Transcript Document

So Where Are We (The World) on This Climate
Change Problem?
By
Edward L. Miles
Bloedel Professor of Marine Studies and Public
Affairs, School of Marine Affairs, and Team Leader
JISAO/SMA Climate Impacts Group
Center for Science in the Earth System (CSES)
University of Washington
Background
Why I Think What I Do
SCALE I: GLOBAL
• Why is the global warming problem
so difficult for the world and the U.S.
to deal with?
Characteristics of Long Time
Scale Problems (Brooks 19 77 )
• Intergenerational trade-offs intrinsic.
• Predicted effects highly uncertain; uncertainty erodes
consensus re action.
• Uncertainties cascade and increase from physical and
chemical effects (lowest), to biological/ecological, to
social.
• When effects long term & cumulative, costs of delay
appear small compared to potential immediate econ. costs
and social dislocations (see point 1).
• Long term envir. probs. require sustained effort; this in
conflict with short term crisis orientation of politics.
Typical Human Response to “Long Wave”
Threats, (Dyson 2005)
• Rapid advance in scientific understanding
(cf. HIV/AIDS).
• But overall societal response characterized
by avoidance, denial, & reproach.
•  little behavioral change until….
• Evidence of damage plain.
Critical Limiting Conditions for Societal Response
Table 1
Residence Times of Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosphere
GHG
Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
Methane (CH4)
Nitrous Oxides (N2O)
Chlorofluorocarbons
CFC-11
HCFC-22
Perfluorocarbon (CF4)
Residence Times
50-200 Years
(The range varies with sources and
sinks and depends on the
equilibration times between
atmospheric CO2 and terrestrial
and oceanic reserves.)
12 years
120 years
50 years
12 years
50,000 years
Source: IPCC. 1990. Climate Change: The Scientific Assessment, Working Group 1.
Critical Limiting Conditions for Societal Response
Table 2
Timescales of the Global Carbon Cycle as Determined by Exchange
Between the Atmosphere and the Ocean
Mechanism
Time Required
Troposphere (lower atmosphere) mixing alone
1 year
Atmosphere to surface ocean layer
4 years
Surface ocean layer to intermediate
50-200 years
layer below the thermocline
Venting from ocean above thermocline to atmosphere
100 years
Turnover time of deep ocean basins
1000 years
Source: IPCC. 1990. Climate Change: The Scientific Assessment.
Why are these two sets of physical characteristics
important for policy development?
• They demonstrate that:
1. global climate change is a problem of long time scale;
2. all policy measures will be indeterminate in their
ultimate impacts;
3. indeterminacy, when linked to issues of costs, changing
lifestyles, and distributive inequities, creates large
obstacles to significant short-run policy action;
4. benefit-cost analytics tend to discount the future heavily
beyond 2 decades.
Uncertainty & International
Regime Building
• Uncertainty about seriousness & causes of a problem
& malign configuration of actor interests are
separately major hurdles in international regime
building. In combination, results often lethal.
• Global climate change the ultimate collective action
problem (large disparities between private & social
costs) but the decision rules of int’l. law-making
conferences stack the deck in favor of the least
enthusiastic parties è the “Law of the Least Ambitious
Program”.
Conditions Under which International System
Responds Effectively to Global Environmental
Problems
• Available evidence suggests two conditions:
a). Disaster; b). Consensus that disaster on
significant scale highly probable in short
run.
• So system propensity to respond is
hyperdependent on rate of envir. change &
immediacy of perceived effects.
SCALE I:GLOBAL
What Do We Know About the Policy Dynamics of
Long Time Scale Environmental Problems?
• Distinguish between malign & benign problems.
• Malign problems characterized by incongruity, where the
cost-benefit calculus of individuals systematically biased
in favor of either costs or benefits of particular courses of
action.
• Incongruities caused by either externalities or
competition. Latter far more difficult to deal with
politically.
• Benign problems characterized by issues of coordination
(synergy or contingency relationships).
• Long time scale = decades to millennia.
Policy Dynamics, cont’d.
