Transcript Fourth Generation War and Grand Strategy, by Chet Richards

Conflict in the Years
Ahead
Chet Richards
J. Addams & Partners, Inc.
It will be protracted, bloody,
and horrible.
Martin van Creveld
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Version 7.1 - August 2006
Purpose
To explore the course of conflict in the early-middle 21st century by
comparing and contrasting the work of six of its more distinguished
observers:
– Bill Lind, particularly “Strategic Defense Initiative,” and
“FMFM 1-A”
– Martin van Creveld: The Transformation of War
– Col T.X. Hammes, USMC: The Sling and the Stone
– Thomas P. M. Barnett: The Pentagon’s New Map & Blueprint for
Action
– Michael Scheuer (“Anonymous”): Imperial Hubris
– Antulio Echevarria: “Fourth Generation War and Other Myths”
My purpose is not to critique these works, per se, but to consider, borrow,
and sometimes reject what John Boyd called “appropriate bits and pieces”
for constructing strategy.
July 2006
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Agenda
•
Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict
•
– Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
– Attrition warfare & maneuver
conflict
•
– Theme for disintegration and
collapse
•
Grand strategy
– Theme for vitality and growth
OODA Loops
– What they are not (and are)
– Ends and means
– How to accelerate OODA loops
– Moral leverage
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
•
Guerrilla warfare
– Blitz & guerrilla: common
strategy
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
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Summary
– Tables
Generations of war
4GW according to Lind, van
Creveld, Hammes, Barnett,
Scheuer, but not Echevarria
– What Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
say about grand strategy
•
•
•
Moral isolation and interaction
– Issues among the authors
– Neither Shall the Sword
•
If I were emperor …
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Pattern
•
National goal
Positive
(constructive)
elements
Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment.
•
Grand strategy
Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also
influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
•
Strategic aim
Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can
cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
•
Strategy
Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload
his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he
depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist.
•
Grand tactics
Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening
and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or
imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;
thereby
Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos
... and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
thereby
Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his
efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.
•
Tactics
Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape
and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tieup, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.
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141
Pattern
Negative (destructive)
elements
Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment.
•
National goal
•
Grand strategy
Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also
influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
•
Strategic aim
Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can
cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
•
Strategy
Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and
overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that
he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist.
•
Grand tactics
Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of
threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes,
or imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;
thereby
Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic,
chaos ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
thereby
Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus
his efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm
him.
•
Tactics
Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as
shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s)
that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.
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141
Generalization
• Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more
quickly while outturning an adversary.
• In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose
engagement opportunities—yet has fast transient (“buttonhook”)
characteristics that can be used to either force an overshoot by
an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender.
Boyd’s study of strategy began as a
fighter pilot and an instructor at the
USAF Fighter Weapons School.
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Idea expansion
• Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should
operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or,
better yet, get inside adversary’s observation-orientationdecision-action time cycle or loop.
• Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous
(unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among
our adversaries—since our adversaries will be unable to
generate mental images or pictures that agree with the
menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are
competing against.
In other words, “faster tempo or rhythm” is not
synonymous with “get inside adversary’s
observation-orientation-decision-action” loop.
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Human nature
Goal
• Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for
independent action.
The competition for limited resources to satisfy these
desires may force one to:
• Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny
him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it
impossible for him to survive at all.
Implication
Point of Patterns of Conflict:
• Life is conflict, survival, and conquest.
IF you find yourself in this situation, make
sure you are the one who wins.
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Impression
•
In examining these many points of view one is bombarded with the notion that:
– It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied
rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish adversary’s capacity
for independent action.
– The simpler organisms—those that make-up man as well as man working
with other men in a higher level context—must cooperate or, better yet,
harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organic
synthesis.
– To shape and adapt to change one cannot be passive; instead one must
take the initiative.
•
Put more simply and directly: the above comments leave one with the
impression that variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (and their interaction) seem
to be key qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing
environment.
•
With this impression in mind together with our notion of getting inside an
adversary’s O-O-D-A loop we will proceed in our historical investigation.
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Historical pattern
Sun Tzu The Art of War c. 400 B.C.
Theme
•
Harmony and trust
•
Justice and well being
•
Inscrutability and enigma
•
Deception and subversion
•
Rapidity and fluidity
•
Dispersion and concentration
•
Surprise and shock
Strategy
These represent potential asymmetries, that
• Probe enemy’s organization and
is, things we can exploit to gain an advantage
dispositions to unmask his
leading to victory over our opponents.
strengths, weaknesses, patterns of
movement
and intentions.keep asking
Throughout
this presentation,
yourself:
• “Shape” enemy’s perception of
Desired outcome
•
•
July 2006
Subdue enemy without
fighting
Avoid protracted war
world
to manipulate
his plans and
• What
were
the asymmetries?
actions.
• How did the winning side achieve these
• asymmetries?
Attack enemy’s plans as best policy.
Next best disrupt his alliances. Next
• How
didattack
they use
them in
ordercities
to win?
best
his army.
Attack
only when
is noyou
alternative.
Sometimes
Boydthere
will give
his answers;
sometimes
will have
to decide
for
• Employyou
cheng
and ch'i
maneuvers
yourself.
to quickly and unexpectedly hurl
strengthAllagainst
weaknesses.
Key point:
conflict
is – or should be –
“asymmetric”!
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13
Historical pattern
Early commanders
Impression
•
Alexander
•
•
Hannibal
Early commanders seem
consistent with ideas of Sun Tzu
•
Belisarius
•
•
Genghis Khan
Western commanders more
directly concerned with winning
the battle
•
Tamerlane
•
Eastern commanders closer to
Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter
adversary prior to battle
Action
Cheng and ch'i*
* Cheng/ch'i maneuver schemes were employed by early commanders to expose adversary vulnerabilities and
weaknesses (a la cheng) for exploitation and decisive stroke (via ch'i).
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Historical pattern
Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our
comments about early commanders, let’s take a
look at an early tactical theme and some battle
(grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the
different ways that the cheng/ch'i game has been
(and can be) played.
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Historical pattern
Tactical theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.)
•
Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform
reconnaissance, screening, and swirling hit-and-run actions to:
– Unmask enemy dispositions and activities.
– Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities.
– Confuse, disorder enemy operations.
•
Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by armor and
shields:
– Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemy
formations generated by interaction with light troops; or
– Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby make them
vulnerable to missiles of swirling light troops.
•
Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and mop-up
isolated remnants of enemy host.
Idea
•
Employ maneuver action by light troops with thrust action of heavy troops to confuse,
break-up, and smash enemy formations.
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Battle of Arbela*
October 1, 331 B.C.
Darius
Mazeus
Bessus
Chariots
Companions
*Also known as the Battle of
Gaugamela
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Parmenio
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Battle of Arbela* (Phase II)
Persians Flee
Persians Flee
The heavy thrust, set up by all the
other action on this page. Although
outnumbered overall, at this point,
Alexander manufactured a temporary
but decisive advantage.
Mazeus
Darius
Reserve Line
Version 1.2
10 March 2005
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Historical pattern
Genghis Khan and the Mongols
Key asymmetries
Theme
•
Superior mobility
•
•
Superior communications
•
Superior intelligence
•
Superior leadership
Widely separated strategic
maneuvers, with appropriate
stratagems, baited retreats,
hard-hitting tactical thrusts, and
swirling envelopments to
uncover and exploit adversary
vulnerabilities and weaknesses.
Aim
in conjunction with
•
Conquest, as basis to
create, preserve, and
expand Mongol nation
Clever and calculated use of
propaganda and terror to play
upon adversary’s doubts, fears,
and superstitions in order to
undermine his resolve and
destroy his will to resist.
keep this in mind
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Genghis Khan and Psyops
• …to play on surprise in a tortured manipulation of public fear
and hope. The objective of such tactics was simple and always
the same: to frighten the enemy into surrendering before an
actual battle began.
• By striking deeply behind enemy lines, the Mongols immediately
created havoc and panic throughout the kingdom.
• The Persian chronicler Ata-Malik Juvaini described his approach
“… air black as night with the dust of cavalry, fright and panic
overcame them, and fear and dread prevailed.”
Jack Weatherford,
Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World,
p. 5
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Added August 2006
Mongol strategic maneuver
(1219-1220)
Chagatai
Genghis
Khan
Jochi
Jebe
Aral
Sea
Kizyl-Kum
Khawarizm
State
Bokhara
Samarkand
(Modern Uzbekistan)
500 miles
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?
Raises nagging question ?
Even though outnumbered, why were Mongols able
to maneuver in widely scattered arrays without being
defeated separately or in detail?
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Historical patterns
Genghis Khan and the Mongols
Message
•
By exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and
mobility as well as by playing upon adversary’s fears and doubts via
propaganda and terror, Mongols operated inside adversary observationorientation-decision-action loops.
Result
•
Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of terrifying strength—by
seeming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere.
hence,
•
Subversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers,
and calculated terror not only created vulnerabilities and weaknesses but
also played upon moral factors that drain-away resolve, produce panic,
and bring about collapse.
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Historical pattern
Napoleon’s art of war
Revolutionary army gifts to Napoleon
Beneficial asymmetry
•
Moral and physical energy of citizensoldiers and new leaders generated by the
revolution and magnified by successes
against invading allied armies
•
•
Subdivision of army into smaller selfcontained but mutually supporting units
(divisions)
•
Ability to travel light and live-off countryside
without extensive baggage, many supply
wagons, and slow-moving resupply efforts
•
Rapid march associated with “120” instead
of the standard “70” steps per minute
•
Discontinued adherence to 1791 Drill
Regulations pertaining to the well regulated
and stereotype use of column and line
formations for movement and fighting
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Mobility/fluidity of force dramatically
better than that possessed by potential
adversaries.
?
Raises question
?
How did Napoleon exploit
this superior mobility/fluidity
of force?
perhaps one reason why
maneuver warfare is often
confused with “speed”
33
Strategy of envelopment
(idealized schematic)
ch'i
maneuver force
strategic barrier
of defense
line
pinning force
LOCs
curtain of
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II. The Reversed Front Battle
strategic barrier
of defense
line
Cheng
pinning force
I. The Envelopment March
curtain of
maneuver
cavalry screen
maneuver
cavalry screen
Source: David G. Chandler, Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980.
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The strategy of central position
(idealized schematic)
III. The Coup de Grace
I. Advance to Contact
base
xxxx
LOC
base
xxxx
LOC
A
base
xxxx
B
xxxx
LOC
base
B
A
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
II. The Double Battle
overnight forced march
xxxx
N
base
xxxx
LOC
LOC
A
base
xxxx
B
xx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxxx
N
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Source: David G. Chandler,
Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980.
36
Historical pattern
Napoleon’s art of war
Early tactic
Later tactics
“The action was opened by a cloud of sharpshooters,
some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to
carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated
mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping
from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect
of his cannon by their dispersal. They were constantly
relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they
also received considerable reinforcement to increase their
over-all effect … Once the chink in foe’s armour had
been revealed … the horse artillery would gallop up and
open fire with canister at close range. The attacking force
would meantime be moving up in the indicated direction,
the infantry advancing in column, the cavalry in regiments
or squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or
everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy
bullets or cannon balls began to slacken … The soldiers
would begin to run forward, those in the front ranks
crossing their bayonets, as the drums beat the charge; the
sky would ring a thousand battle-cries constantly repeated:
“En avant. En avant. Vive la Republique.”
