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CHARITIES: KEEPING YOUR SEAT AT THE TABLE BY
KNOWING AND EXERCISING YOUR RIGHTS
Presented by:
Robert B. Judd, Esquire
Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A.
450 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Telephone: (954) 462-2000
Fax: (954) 523-1722
Email: [email protected]
INTRODUCTION
I.
THE CY PRES DOCTRINE
A.
B.
C.
D.
Cy Pres Defined
Testamentary Trust of Mary Ericson
Behind the Scenes
Other Relevant Florida Caselaw
II. THE CHARITABLE PLEDGE
A.
B.
C.
Pledge Defined
Mount Sinai Revisited: Lessons Learned
A Sample Pledge Form: Effective and Enforceable?
III. OTHER TYPES OF LITIGATION
A.
B.
C.
Will and Trust Contests
Objections to Accountings and Surcharge
Actions Seeking Modifications or Terminations of Trusts
I. THE CY PRES DOCTRINE
A. CY PRES DEFINED
Cy Pres: [Law French “as near as”] The
equitable doctrine under which a court reforms a
written instrument with a gift to charity as
closely to the donor’s intention as possible, so
that the gift does not fail. Courts use cy pres esp.
in construing charitable gifts when the donor’s
original charitable purpose cannot be fulfilled. It
is also used to distribute unclaimed portions of
class-action judgments or settlement funds to a
charity that will advance the interests of the
class. More recently, courts have used cy pres to
distribute class-action-settlement funds not
amenable to individual claims or to a meaningful
pro rata distribution to a nonprofit charitable
organization whose work indirectly benefits the
class members and advances the public interest.
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
B. TESTAMENTARY TRUST OF MARY ERICSON
SPCA Wildlife Care Center v. George Abraham and Albert O. Cheval,
75 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
SPCA Wildlife Care Center v. George Abraham and Albert O. Cheval,
75 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
SPCA Wildlife Care Center v. George Abraham and Albert O. Cheval,
75 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
“It complains that the trial court erred in sua
sponte determining that the residuary clause of
the will failed and that the residue of the
testamentary trust would pass by intestacy
instead of to a charitable organization for the
benefit of animals. Because the court ruled on
a matter not raised by the parties and failed to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to permit the
parties to present evidence on the issue, we
agree that the court erred. We thus reverse.”
SPCA Wildlife Care Center v. George Abraham and Albert O. Cheval,
75 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
SPCA Wildlife Care Center v. George Abraham and Albert O. Cheval,
75 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
“Instead, the issue raised by the Co–Trustee's
petition was simply for the court to determine
the proper animal organization that would be
the beneficiary of the testamentary trust upon
the death of the income beneficiary, in light of
the fact that the designated charitable donee
was a non-existent entity.”
“To be sure, a trial court may sua sponte raise
the question of whether a will provision is
invalid and thus a disposition should pass by
intestacy. However, the issue can be decided
only after all parties receive appropriate notice
and an opportunity to be heard, including the
opportunity to present evidence in support of
their position.”
“Florida courts have held that “the misnomer
of a devisee will not cause the devise to fail
where the identity of the devisee can be
identified with certainty.”
SPCA Wildlife Care Center v. George Abraham and Albert O. Cheval,
75 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
“From the language of the will and the
affidavits in the record, it appears that the
decedent had a general charitable intent for the
residue of her testamentary trust to pass to a
charitable organization for the benefit of
animals. Even if it cannot be determined
which organization the testator had in mind,
the interested parties should have the
opportunity to present evidence to demonstrate
that the cy pres doctrine should apply and
permit distribution to a claimant or claimants
which can fulfill the original intent of the
bequest as closely as possible. Based on the
foregoing, we reverse and remand for an
evidentiary hearing.”
C. BEHIND THE SCENES
1. Pertinent Documents
a. Last Will and Testament
b. Petition to Determine Beneficiaries
b. Petition to Determine Beneficiaries
b. Petition to Determine Beneficiaries
Exhibits Omitted
c. Supporting Affidavits
c. Supporting Affidavits
c. Supporting Affidavits
c. Supporting Affidavits
D. OTHER RELEVANT FLORIDA CASELAW
1. Lewis v. Gaillard, 56 So. 281 (Fla. 1911).
2. Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa, 40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
3. The Jewish Guild for the Blind v. The First Nat. Bank in St. Petersburg, 226 So. 2d
414 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968).
4. Humana, Inc. v. Estate of Mabel Raquet Scheying, 483 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2nd DCA
1986).