• Policy dynamics constitute a “prism”. Actions
must be taken initially by gov’ts.  all global
intergovernmental efforts re mitigation must be
refracted through:
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1. dynamics of bureaucracy at nat’l. level;
2. rates & magnitudes of envir. change;
3. perceptions of winners & losers;
4. differing discount rates;
5. societal capacity to learn over timescales required.
Proposed Standards
The Framework Convention on
Climate Change(FCCC), Art. 2
The ultimate objective of this Convention …is to
achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. Such a level should be achieved
within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to
adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened, and to enable economic
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
Standards, cont’d.
• Informal settling on 2X pre-industrial ambient
concentration as standard = 560ppmv. [Impacts presumed
manageable and effect on world GNP calculated on order
of 1%].
• Rev.BAU projections of >2X CO2 world [575ppmv] by
2050 & >900ppmv by 2100,i.e., >3X CO2 world.
• Current (2005) levels at 380ppmv. Note that between 1860
& 2005 anthropogenic inputs of CO2 now at max. level at
onset of ice ages over last 420k yrs ( & maybe over last
20-22 million yrs.)
Implications of Standards
• To achieve stabilization level of 550ppmv by 2100, IPCC
WGI (1994) calculating need to cut aggregate world
emissions of CO2 by 30% by 2050 and another 30% by
2100.
• Enormous economic pain and personal suffering would
ensue.  not doable.
• Amended Kyoto-Marrakesh Protocol requiring < 5% cut
by 2012, followed by progressive re-negotiations.
So Where Are We at the Global
Level?
• Gridlock--global negotiations cannot produce effective
remedies on timescale required. Emissions likely to double
by 2050 at present rate.
• Global climate very sensitive to small changes in mean
global T--1-2.5C.
• Considerable uncertainty re magnitude, timing, type, and
scale of impacts as result of warming.
• Long time delays between action and consequences.
• Need for collective action on global scale.
• Severe distributive inequities, both present &
intergenerational.
II. Why are E.U., U.S., & LDC
Responses so Different?
• What is at stake for each set of players?
– -For E.U. scale and urgency of problem combined with promise of
tech. innovation & competition for new markets.
– --For U.S. protection of fossil fuel economy and role of U.S.
manufacturing in that. [e.g. Light trucks, aka SUVs, as route for
reinvigorating auto industry]. While energy intensity of U.S.
industry decreasing significantly, aggregate emissions growing
rapidly. USEIA 1994 reporting that U.S. already 18% above their
1990 quota and projecting another 16% increase by 2010. So U.S.
industry seeing their Kyoto Protocol penalty as 34%, not the
original 7%.
What’s at Stake?, cont’d.
• LDCs split:
• majority say those who caused the problem
obligated to solve it & their development (based
on fossil fuels) will not be sacrificed for the AICs
benefit.
• AOSIS wants deep cuts in emissions--pushing for
20% cut by 2010--because their lives and
territories at stake.
• Arabs want compensation for lost sales of
petroleum as a consequence of int’l. regulation.
III. Implications of Regional, State
and City Initiatives in the U.S.
• While Fed. Gov’t. stalemated on GW action, snowballing
stream of initiatives from States, cities, and regions now
evident(Hassol & Udal. 2003). Initiatives triggered by:
• scientific reports of IPCC & NAS.
• direct evidence of earlier springs, glacier & sea ice
melting, and consistent warming trend of last 20 years.
• Major regional efforts by West Coast & East Coast states.
• California the most systematic and comprehensive of all re
control of emissions--automobiles, refrigerators, etc.
U.S. National Developments,
2005
• As expected, McCain-Lieberman Bill defeated in
Senate, BUT major surprise in (largely symbolic)
Sense of the Senate Res. White House strongly
opposing but defeated.
• Bush publicly acknowledging reality of GW, but
U.S. not doing anything proactive about it.
• Clear shift in arguments of skeptics--yes warming
but magnitude within range of natural variability.
IV. So Why Am I Now Scared To
Death?