“At the outset, a heavy bombardment would be loosed
against the enemy formations, causing fearful losses if
they failed to seek shelter, and generally lowering their
power of resistance. Under cover of this fire, swarms of
voltigeurs would advance to within musketry range and
add a disconcerting ‘nuisance’ element by sniping at
officers and the like. This preliminary phase would be
followed by a series of heavy cavalry and infantry
attacks. The secret of these was careful timing and
coordination. The first cavalry charges were designed to
defeat the hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry
to form squares”, thereby reduce fire in any one direction
and enable the columns to get to close grips before the
enemy could resume his linear formation. The infantry
(deployed or not) and accompanying horse artillery would
then blaze a gap in the enemy formation and finally the
cavalry would sweep forward, again, to exploit the
other words to describe this:
breakthrough.
organic, formless, reconnaissance
pull, surfaces-and-gaps
Essential point
Early tactics, without apparent design, operate in a fluid, adaptable manner to uncover, expand and exploit adversary
vulnerabilities and weaknesses while later tactics emphasize massed firepower and stereotyped formations working
formally together to smash adversary strength.
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Historical pattern
Napoleon’s art of war
Critique
Why?
•
•
Napoleon emphasized the conduct of war
from the top down. He created and
exploited strategic success to procure
grand tactical and tactical success.
•
To support his concept, he set up a highly
centralized command and control system
which, when coupled with essentially
unvarying tactical recipes, resulted in
strength smashing into strength by
increasingly unimaginative, formalized,
and predictable actions at lower and
lower levels.
Napoleon exploited ambiguity, deception,
and mobility at the strategic level,
whereas,
•
He increasingly emphasized formal
battering ram methods and deemphasized loose, irregular methods
(e.g. skirmishers) at the tactics level—via
a return to, and increasingly heavyhanded application of, the 1791 Drill
Regulations.
Result
Strategic maneuvers ambiguous and deceiving prior to tactical concentration; after concentration,
“maneuvers” stereotyped and obvious.
hence
Tactical “maneuvers” could not easily procure the victory because of their obvious, predictable
nature.
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Technology and the art of war
•
The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini’s tactical regularity and the continued use
of large stereotyped formations for tactical assault, together with the mobilization of large
armies and massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network, “telegraphed”
any punch hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and
mobility to generate surprise for a decisive edge.
•
In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and
debilitating casualties on all sides during the:
–
–
–
–
–
–
American Civil War (1861-65)
Austro-Prussian War (1866)
Franco-Prussian War (1870)
Boer War (1899-1902)
Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
World War I (1914-18)
Point
•
Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality developed and
produced by 19th century technology.
?
•
Raises question
?
Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to evolve better
tactics to avoid over a half century of debilitating casualties?
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World War I
Action
Reaction
•
•
Defense organized into depth of
successive belts of fortified terrain.
•
Massed artillery and machine-gun
fire designed to arrest and pin down
attacker.
•
Counter-attack to win back lost
ground.
•
•
Offensives conducted on wide
frontages—emphasizing few, rather
than many, harmonious yet
independent thrusts.
Evenness of advance maintained to
protect flanks and provide artillery
support as advance makes
headway.
Reserves thrown in whenever attack
held-up—against regions or points
of strong resistance.
Result
Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected
along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and
choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed firepower and infantry.
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World War I
a way out
Idea
•
•
July 2006
Authors
Infiltration tactics
Guerrilla tactics
•
Capt. Andre Laffargue
•
Gen. von Hutier?
•
Gen. Ludendorff
•
T.E. Lawrence
•
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck
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World War I
infiltration tactics
cheng
Key points
•
Fire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machine-guns is exploited to hold adversary
attention and pin him down hence—
•
Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represent an immediate
and ominous threat to capture adversary attention, force heads down and
dramatically obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators movements.
•
Dispersed and irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to well defined line
abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against irregular and changing terrain
features as they push forward.
•
Taken together, the captured attention, the obscured view, and the indistinct character
of moving dispersed/irregular swarms deny adversary the opportunity to picture what
is taking place.
ch’i
Result
•
Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow thru, around,
and behind disoriented defenders.
Note: This is the essence of maneuver warfare/3GW. Good
discussions in Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics,
and Stephen Biddle, Military Power.
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Looming up
(asymmetric fast transients)
OODA “loops” in action
The Asian soldier is a master of the approach march. His
tradition is to attack out of nowhere—to suddenly appear where
he is least expected.
John Poole, Phantom Soldier, 139
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Creation of the Blitzkrieg
Envelopment
(Leuctra, Cannae)
Flying Columns
(Mongols)
Blitzkrieg
(Heinz Guderian)
Tank Attack with
Motorized Vehicles
(J.F.C. Fuller)
• Multiple narrow
thrusts
• Armored recce
• Commanders
forward
Infiltration
(Ludendorff)
• Extensive
communications
net
• Air in lieu of (or
with) artillery
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Blitzkrieg
Action
•
Intelligence—signal, photo, agent … reconnaissance (air and ground)—and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during combat
operations to uncover as well as shape changing patterns of strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.
•
Adversary patterns, and associated changes, are weighed against friendly situation to expose attractive, or appropriate, alternatives that exploit
adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence help shape mission commitment and influence command intent.
•
Mission assigned. Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort) established before and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary strength and
strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting efforts) employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary attention and strength
(elsewhere).
•
Special seizure/disruption teams infiltrate (by air or other means) enemy rear areas where, with agents already in place, they: seize bridges and road
crossings, sever communications, incapacitate or blow-up power stations, seize or blow-up fuel dumps … as well as sow confusion/disorder via
“false messages and fake orders”.
•
Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed) sudden/brief preliminary artillery fires are focused in appropriate areas to impede
(or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications, suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divert attention.
•
Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least expected regions and infiltrate adversary front
to find paths of least resistance.
•
Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, anti-tank guns, and combat engineers as well as other specialists, together with close artillery and air
support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and movement combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least resistance uncovered by
armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers.
•
When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored recce with air support (recce, fire, and airlift when
necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt movement,
paralyze command and envelop adversary forces and resources.
•
Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to collapse isolated pockets of resistance, widen the breaches and
secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counter-attack.
Idea
•
Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial surprise and exploiting the fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams,
with air support, as basis to repeatedly penetrate, splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out disconnected remnants of adversary organism in
order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist.
Note: maneuver warfare does not mean leaving intact
and motivated enemy forces in your rear.
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What happens if we don’t probe, test,
uncover and shape?
… the U.S. intelligence community missed the significance
of the Fedayeen organization. It was a striking omission
given the visibility of the Fedayeen in Iraqi towns and cities
and the vital importance of the Fedayeen to the regime,
but understandable given the CIA’s dearth of human
sources … (Gordon & Trainor, Cobra II, p. 62)
July 2006
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Which lead to:
Essence of blitzkrieg
Employ a Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt maneuver philosophy to generate ambiguity, realize deception,
exploit superior mobility, and focus violence as basis to quickly:
•
Create many opportunities to penetrate weaknesses in the form of any moral or mental
inadequacies as well as any gaps or exposed flanks that open into adversary’s vulnerable rear and
interior, hence-
•
Create and exploit opportunities to repeatedly penetrate adversary organism, at all levels (tactical,
grand tactical, and strategic) and in many ways, in order to splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out
isolated remnants, thereby generate confusion and disorder, hence -
•
Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt his system for communication, command, and support,
as well as undermine or seize those connections or centers that he depends upon, thus shake his will
or capacity to decisively commit his back-up echelons, operational reserves, and/or strategic
reserves, thereby magnify adversary’s confusion and disorder and convince him to give up.
Intent
Create grand tactical success then exploit and expand it into strategic success for a decisive victory.
Implication
Blitzers, by being able to infiltrate or penetrate or get inside adversary’s system, generate many moralmental-physical non—cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as undermine or seize those
centers of gravity adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, produce paralysis, and bring about
adversary collapse.
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Categories of conflict
Note: Boyd did not use the term
“maneuver warfare” in his briefings.
Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history
we can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
– Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by
all sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the
Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear
planners.
– Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General
Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union
General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler’s Generals (in particular
Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under
Generals Patton and MacArthur.
– [we’ll come back to this bullet later]
With these comments in mind let’s look into the essentials of each.
Version 1.2
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111
Attrition observations
• Firepower, as a destructive force, is king.
• Protection (trenches, armor, dispersion, etc.) is used to weaken or
dilute effects of enemy firepower.
• Mobility is used to bring firepower to bear or to evade enemy fire.
• Measures of success are (now) “body count” and targets
destroyed.
• Seize and hold terrain objectives replaces Napoleon’s dictum:
Destroy enemy army.
Key point: measures of success are
(virtually all) quantitative and objective,
and if what you’re doing isn’t working,
you just haven’t done it enough.
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Essence of attrition warfare
Note – moral purpose
Create and exploit
•
Payoff
Destructive force:
Weapons (mechanical, chemical,
biological, nuclear, etc.) that kill, maim,
and/or otherwise generate widespread
destruction.
•
•
Frightful and debilitating attrition via
widespread destruction as basis to:
–
Break enemy’s will to resist
–
Seize and hold terrain objectives
Protection:
Ability to minimize the concentrated and
explosive expression of destructive force
by taking cover behind natural or
manmade obstacles, by dispersion of
people and resources, and by being
obscure using camouflage, smoke, etc.,
together with cover and dispersion.
•
Mobility:
Speed or rapidity to focus destructive
force or move away from adversary’s
destructive focus.
Aim
Compel enemy to
surrender and sue
for peace
Attrition – destruction – is the
means, not the end.
Note: “speed”
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Observations regarding maneuver
• Ambiguity, deception, novelty, mobility, and violence (or
threat thereof) are used to generate surprise and shock.
• Fire and movement are used in combination, like cheng/ch'i
or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, divert, or drainaway adversary attention and strength in order to expose as
well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses
elsewhere.
• Indications of success tend to be qualitative and are related
to the widespread onset of confusion and disorder, frequent
envelopments, high prisoner counts, or any other
phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change.
It’s the interpretation that’s important, not the
quantitative data themselves. Unlike attrition
warfare, one does not typically reinforce failure.
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Essence of maneuver conflict
Create, exploit, and magnify
Payoff
•
•
Ambiguity:
Alternative or competing impressions of events as they
may or may not be.
•
•
•
•
Overload:
A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one’s
mental or physical capacity to adapt or endure.
Fast transient maneuvers:
Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver
event/state to another.
•
Disruption:
State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn
asunder.
Novelty:
Impressions associated with events/ideas that are
unfamiliar or have not been experienced before.
•
Mismatch between events one observes or
imagines and events (or efforts) he must react or
adapt to.
Deception:
An impression of events as they are not.
Disorientation:
Effort (cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt):
An expenditure of energy or an irruption of violence—
focused into, or thru, features that permit an organic
whole to exist.
Note: High tempo, not
(necessarily) high speed.
Aim
Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient, disrupt, or overload those that adversary
depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse;
or equivalently,
Uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull adversary apart
and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.
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It is true that the Russian can be
superb in defense and reckless
in mass attacks, but when faced
by surprise and unforeseen
situations he is an easy prey to
panic. Field Marshal von Manstein proved in this
operation* that Russian mass attacks should be met
by maneuver, not by rigid defense.
Panzer Battles,
Major General F. W. von Mellenthin,
p. 254
* The Kharkov Counterstroke –
February & March 1943
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why this is called
“maneuver” conflict
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Second impression
Transients
Intentions
•
•
Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses,
maneuvers, and intentions.
•
Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertaintymistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as basis to
sever adversary’s moral ties and disorient ...
•
Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
•
Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue
directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and
threaten alternative objectives.
•
Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit
success).
•
Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, and
obsessions of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to
cope ...
•
Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary’s
vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities ... in order
to dismember organism and isolate remnants for wrap-up or
absorption.
•
Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos ... to shatter
cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse.
•
Become an extraordinary commander.
Observe, orient, decide and act more
inconspicuously, more quickly, and with
more irregularity ...
or put another way
•
Operate inside adversary’s observationorientation-decision action loops or get
inside his mind-time-space.
