A mothballed tele-therapy irradiator was present in an
abandoned hospital building.
• Two men decided to “mine” the metal in the irradiator.
• The unit (containing 1400 curies of Cs-137) was
dismantled. The source capsule was ruptured and the
cesium was released.
• The “glowing crystals” (due the the extremely high
radioactivity of the material) was taken home and
shared with family and friends.
• There was widespread contamination of the
neighborhood.
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Initial Response
112,000 people (10 % of Goiania’s population) were
surveyed at an Olympic Stadium.
– 250 were identified as contaminated
– 50 contaminated people were isolated in a camping area
inside the Olympic Stadium for more detailed screening
– 20 people were hospitalized or transferred to special housing
with medical
and nursing assistance
– 8 patients transferred
to the Navy Hospital in
Rio de Janeiro
– Residential
contamination survey
was initiated
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Early Consequences
• Widespread contamination of
downtown Goiania
• 85 residences found to have
significant contamination
(41 of these were evacuated and
a few were completely or partially
demolished)
• People cross-contaminated
houses 100 miles away
• Hot Spots at 3 scrap metal yards
and one house
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Radiation Injuries and Uptakes
• 4 fatalities (2 men, 1 woman and 1 child)
• 28 patients had radiation induced skin injuries
(they held/played with the source for extended
periods)
• 50 people had internal
deposition (ingestion)
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The Goiania Experience (cont.)
• Significant psychological consequences amongst the
population such as fear and depression.
• Discrimination against the victims and key products of
local economy
• Psychomatic illnesses related to the accident stress.
• In first 60,000 monitored individuals;
• 5,000 presented symptoms consistent with Acute
Radiation Syndrome (i.e, rash, nausea, vomiting,
diarrhea, weakness, etc.).
• Of these 5,000 persons, NONE were
contaminated.
Salter (citing Peterson in Nuclear News; 1988). Helping to Prevent Terror Following A Radiological Incident. HPS 14
Annual Meeting; 2001.
Conclusions
• Long and expensive
clean-up effort.
• Profound
psychological effects
such as fear and
depression on large
populations
• Isolation and boycott
of goods by
neighbors
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The Reality:
The primary effect of this dispersed radioactivity
was psychological and sociological, not
radiological.
The true radiation effects were limited to those
in the immediate vicinity of the source
remnants:
• They were exposed the longest
• They were closest to the source material
• They had little protection from the source
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The “Radiation” Terrorist
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The term "terrorism" means an activity that -(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life,
property, or infrastructure; and
(ii) appears to be intended -(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(B) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
(C) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostagetaking.
Executive Order on Terrorist Financing, 24-September-2001
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The Nuclear Weapon
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What was your reaction to that
last slide?
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Myth 2
Nobody can survive the aftermath
of a nuclear weapon. There is so
much radiation that it will scorch
the earth.
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Blast and Fire create
high levels of
destruction
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The process (nuclear fission), creates radioactive
materials and distributes them over a wide area
(“fallout”).
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The Reality
Terrorists do not have thermonuclear weapons. They
may have small yield nuclear (fission) weapons.
The levels of an atomic weapon’s dispersion are NOT
as severe as a hydrogen bomb’s, and CAN be survived.
While such an attack would be devastating, it does not
create an inescapable environment in the surrounding
areas (i.e., survive the blast, and you have a good
chance of escaping).
With proper planning and preparation, people can
escape from fallout affected areas without incurring
serious exposures.
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Radiological Dispersal Device
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Myth 3
Thousands will die if a “dirty bomb” is
exploded in a major city.
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The Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
Radioactive
Material
High
Explosive
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Detectable Ground Contamination
Can be Found Miles Downwind
≥ 0.2 uCi/m2
Can be detected
with thin window
G-M meter
≥ 2 uCi/m2
Can be detected
with dose rate
meter
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Despite Widespread Contamination,
There Are Relatively Small Exposures
≥1 REM
EPA Shelter
Area Less than
0.1 miles
downwind
0.01 – 0.1 REM
out to 2 miles
[Dose similar to a
chest x ray or
~30% of natural
background]
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Los Angeles Example: EPA PAG Would
Recommend Shelter/Evacuation of a
Few Residential Blocks
HYPOTHETICAL
Release: 1.3 KCi CS-137 RDD
with 5 lbs HE
4-Day Dose (Internal + External)
Evacuation/Relocation PAG
Color
Level
(Rem)
Area
(km2)
1
0.026
0.1
.42
0.01
3.84
Description
Consider evacuation. Shelter
in place if no evacuation.
