Transcript SIX SIGMA PROJECT REVIEWS: GUIDELINES FOR QUESTIONS

CARGO DOOR’S DEPRESSOR SEAL
Depressor Seal
DAMAGED DEPRESSOR SEAL
Damaged
DamagedSeal
Depressor
Depressor Seal
Background

Six Sigma is data – driven business
process optimization methodology which
aims to reduce variation, elimination nonvalue added activities and significantly
improve process quality.
How does it work ?
(DMAIC)
Y = f(X)
Define
Measure
Analyze
Y
What is important to the organization ?
8-Blocker, Fishbone, CTQ, Process Flow
How much can the existing process improve ?
Capability analysis
What are the critical factors ?
Hypothesis testing, Regression
Improve
How to reduce variation, time, cost, defects ?
DOE, Simulation
Control
How to maintain improvement ?
SPC
DEFINE & MEASURE
Project Definition
Objective
 Reduce depressor seal damage (DSD) by more than
50%
Defect Definition
 FWD & AFT Cargo Doors Depressor seal damage
(DSD)
Benefits
 Reduce maintenance repair cost
 Reduce flight delays
 Minimize operation interruptions
Constraints
 Non-availability of detail data regarding the damage
 Non-availability of maintenance repair cost
Team Members
Team Members
 Saad Nujaim
 Adel Sait
 Mohammad Fayoumi
 Khaild al ghomari
Master Black Belt
 Saad Nujaim
Process Sponsor
 GS, MD- GS Strategic Unit
Cause and Effect
Environment
Materials
Methods
weather
Guiders set up of Hi-Loader
Hardness of depressor seal
Light
Position Hi-Loaders
Condition of container
Temperature
Rush Operation
.
Using of stoppers in
Cargo compartment
Training
DPU
Supervision
Fatigue
License
A/F Protection
Guiders
Different natis
Condition of stoppers in a/c
Cargo comprtment
Qualification
Manpower
Machine
Measurements
Shipment Size
A/C Door size
Depressor
Seal
Damage
(DSD)
Existing Loading/ Offloading
Process
Load
Load Containers
from transporter to
H/L
Load Containers
from H/L to CGO
Comartment
Offload
Wait for
Loading
Stow Safety Rails
Offload Containers
from H/L to
Transporter
Close CGO door
Offload Containers
from CGO
compartment to H/L
Hi-loader
positioned
properly
Check for
External &
Internal Dep.
Seal Damage
Descriptive Statistics for all DSD
(2001 – 1st Qtr of 2008)
Process Capability
Run Chart (2001 – 1st Qtr of 2008)
Calculation of Z-ST & Z-LT
Upper Specification Limit (LSL)
N (LT)
N (ST)
Z (ST)
Z (LT)
Avg DSD (ST)
STDEV (ST)
**
**
Z (ST)
Z (LT)
Z (SHIFT)
=
=
=
2 dsd/qrt
28
6
= [ USL - Avg DSD (ST) ] STDEV(ST)
= [ USL - Avg DSD (LT) ] STDEV(LT)
= 1.17
= 0.98
Avg DSD (LT)
STDEV (LT)
= [ 2 – 1.17 ]
= [ 2 – 3.71]
= Z(ST) – Z(LT)
= 0.85 + 0.66
= 1.51
0.98
2.59
= 3.17
= 2.59
= 0.85
= - 0.66
Control Vs Technology
3.0
Poor control
Poor technology
Control
(Zshift)
Zst =0.85
Zlt =- 0.66
Zshift = Zst - Zlt
= 0.85+0.66
=1.51
1.5
Need better control
Technology is fine
Where we are now
Control is fine
Impove factory
or technology
World class
Goal
0.0
0.0
3.0
Technology
(Zst)
6.0
ANALYSIS
Depressor Seal Damage
Based on A/C Type
60
56
# OF ACCDNTS
33
40
20
10
3
1
1
0
B747
Classic
B744
B777
MD-11
MD-90
A300
86 % of DSD is related to B-747 ,while 14 % is related to other fleet type.
Depressor Seal Damage by Station
30
28
27
25
21
20
# OF ACCDNTS
15
10
5
7
6
6
4
3
2
0
JED RUH DAC CAI JFK MED BRU CGK UKN
53% OF DSD took place in Jeddah and Riyadh stations
Relationship Between DSD And
Other Variables
Determination of the existence relationship between the
number of DSD and some other variables is measured by
the value of the correlation coefficient “R”. The Correlation
Analysis and its “R” value is shown in the table below:
Variables
R-value
Interpretations
(No of DSD) and ( No of Revenue Departure For All Fleet)
0.277
Weak
relationship
(No of DSD) and ( No of Revenue Departure Form JED&RUH
Stations)
0.844
Strong
relationship
(No of DSD) and ( No of Revenue Departure For B-747)
0.698 Good relationship
Based on the above table , it is clear that the total number
of DSD is linearly correlated to JED & RUH operation and
B-747 fleet.
Note: Data Source :ARP-TSV
Analysis of DSD Causes
One of the major causes of DSD incident is loading and off loading operation
on the A/C. B-747 A/C and B-777 A/C are very identical in terms of :
1- Loading / off-loading operation
2- Shipment types and size (ULD’S & Pallets)
3- Equipment used for loading/off-loading operation.
Factor
B-747
B-777
Interpretations
Hardness of DS
MAT.7075-T6.