… permits
one to
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Select the initiative (or response)
that is least expected
• (Genghis Khan) had secretly pushed and pulled another
division of warriors over a distance longer than any other army
had ever covered—two thousand miles of desert, mountain, and
steppe—to appear deep behind enemy lines, where least
expected. (Weatherford, p. 4)
• We intended to make our decisive thrust not immediately in the
area where the front protruded west, but down in the southern
sector, along the Black Sea coast. In other words, where the
enemy would be least expecting it. Field Marshal Erich von
Manstein on the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula, May 1942 (Lost
Victories, p. 234). [Although outnumbered 2-to-1 and facing a
well prepared enemy, Manstein won a spectacular victory that
led to his promotion to Field Marshal].
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Added August 2006
Agenda
•
•
•
Conflict
–
Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
–
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict
Moral isolation and interaction
–
•
OODA Loops
Theme for disintegration and
collapse
Grand strategy
–
What they are not (and are)
–
Theme for vitality and growth
–
How to accelerate OODA loops
–
Ends and means
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
–
Moral leverage
•
Guerrilla warfare
–
What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
Barnett, and Scheuer say about
grand strategy
–
Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy
•
Generations of war
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
–
Tables
–
Issues among the authors
4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
–
Neither Shall the Sword
•
•
•
July 2006
Summary
If I were emperor …
http://www.jaddams.com
Boyd’s original concept of
the OODA loop
Orient
Observe
Decide
A scheme like this would be a “stage
model.” The drawbacks of such
models are well known – see for
example, Gary Klein’s Sources of
Power, pp. 127-128.
Act
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The only drawing Boyd made of
the OODA “loop” (1995)
Observe
Orient
Implicit
Guidance
& Control
Unfolding
Circumstances
Observations
Feed
Forward
Genetic
Heritage
Act
Implicit
Guidance
& Control
Cultural
Traditions
Analyses &
Synthesis
New
Information
Feed
Forward
Decision
(Hypothesis)
Feed
Forward
Previous
Experience
Outside
Information
Unfolding
Interaction
With
Environment
Decide
Action
(Test)
Unfolding
Interaction
With
Environment
Feedback
Feedback
J. R. Boyd, “the Essence of Winning and Losing,” 1995.
“Orientation is the Schwerpunkt.” Organic Design, 16.
“Emphasize implicit over explicit in order to gain a favorable mismatch in friction and
time (ours lower than any adversary’s).” Organic Design, 22.
“Interaction permits vitality and growth, while isolation leads to decay and
disintegration.” Strategic Game, 29.
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Prerequisites
Fingerspitzengefühl
•
An ability to “feel” or sense the flow of events
– Often associated with Rommel
•
Related to the implicit guidance and control link from orientation to
action
•
“When this unminding becomes your mind, you do not dwell on
anything and do not miss anything. In your body it comes out when a
need faces it, to fulfill that need.” – Zen Master Takuan (Thomas Cleary,
The Japanese Art of War, 65)
•
“You must practice all of your techniques until they become second
nature … actual combat is extremely fast and demands that you act
and react without thinking.” – Miyamoto Musashi, Book of Five Rings
•
“A major difference between a military that can do maneuver warfare in
combat and one that can only talk about it is excellence in techniques.
Sloppy technique slows down your Boyd Cycle [OODA loops] and
makes your actions ineffective. – Bill Lind, Maneuver Warfare
Handbook
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Blitz operating philosophy
Key point
•
Each level from simple to complex (platoon to theater) has their own observation-orientation-decision-action
time cycle that increases as we try to control more levels and details of command at the higher levels. Put
simply, as the number of events we must consider increase, the longer it takes to observe-orient-decide-act.
Idea
•
This brings out the idea that faster tempo, or rhythm, at lower levels should work within the slower rhythm but
larger pattern at higher levels so that overall system does not lose its cohesion or coherency.
Raises question
•
How do blitzers harmonize these differing tempos/rhythms so that they can exploit the faster rhythm/smaller
pattern (of the lower-level units) yet maintain the coherency of the rhythm/pattern for the larger effort?
Response
•
Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall mind-time-space scheme, to shape/direct
their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in harmony with the
larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more general aim and larger effort at the strategic level.
Shaping agents
•
Shape overall scheme by using mission concept or sense of mission to fix responsibility and shape
commitment at all levels and through all parts of the organism. Likewise, use Schwerpunkt concept through
all levels to link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level of the organic whole can operate at its own
natural rhythm—without pulling organism apart—instead of the slower pace associated with a rigid centralized
control.
These, inside a shared value system, permit
implicit guidance and control.
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72
Overall mind-time-space scheme
Message
•
According to General Gunther Blumentritt, such a scheme presupposes a
common outlook based upon “a body of professional officers who have received
exactly the same training during the long years of peace and with the same
tactical education, the same way of thinking, identical speech, hence a body of
officers to whom all tactical conceptions were fully clear.”
•
Furthermore, a la General Blumentritt, it presupposes “an officers training
institution which allows the subordinate a very great measure of freedom of
action and freedom in the manner of executing orders and which primarily calls
for independent daring, initiative and sense of responsibility.”
Point
•
Boyd also used the German word,
Without a common outlook superiors cannot give
subordinates
freedom-of“Einheit,”
to describe
this common
action and maintain coherency of ongoing action.
outlook.
Implication
•
A common outlook possessed by “a body of officers” represents a unifying
theme that can be used to simultaneously encourage subordinate initiative
yet realize superior intent.
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Schwerpunkt
(focus of main effort)
Message
•
Schwerpunkt acts as a center or axis or harmonizing agent that is used to help shape commitment and
convey or carry-out intent, at all levels from theater to platoon, hence an image around which:
–
Maneuver of all arms and supporting elements are focused to exploit opportunities and maintain tempo
of operations,
and
–
•
Initiative of many subordinates is harmonized with superior intent.
In this sense Schwerpunkt can be thought of as:
–
A focusing agent that naturally produces an unequal distribution of effort as a basis to generate
superiority in some sectors by thinning-out others,
as well as
–
A medium to realize superior intent without impeding initiative of many subordinates, hence a medium
through which subordinate initiative is implicitly connected to superior intent.
Implication
–
Schwerpunkt represents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly shape focus and direction of effort
as well as harmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true decentralization of
tactical command within centralized strategic guidance—without losing cohesion of overall effort.
or put another way
–
Schwerpunkt represents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate
actions with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a favorable
mismatch in time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances.
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Auftragstaktik—missions and
contracts instead of directives
The concept of mission can be thought of as a contract, hence an
agreement, between superior and subordinate.
– The subordinate agrees to make his or her actions serve
superior's intent in terms of what is to be accomplished,
– The superior agrees to give the subordinate wide freedom to
exercise his or her imagination and initiative in terms of
how intent is to be realized.
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Auftragstaktik—what “commitment”
means
As part of this concept, the subordinate is given the right to
challenge or question the feasibility of the mission if:
– he feels his superior's ideas on what can be achieved are
not in accord with the existing situation or
– he feels his superior has not given him adequate resources
to carry it out.
Likewise, the superior has every right to expect his
subordinate to carry out the mission contract when
agreement is reached on what can be achieved consistent
with the existing situation and resources provided.
J. R. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, 76
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Auftragstaktik
•
But once the attack is underway and the situation begins changing rapidly, the
subordinate will again be expected to adjust his actions to the changes on his
own initiative, with appropriate references to his superior’s intent. Lind,
Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 13-14
•
Advantages of Auftragstaktik:
– Leaders at all echelons are forced to analyze their own situations as well as
that of the next highest command
– Transmission of orders from one command level to another is expedited
– Measures taken at the scene of action are in harmony with actual conditions
General W. von Lessow, Bundeswehr, 1977
(in van Creveld, Fighting Power)
•
It provides for the degree of cooperation necessary to achieve harmony of effort
yet gives commanders at all levels the latitude to act with initiative and boldness
… It is not more command and control that we are after. Instead, we seek to
decrease the amount of command and control that we need. MCDP 6,
Command and Control, Ch. 3
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Before you rush in …
• Mission command and control demands mutual trust among
all commanders, staffs, and Marines—confidence in the
abilities and judgment of subordinates, peers, and seniors.
In other words, you must earn the MCDP
right 6, p. 10
use Auftragstaktik.
• Such a system, oftocourse,
presupposes uniformity of thinking
and reliability of action only to be attained by thorough
training and long experience. More importantly still, complete
confidence of superiors and their subordinates and vice versa
is absolutely indispensable.
van Creveld, Fighting Power, p. 36.
July 2006
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Version 1.2
10 March 2005
Idealized schematic
The FESA climate
Common outlook
II. Einheit
I. (Individual)
Fingerspitzengefühl
III. Schwerpunkt
IV. Auftrag
July 2006
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What OODA “loop” speed
really means
Quickly
understand
what’s going on
Observe
Shared values;
common
experiences;
commander’s
intent, etc.
Know what to do
Orient
Decide
Implicit
Guidance
& Control
Unfolding
Circumstances
Observations
And be able to
do it
Act
Implicit
Guidance
& Control
Feed
Forward
Feed
Forward
Decision
(Hypothesis)
Feed
Forward
Action
(Test)
Key Points:
Outside
• When
you’re doing OODA “loops” right,
Information
accuracy and
speed improve together; they don’t
Unfolding
Feedback
trade off. Interaction
With
Environment
Feedback
• The main function of management is to build an
organization that gets better and better at these
things.
July 2006
Unfolding
Interaction
With
Environment
While learning
from the
experience
http://www.jaddams.com
Agenda
•
•
•
Conflict
–
Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
–
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict
Moral isolation and interaction
–
•
OODA Loops
Theme for disintegration and
collapse
Grand strategy
–
What they are not (and are)
–
Theme for vitality and growth
–
How to accelerate OODA loops
–
Ends and means
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
–
Moral leverage
•
Guerrilla warfare
–
What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
Barnett, and Scheuer say about
grand strategy
–
Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy
•
Generations of war
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
–
Tables
–
Issues among the authors
4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
–
Neither Shall the Sword
•
•
•
July 2006
Summary
If I were emperor …
http://www.jaddams.com
Categories of conflict
Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we
can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
– Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all
sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies
during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
– Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General
Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union
General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler’s Generals (in particular Manstein,
Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under Generals
Patton and MacArthur.
– Moral conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, most guerrilla
leaders, a very few counter-guerrillas (such as Magsaysay) and
certain others from Sun Tzu to the present.
With these comments in mind let’s look into the essentials of each.
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Observations related to moral conflict
Gen. Hermann Balck
Theme
•
No fixed recipes for organization, communications, tactics, leadership, etc.
•
Wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative—yet harmonize within intent of
superior commanders.
•
Heavy reliance upon moral (human values) instead of material superiority as basis for cohesion and
ultimate success.
•
Commanders must create a bond and breadth of experience based upon trust—not mistrust—for
cohesion.
How is this atmosphere achieved?
•
By example leaders (at all levels) must demonstrate requisite physical energy, mental agility, and
moral authority, to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and take initiatives within
superiors intent.
What is the price?
•
Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front.
•
Willingness to support and promote (unconventional or difficult) subordinates that accept danger,
demonstrate initiative, take risks, and come-up with new ways toward mission accomplishment.
•
Dedication and resolve to face-up to and master uncomfortable circumstances that fly in the face of the
traditional solution.
Benefit
•
Internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.
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Essence of moral conflict
Create, exploit, and magnify
Idea
•
•
Menace:
Impressions of danger to one’s well
being and survival.
•
Uncertainty:
Impressions, or atmosphere,
generated by events that appear
ambiguous, erratic, centers of
gravity, as well as subvert
contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic,
etc.