Release location: Burbank Police Department
34 10' 60"N, 118 18' 31"W
100% Aerosolized release fraction
Normal summertime west-northwest winds,
10-12 mph.
Map size: 6 x 6 km
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The Reality
The Dirty Bomb is a weapon of mass
disruption, not mass destruction.
It is effective to the degree that it would:
– Deny area access
– Induce psychological stress in a
population
– Create economic disruption
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What Will You Need to Know?
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Know the Basics About Radiation
• Lack of trained personnel is the primary
reason for loss of control of radiation /
radioactive environments
• Responders FEAR radiation about as much as
the public
• Training should be tailored to the mission /
scope of the responder (Firefighter vs. EMT
vs. Haz Mat’l Team)
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Where do you get this
information?
http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is301.asp
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Where do you get this
information?
Many local
HPS Chapters
will provide
training
(general or
specific) as a
public service
(especially to
small (poor)
organizations).
http://hps.org/aboutthesociety/organization/chapters.html
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Where do you get this
information?
http://hps.org/hsc/documents/
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Know Your Response Mission
Precisely
Examples:
• Fire fighters: Set Perimeter; Recover Victims
• Police: Secure Perimeter / Scene Investigation
• FBI: Scene Management
•
•
Red Cross (and others): Mass Shelter and Feeding
EMTs / Medical: Victim Triage and Medical Services
Management
Each Mission Requires a Different
Radiation Protection Approach
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Where do you get this
information?
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/applications/nfacsd
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Where do you get this
information?
http://terrorism.spjc.edu/ceu/blurb.asp?examid=11
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Where do you get this
information?
http://hps.org/publicinformation/asktheexperts.cfm
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Obtain and Maintain Instruments
• “Simple” works
• Match the Instrument to the Mission
• Dose Rate instrument for scene entry
• Contamination instruments for
perimeters
• No one instrument does it all
• Cover a range of levels / doses
• Dose Rates: 0.010 – 50,000 millirem
• Contamination: 100 – 100,000 dpm
• Keep them working and calibrated
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Can I get instruments with no
budget?
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/equipment_hder.htm
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Know Your Radiation Exposure
Limits for a Terrorist Scene
• What is a “safe” dose level for a member of
the public?
• What dose level should a responder not
exceed?
• What dose level would make a rescue too
dangerous to attempt?
• When would the dose levels apply?
These levels should be formally described. If you’re
trying to figure this out AT THE SCENE, it’s TOO LATE!
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“Emergency” Limits
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
No dose: Anecdotally reported to be the limit in several
U.S. cities
100 mrem: Limit listed for first responders in several
emergency response guidance documents (some in draft
stage)
5,000 mrem: OSHA limit, (first responders to be engaged in
occupational exposure in an emergency scenario)
10,000 mrem: EPA guidance for property protection
25,000 mrem: EPA guidance for lifesaving activities
50,000 mrem: NCRP Report 138
75,000 mrem: “Old” military limit for lifesaving activities
No upper limit: Draft ICRP Guidance for lifesaving activities
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Know Where to Get Expert Help
• Local Radiation Regulatory
Organizations (City, County, State)
• Federal Organizations with Radiation
Expertise (NRC, DOE, EPA)
• Local Professional Societies (Health
Physics Society Chapters, Medical
Physicists, Radiation Oncologists, etc.)
Do it NOW! Don’t wait until the event
happens!
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RAP Team Configuration
• Each region has a minimum of 3 teams
• RAP teams consist of trained employees from DOE and
DOE contractors/facilities
• Each team consists of 9 members; one Team Leader,
one Public Information Officer, one Team Captain, one
Senior Scientist, and five Health Physics Survey/Support
personnel
• Additional personnel are available, such as industrial
hygienists, transportation specialists, logistics support,
etc.
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Standard Response Equipment
• Alpha Detection
• Beta Detection
• Gamma Detection
• Neutron Detection
•Gamma spectroscopy
systems (NaI and HPGe)
•Air samplers (high and low
volume)
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RAP Regional
Contact Numbers
Region 1, Brookhaven Area Office
Region 2, Oak Ridge Operations Office
Region 3, Savannah River Operations Office
Region 4, NNSA Service Ctr. Albuquerque
Region 5, Chicago Operations Office
Region 6, Idaho Operations Office
Region 7, Livermore Site Office
Region 8, Richland Operations Office
(631) 344-2200
(865) 576-1005
(803) 725-3333
(505) 845-4667
(630) 252-4800
(208) 526-1515
(925) 422-8951
(509) 373-3800
DOE HQ
(202) 586-8100
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Any Questions?
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