Thichness0.05
MAT.2024-T42.
Thichness0.063
Not significat,T6
is harder
Door size
FW (269 cm by 170 cm).
B-777 is bigger
AFT (A-J 177.8 Cm by 170.2// by 5 cm X 2 cm
FW& AFT (264 cm by 168 cm)
OTHERS 269.2 Cm
except for A-J
by 170Cm)
AFT door
Protection guide
fitted in A/C
Not Available
Drive Power
Unit
PDV2101(1,5,3,6).UNT2218(0).
DRV2100(0,1,1,2).
DV2300(3,0,4,3)
Available
Help offloading
Operation
KUNT251(3,5,3,2).
KUNT252(0,0,0,1).
KUNT250(0)
Both reliable,
not a sensitive
cause*
* Components Removals for years 2003,2004,2005,2006,2007 data Source :ARP-TSV
Operation Volume Analysis
Question :- Does the operation volume of A/C B-747 and A/C B777 is
significantly Different ?
Test of Hypothesis is used to compare the mean of B-747 NO. revenue dept
and the mean of B-777 NO. revenue dept.
Analysis of Variance
Source DF
SS
MS
F
P
Factor
1 47383681 47383681 60.17 0.000
Error
54 42525739 787514
Total
55 89909420
Individual 95% CIs For Mean
Based on Pooled StDev
Level
N
Mean StDev
-------+---------+---------+--------B-747ALL 28 4086.8 851.0
(---*----)
B-777
28 5926.5 922.4
(----*---)
-------+---------+---------+--------Pooled St Dev = 887.4
4200
4900
5600
Answer : Yes
Because the P-value = 0.000 , < 0.05 , we conclude that there is a statistical
difference between the two means and the mean of B-777 NO. revenue dep.
is higher.
Analysis of Loading/offloading and
Hi-loader Operation
Following observations were made during the
inspections performed in Jeddah and Dhaka
(may2008) stations:
 No adjustment for Hi-loader’s protection
guiders was made
during loading and
off-loading operation.
Analysis of Loading/offloading
and Hi-loader Operation
 The operator stands
on the right side
of A/C door.
 A lot of damaged
ULDs were used.
Analysis of Loading/offloading
and Hi-loader Operation
 Some of heavy ULDs were handled
by the operator alone.
 Inadequate supervision
Depressor Seal Damage By
Door Location
60
52
50
40
30
25
20
3
LH UPR COR
INCEDENT
NO
UNKN
RH FRAME
2
UPR FRAME
7
RH LWR COR
6
RH UPR COR
5
LH FRAME
LH UPR COR
0
LH LWR COR
4
10
LH LWR COR
LH FRAME
RH UPR COR
RH LWR COR
RH FRAME
UPR FRAME
UNKN
33 % OF DSD was located on the left side of A/C CGO doors, while 14 % of DSD was
On right side of A/C CGO doors.
Conclusion
The analysis revealed that:
1- Hi-loader’s protection guiders
setting is considered as
the major cause of DSD.
2- Damaged and heavy ULDs
are another cause of DSD in
the absence of proper setting
of Hi-loader’s protection guiders and the operator stand alone
on the right side of A/C cargo door.
Conclusion
3- Cargo door of B-777 has less DSD due to :
A- Bigger door size in width.
B- It has protection guide fitted in A/C’s cargo door (help in
offloading).
B-777
B-747
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Hi-loader protection guiders
must be adjusted within A/C
Cargo door width.
2. Damaged ULD’S should not to be used.
3. ULD’S weight must be controlled to avoid loading of
heavy ULD’S.
RECOMMENDATIONS
4. Assistance must be requested
by the operator in case of facing
stuck/heavy ULD’s.
5. Damaged ULD’s should
not be loaded side door.
6. Any failure of PDU should
be reported by the operator.
IMPROVE & CONTROL
IMPROVED Loading/ Offloading Process
Offload
Load
Load Containers
from transporter
to H/L
Heavy
containers
stuck/
damaged?
Hi-loader
positioned
properly
Wait for
Loading
YES
Offload
Containers from
H/L to
Transporter
1)Call for assistance/fix
2) don’t place on door
sides
NO
heavy
container
stuck/
damaged?
YES
Call for
assistance
/fix
NO
Load Containers
from H/L to CGO
Comartment
Stow Safety Rails
Offload
Containers
from CGO
compartment
to H/L
Close CGO door
Adjust the
protection
guiders
Check for
External &
Internal Dep.
Seal Damage
Depressor Seal damaged Trend
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
# OF ACCDNTS
2006
2007
2008
Process Fixes & Control
Causes of Variation
- The Adjustment
of Hi-loader’s
protection guiders
was not performed
-A lot of ULD’S
were damaged.
- Inadequate
Supervision.
Process Fix
-Review & study the
processes of
loading and
offloading.
-Update GSPM to
include the
recommendations.
-To enhance safety
awareness by
explaining correct
practices to the
concerned staff.
- GS established
licensing & training
programs.
Control System
- Monitor the
processes of
loading and
offloading.
- Perform the
random
inspection.
- Monitor DSD
trend.
Project Closure
Implementation of project recommendations will yield the
following :Financial
Operation
 Eliminate the maintenance repair cost
 Eliminate any related cost to operation interruption
and flight delays
 Minimize
operation interruption
 Minimize unexpected flight delays
 Improve A/C safety.