•
Surface, fear, anxiety, and
alienation in order to generate
many non-cooperative centers of
gravity, as well as subvert those that
adversary depends upon, thereby
magnify internal friction.
payoff
In order to breed these
Aim
Mistrust:
July 2006
In other words, pump up these
Destroy moral bonds
Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion
that loosens human bonds among
that permit an organic
members of an organic whole or
whole to exist
between organic wholes.
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Essence of moral conflict
Negative factors
Counterweights
•
•
Menace:
Initiative:
Impressions of danger to one’s well being
and survival
•
•
Uncertainty:
Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by
events that appear ambiguous, erratic,
contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc.
•
Internal drive to think and take action
without being urged
Mistrust:
Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that
loosens human bonds among members of
an organic whole or between organic
wholes
Adaptability:
Power to adjust or change in order to cope
May use
a variety
of tools:
with new
or unforeseen
circumstances
• physical
– movement or firepower
•
Harmony:
Interaction of apparently disconnected
• mental
– e.g., ambiguity via more
events or entities in a connected way
rapid OODA loops
• or moral – propaganda,
Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, subversion
and alienation in order
to generate
many non& covert
action,
etc.
Aim
cooperative centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral
bonds that permit adversary to exist as an organic whole.
Simultaneously,
build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface
courage, confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds
that permit us, as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.
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Prism of Conflict
Attrition
Maneuver
Moral
Any actual conflict
Note: This is my interpretation - as far as I
know, Boyd never used it.
July 2006
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Agenda
•
•
•
Conflict
–
Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
–
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict
Moral isolation and interaction
–
•
OODA Loops
Theme for disintegration and
collapse
Grand strategy
–
What they are not (and are)
–
Theme for vitality and growth
–
How to accelerate OODA loops
–
Ends and means
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
–
Moral leverage
•
Guerrilla warfare
–
What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
Barnett, and Scheuer say about
grand strategy
–
Blitz & guerrilla: common
strategy
•
•
Generations of war
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
•
4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
July 2006
•
Summary
–
Tables
–
Issues among the authors
–
Neither Shall the Sword
If I were emperor …
http://www.jaddams.com
World War I Guerrilla Warfare
(a la T.E. Lawrence)
Action
•
Gain support of population. Must “arrange the minds” of friend, foe and
neutral alike. Must “get inside their minds”.
•
Must “be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting
about like a gas” (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of action). Must
be an “attack-in-depth”.
•
Tactics “should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes” with “use of the
smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place”.
•
Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a
threat everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and
environmental background (vast unknown desert) as basis for “never
affording a target” and “never on the defensive except by accident and
in error”.
Idea
•
Disintegrate existing regime’s ability to govern.
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Impression
•
Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff
seem to be similar in nature to
irregular or guerrilla tactics a la
Lawrence.
•
Why? Both stress clouded/distorted
signatures, mobility and cohesion of
small units as basis to insert an
amorphous yet focused effort into
or thru adversary weaknesses.
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Major advances between
World Wars I and II
Soviet revolutionary strategy
•
Lenin, and after him Stalin, exploited the idea of crises and vanguards—that arise out of Marxian
contradictions within capitalism—to lay-out Soviet revolutionary strategy.
•
Result:
–
A scheme that emphasizes moral/psychological factors as basis to destroy a regime from within.
Lightning war (blitzkrieg)
•
•
Infiltration tactics of 1918 were mated with:
–
Tank
–
Motorized Artillery
–
Tactical Aircraft
–
Motor Transport
–
Better Communications
– J.F.C. Fuller
by
– Heinz Guderian
Result:
–
Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with multiple narrow thrusts using armor,
motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.
Guerrilla war
•
Mao Tse-Tung synthesized Sun Tzu’s ideas, classic guerrilla strategy and tactics, and Napoleonic style
mobile operations under an umbrella of Soviet revolutionary ideas to create a powerful way for waging
modern (guerrilla) war.
•
Result:
–
July 2006
Modern guerrilla warfare has become an overall political, economic, social and military framework for
“total war”.
http://www.jaddams.com
66
Blitzkrieg and guerrilla strategy
Infiltration and isolation
•
Note
Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral
fiber of the political, economic and social structure. Simultaneously, via diplomatic,
psychological, and various sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away potential allies thereby
isolate intended victim(s) for forthcoming blows. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu,
blitz, and guerrillas:
–
Probe and test adversary, and any allies that may rally to his side, in order to unmask
strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.
–
Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., in
order to foment mistrust, sow discord and shape both adversary’s and allies’ perception
of the world thereby:
• Create atmosphere of “mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness,
panic”...
• Manipulate or undermine adversary’s plans and actions.
• Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary during his time of trial.
Purpose
•
Force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures
or
•
Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will follow.
July 2006
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69
Modern guerrilla campaign
Essence
•
Capitalize on corruption, injustice, incompetence, etc., (or their appearances) as basis to generate
atmosphere of mistrust and discord in order to sever moral bonds that bind people to existing regime.
Simultaneously,
•
Share existing burdens with people and work with them to root out and punish corruption, remove
injustice, eliminate grievances, etc., as basis to form moral bonds between people and guerrillas in
order to bind people to guerrilla philosophy and ideals.
Intent
•
Question:
Shape and exploit crises environment that permits guerrilla vanguards or cadres to pure-up guerrilla
Aretheal-Qa’ida
orand
the
Iraqi insurgents
accomplishing
resolve, attract
uncommitted,
drain-away
adversary resolve
as foundation to replace existing
regime withor
guerrilla
evenregime.
trying to accomplish these?
Implication
•
Guerrillas, by being able to penetrate the very essence of their adversary’s moral-mental-physical
being, generate many moral-mental-physical non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as
subvert or seize those centers of gravity that adversary regime must depend upon, in order to magnify
friction, produce paralysis, and bring about collapse.
Yet,
•
Guerrillas shape or influence moral-mental-physical atmosphere so that potential adversaries, as well as
the uncommitted, are drawn toward guerrilla philosophy and are empathetic toward guerrilla success.
July 2006
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91
Guerrilla results
Successful
Successful
Unsuccessful
•
American Colonies
1775-81
1775-81
Philippines
• • Philippines
1899-1902
•
Spain
1808-14
1808-14
South
Africa
• • South
Africa
1900-02
•
Russia
1812
1812
• • Greece
Greece
1944-49
•
German East Africa
1914-18
1914-18
• • Philippines*
Philippines*
1946-54
•
Arabia
1916-18
1916-18
1948-60
•
• • Malaya*
Malaya*
China
1927-49
1927-49
•
Russia
1941-45
•
Yugoslavia
1941-45
•
Indochina
1945-54
•
Algeria
1954-62
•
Cuba
1956-59
•
South Vietnam
1958-75
1941-45
1941-45
1945-54
1954-62
1956-59
1958-75
Guerrilla war is the war of the broad masses of an
economically backward country standing up against a
powerfully equipped and well trained army of aggression.
Vo Nguyen Giap
People’s War People’s Army
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
* Regime exercised particular care not to
inflict casualties and to protect
population.
97
Blitz and guerrilla theme
Essence
•
Avoid battles—instead penetrate adversary to subvert, disrupt, or
seize those connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion
(e.g., psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of
communication, command and supply centers ...)
•
Exploit ambiguity, deception, superior mobility, and sudden violence to
generate initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shock
again, again, again ...
•
Roll-up/wipe-out the isolated units or remnants created by the
subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure.
Intent
•
Exploit subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure to generate
confusion, disorder, panic, etc., thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze
effort, and bring about adversary collapse.
July 2006
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98
Counter-guerrilla campaign
Action
•
Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to
represent and serve needs of people—rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.*
•
Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as
popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*
•
Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and
organization.
•
Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away
potential allies as well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with outside world.
•
Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to: inhibit guerrilla
communication, coordination and movement; minimize guerrilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres;
and destroy their infrastructure.
•
Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in
order to protect people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla cadres and their fighting units.
•
Use special teams in a complementary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ (guerrillas’ own) tactics of
reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to: keep roving bands off-balance, make base areas
untenable, and disrupt communication with outside world.
•
Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine,
collapse, and replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.
•
Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and
needs of people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.
Idea
•
Break guerrillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political
initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize
stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.
___________
* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!
July 2006
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108
Agenda
•
•
•
Conflict
–
Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
–
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict
Moral isolation and interaction
–
•
OODA Loops
Theme for disintegration and
collapse
Grand strategy
–
What they are not (and are)
–
Theme for vitality and growth
–
How to accelerate OODA loops
–
Ends and means
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
–
Moral leverage
•
Guerrilla warfare
–
What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
Barnett, and Scheuer say about
grand strategy
–
Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy
•
Generations of war
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
–
Tables
–
Issues among the authors
4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
–
Neither Shall the Sword
•
•
•
July 2006
Summary
If I were emperor …
http://www.jaddams.com
Another scheme –
the generations of war
• 1GW: short-range, smoothbore weapons; line and column; rigid
discipline with top down control. Training & élan could often
close with and defeat enemy before absorbing debilitating
casualties
• 2GW: rifled weapons, automatic weapons, indirect fire artillery;
tactics still basically linear (esp. on defense), but firepower
replaced manpower as predominant element. Attempts to use
“élan” to overcome firepower were now suicidal
• 3GW: same weapons; but: non-linear tactics (infiltration/pull;
surfaces & gaps); time rather than place as basis of operational
art; emphasis on collapsing enemy rather than closing with and
destroying him (AKA blitzkrieg, maneuver warfare, modern
system)
July 2006
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1 & 2 GW
Battle of Antietam
September 17, 1862
July 2006
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Agenda
•
•
•
Conflict
–
Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
–
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict
Moral isolation and interaction
–
•
OODA Loops
Theme for disintegration and
collapse
Grand strategy
–
What they are not (and are)
–
Theme for vitality and growth
–
How to accelerate OODA loops
–
Ends and means
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
–
Moral leverage
•
Guerrilla warfare
–
What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
Barnett, and Scheuer say about
grand strategy
–
Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy
•
Generations of war
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
–
Tables
–
Issues among the authors
4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
–
Neither Shall the Sword
•
•
•
July 2006
Summary
If I were emperor …
http://www.jaddams.com
Blitz vs. guerrilla
•
Same basic themes (PISRR), collapse rather than overpower enemy
•
Same emphasis on cheng/ch’i
•
Differences include:
Blitz/3GW
Guerrilla
Penetrate
Enemy forces
Target society
Isolate
Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g.,
penetrated units, fighting units
from logistics, etc.)
Government from people
Subdue/Subvert
Isolated remnants
Elements of society, geographic
entities (villages, provinces, etc.)
Reorient
Ourselves for next objective
Subverted elements
Reharmonize
Our forces (e.g., shift
Schwerpunkt)
Elements of society under our
control
Content
High mental
High moral
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Clausewitz’s Trinity*:
State vs. State
Other state
1, 2,
3GW/Blitz/MW
Government
The
State
Army
People
*simplified
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Clausewitz’s Trinity:
Insurgency
Allies
of
The
State
penetrate &
isolate
Guerrilla
Government
The
State
penetrate &
isolate
People
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Army
3GW restores maneuver
Attrition
Maneuver
Moral
1GW
2GW
3GW
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Guerrilla
Now, come with me into the fourth
generation!
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW, according to Lind
What defines 4GW:
• “Crisis in legitimacy of the state”: The loss of the state's
monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of its citizens and the
rise of non-state entities that command people’s primary loyalty
and that wage war. These entities may be gangs, religions,
races and ethnic groups within races, localities, tribes, business
enterprises, ideologies—the variety is almost limitless.
• A return to a world of cultures, not, merely states, in conflict; and
• The manifestation of both developments—the decline of the
state and the rise of alternate, often cultural, primary loyalties—
not only “over there,” but in America itself.