1. Lewis v. Gaillard, 56 So. 281 (Fla. 1911).
“…and that the rest of the estate of said
testator be held in trust for the benefit of the
West Florida Seminary, the institution located
at Tallahassee. That only the interest upon the
principal should be used yearly.”
“That at least one-half of this interest should
be expended for the benefit of students of
Leon county under the direction of the
managing officers of the institution. That none
of said trust property or moneys of said estate
of said testator should be used for building or
improvement of grounds.”
Lewis v. Gaillard, 56 So. 281 (Fla. 1911).
“That afterwards, to wit, by statute of the state
of Florida, to wit, chapter 5384 of the statutes
of the said state approved June 5, 1905, and
which took effect immediately upon its
approval, according to the terms thereof the
West Florida Seminary mentioned in said will,
and for the benefit of which said trust property
was by said will directed to be held in trust as
therein set forth, was abolished, and each and
every of the charters, franchises, powers,
rights, and privileges granted to or possessed
by it were thereby revoked, vacated, and
abolished.”
Lewis v. Gaillard, 56 So. 281 (Fla. 1911).
“That thereupon, as your orators are
informed, advised, and so allege, said trust
created by said will of said James D. Westcott
for the benefit of the West Florida Seminary
ceased and determined, and the property held
by said defendant Lewis as executor or trustee
under said will or which was the property of
said estate or which had accrued to said estate
or to said trust fund or the proceeds thereof,
or property acquired therefrom or thereby, or
by investments or use of property of said
estate or said fund, passed to the heirs or
distributees of said James D. Westcott or his
estate, or they became entitled thereto, and
said trustee became trustee for them in the
premises, and to hold and apply such
property, real, personal, and mixed, for their
use and benefit.”
Lewis v. Gaillard, 56 So. 281 (Fla. 1911).
“That since the passage of said statute said
institution, the West Florida Seminary, for the
benefit of which said property was left in trust
as aforesaid by said will, has not only been
abolished by law but in fact, and has ceased
to operate, and has been wholly discontinued
and so remains.”
Lewis v. Gaillard, 56 So. 281 (Fla. 1911).
“There have been many changes in the
institution in the quarter century since Judge
Westcott made his will. We may add
parenthetically that all institutions which have
survived this rapidly progressive age have of
necessity made many changes in order to
survive. Mere change of name, unless some
peculiar affection for the name is indicated by
the donor, means nothing, while location is
important. Institutions controlled by the state
are of necessity subject to change in state
policy, and of this those endowing such
institutions must be held to have knowledge,
and, if they would offer a check upon this
change of policy, their will upon the matter
should be made known, if not directly, at least
by clear inference.”
Lewis v. Gaillard, 56 So. 281 (Fla. 1911).
“Perhaps the above reasoning would savor too
much of special pleading and be
unsupportable without the assistance of the
doctrine of cy pres as now almost universally
recognized by the courts of this country.”
“It is apparent that the testator desired his
estate to go not to his remote heirs-he had
none nearer than the maiden aunt, whom he
specifically remembered-but to this public
educational institute at his home town, and for
assistance through that institute to the students
from his home county of Leon.”
“…we think we are well within the decided
cases, and are doing no violence to the
intention of the testator in holding that the
Florida State College for Women is entitled to
receive the income from the residuary estate.”
Lewis v. Gaillard, 56 So. 281 (Fla. 1911).
WHITFIELD, C. J. (dissenting).
“Charitable bequests are favored, and, if
practicable, they should be so applied as to
effectuate the testator's purpose whether the
exact limitations of the bequests are expressed
in definite words or not. But the heirs of the
testator can lawfully be deprived of the
beneficial use of property bequeathed to
charity only when the designated beneficiaries
can legally and in fact receive the bequest as
intended by the testator.”
“The will discloses no general charitable
purpose-no intent to aid public education
generally at Tallahassee or elsewhere-and the
bequest was specifically and expressly made
‘for the benefit of The West Florida Seminary,’
a state institution of learning and its students.”
2. Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“12. I give, devise and bequeath my home,
comprising approximately three and one half
acres, located at 4421 Bayshore Boulevard,
also known as ‘Shady Nook’, bounded on the
North by what is known as Lawn Avenue, on
the East by Bayshore Boulevard, on the South
by what is now known as Fair Oaks Avenue
and on the West by Bayshore Crest
Subdivision, and also, all the remainder of my
property, real, personal and mixed, to the
Christian Herald, a corporation created by and
existing under the laws of the State of New
Jersey; the same to be used for charitable
purposes only.”
