Transcript RULE OF LAW

MONUC
Global Forum V
Hot spots: non state sectors
vulnerable to corruption
The DRC Context
– History of colonial exploitation and
dictatorship;
– Emerging from/struggling with conflict;
– fledgling democracy;
– Weakened and dysfunctional institutions
and limited extension of state authority, in
a vast geographic territory (2,345,410 sq. km
bordering 9 countries);
– Collapsed justice system
– Extensive natural resource wealth.
Natural Resources in the DRC
Natural Resources:
 Coltan (cassiterite), copper, gold, silver, diamonds,
niobium, tantalum, zinc, manganese, tin, uranium
 50% of Africa’s hardwoods
 10% world’s hydro-electric capacity
(Source: UN Reports)
Mining:
 1980 – generated 66% budgetary receipts
 1990 – export receipts = 1 billion USD
– 465,000 tonnes of copper
 Today – no significant contribution to budget
– 20,000 tonnes of Copper (2006)
(source: Programme du gouvernement 2007-2011)
Extractive industries in the DRC
“IF THE DRC IS TO EMBARK ON A
PROCESS OF RECOVERY, IT WILL
HAVE TO RELY ON THE
GENERATION OF STATE
REVENUES FROM EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES” (s/2007/68)
Extractive industries - challenges
 Limited extension of state authority creates
vacuums (imposed “taxes”)
 Corporate entities engage “protection forces” who
extort payments from local populations
 Government troops at border often complicit (note:
many elements of the FARDC are not paid on a
regular basis and only receive minimal salary)
 Limited technology/investment required and
desperate, unskilled labour easily exploited
 Parallel systemic corruption
Extractive industries - challenges
 Formal sector undermined by vulnerability to interference
from military elements, rebel groups, foreign interests and
unscrupulous traders – allegations of protection by DRC
personalities;
 State mining companies unable to protect concessions,
enabling unregulated diggers
 Vast wealth both a source of financing for armed groups,
and also a motive to continue
 Corruption and mismanagement – resulting in large
majority of sales and exports outside authority of state
 Legitimate, conscientious mining companies, comptoirs,
négociants, find it impossible to compete
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources:
Non-State Actors
Artisanal miners
_____________________________________
Economic operators violating Congolese law:
(potential targets of UN sanctions)
 Middlemen – buyers and traders engaged in fraudulent
activities (subcontractors, négociants, comptoirs/
exporters)
 Mining companies
_______________________________________
Artisanal Miners
 2 million artisanal miners
 Subsistence income at best – often in debt
 Required to pay string of charges – i.e. local
chief, unintegrated FARDC elements,
mining police, de facto authorities
 Subjected to intimidation and violence (armed
gangs – suicidaires – 38 deaths registered by HR in Kasai Oriental
2006)
Other non-state actors
Fraudulent exporters or comptoirs
– buy most cassiterite at prices legitimate exporters cannot afford
– Cassiterite exports undervalued by 50-60-%
– control of cassiterite estimated 70-75% or more
– None contribute to the building of formal sector
– 80-90% of gold exported fraudulently (8 million USD/month)
– 40% diamonds exported illegally; large portion sold by négociants
with no fees paid
– Hire and exploit children
– Tax evasion
– Corrupt payments
(Source: estimates quoted in S/2007/60)
Corrupt economic operators
illegal activities
– Fraud
– Use of armed groups to secure access to
concessions and/or to extort payments from
miners
– Tax evasion
– Corrupt payments to officials
– Smuggling
IS THERE JUSTICE IN THE DRC ?
ACCESS TO
CIVILIAN
JUSTICE



60 of 180 required first
instance courts are yet
established
Less than half of the
required 5000
magistrates
Total dilapidation of
existing court,
prosecution- and
detention premises,
especially in the interior
of the country
ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE
CIVILIAN & MILITARY
Courts
Existing critical mass of
competent jurists,
desiring reform,
retraining
Lack of basic equipment
Absence of case tracking
leading to excessive
detention, archives,
case law
Interference/
pressure from
government officials
Alleged corruption – lack of
confidence of
population
Need for national training
capacity
ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE
Prisons