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW, according to Lind
The goal of 4GW is largely moral:
Fourth Generation war focuses on the moral level, where it
works to convince all parties, neutrals as well as belligerents,
that the cause for which a Fourth Generation entity is fighting is
morally superior. It turns its state enemies inward against
themselves on the moral level, making the political calculations
of the mental level irrelevant.
“What if we combined terrorism, high technology, and the following
additional elements?
• A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or
religion
• A direct attack on the enemy’s culture …
• Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially
through manipulation of the media, particularly television
news …
July 2006
“The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Lind, et. al., 1989
http://www.jaddams.com
“collapse a state morally”
– Moral strength: Mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and
mistrust.
– Moral victory: Triumph of courage, confidence, and esprit (de corps)
over fear, anxiety, and alienation when confronted by menace, uncertainty,
and mistrust.
– Moral defeat: Triumph of fear, anxiety, and alienation over courage,
confidence, and esprit when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and
mistrust.
– Moral values: Human values that permit one to carry on in the face of
menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
– Moral authority: Person or body that can give one the courage,
confidence, and esprit to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
When this happens, you just
give up and quit.
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
121
“Fighting” 4GW
Lind
•
You can use either the de-escalation model or the “Hama”*
(annihilation) model. If you fall in between, you’re doomed.
•
The de-escalation model: stresses the moral level, understands the
power of weakness, integrates troops with the local population,
draws on that integration for good cultural intelligence.
•
In fighting 4GW, “less is more.” Try to keep your physical presence
small, if possible so small that you are invisible. If you can’t do that,
then keep your footprint small in time – get in and get out, fast.
•
Finally, if you have to take the least desirable route, invading and
occupying another state, you must do everything you can to
preserve that state at the same time you are defeating it. As we
see in Iraq, if you destroy the state itself, there is a good chance
nobody will be able to recreate it.
*Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad quelled an insurrection in
the city of Hama by leveling part of it with an artillery
barrage on January 30, 1982. Estimates of the death toll
run from 10,000 to 40,000.
July 2006
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From “FMFM 1-A,” On War # 101,
January 25, 2005
Still “fighting” 4GW
Lind
• Other important pieces:
– 4GW is often light infantry/Jaeger (hunter) warfare
– “Out G-ing the G” – get better at guerrilla warfare than the
guerrilla (quoting COL David Hackworth, USA, Ret.)
– Most important supporting weapon is cash
– “Force protection” is the enemy of “force integration” (with
the local population)
– HUMINT is the only “int” worth discussing
From “FMFM 1-A,” On War # 101,
January 25, 2005
July 2006
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Can 4GW be avoided?
• Even had American forces understood that they were likely to
face a growing insurgency after the war, it is doubtful that they
could have elaborated an effective strategy for defeating it
quickly, if at all …
• A different conclusion would be to devise a national security
strategy in which there is no imperative to fight the kind of war
that the United States has fought in Iraq. Rather than “do it
better next time,” the contrary lesson would be on the order of
“don’t do it at all.”
“Revisions In Need Of Revising: What Went Wrong In The Iraq War,”
David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
December 2005
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Fourth generation warfare
Hammes
• It uses all available networks – political, economic, social and
military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that
their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the
perceived benefit.
• Note: Neither Lind nor van Creveld totally agree with the
objective
– Lind – focus is on moral level, so calculation of benefit is not
dominant or sometimes even relevant
– van Creveld – “interests” or “policies” are not the primary
cause of war
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Fourth generation warfare
Hammes
•
It is an evolved form of insurgency (208)
– practical people solving specific problems in order to defeat more
powerful enemies (3)
– But, Lind: “Contrary to what a number of writers on 4GW have said,
Fourth Generation war is not merely a new name for insurgency or
guerrilla warfare.”
•
(Social) networks will be employed to carry specific messages to our
policy makers and to those who can influence the policy makers (208)
– Networks are exceptionally resilient and difficult to destroy. (183)
•
Clausewitzian “decisive battles” and even 3GW maneuver campaigns
are irrelevant (208) at least until Mao’s Phase III against a state
government
•
Too much central control can destroy the effectiveness of a 4GW force
(209)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Fourth generation warfare
Hammes
• A state will not give up its right to exist as a result of 4GW
techniques
– a final (Mao Phase III) conventional campaign will be
required (211)
– can achieve less drastic goals with 4GW
• Successful 4GW organizations focus on the movement’s long
term political viability, rather than near-term tactical
effectiveness. (222)
– see themselves not as military organizations but as webs
– unified by ideas
• Must bring to bear full set of economic, social, intelligence &
military capabilities of western states
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW – non-trinitarian warfare
van Creveld
Martin van Creveld doesn’t use the term “4GW” but has stated that
the concept is basically the same as “non-trinitarian” warfare, as
described in The Transformation of War (1991.) What changes in
4GW is who fights and what they’re fighting for.
– The state as we know it (government separate from ruler)
became the dominant form of political organization in Europe
only in 1648
– In many parts of the world, states were only established in
the 19th & 20th centuries through colonization/
decolonization and some parts of the world never developed
functioning states at all
– Even where states were established, other organizations are
coming to the fore and beginning to wage war not involving
governments, people, and armies.
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Why societies go to war
van Creveld
•
States
– interests; policy (Politik): cost/benefit calculations, often disguised,
implied, or backfilled
•
Non-States (and sometimes states)
– grievances, objectives, glory of individuals/status in tribe
– obtaining the spoils of war: booty, slaves, territory, women, which
override and complicate any pursuit of tribal/community “policy”
– obtaining prisoners for religious or culinary reasons (150)
– doctrinal differences
– other “will of God” reasons
– justice: avenge perceived wrongs; community honor (e.g., Trojan War)
– assist an ally (WW I and to some extent WWII)
•
Everybody
– existence, either as a group (insurgency) or as a state
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Predictions
van Creveld
• The side with the more rational interests will lose (149)
•
Wars will be waged by groups we today call “terrorists”
– tribes, religious groups, commercial groups, criminal groups,
insurgencies, etc.
– their home territories will not be continuous, impenetrable, or
very large; no clear line on a map
– leadership will be along personal & charismatic lines
• Role of women in non-trinitarian warfare (4GW, but not 2/3GW!)
will approach that of men, as it historically has in guerrilla
warfare (180)
July 2006
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Predictions (II)
van Creveld
• Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will
the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)
• Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres
• Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian
population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm
(208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)
• Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian
warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a
corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological
complexity (cost) of military forces
• Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by
police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on
the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today)
(225)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
War through the ages
van Creveld
“It is not true that war is simply a means to an end, nor do
people necessarily fight
in order to attain this objective
or that. In fact, the opposite is
often true: people very often
take up one objective or another
precisely in order that
they may fight.” (226)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW
Barnett
• Guerrilla or insurgency-based warfare
– Defeat enemy politically
– Not on battlefield but through years of LIC
• Incorporates notion of “war within the context of everything else”
– Military tactics subordinated to economic, political, and social
pain inflicted upon opponent
– Focus is enemy’s “societal will to wage war” (Blueprint, 20)
• Could be precluded by a sufficiently large Sys Admin force
(Blueprint, 17)
• Essentially a war against individuals; inside Core states,
reduces to a law enforcement problem (Blueprint, 122, 123)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW
Barnett
• Problems with 4GW:
– Suggests a world in perpetual war with an “unredeemable
and inexhaustible” supply of savages (Blueprint, 21 – citing
Robert D. Kaplan)
– Envisions long, drawn out conflict with al-Qa’ida or its
successor (Blueprint, 88 – citing Kaplan)
– “Addicted to notion of declining state” (on his blog 1/22/06)
• 4GW techniques possible in conflict between Core states, but
hard to see the payoff (Blueprint, 126-129) Discounts religion as
a strong cause of the 9/11 attacks (Map, 285; Blueprint, 87 citing Olivier Roy)
• “We seek to do unto al-Qa’ida what they did unto us: trigger a
System Perturbation …” (Map, 285)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW
Barnett
• But, system perturbation is risky
– Outcome of perturbation, itself
– Effect on rest of region (and by implication, the Gap as a
whole) (Map, 290)
– “Rule-Set Reset” can be a dangerous time because “the
cure may be worse than the disease” (Blueprint, xviii)
• Toppling Saddam was a real System Perturbation, but working
the insurgency is a serious, long-term horizontal scenario,
requiring people who can see across time. A PhD in history has
to help on that score. Doesn't mean you're not still killing bad
guys, it just means you do it with more care and discretion,
making sure you don't simply create more enemies in the
process.In the end, you get to leave when their economy is
working. Jobs kill insurgencies, not soldiers. (Blog 17 Feb 06)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW
Scheuer
• Doesn’t really consider the subject – for reasons we’ll cover
under Grand Strategy.
• Follows Lind and Hafez al-Assad, should military force become
necessary.
• Because we are so bad at grand strategy, we are only left with
one military option:
– “The piles of dead will include as many or more civilians as
combatants because our enemies wear no uniforms. Killing
in large numbers is not enough to defeat our Muslim foes.
With killing must come a Sherman-like razing of
infrastructure. Roads and irrigation systems; bridges, power
plants, and crops in the field; fertilizer plants and grain mills
… As noted, such actions will yield large civilian casualties,
displaced populations, and refugee flows.” (241-242)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
John Robb
Open source warfare
• Open source warfare: “relies on networks of peers rather than
the hierarchies of command and control we see in conventional
militaries. This structure provides an open source movement
with levels of innovation and resilience that rigid hierarchies
can't match.”
• Multiple, smaller attacks against “systempunkts” (disruptive
leverage points) like power & telecom nodes, water, ports, etc.
• Iraq appears to be developing a cooperative community among
diverse groups that operates like the open source software
industry
• Locally successful tactics are quickly replicated; ineffective ones
quickly abandoned – has evolutionary overtones
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Robb: open source warfare
• On the tactical level the objective is to undermine and
collapse the state by driving people to primary loyalties
to meet their needs. On the strategic level it is used
to undermine the sentiment of the global financial/trade
markets in relation to the target state to cause capital
outflows, inflation, spiraling debt, and potentially
economic depression.
• Note: compressing the distance between “tactical” and
“strategic” is a feature of (counter-)guerrilla warfare and
4GW. The Marine Corps uses the term “strategic
corporeal” to indicate that the actions of low-ranking
people may have strategic or grand strategic impact
(e.g., Abu Ghraib)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Other thoughts on 4GW
•
Al-Qa’ida or whatever it is now, is having no problem developing future
leaders and developing its “franchise” model (Sherifa Zuhur, SSI)
•
The centre will reinforce successful cells with funds, skills and weapons,
seeking to establish a sanctuary from which to develop. It will allow cells
considerable latitude in the method they adopt to suit the local
circumstances – provided that security is not breached and that the cell is
both successful and in its actions no more corrupt than condoned by the
movement. Gen Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force
•
Organized crime will sometimes cooperate with “terrorist” groups; can
create dysfunctional governments (Phil Williams; Max Manwaring)
•
Demographic youth bulge will continue to provide fertile recruiting grounds
for “terrorist” vanguards—Nepal, for example
•
There are some 30-40 “irregular” conflicts in any given year (Frank
Hoffman)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Echevarria’s critique of 4GW
Dr. Echevarria is the Director of Research at SSI
• Uses a version of Hammes’ interpretation (1)
• Defines 4GW as: “future terrorists would first seek to infiltrate a
society and then attempt to collapse it from within by means of
an ill-defined psychocultural ‘judo throw’ of sorts” (2-3)
• “the types of high-technology that 4GW’s proponents envisioned
terrorists using includes such Wunderwaffe as directed energy
weapons and robotics …” (3)
• Critiques 4GW as claiming that US forces are: “designed to
operate within a nation-state framework” and then gives WW II
as a counter example (!) (5)
• “ … by comparing what essentially amounts to military means or
techniques – such as ‘massed manpower,’ ‘firepower,’ and
‘maneuver’ – on the one hand, to what is arguably a form of
warfare – such as insurgency – on the other… “ (15)
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Comments on Echevarria
• Confuses 4GW with a technological approach to warfare (2)
• Assumes that to be effective, guerrilla warfare must support
state-vs-state warfare (echoing Clausewitz) (12-13)
• Confuses “maneuver” with “movement” (15) This is a major
error. And “insurgency” is simply a rebellion, not a form of
warfare.
