Transcript Slide 1

ECON 4009
Labor Economics I
2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Economics, NTU
Lecture 8
Discrimination
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 1
Introduction
• Discrimination occurs when the marketplace takes into
account such factors as race and sex when making economic
exchanges.
• However, it is difficult to distinguish statistical
discrimination, which refers to racial or gender inequality
based on stereotypes, and discrimination based on
preferences.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 2
Race and Gender in the Labor Market
• Men earn more than women, and whites usually earn more
than nonwhites.
• Differences in educational attainment between whites and
nonwhites account for a portion of the wage differential.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 3
The Discrimination Coefficient
• Taste discrimination translates the notion of
racial prejudice.
– Racial prejudice causes employers to blindly
perceive the costs of hiring blacks as being higher
than the true cost.
– Even though it costs wb dollars to hire one
person-hour of black labor, the employer acts
as if it costs wb(1+d) dollars, where d, d>0, is
the discrimination coefficient.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 4
Employer Discrimination
• Implication of the Becker model
• If blacks and whites are perfect substitutes,
employers have a segregated work force.
– Even non-discriminating employers have a segregated work force, as
they employ all black workers
• Discrimination does not pay.
– Employers hire the wrong type of worker and/or they hire the wrong
number of workers.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 5
The Employment Decision for a Firm That
Does Not Discriminate
Dollars
wB
VMPE
EB
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
If the market-determined black
wage is less than the white
wage, a firm that does not
discriminate will hire only
blacks. It hires black workers
up to the point where the black
wage equals the value of
marginal product of labor, E*B.
Employment
Lecture 8 slide 6
The Employment Decision for a Prejudiced Firm
Dollars
Dollars
wW
wB(1+d1)
wB(1+d0)
wB
VMPE
VMPE
EW
(a) White Firm
Employment
EB1
EB EB*
Employment
(b) Black Firm
Firms that discriminate can be either white firms (if the discrimination coefficient is very high) or
black firms (if the discrimination coefficient is relatively low). A white firm hires white workers up to
the point where the white wage equals the value of marginal product. A black firm hires black
workers up to the point where the utility-adjusted black wage equals the value of marginal product.
Firms that discriminate hire fewer workers than firms that do not discriminate.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 7
Profits and Discrimination
Dollars
Discrimination reduces profits
in potentially two ways. A
discriminatory firm that hires
only white workers will hire
too few workers at a very
high wage. Even a
discriminatory firm that only
hires black workers is harmed
by its actions as it hires too
few workers.
MAX
W
Black
Firms
0
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
White
Firms
dW
Discrimination
Coefficient
Lecture 8 slide 8
The Black-White Wage Ratio in the
Labor Market
• Employer discrimination generates a wage gap
between equally skilled black and white workers.
• The quantity demanded for black labor increases as
the black-while wage ratio falls.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 9
Determination of Black/White
Wage Ratio in the Labor Market
Black-White
Wage Ratio
S
(wB/wW)
1
D
R
(wB/wW)*
D
0
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
N
Black
Employment
If the black-white wage ratio is very high,
no firm in the labor market will want to
hire blacks. As the black-white wage ratio
falls, more and more firms are
compensated for their disutility and the
demand for black workers rises. The
equilibrium black-white wage ratio is
given by the intersection of supply and
demand, and equals (wB/wW)*. If some
firms prefer to hire blacks, they would be
willing to hire blacks even if the blackwhite wage ratio exceeds 1, shifting the
demand curve up to D. If the supply of
blacks is sufficiently small, it is then
possible for the black-white wage ratio to
exceed 1.
Lecture 8 slide 10
Employee Discrimination
• Employee discrimination does not generate a wage
differential between equally skilled black and white
workers.
• Employee discrimination does not affect the
profitability of firms.
• Work places will be segregated
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 11
Customer Discrimination
• If customers discriminate, their perceived price of a good is
utility-adjusted with a discrimination coefficient.