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“Dr. Poling testified that the New York
corporation continued after 1928 all the
charities previously conducted by the New
Jersey corporation. The Christian Herald
continued to accept gifts for charities and
passed the same on to the charitable
organizations to be expended for these
purposes. Some of the funds received were
spent through the Bowery Mission, of which
Dr. Poling was president. The Bowery
Mission was a rescue mission-and had
rendered services to derelicts for more than
fifty years coming to New York from around
the globe and all over the world. The mission
had a dormitory, fed and slept these
unfortunates, and conducted religious services
and helped to rehabilitate all and assisted in
getting jobs for them. Dr. Poling described the
Bowery as a ‘physical, moral and spiritual
rehabilitation center’.”
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“The Christian Herald Children's Home,
according to Dr. Poling, had been operated for
more than half a century for the
underprivileged children of the urban area in
New York City.”
“The Christian Herald has been published
each week for approximately 71 years without
missing a single weekly issue. The last issue
of the Christian Herald as published under the
laws of the State of New Jersey prior to
dissolution was dated in June, 1928, and the
next succeeding weekly issue was published
by the Christian Herald, a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of New
York.…”
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“…When the testator in 1935 executed his last
will and testament the Christian Herald, a
corporation existing under the laws of the
State of New Jersey had been dissolved but
the Christian Herald, a corporation organized
under the laws of the State of New York, was
the successor in interest to all the holdings
and the charitable agencies of the dissolved
New Jersey corporation. The reorganization or
change in the corporate structure did not
change the established charitable policy of the
Christian Herald. The Chancellor held that
Section 12 of the will lapsed and became
invalid under the pro-visions of Section
731.20, F.S.A., upon the dissolution in 1928
of the Christian Herald, a corporation existing
under the laws of the State of New Jersey. It
was his view that the cy pres doctrine was
inapplicable to the controversy.”
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“We have held on many occasions that the
intention of the testator is to guide the courts
in the construction of wills.”… “In construing
a will, the testator's intention must be
determined and the whole will should be
considered in order that light may be thrown
on the meaning intended to be expressed.”…
“In ascertaining the testator's intention, the
will in its entirety will be considered, and
when once the intention has been discovered,
the wording of the will will be given such
liberal construction as will effectuate the
intention of the testator as may be consistent
with established rules of law.”
“The value of the gifts made to these cousins
is small when considering an estate valued at
$75,000.00.”
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“If the size or value of the gifts made to
charitable
agencies
or
organizations
enumerated in the will is a just criterion as to
the intention of the testator, then it is safe to
conclude that his intention was charity rather
than sharing his bounty with his distant
relatives, as paragraph 3 of the will is a gift of
$1,000.00 to the Salvation Army of Tampa,
Florida. Paragraph 7 is a gift of $2,000.00 to
Masonic Lodge No. 154 of Tampa; also
$5,000.00 to the Florida Masonic Home of St.
Petersburg, Florida. Paragraph 8 is a gift of
$1,500.00 to the Christian Herald Children's
Home of New York. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 are
gifts of $100.00 to each of three named
cousins, but with a proviso in each paragraph
supra to the effect that if the named cousins be
not living at the time of testator's death, then
said sum shall be a gift and paid to the
Salvation Army of Tampa, Florida.”
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“The lower court held that the legal effect of
the dissolution in 1928 of the Christian
Herald, a corporation existing under the laws
of the State of New Jersey, was to render
invalid paragraph 12 of the will under section
731.20, supra, which provides: ‘(1) If a
devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime of
the testator, the testamentary disposition to
such devisee or legatee lapses, unless an
intention appears from the will to substitute
another in his place; * * *.’ Likewise the cy
pres doctrine of construction was inapplicable
to the will.”
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“The dominant thought or idea of the testator,
gleaned from the four corners of his will, was
that the corpus of his estate, with minor
exceptions, should be used for charitable
purposes. The agency, Christian Herald, was
the vehicle chosen by the testator to
accomplish his purposes.”
Christian Herald Ass’n, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Tampa,
40 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1949).
“The dominant purpose or intention of the
testator was that the property described in
paragraph 12 should be a gift to the Christian
Herald ‘to be used for charitable purposes
only’. If the words ‘New York’ had been
employed by the scrivener in drafting the will
rather than the words ‘New Jersey’, the
appellees would have had but little, if any,
ground to stand upon. It is clear that the
testator wanted to use the Christian Herald
only as a conduit to place the property described in paragraph 12 with its charitable
agencies, supra, and that the ‘same used (by
the said charitable agencies) for charitable
purposes only’.”