• Asserts that the epitome of warfare is violence and that
Napoleon (who lost decisively to Wellington) was its master (16)
• Does not appreciate that in 4GW, the “insurgents” are primarily
targeting the outside state power - the local “state” has already
failed. If the local state has not failed, then he has a good point:
what’s happening is classic insurgency, not 4GW.
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW: One pattern, a la Clausewitz
Failed states
4GW
Supporting
country
LIC
Coup
G
Government
2/3GW
The
State
A
P
Target
(failing state)
July 2006
Army
People
http://www.jaddams.com
4GW: One pattern, a la Clausewitz
Failed states
4GW
Supporting
country
Government
G
The
State
4GW
A
P
Failed state
Army
People
July 2006
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Blitz vs. guerrilla vs. 4GW
Blitz/3GW
Guerrilla
4GW???
Penetrate
Enemy forces
Own society
Society of supporting country
Isolate
Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g.,
penetrated units)
Government from people
Non-cooperative centers of gravity
(e.g., institutions, organizations)
Subdue/Subvert
Isolated remnants
Elements of society
Enough NCoGs to cause
supporting country moral collapse
& withdrawal
Reorient
Ourselves for next objective
Subverted elements
Ourselves: for example, expand
guerrilla or convert to 3GW in
target country
Reharmonize
Our forces (e.g., shift
Schwerpunkt)
Elements of society under our
control
Ourselves: for example to continue
fight in target country
Content
High mental
High moral
Moral vs. supporting country;
All vs. target country
July 2006
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The “generations of war” model
From the viewpoint of Core states and nuclear powers
Nuclear
Weapons
Proliferate
Peace of
Westphalia
Fall of
USSR
state vs. state
Precursor activities – going
back to Alexander & Sun Tzu
(and before)
2 GW
1
GW
3 GW
States &
non-states
wage war
maneuver
concepts
State-vs-state—
only “legal” form
of war
New commo &
trans networks
4 GW
States & nonstates wage
war
Highly irregular / partisan
warfare; terrorism; criminal
organizations, etc.
1600
July 2006
1700
1800
http://www.jaddams.com
1900
2000
Agenda
•
•
•
Conflict
–
Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
–
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict
Moral isolation and interaction
–
•
OODA Loops
Theme for disintegration and
collapse
Grand strategy
–
What they are not (and are)
–
Theme for vitality and growth
–
How to accelerate OODA loops
–
Ends and means
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
–
Moral leverage
•
Guerrilla warfare
–
What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
Barnett, and Scheuer say about
grand strategy
–
Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy
•
Generations of war
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
–
Tables
–
Issues among the authors
4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
–
Neither Shall the Sword
•
•
•
July 2006
Summary
If I were emperor …
http://www.jaddams.com
July 2006
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!
Simply stated
!
As human beings, we cannot exist without an external or
surrounding environment from which we can draw
sustenance, nourishment, or support.
In other words
Interaction permits vitality and growth while isolation leads
to decay and disintegration.
July 2006
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SG 29
Illuminating example
(continued)
Overall Message
•
The ability to operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than an adversary enables one to fold adversary
back inside himself so that he can neither appreciate nor keep up with what's going on. He will
become disoriented or confused;
which suggests that
•
Unless such menacing pressure is relieved, adversary will experience various combinations of
uncertainty, doubt, confusion, self-deception, indecision, fear, panic, discouragement, despair,
etc., which will further:
Disorient or twist his mental images/impressions of what's happening;
thereby
Disrupt his mental/physical maneuvers for dealing with such a menace;
thereby
Overload his mental/physical capacity to adapt or endure;
Key point: only at the level
of strategy & below
July 2006
thereby
Collapse his ability to carry on.
http://www.jaddams.com
SG 44
?
What’s the point of all this
?
• We can’t just look at our own personal experiences or use the
same mental recipes over and over again; we've got to look at
other disciplines and activities and relate or connect them to
what we know from our experiences and the strategic world we
live in.
If we can do this
• We will be able to surface new repertoires and (hopefully)
develop a Fingerspitzengefühl for folding our adversaries
back inside themselves, morally-mentally-physically—so
that they can neither appreciate nor cope with what's
happening—without suffering the same fate ourselves.
July 2006
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SG 45
Which carries us to the
?
question
?
• How do we fold adversaries back inside themselves, morallymentally-physically … without suffering the same fate
ourselves?
or put another way
• How do we physically isolate our adversaries yet interact with
others outside ourselves?
• How do we mentally isolate our adversaries yet keep in touch
hence interact, with unfolding events?
• How do we morally isolate our adversaries yet maintain the
trust/confidence of others and thereby interact with them?
July 2006
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SG 46
Illumination
•
Physically we can isolate adversaries by severing their communications
with outside world as well as by severing their internal communications
to one another. We can accomplish this by cutting them off from their
allies and the uncommitted via diplomatic, psychological, and other
efforts. To cut them off from one another we should penetrate their
system by being unpredictable, otherwise they can counter our efforts.
•
Mentally we can isolate our adversaries by presenting them with
ambiguous, deceptive, or novel situations, as well as by operating at a
tempo or rhythm they can neither make out nor keep up with. Operating
inside their O-O-D-A loops will accomplish just this by disorienting or
twisting their mental images so that they can neither appreciate nor cope
with what's really going on.
•
Morally our adversaries isolate themselves when they visibly improve
their well being to the detriment of others (i.e. their allies, the
uncommitted, etc.) by violating codes of conduct or behavior
patterns that they profess to uphold or others expect them to
uphold.
July 2006
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SG 47
Expected payoff
Disintegration and collapse, unless adversaries change
their behavior patterns to conform to what is deemed
acceptable by others outside themselves.
July 2006
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SG 48
Illumination
(continued)
• Physically we interact by opening-up and maintaining many
channels of communication with the outside world, hence with
others out there, that we depend upon for sustenance,
nourishment, or support.
• Mentally we interact by selecting information from a variety of
sources or channels in order to generate mental images or
impressions that match-up with the world of events or
happenings that we are trying to understand and cope with.
• Morally we interact with others by avoiding mismatches
between what we say we are, what we are, and the world we
have to deal with, as well as by abiding by those other cultural
codes or standards that we are expected to uphold.
July 2006
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SG 49
Expected payoff
Vitality and growth, with the opportunity to shape
and adapt to unfolding events thereby influence
the ideas and actions of others.
July 2006
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SG 50
Theme for disintegration
and collapse
Synthesize
Idea
•
•
Lethal effort:
Tie-up, divert, or drain-away
adversary attention and strength as
well as (or thereby) overload critical
vulnerabilities and generate
weaknesses.
•
Destroy adversary’s moral-mentalphysical harmony, produce paralysis,
and collapse his will to resist.
Aim
Maneuver:
Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload,
or seize those vulnerable yet critical
connections, centers, and activities
as basis to penetrate, splinter, and
isolate remnants of adversary
organism for mop-up or absorption.
•
Moral:
Render adversary
powerless by denying
him the opportunity to
cope with unfolding
circumstances.
Create an atmosphere of fear,
anxiety, and alienation to sever
human bonds that permit an organic
whole to exist.
July 2006
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136
Agenda
•
•
•
Conflict
–
Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
–
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict
Moral isolation and interaction
–
•
OODA Loops
Theme for disintegration and
collapse
Grand strategy
–
What they are not (and are)
–
Theme for vitality and growth
–
How to accelerate OODA loops
–
Ends and means
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
–
Moral leverage
•
Guerrilla warfare
–
What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
Barnett, and Scheuer say about
grand strategy
–
Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy
•
Generations of war
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
–
Tables
–
Issues among the authors
4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
–
Neither Shall the Sword
•
•
•
July 2006
Summary
If I were emperor …
http://www.jaddams.com
?
Raises question
?
How do we connect the tactical and strategic
notions, or the theme for disintegration and
collapse, with the national goal?
July 2006
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138
Via a sensible grand strategy that will:
• Support national goal.
• Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve,
and attract the uncommitted.
• End conflict on favorable terms.
• Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide
seeds for (unfavorable) future conflict.
July 2006
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139
Grand strategy
Essence
• Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our
spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our
adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential
adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy
and are empathetic toward our success.
July 2006
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140
Insight
On one hand … the national goal and grand strategy tend to be
constructive in nature. On the other hand, the strategic aim, strategy, grand
tactics, and tactics are destructive in nature and operate over a shorter
time frame.
In this sense, the upper two and the latter four notions, as expressed,
appear to be in disharmony with one another. Yet, application of these
latter four strategic and tactical notions permit real leadership to
avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick
victory. This combined with shattered cohesion, paralysis, and rapid
collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime, makes it appear
corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern.
Under these circumstances, leaders and statesmen offering generous
terms can form the basis for a viable peace. In this sense, the first two and
the latter four notions can be in harmony with one another.
Roughly, the principles of maneuver (warfare)
July 2006
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142
Further elaboration
Up to this point—by repeatedly adding, stripping-away, and recombining many different,
yet similar, ideas and thoughts—we have examined the nature of conflict, survival, and
conquest in many different ways.
A review and further manipulation of the ideas and thoughts that make-up these
different ways suggests that, for success over the long haul and under the most difficult
conditions, one needs some unifying vision that can be used to attract the
uncommitted as well as pump-up friendly resolve and drive and drain-away or subvert
adversary resolve and drive. In other words, what is needed is a vision rooted in human
nature so noble, so attractive that it not only attracts the uncommitted and magnifies the
spirit and strength of its adherents, but also undermines the dedication and
determination of any competitors or adversaries.
Moreover, such a unifying notion should be so compelling that it acts as a catalyst or
beacon around which to evolve those qualities that permit a collective entity or organic
whole to improve its stature in the scheme of things. Put another way, we are
suggesting a need for a supra-orientation or center-of-gravity that permits leaders, and
other authorities, to inspire their followers and members to enthusiastically take action
toward confronting and conquering all obstacles that stand in the way.
Such a scheme can be portrayed as follows:
July 2006
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143
Unifying vision
Side by side, unaided except by their kith and kin in the great
Dominions and by the wide empires which rest beneath their
shield—side by side, the British and French peoples have
advanced to rescue not only Europe but mankind from the foulest
and most soul-destroying tyranny which has ever darkened and
stained the pages of history. Behind them—behind us—behind the
Armies and Fleets of Britain and France—gather a group of
shattered States and bludgeoned races: the Czechs, the Poles, the
Norwegians, the Danes, the Dutch, the Belgians—upon all of whom
the long night of barbarism will descend, unbroken even by a star
of hope, unless we conquer, as conquer we must; as conquer we
shall. Winston Churchill, “First Broadcast as Prime Minister,” May
19, 1940
July 2006
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Theme for vitality and growth
Unifying vision
Ingredients needed to pursue vision
•
•
A grand ideal, overarching theme, or
noble philosophy that represents a
coherent paradigm within which
individuals as well as societies can
shape and adapt to unfolding
(Positive)
essenceoffers
of a way to
circumstances—yet
expose
flaws of–competing
moral
conflict
chart or
adversary systems.
