Transcript Sellafield Ltd An Overview

Sellafield Ltd
An Overview
Modern Catastrophes
• BP Deep Water Horizon
• 11 employees died in the initial explosion
• Cost to date £30 Billion and rising
• Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
• Arising from Natural event
• Costs around £30 Billion and rising
• TEPCO Nationalised by Japanese
Government
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National Audit Office 2012
• “Nuclear operations at Sellafield started in
the 1940s, successive operators of the site
did not give sufficient thought to
decommissioning or retrieving and disposing
of radioactive waste. The Authority inherited a
legacy of poor planning, neglect and gaps in
information”
• Predicted out turn costs £70 Billion
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Sellafield Strategy
• Safe Secure Stewardship
• Demonstrable Progress
• Return on Investment
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Sellafield Today
£1.8bn|
annual
budget
£300m|
Local supply
chain spend
11,000
employees at
Sellafield
Sellafield Context
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7 shutdown reactors
2 Reprocessing plants
Waste Management
High hazard legacy facilities
Product Storage
Supporting Infrastructure
Low temperature, low pressure processes
Very large inventory of radioactive material
Relatively low rates of change to loss of cooling
Aging facilities and infrastructure
Sellafield Ltd COMAH status
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SL is the largest Nuclear site in Europe
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One of only two COMAH (Seveso) Nuclear sites in the UK
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SL uses a number of hazardous substances (COMAH).
Examples are as follows, with associated major accident hazards (MAH):
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Petroleum products
Oxygen
Sodium Nitrite 38%
Hydroxylamine Nitrate 36%
NOx
Hydrogen
COMAH assessment shows SL is currently
a lower-tier site
PROTECT - COMMERCIAL
18 July 2015
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Site History – National Defence Programme
• The Sellafield site has been
operational since the 1940s,
when it was used as a Royal
Ordinance Factory supporting
the war effort.
• In 1946 the US Congress
passed an Atomic Energy Act
prohibiting passing classified
information to other countries
• In response to this, Sellafield
became the UK’s first atomic
energy site and construction of
the Windscale Piles to produce
military plutonium began in 1947.
Site History – Accelerating the clean up
• From the 1990s construction
began on a number of waste
treatment and storage facilities
to support reprocessing and
decommissioning operations.
• In 2002 the Waste Vitrification
Plant was opened to convert
the Highly Active Waste from
reprocessing into a solid form
for long term storage.
Nuclear Safety Principles:
Preventing a Catastrophe
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Maintaining containment
Maintaining cooling
Maintaining control of reactivity
Maintaining control of chemistry
Scope of Emergency Arrangements
• Radiological/Nuclear
• Chemical
• Fire
• Transport
• Loss of Site Services
• External Events – Weather, Seismic,
• Malicious Acts/Security
• Environmental Impacts
• Severe Accident Considerations
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Co-ordination of Emergency Response
LOCAL
SITE
Incident Plant
Emergency
Services
Access
Control
Point
Engineering
Services
Environmental
Monitoring
DISTRICT
NATIONAL
Media Briefing
Centre (MBC)
Parliament
West Cumbria
Emergency
Control centre
(WCECC)
Nuclear
Emergency Briefing
Room (NEBR)
External Agencies
Centres
Other countries
Re-entry
Teams
Incident
Control
Centre
Site Emergency Control Centre
Communications:
Workforce
Media
External Agencies
General Public
Emergency Management
18/07/2015
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Effective Management Control
• Control of Contractors
• Security
• SQEP
• Nuclear Site Licence
• COMAH
•Training
• Accountability
• Assurance
• Regulators
• Review
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Control of contractors
• Approved contractor status
• Gated process
• Demonstrate SQEP
• Subject to intense scrutiny
• Performance subject to monthly review
• Scocio economic commitments
• Security vetting
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Security considerations
• Driven by specific legislation
• Classification anyone on site
• DV
• SC
• BC
• Visitors
• Info security
• Breach sanctions
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SQEP
• Demonstrable and auditable experience
• Must be “Suitable”
• Formally reviewed at least annually
• Applies to all site areas
• Subject to regulatory review
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Nuclear Site Licence
• 36 Licence conditions
• Each condition approved by the Regulator
• Covers all aspects of site
• Subject to formal review
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Training
• Not SQEP
• Formal
• Site Induction linked to Security
• Contract Induction
• Planned
• Approved
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Accountability
• At all levels
• Reviewed as part of work package planning
• Reviewed at Stakeholder meetings
• Subject to formal review by the Regulator
• Runs from SL Board to all areas
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Assurance
• Internal Assurance Group
• Focussed on:
• Internal Regulation
• Tiered audit process
• Full range of activities
• Reports directly to the SL Board
• Works alongside Regulators
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Regulators
• Regulators:
• ONR
• HSE
• EA
• Euratom
• IAEA
• WANO
• INPO
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Review
• Activities reviewed by SL Board through:
• Safety, Security Assurance Group
• Project Assurance Group
• Safety Case Assurance Group
• RIM (Regulator Interface Meetings)
• Tier 1 Regulatory interface
• NMP Safety and Operations Review Group
• Performance Assurance Group
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Conclusions
• Sellafield Limited and its specialist suppliers have developed an
effective and systematic method of assessing resilience.
• Effective management control cornerstone
• Focussed on the plants within the greatest potential
consequences
• Provided successful insights into many facilities beyond their
Design Basis.
• Identified a range of considerations and actions which will make
a genuine and sustainable improvement in resilience.
• Close engagement with Regulators and industry colleagues has
been important to success
• Sellafield are committed to enhanced resilience
• Incorporated this approach into our long-term periodic review of
safety cases
Arrangements for resilience
All Sellafield Limited Sites
Excellence in
Safe
Operations
Site
Resilience
Excellence in
Emergency
Preparedness
Excellence in
Security