3. The Jewish Guild for the Blind v. The First Nat. Bank in St.
Petersburg, 226 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968).
The Jewish Guild for the Blind v. The First Nat. Bank in St. Petersburg,
226 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968).
“Simeon E. Cohn died in July, 1967.
Paragraph FOURTH of his will set up a trust
of which the appellee was named trustee, and
into which the testator bequeathed the residue
of his estate. Appellant, as successor to the
New York Guild for the Jewish Blind, is the
first-named beneficiary of the entire trust, the
provisions of which require that such
beneficiary accept the bequest within ninety
days from testator's death and, thereafter,
within five years from said date use the trust
estate ‘for the purpose of acquiring or
constructing a separate building which will
provide proper facilities for the education and
recreation of blind children’ to be dedicated in
memory of the testator's wife.”
The Jewish Guild for the Blind v. The First Nat. Bank in St. Petersburg,
226 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968).
“The FOURTH paragraph of the will further
pro-vides that if the first-named beneficiary
does not accept the bequest, or having
accepted it, does not use it ‘as hereinabove
provided’, then the ‘trust shall terminate’ and
the principal of said trust estate shall be paid
to Montefiore Hospital For Chronic Diseases
in the City of New York for the purpose of
establishing an orthopedic ward for children
in memory of the testator's wife.”
“…appellant alleges that the trust assets
presently
amount
to
approximately
$102,000.00; and that such amount is
insufficient for the acquisition or construction
of a ‘separate’ building in New York City.…”
The Jewish Guild for the Blind v. The First Nat. Bank in St. Petersburg,
226 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968).
“Montefiore Hospital For Chronic Diseases in
the City of New York, the contingent
beneficiary, executed and caused to be filed
its ‘Answer and Waiver of Service of
Citation’ in which it ‘agrees and consents’ to
the proposed use of the trust funds set forth
by appellant in its petition. The Answer and
Waiver also states it to be the ‘belief’ of
Montefiore Hospital that appellant's proposal
fully complies with the terms of the trust with
respect to providing proper facilities for the
education and recreation of blind children.”
The Jewish Guild for the Blind v. The First Nat. Bank in St. Petersburg,
226 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968).
“…the precise question here is whether the
Cy pres doctrine is applicable to the facts in
this case.”
“Considering the allegations of the petition as
true, which we must do in the present posture
of the case, the first choice of the testator is
impossible. But he anticipated the eventuality
that his first choice would not be complied
with; and he expressly provided for an
alternative use of the trust funds, that is, to
establish an orthopedic ward for children in a
specific hospital. Under either alternative the
dominant intention of the testator can be
fulfilled.”
“When an alternative is provided for by the
testator himself however, there is no need to
apply the doctrine at all; and the general rule
is that it will not be applied.”
The Jewish Guild for the Blind v. The First Nat. Bank in St. Petersburg,
226 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1968).
“…nor does it mean that if Montefiore
Hospital rejects its benefits appellant cannot
thereafter, within the five years, urge
application of the Cy pres doctrine. All it
means is that as of now, application of the Cy
pres doctrine is inappropriate.”
4. Humana, Inc. v. Estate of Mabel Raquet Scheying,
483 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986).
“The personal representative of the estate of
Mabel Raquet Scheying filed a petition for
instructions in the circuit court seeking
clarification of paragraph twenty-second of
decedent's will, which devised one-half of her
residuary estate to Apollo Medical Center.
Decedent's husband, John Scheying, was
treated at Apollo Medical Center for lung
cancer during the last days of his life from
July 31 to August 6, 1977. He died on August
15, 1977. On May 5, 1978, Mabel Scheying
changed her will to devise one-half of her
residuary estate to Apollo Medical Center
located at No. 400 30th Avenue South, St.
Petersburg, Florida, “to be used for the
acquisition of advanced medical equipment
for the treatment of cancer.” At that time,
Apollo Medical Center was a for profit
hospital owned by Apollo Medical Center,
Inc.”
Humana, Inc. v. Estate of Mabel Raquet Scheying,
483 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986).
“On October 1, 1978, Humana, Inc., another
for profit corporation, merged with Apollo
Medical Center, Inc. and became the new
owner of the hospital.”
Humana, Inc. v. Estate of Mabel Raquet Scheying,
483 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986).
“On May 28, 1981, decedent executed her
fourth and last will. The language of
paragraph twenty-second of this will was
identical to the language in the June 3, 1980
will which devised one-half of her residuary
estate to Apollo.”