125
Improve fitness as an
organic whole to shape
and expand influence or
power over the course of
events in the world.
July 2006
Ability to peer into and discern the inner nature or
workings of things.
•
Orientation
Ability to harmonize our images, views, or
impressions of the world in order to comprehend
changes in the world
•
Aim
Insight:
Harmony:
Power to perceive or create interaction of apparently
disconnected events or entities in a connected way.
•
Agility:
Ability to transition from one OODA state – or
equivalently one orientation state – to another more
rapidly than any opponent
•
Initiative:
Internal drive to think and take action without being
urged.
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144
Boyd’s pattern
Unifying
Vision
Grand Strategy
Domain of the OODA “Loop”
Strategy
Observe
Grand Tactics
Orient
Implicit
Guidance
& Control
Unfolding
Circumstances
Observations
Feed
Forward
Genetic
Heritage
Analyses &
Synthesis
New
Information
Tactics
July 2006
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Act
Implicit
Guidance
& Control
Cultural
Traditions
Previous
Experience
Outside
Information
Unfolding
Interaction
With
Environment
Decide
Feedback
Feed
Forward
Decision
(Hypothesis)
Feed
Forward
Action
(Test)
Unfolding
Interaction
With
Environment
Feedback
v 1.4 5/17/2005
Boyd’s pattern
Unifying
Vision
Grand Strategy
Basis
A “Code of Moral Values”—what van Creveld calls the “war
convention” —that determines what actions (“transients”) are
and are not acceptable.
If you violate these, or are tricked into violating them, you
isolate yourself morally and demoralize your own forces.
Strategy
Key point: The attractiveness of the
unifying vision is not what determines
which actions are acceptable.
Grand Tactics
That would be “ends justifying means”
– creative writing, in other words.
Tactics
July 2006
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v 1.4 5/17/2005
With these thoughts in mind, let’s look
at what our authors have to say about
grand strategy
July 2006
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Grand strategy
Bill Lind
• “Col John Boyd, USAF, America’s greatest military theorist,
defined grand strategy as the art of connecting to—while
isolating the enemy from—as many independent power centers
as possible. The grand strategic question facing the US is how
to do that in a 21st century that will increasingly be dominated
by non-state, Fourth Generation forces.”
• Lind’s grand strategy: minimize contact with sources of disorder,
while making every effort to connect with sources of order:
– Control entry and immigration from sources of disorder
– Learn to live (well) without their products and resources
– If necessary, retaliate as a “spasm”: massively and
immediately
– “strategic (military) defensive combined with annihilating
strategic and tactical counteroffensive”
July 2006
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Grand strategy
Lind
• Sources of order:
– States
– Some religions and ideologies
– Some businesses and other commercial enterprises
– Mercenary armies
• Sources of disorder
– Failed states, including Afghanistan and Iraq
– Islam
• Idea is to “fold sources of disorder back inside themselves,” as
in Boyd’s military strategy of Interaction and Isolation (Strategic
Game)
July 2006
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Lind’s grand strategy –
Assessment
• Idea of “sources of disorder” is similar to Barnett’s “nonintegrating gap” (which includes all states with a Muslim
majority.)
• But Lind does not propose trying to integrate the sources of
disorder back into the sources of order by means of active
involvement
• Sees two major drawbacks to a (military) offensive in the “War
on Terror”:
– Will be widely viewed as aggression
– Will involve “sources of order” directly in the midst of
“sources of disorder,” breaking their isolation
i.e., violation of universal moral code
July 2006
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Grand strategy
in insurgency/4GW
van Creveld
• An armed force that keeps beating down on a weaker opponent
will be seen as committing a series of crimes; therefore it will
end up by losing the support of its allies, its own people, and its
own troops …
• In other words, he who fights against the weak—and the rag-tag
Iraqi militias are very weak indeed—and loses, loses. He who
fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent
who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore
cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore
foolish. – “Why Iraq Will End as Vietnam Did”
i.e., violation of universal moral code,
the “war convention” - why in an
Internet Age, states have difficulty
waging attrition warfare against
guerrillas.
July 2006
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Problems with military force
van Creveld
• … the original goals for which the US went to war included
stopping communism and preserving democracy in South
Vietnam (147)
• From the Americans in Vietnam to the Soviets in Afghanistan,
the number of those who found their calculations upset and their
plans confounded by the enemy’s determination to suffer and
endure is legion (148)
Replace “communism” with the bad ideology du jour
(Islamic Fundamentalism or some such) and you get
goals similar to those used to justify the invasion of Iraq.
July 2006
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Core vs. Gap
Barnett
• Agreeing on a written, common rule set builds unity
among Core nations (Blueprint 126)
• “Disconnectedness defines danger” (xvi)
• No safety until “everyone is invited in” with justice
(208)
• Ends can justify means (140, 205)
• Preemptive war still the best tool (121)
July 2006
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Barnett’s grand strategy
“Disconnectedness defines danger”
Core
• Highly connected
Gap
• Codified rule sets on security
• High degree of sharing these rule
sets
• 4GW is a law-enforcement issue
• Agreement on how to handle
“terrorists”
• Share in burden of
interventions into the Gap
• 6 step A-Z rule
set for processing
failed stated
July 2006
• Lack of codified rule sets on
security
• Varying degrees of disconnectivity,
oppression
• Local governments incapable of or
unwilling to fight “terrorism”
• Core states have right to violate Gap
“sovereignty”
• Interventions must have support of main Core
states and results must be seen as fair & just
http://www.jaddams.com
Barnett’s grand tactics:
the “Six Steps”
1.
UNSC “indicts”
2.
“Functioning executive body” (e.g., Group of 8) sanctions
military action
3.
US-led force invades, arrests old regime
4.
Core SysAdmin force restores stability
5.
International organization (TBD) reconstructs
6.
Bad guys are tried before the International Criminal Court
(Blueprint 51-52)
July 2006
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Blueprint’s grand tactics:
kinetics
• Leviathan:
– Special Ops for 4GW
– Network-Centric Warfare - primarily airpower - as enabler for
Sys Admin & reconstruction
• Systems Administrator
– Most of Army
– All of USMC (except special operations)
– 50% uniformed military; 25% uniformed police; 25%
government civilians
– Highly multinational
July 2006
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Barnett’s Pattern
Unifying Vision
Shrink the Gap. A connected world – “disconnectedness” is the enemy.
Grand Strategy
Utilize networks in Functioning Core, primarily private sector investment, as
“pull” mechanism; use Core military to “export” security, “proactively shape a
better tomorrow”.
Strategy
System perturbation: put system into play & integrate into the core.
Grand Tactics
Six Point A-to-Z rule set for processing failed states. “Leviathan” against
rogue states & to take out “bad actors.” Sys Admin to integrate. Special ops
against “terrorists.”
Tactics
Airpower, NCW for access, regime change. Rapid reconstruct to pre-empt 4GW
July 2006
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Making rollback work –
(Gordon & Trainor)
Know your enemy and
know yourself and you
will not fear in 100
battles.
Enabling
occupation
Establishing security &
rehabilitating Iraq
Cobra II, p. 503
July 2006
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What we did instead
(Gordon & Trainor)
Our
Emphasis
WAR
Other coalition members?
Allies?
Arabs?
The Iraqis themselves?
Stability Operations
Cobra II, p. 503
July 2006
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The grand strategy of al-Qa’ida
Scheuer
• Osama bin Laden is playing defense (a la Bill Lind.)
• His grand strategy consists of three parts, one directed towards
Muslims, one directed towards the uncommitted, and one
directed towards the United States.
• His intent is to remove US & Western influence from the lands
that are traditionally Muslim (including Spain!) and institute a
“pure” (Salafist) form of Islam in these areas
• Scheuer echoes Boyd in deconstructing grand strategy into
three messages:
– To our (bin Laden’s) side / allies (in this case, the Muslim
world)
– To the uncommitted
– To opponents (primarily the United States)
July 2006
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Grand strategy of al-Qa’ida
Scheuer
Message to Muslims:
•
Islam is under attack from non-Islamic forces
•
As evidence, he preaches a consistent message:
1. Support for Israel that allows her to oppress the Palestinians
2. Western troops on the Arabian Peninsula
3. US invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan; statements that our
goal is to make them “secular democracies”
4. Support for other regimes hostile to Muslims: Russia, India, China,
Uzbekistan, etc.
5. US pressure on Arab energy producers to keep prices low, thereby robbing
Muslims of their future
6. US & Western support for apostate, corrupt, unjust, and tyrannical Muslim
governments (Saudi Arabia, Syria, Gulf States, and until recently, Iraq.)
•
Bin Laden stays on message: It is your duty as Muslims to oppose this attack. You
will either succeed or become martyrs
“If bin Laden’s argument is accepted, (each Muslim) must take up
arms or otherwise support the mujahideen, or face eternal
damnation for not performing a duty mandated by God.” IH, 8.
July 2006
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Grand strategy of al-Qa’ida
Scheuer
Message to the uncommitted:
• We have no quarrel with you, so long as you do not
oppress Muslims or assist the US in the six activities
mentioned above.
• If you do, we are capable of striking you and striking
hard
–
Madrid railway attack, 4 April 2004
–
London transit attack, 7 July 2005
… and not to target whoever wanted to be neutral, but whoever insisted on fighting
along with the Crusaders against Muslims should be killed, regardless of their sect or
tribe.
… [but] southern Iraqis cannot participate with the United States and its allies in
invading al-Fallujah, al-Ramadi, Baqubah, Mosul, Samarra, al-Qaim and other towns and
villages while their areas remain safe from reprisal and harm.
Osama bin Laden, speeches of June 30 and July 1, 2006
July 2006
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Grand strategy of al-Qa’ida
Scheuer
Message to the United States and its allies:
• We hate you for what you do, as noted above.
• We do not hate “democracy” or “freedom.”
• We are not going to start a jihad to destroy your theaters,
beaches, or taverns (although these are clearly signs that your
civilization is depraved.)
• I (bin Laden) invite Mr. Bush and the American People to
embrace Islam; I will be your guide.
• If you do not, and if you continue in the six practices noted
above, we will strike you with ever more massive attacks until
you finally leave.
Comment: We do not want to connect with corruption and
vice. [It is the duty of a Muslim ruler to encourage that which
is good and forbid that which is evil. – e.g., Qu’ran 3:104-114,
9:67; 16:90]
July 2006
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Why Grand Strategy in 4GW?
• In truth, such a condition of democracy is militarily difficult to
achieve when occupation is involved, as Israel has discovered
in the occupied territories and as the imperial powers discovered
after the Second World War, when the colonies sought
independence … The initiative moves to the occupied, who can
choose to cooperate with the occupiers or not.
• The dangers and costs of coercing the people have already
been discussed, and if, as history keeps showing, they are
used, then the coercive measures must be maintained, or the
spirit of freedom and independence will break out.
Gen Sir Rupert Smith,
The Utility of Force
July 2006
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Conflict in the Muslim World
Michael Vlahos (Johns Hopkins)
• US has indeed unleashed a system perturbation on the Muslim
World
• Unfortunately it is one we do not understand and can only partially
control
– Rooted in ancient Muslim traditions - freedom from outside
– Aggravated by 25 years of US support for repressive regimes
• Possibilities include:
– Failed state: 27 million person version of Somalia
– We leave, but the insurgency doesn’t
– “Iraqoslavia” - partition, then civil war, then regional war
• In all cases, we’ve trained the next generation of Jihadists
• Prescription - connect to groups we can live with
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Grand Strategy in Iraq?
If there was a simple formula by which a coherent political strategy
may be expressed, it was to
– communicate to the Shia that they would, as the majority
group, quickly gain power through free elections;
– to reassure the Sunni that, despite losing their historic
dominance over Iraq, they would not be subject to
persecution;
– and to persuade the Kurds to cooperate in the maintenance
of the Iraqi state and to rest content with an autonomous
status short of independence.