Growing Evidence of “Slippery Slopes”
and “Tipping Points”:Cumulative, Multiple
Stresses and Changes Irreversible on
Human Timescales
On Thresholds and
Concentrations
Have we seriously underestimated
both the magnitude & rate of change?
Targets, Thresholds,
Communications (Janetos. 2004)
Thinking About Targets and Thresholds
• Different thresholds for different systems
• Different thresholds for the same system in
different places
• Different ways of valuing by different
actors
Questions Posed at February 2005 U.K. Meeting
• Dangerous for whom?
• Dangerous by when?
• Can a global target represent dangers at the
local level?
• How much climate change is too much?
(Tony Blair)
O’Neill and Oppenheimer. 2002. SCIENCE, VOL.
296, (14 June)
• Still a very influential source re targets via multiple
thresholds: shut down of THC at 3°C over 100 yrs;
WAIS disintegration at 2-4C; disintegration of Greenland
ice sheet at 1C, along with widespread bleaching of coral
reefs.
• O & R recommending concentration target of 450ppmv
even with uncertainties.
Alternative Approaches
• John Stone (Canadian Met Office) suggesting “global warming” not a
good term since suggesting 1 variable & smooth change. More
worried about discontinuous change, possibly rapid, high system risks,
e.g., SLR, THC, acidification, change in ocean & terrestrial carbon
sinks, etc. [YES! YES! YES!].
• Lot of concern expressed by others re stability of sinks and
consequences. Others also concerned about vulnerability of food
systems & human health to climate change.
• Meinhausen arguing that risk of very high warming cannot be
completely excluded even for 350ppmv. Most likely value for climate
sensitivity is 3.2°C. Stabilization at 550ppmv unlikely to meet a 2°C
increase limit. Aim then not for stabilization but reversal--peak at
475ppmv & stabilize at 400. [YES again!! Why this current focus on
2.5-2.7C as most likely value for CS??].
BUT CONSIDER
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•
At 380ppmv enormous increase in surface & sub-surface heat in ocean [14.7 x
1022J.Levitus et al., 2000,2005] & significant decreases in pH (Sabine et al.,
2004, Feely et al. 2004)..
Both combine to dislocate marine ecosystems at almost all trophic levels &
combine again with overfishing to deliver a triple whammy of multiple
stresses.
Recent indications that both the oceanic (Feely et al., 2005) & terrestrial (Fung
et al., 2005) carbon sinks slowing down rate of uptake. Under what conditions
will large sinks become large sources over what timescales? And corals at
great risk even < 1°C.
If uptake slows, then projections of maximum temperature increases by 2100
significantly understated.
Clearly doubling cannot be a sensible standard. Do we then have to keep
ratcheting down over the next 200 years to a level again <300ppmv??
IN ADDITION
• Re glacier disintegration, Hansen (2005) poses & explores
the question whether anthropogenic GW can cause icesheet melting measured in meters on timescale of
centuries. The dynamics seem to be more than plausible.
• Re increases in hurricane intensity (not frequency),
suggestive recent work by Emmanuel (2005) appears to
establish positive correlation with tropical SST’s.
• Impacts of both of above combined mean greater hazards
for growing global coastal populations and higher
destructive potential. [>30 mega-cities (>8 million people),
most in Asia, projected by 2050).
BUT CONSIDER FURTHER
• BAU facilitating econ. devel. for both AIC’s & LDC’s to 2100, but at a
price of concentration levels above 560ppmv with further long term
GW commitment.
• And world pop. growth projected to stabilize at ~ 9 billion, most of
which in LDC’s.
• Does a strategy of severely constraining fossil fuel emissions over the
long term condemn an even larger no. of people in LDC’s to continued
poverty? (See Dyson 2005).
• But not doing so also condemns them to pay the highest price that
nature will extract.(See IPCC/TAR, Vol. II, 2001).
• And what of our obligations to future generations?
Distributional Issues
Source: Cain, Hansen, et al. 2004
Distributional Issues, cont’d.
Source:Cain, Hansen et al. 2004
Distributional Issues, cont’d.
Source: Cain, Hansen, et al
.2004