“Public records disclose that no entity was
operated under the name of Apollo Medical
Center for over two years prior to when
decedent executed her last will in 1981.”
Humana, Inc. v. Estate of Mabel Raquet Scheying,
483 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986).
“Mabel Scheying died on September 24,
1984. In their petition for instructions, the
personal representatives of her estate
expressed doubt as to whether Apollo should
be the beneficiary under paragraph twentysecond, because Apollo had been merged
into Humana two and one-half years before
decedent executed her last will. After a
hearing, the trial court entered a final order,
in which it ruled that Apollo Medical Center
had ceased to exist and declared that the
devise to Apollo had lapsed.”
“In construing a will, the primary
consideration is ascertaining the intent of the
testator.” … “Furthermore, the misnomer of a
devisee will not cause the devise to fail where
the identity of the devisee can be identified
with certainty.”
Humana, Inc. v. Estate of Mabel Raquet Scheying,
483 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986).
“…that the decedent intended to devise onehalf of her residuary estate to the hospital at
which her husband was treated just before his
death. Although Apollo had already merged
into Humana when decedent executed her last
will, the hospital itself did not cease to exist.
It remained the same hospital at the same
location where decedent's husband received
his treatment.”
“Because there was sufficient evidence that
the decedent intended the devise to the
hospital which is now known as Humana
Hospital Sunbay, we must reverse.”
II. THE CHARITABLE PLEDGE
A. PLEDGE DEFINED
Pledge: A solemn binding promise to do,
give, or refrain from doing something. The
American Heritage College Dictionary (4th
ed. 2007).
B. MOUNT SINAI REVISITED: LESSONS LEARNED
1.
The Enforceable Pledge:
a.
More than a gratuitous promise;
b.
Pledge must recite with particularity the specific purpose; and
c.
Charity must show actual reliance of substantial character in
furtherance of the specified purpose.
Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Gladys B. Jordan,
290 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1974).
Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Gladys B. Jordan,
290 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1974).
“The salient facts establish that Harry M. Burt
executed two pledges of $50,000.00 each in
1968. These pledges were delivered to the
petitioner and provided in pertinent part:”
“In consideration of and to induce the
subscriptions of others, I (We) promise to pay
to Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami,
Inc. or order the sum of Fifty Thousand and
no/100 dollars $5,000.00 payable herewith:
Balance in Nine equal annual installments
commencing on January (sic) 1 of….”
Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Gladys B. Jordan,
290 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1974).
“Mr. Burt made payments totalling
$20,000.00, which were applied equally to the
two pledges and upon his death on November
18, 1969, there remained an unpaid balance of
$80,000.00. Upon Mr. Burt's death, the
petitioner filed a claim for the unpaid balance
of the pledges against his estate. The
respondents, as executors, objected to this
claim. On the basis of these facts, the trial
court held in favor of the charities and the
respondents appealed.”
“(W)hether the recitation in a charitable
pledge that it is given in consideration of and
to induce the subscription of others
constitutes consideration rendering it
enforceable by the promisee against the
promisor, in the absence of any reliant action
thereon by the promisee such as would create
promissory estoppel.”
Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Gladys B. Jordan,
290 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1974).
“For the doctrine of promissory estoppel to be
applicable, the promisor must make a promise
which he should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a substantial
character on the part of the promisee, . . .”
“First, the document stating the conditions of
the pledge must recite with particularity the
specific purpose for which the funds are to be
used. It would, for example, be insufficient if
the pledge designated the general operating
fund.”
Mount Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Gladys B. Jordan,
290 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1974).
“Secondly, the donee must affirmatively show
actual reliance of a substantial character in
furtherance of the specified purpose set forth
in the pledge instrument before the claim may
be honored by the estate. Text writers have
expressed a similar view: ”
“A review of the record reveals that the
pledge in question was not made for any
specified purpose, clearly was not used to
induce others to subscribe and the Hospital
undertook no work in reliance upon Burt's
subscription.”
“Courts should act with restraint in respect to
the public policy arguments endeavoring to
sustain a mere charitable subscription. To
ascribe consideration where there is none, or
to adopt any other theory which affords
charities a different legal rationale than other
entities, is to approve fiction.”
C. A SAMPLE PLEDGE FORM: EFFECTIVE & ENFORCEABLE?
III. OTHER TYPES OF LITIGATION
A. WILL AND TRUST CONTESTS
B. OBJECTIONS TO ACCOUNTINGS AND SURGHARGE
C. ACTIONS SEEKING MODIFICATIONS OR TERMINATIONS OF
TRUSTS
END