• When a firm cannot hide black workers, customer
discrimination can have an adverse effect on black wages.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 12
Statistical Discrimination
• Statistical discrimination is based on treating an individual
on the basis of membership in a group and knowledge of
that group’s history.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 13
The Impact of Statistical Discrimination on Wages
Dollars
Dollars
White
White
Black
T*
(a) Whites have higher average score
Test Score
Black
T
Test Score
(b) Test is better predictor for white workers
The worker’s wage depends not only on his own test score, but also on the mean
test score of workers in his racial group. (a) If black workers, on average, score
lower than white workers, a white worker who gets a score of T* earns more than a
black worker with the same score. (b) If the test is a better predictor of
productivity for white workers, high-scoring whites earn more than high-scoring
blacks, and low-scoring whites earn less than low-scoring blacks.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 14
Measuring Discrimination
• One possible measure of discrimination is the
difference in mean wages.
• A better measure would compare the wages of
equally skilled workers.
• Oaxaca decomposition: a technique that
decomposes the raw wage differential into a
portion related to a difference in skills and a
portion attributable to labor market discrimination.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 15
Oaxaca decomposition
Male earnings function: wM   M   M sM
Female earnings function: wF   F   F sF
w =wM  wF   M   M sM   F   F sF
  M   F  (  M   F ) sF   M ( sM  sF )
• The first 2 terms combined captures the differential
due to discrimination, while the last term is the
component of differential that can be explained by
skills.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 16
Measuring the Impact of Gender
Discrimination on the Wage
Dollars
Men’s Earnings
Function
w
M
wF
Women’s Earnings
Function
M
w
F
F
s F
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
s M
Schooling
The average woman has sF
years of schooling and earns
w–F. The average man has
sM years of schooling and
earns w–M. Part of the wage
differential arises because
men have more schooling
than women. If the average
woman was paid as if she
were a man, she would earn
w*F. A measure of
discrimination is then given
by w*F–w–F.
Lecture 8 slide 17
Policy Application: Determinants of
the White-Black Wage Ratio
• There has been an upward trend in the wages of blacks in
recent years.
• This has been attributed to increases in the quality and
quantity of black schooling.
• Government programs have positively affected black wages.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 18
The Oaxaca Decomposition of the
Black-White Wage Differential, 1995
Controls for Differences Controls for Differences
in Education, Age, Sex, in Education, Age, Sex,
and Region of
Region, and Occupation
Residence
and Industry
Raw log wage differential
-0.211
-0.211
Due to differences in skills
-0.082
-0.144
Due to discrimination
-0.134
-0.098
Source: Joseph G. Altonji and Rebecca M. Blank, “Race and Gender in the Labor Market,” in Orley Ashenfelter and David
Card, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3C, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999, Table 5. The log wage differential
between any two groups can be interpreted as being approximately equal to the percentage wage differential between the
groups.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 19
The Trend in the Black-White Earnings
Ratio, 1967-2009
1
0.95
Black-white earnings raatio
0.9
Women
0.85
0.8
0.75
Men
0.7
0.65
0.6
1965
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
Year
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Lecture 8 slide 20
Male Labor Force Participation Rates, by
Race, 1955-2009
90
85
Participation Rate
80
Whites
75
70
Blacks
65
60
1950
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
1960
1970
1980
Year
1990
2000
2010
Lecture 8 slide 21
The Decline in the Labor Force
Participation of Blacks and the Average
Black Wage
Frequency
w~1
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
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w~2
w1
w2
Wage rate
Lecture 8 slide 22
Discrimination Against Other
Groups
• Differences in wages can be linked to varying educational
attainment.
• Less skilled workers earn less, just as human capital theory
proposes.
• Asians tend to earn more than white, mainly due to
schooling.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 23
The Trend in the Earnings Ratio of
Hispanics and Asians, 1974-2009
1.2
Asian women
1.1
Earnings Ratio
1
Asian men
0.9
0.8
Hispanic Women
0.7
Hispanic men
0.6
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Year
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 24
Policy Application: Determinants of
the Male-Female Wage Ratio
• Occupational crowding has segregated women into
particular occupations where the return to education is
lower.
• Human capital is more profitable the longer the payoff
period.
• Women are better off if they enter occupations in which
their skills do not deteriorate during the years they
spend in the household sector.
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
Lecture 8 slide 25
Trend in the Female-Male
Earnings Ratio, 1960-2009
0.8
Female-Male Earnings Ratio
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
1960
Economics of Labor, 2013 Fall
Elliott Fan
1970
1980
1990
Year
2000
2010
2020
Lecture 8 slide 26