Starvation deaths - 1/145
prisons has budget for food

No high security facility

Abuse of authority leading to
unlawful detention

Crumbling and non-existent
walls, inadequate surveillance,
resulting in:




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
escapes
regular assault and rape
overcrowding
inability to accommodate serious
offenders
risk of creating flash-points for
violence
Children, women, military, militia,
all detained in the same facilities
URGENT NEEDS

Legislation

High security military detention facilities

Court and prison facilities (infrastructure)

Food for prisoners

Increase number and rank of military prosecutors and judges

Increase in support staff

Technical assistance (material needs and expertise) to provide immediate national capacity
required to investigate, prosecute and administer justice, including in regard to serious human
rights abuses

Support for development of independent “watchdogs” (counterbalances), i.e. regulatory bodies,
media, independent NGO’s, etc)

Support for the development of state capacity to provide intra-governmental human rights
guidance and sensitization (i.e. Ministry of Human Rights)

Support for development of sustainable national training programme and institution(s)
Extractive Industries - Reports
NATIONAL
Lutundula Commission (February 2006)
INTERNATIONAL
 UN Panel of Experts– reports on illegal exploitation of
natural resources (2001-2003)
 UN Group of Experts monitoring the arms embargo –
report to Security Council on feasible and effective
measures to prevent illegal exploitation financing
armed groups (res 1698 of 2006)
 UN Secretary-General – report to Security Council (8
February 2007, pursuant to res 1698 of 2006 – currently the subject of
informal debate)
Lutundula Commission
 Set up by the peace accords of 2003
 Lutundula Commission included representatives
from all major parties to the conflict
 Highly controversial: allegations of withdrawing
names, not dealing with important actors, certain
sectors not included – no follow-up (electoral period)
 Sent a signal to companies that they could be
exposed – naming and shaming
Lutundula Report
 Investigated 50 mining contracts signed during the
conflict
 Found that dozens of contracts were either illegal
or of limited value for the development of the
country
 Recommended that 16 contracts be ended or
renegotiated
 Recommended that 28 Congolese and
international companies be investigated for
violation of Congolese law
 Recommended that 17 persons be prosecuted for
crimes including fraud and theft.
Implications of sanctions in
extractive industries
 On armed conflict – financing armed groups
 Artisanal miners – sanctions likely to affect
them most severely – livelihood security
issues
 Impact on/of existing (corrupt) trading
system – mushroom effect (cut one, another
grows in its place)
Conclusion: Sanctions may not be the answer
(under consideration)
Addressing illegal exploitation
Recommended governmental reform initiatives:
 Reinforce/build institutions capable of promoting legitimate trade,
reducing criminal involvement and raising public revenues (regulatory
bodies, security sector)
 Extractive industries transparency initiative (Min of Plan supporting
technical committee with a view to implementation)
Recommended non-state initiatives:
 Organize producers to create mechanisms to promote social
development
 Engagement to respect best practices through voluntary principles,
code of conduct, and respect for rule of law
Recommended regional initiative: a cross-border commission to stem
fraudulent exports (requires viable national counterparts, i.e. justice)
Attacking Corruption
 Culture:
• Integrity vs. Corruption – long-term vs. short-term
• Regaining public trust through participation, consultation
- fostering perception of integrity
 Political will:
• Creation of personal and corporate risks to engage in
corruption – judicial, administrative, regulatory, financial,
and economic sanctions
What future?
DRC Government Programme 2007-2011
 JUSTICE AT THE FOUNDATION OF REFORMS – SINE QUA NON
– Calls for restructuring public enterprises and a mechanism for monitoring
the execution of mining contracts
– Proposes reform that will include transparency, increasing revenues, as
well as environmental and social sustainability
– Recruitment and deployment of consultants to assist DRC mining officials
to conduct inspections
– Publication of key elements and analyses of partnership agreements, and
the renegotiation of agreements as required
– Adoption of a business plan and reform programme for Gecamines and
short-term reform programmes for other public enterprises;
– Adoption of transparent procedures for awarding mining rights (exploration
or exploitation)
– Political will, including justice reform, together with private enterprise
support are key for executing the government’s plans.