In fact, the American occupiers did not consistently pursue any
such logic.
Hendrickson & Tucker, “Revisions”
July 2006
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Grand Strategy in Iraq?
“People who were on the fence or supported us" in the past "have
in fact decided to strike out against us."
LTG Peter Chiraelli, USA, Commander,
Multinational Corps, Iraq
Quoted in Andrew Bacevich, “What Is An Iraqi Life Worth?”
The Washington Post, July 9, 2006
July 2006
http://www.jaddams.com
Agenda
•
•
•
Conflict
–
Sun Tzu to the Blitzkrieg
–
Attrition warfare & maneuver conflict
Moral isolation and interaction
–
•
OODA Loops
Theme for disintegration and
collapse
Grand strategy
–
What they are not (and are)
–
Theme for vitality and growth
–
How to accelerate OODA loops
–
Ends and means
•
Moral conflict & the prism of conflict
–
Moral leverage
•
Guerrilla warfare
–
What Lind, van Creveld, Hammes,
Barnett, and Scheuer say about
grand strategy
–
Blitz & guerrilla: common strategy
•
Generations of war
•
Penetrate, isolate, subdue/subvert,
reorient, reharmonize
–
Tables
–
Issues among the authors
4GW according to Lind, van Creveld,
Hammes, Barnett, and Scheuer
–
Neither Shall the Sword
•
•
•
July 2006
Summary
If I were emperor …
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Now, let’s collect up the
bits and pieces.
Role & utility of military
force
Involvement in the Gap
Fourth Generation
Warfare
Grand Strategy
What “Winning” means
July 2006
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Summary
Issue
Military force
Lind
Hammes
Barnett
Massive retaliatory
spasm
Modernized counter –
insurgency
3GW: Access &
regime change
Occasional 4GW
efforts on a defensive
basis
Project homeland
security
New “force” to
rebuild, play global
cop-on-the-beat
US to play lead role
van Creveld
Conventional armies
will rot in this
environment
Armies will bifurcate
into gangs & private
services
Scheuer
Annihilating attacks in
defense of national
interest; collateral
damage be damned
Otherwise, stay out
Involvement in Gap
No – retaliation only
Vital interest only
Yes – integrate Gap
No choice – it’s
coming our way
No – vital interest
only
4GW
• Non-state
• Evolved form of
insurgency
Included in substate
violence by
individuals – province
of special ops.
• Non-trinitarian
• Al-Qa’ida is main
threat
• Focus is moral
defeat of state
• Large dose of
insurgency
July 2006
• (Social) netwar
• Persuade decisionmakers
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• Agrees with Lind,
vis-à-vis Israel –
Palestinians (wall
so high a bird can’t
fly over it)
• Change policies in
ME or follow LInd
Summary
Issue
Grand Strategic
Orientation
Lind
Breakdown of state
system
Isolate sources of
disorder; Islam
Connect with sources
of order (state & nonstate)
Winning
Can’t be done –
isolate and hope for
best
Hammes
Evolution of
insurgency into
netwar
Involves current
situation in ME, but
also criminal & narco
networks
Barnett
Eliminate a few bad
actors, suppressing
universal longing for
connectedness.
Main tool: cause &
manage system
perturbations
Neo-Clausewitzian
view of causes of war
on state side
Use economic, social
tools to re-integrate
Gap
Interagency approach
can contain – project
“Homeland Security”
Gap is shrunk to
manageable level
Be patient
July 2006
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van Creveld
Breakdown of state
system
Many motivations for
non-state actors,
including:
–
War is fun
Scheuer
Life in Muslim ME
focused on religion,
honor, survival, kin
obligations;
See themselves as
under attack
Clausewitz can be
fatal (rational actor
loses)
Al-Qaida is catalyzing
body for some
fraction
Can’t be done –
isolate and hope for
best
Fix US ME policy;
crush residual threats
if they cause
problems; beacon –
not arsenal – of
democracy
Main issue: role of military force
• Is ancient wisdom now obsolete: Whoever relies on the Tao in
governing men doesn’t try to force issues or defeat enemies by
force of arms. For every force there is a counterforce. Violence,
even well intentioned always rebounds upon oneself. Tao Te
Ching, 30
• Is Iraq really experiencing 4GW, or just classical insurgency? In
particular, what is the objective of the transnational element?
• What about large-scale conventional conflict, i.e., with China,
Russia, or India?
July 2006
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Conclusions
• We’re not going to fight Russia, China, or India (at least not with
conventional weapons).
July 2006
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China
China
USA
Potentially hostile
border
13,700 mi.
0
Restive minorities
Tibetans, Uygurs,
Mongolians, etc.
0
Taiwan
0 (since 1865)
Strat nuc weapons
25-50
10,000
Recent invasions
Vietnam
Grenada, Panama, Iraq
Breakaway provinces
(29 day incursion, 1979)
Defense budget
July 2006
$70 billion
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$500 billion
Conclusions
• We’re not going to fight Russia, China, or India (at least not with
conventional weapons).
• Therefore we can eliminate most of the non-nuclear forces we
now have.
• What we will face is “evolved insurgency,” for which we have, at
the moment, no good solution. The environment will be the failed
states of the Gap.
• Our best strategy is military containment combined with active,
non-military measures.
• Eventually, we should privatize our residual conventional combat
forces.
July 2006
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So, what is 4GW?
• It’s any way that non-state entities confront the organized power
of a state
– Inside a Core state, it is a law enforcement problem
– If it is just inside a non-Core state, it is insurgency
• If it does not fit into either of these categories and if it is severe
enough to be considered “war,” then it may be 4GW
– Transnational - gangs, tribes, corporations, nationalities
without states, etc.
– Sometimes based around religion or ideology
– May use the methods of guerrilla warfare
– Focus is on collapsing the will of local states to survive or
oppose and of supporting states to interfere
– May or may not have any grand plans for the future
July 2006
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Predictions
van Creveld
• Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will
the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)
• Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres
• Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian
population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm
(208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)
• Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian
warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a
corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological
complexity (cost) of military forces
• Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by
police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on
the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today)
(225)
Ref: Transformation of War, 1991
July 2006
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Predictions
van Creveld
• Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will
the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)
• Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres
• Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian
population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm
(208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)
• Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian
warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a
corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological
complexity (cost) of military forces
• Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by
police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on
the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today)
(225)
July 2006
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As a first step, we need to privatize
much of our military force
• Bankrupt organizations can go out of business
• Markets unleash competition
– variety, rapidity, initiative
– creativity
Also, consider that
our opponents in
4GW are already
privatized.
• Privatization has a long military history
– mercenary organizations, including criminal
– British East India Company
(1600-1858) and privateers
– US PMCs today
– van Creveld’s gloomy tomorrow
• Nothing less will force the amount
of change that we need
July 2006
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Why not rollback as recommended
by Barnett?
• Don’t know how to do it
July 2006
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Rollback, in the heart
of NATO
NATO
“In Albania and much of ex-Yugoslavia, the forces ranged against the
state—crime syndicates and armed nationalists—are often more
than a match for legitimate business and politics. Government, in so
far as its writ runs at all, is frequently worse than useless: customs
barriers and regulations simply obstruct legal business, offer bribe
opportunities for bureaucrats and abet crime.
“… Albanian gangs spirit people into Britain and Germany; guns are
reaching Britain from Croatia and points south; the stolen-vehicle
trade in the Netherlands is dominated by Serbs; and Chinese
syndicates based in ex-Yugoslavia send illegal migrants to Finland.
It was once said of the Balkans that they produce more history than
can be consumed locally; it is even more true that the region is a
big net exporter of crime.”
New York Times Map
“Europe's banlieue,” The Economist,
Nov 24th 2005
July 2006
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Why not rollback?
• Don’t know how to do it
• Occupations are unpredictable in
result, but always expensive
– nationalism, tribalism,
sectarianism, etc.
– insurgency / guerrilla warfare
almost inevitable
• We never fund the reconstructing
phase adequately
• And then there’s corruption
July 2006
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Epilogue
IfIf II Were
were Emperor …
July 2006
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Are there alternatives?
appropriate bits and pieces
• play for shih (position/force/configuration/advantage/energy –
title of Chapter 5 in Sun Tzu.)
1. Employ cheng/ch’i
2. Employ timing and force together
3. Develop favorable situations with great potential
4. Take and maintain the initiative
David Lai, “Learning From the Stones,” p. 2
•
pump up the elements on the right side of the “Theme for Vitality and
Growth” [Patterns #144; chart 124 of this presentation]
•
work on improving connections with as many “sources of order”/Core
states as possible
•
continually improve our understanding of how Gap countries actually
work – ethnic/tribal, religious, legal, criminal, etc.
July 2006
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Version4.01
February 2006
Are there alternatives?
appropriate bits and pieces
• recall the ancient wisdom of the Tao te Ching: Violence, even
well intentioned always rebounds upon oneself. This represents
the distilled wisdom of practical people over thousands of years.
• if you’re going to do it anyway, exploit Sun Tzu and those
thousands of years of experience:
– best to attack his plans
Where we should have started
– next best attack his alliances
– third best alternative, attack his army
– fourth on the list – attack cities
Where we in fact did start in Iraq
Taking a state whole is superior;
Destroying it is inferior to this.
Sun Tzu (Denma Trans.) Chapter 3
July 2006
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Are there alternatives?
appropriate bits and pieces
• take nothing off the table, so if we feel the need to help things
along (e.g., to prevent misuse of nuclear material), use PISRR:
– Penetrate
– Isolate
– Subvert
– Reorient
– Reharmonize
for populations suffering under “big men,” this
shouldn’t be that difficult
idea is to preserve existing system, but co-opt it
(perhaps minus the “big man”) and steer it into the
world economy.
also, consider the “Theme for Disintegration &
Collapse,” Patterns chart 136.
• under this approach, there will often be no need for a large and
visible Sys Admin, since most of the people who know how to
rebuild and run the system are already there.
• and there will be no need for an all-American “Leviathan” - the
USMC and SOF we have will do just fine (detailed
recommendations in A Swift, Elusive Sword).
July 2006
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Army
Heavy forces
Reserve
Component
Navy
Special
operations
forces
Special
operations
forces
Tactical
air
Air Force
Tactical
airlift
Special
operations
forces
All
Tactical air
SES
Strike Force
For
Containment
Evolved SES
Strike Force
Potentially
Political, financial,
law enforcement,
engineering, etc.
For Rollback
Developed world must combine
military containment
Counterinsurgency with police,
/ reconstructing
and
strong preemptive
3GWintelligence,
forces
forces
incentives:
System
FinancialAdministrator
•
SES
“Leviathan”
• Commercial
• Political
• Diplomatic
Private
military
companies
July 2006
USMC
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Could it work?
If we spent half as much time studying this approach as we now do
preparing to fight 2GW (and some 3GW) against Core states and
vanished empires, we might get somewhere.
The shih of battle do not exceed cheng & ch’i, yet their variations cannot be exhausted. Sun Tzu, Chapter 5
July 2006
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Could it work?
We integrated:
– The entire Soviet Union
(except Belarus?) and
– The entire Warsaw Pact
into the global system without invading anybody.
(In fact, a proximate cause of the fall of the Soviet system
was its successful attempt to invade and remove a “big man,”
Hafizullah Amin, in Afghanistan.)
10 are now members of NATO
and 8 also belong to the EU
July 2006
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To flourish and grow in the
• many-sided
• uncertain, and
• ever-changing world
that surrounds us suggests that we must make
intuitive within ourselves those many practices
we need to meet the exigencies of that world.
—John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning & Losing
July 2006
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