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Effects Based Operations within the United Kingdom Joint Force Air Component Headquarters 22ISMOR

George Onslow & Geraldine Wrigley Defence Science & Technology Laboratory & Air Warfare Centre Royal Air Force & UK JFACHQ 22ISMOR

Outline • Why the RAF has embraced EBO • UKJFACHQ • Role of OA • Assessment of EBO - OEA • The JFACHQ Process • Issues • Conclusion 22ISMOR

What this Paper will not Discuss • EBO in detail • JFACHQ in detail • NB The term EBO will be used throughout rather than EBA etc. No subtle distinctions are meant by this 22ISMOR

Precision Campaign Effects At Range, In Time RAF Strike Command Mission Directive 2005 22ISMOR

JFACHQ • The Joint Force Air Component HQ is the deployable military C2 HQ for Air operations.

• It is held on high readiness and has a cadre of some 70 officers and other ranks • The Joint Force Air Component Commander is responsible to the Joint Force Commander for the planning and prosecution of air operations.

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OA in the JFACHQ • JFACHQ has an embedded OA team of civilian analysts • Analysts normally deploy on exercise and operations • Analysts may reachback to AWC and wider MoD Science Community 22ISMOR

A Warning • EBO is immature - much remains to be done (and is being done) – Development of understanding of cognitive processes and how they may be targeted – Incorporation of other instruments of power Diplomatic and Economic into a cohesive whole • The JFACHQ approach (and especially the OA contribution) is very much work in progress 22ISMOR

Operations Effects Analysis (OEA) • Analysis conducted at the tactical level to evaluate the success and progress of the operational plan with respect to the component objectives and phasing requirements of the campaign plan. • “How are we doing in relation to the plan” • Previously known as Combat Analysis 22ISMOR

22ISMOR Strategy to Task Government Strategic Objective Operational Objective Operational Sub-Objective Tactical Objective Tactical Task Missions

OEA - Planning • JFACHQ uses 5-stage process called the Objectives to Metrics Methodology 1 (OMM) • Stages are Identify, Define, Frame, Assign and Establish Metrics 22ISMOR 1. Lee and Kupersmith 2002

OEA - Planning 2 • Identify – Derive the desired effects from the JFC intent statement.

• Define – Define the effect from doctrinal sources if possible, if not agree a definition with JFACC’s approval.

• Frame – Determine the questions that ‘frame’ or ‘encompass’ the effects required.

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OEA - Planning 3 • Assign – Link effects to targets.

• Establish Metrics – Determine the metrics that answer the framing questions.

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OEA - Metrics • The final stage of Establishing Metrics is the key part of the process • The metrics must be relevant (obviously) but also must be collectable • Therefore advice is sought from A2 Collections staff as to the ‘collectability’ of a proposed metric 22ISMOR

SIs and MOEs • Success Indicators and Measures of Effect are the metrics applied to Objectives and Tasks.

• Names are to some extent historical and MOE in particular is probably not the best name for the metric concerned.

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Success Indicator (SI) • The range of consequences to be observed that indicate the successful achievement of an effects-based objective.

• an occurrence or event that can be collected by Intel and provides an indication that the employed action is having the desired effect. Normally expressed in effects terms 22ISMOR

Measure of Effect (MOE) • A predetermined criteria, parameter or set of conditions that indicates the level of achievement for a defined action, normally refers to a tactical task that can be readily measured in terms of physical achievement.

• A quantity that can be measured and that demonstrates whether things are occurring according to plan. Normally expressed in terms of sorties flown, targets hit etc.

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Strategy to Task Incorporating OEA metrics Government Strategic Objective Operational Objective Operational Sub-Objective Tactical Objective Success Indicator 1 Success Indicator 2 Success Indicator 1 Success Indicator 2 Success Indicator n Success Indicator 1 Tactical Task Measure of Effectiveness 1 Measure of Effectiveness 2 Missions 22ISMOR

OEA - Assessment • Assessment of the values against the SIs and MOEs is carried out by the analyst.

• There is no automatic or pre-set weighting involved in the process.

• Analyst will take advice from ‘experts’ when formulating the assessment.

• Analyst will establish a confidence level in the assessment.

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Reporting of OEA • JFACC normally briefed twice daily • Normally 2 or 3 slides presented in Main Brief • Issues normally briefed in Strategy Brief • Complete OEA briefing is 80+ slides 22ISMOR

Top Level - Campaign Schematic with Decisive Points Shape Secure

Task not started Task just begun Task nearly complete Task complete

M Shape 1 Early I&W established IOT inform force entry 4 Physically isolate RJL from KL M 6 Establish Air Control External H 11 Disrupt RKLO SLoC H Secure 3 Establish and deploy

No Effect

advance force

Well short Approaching Achieved Border Colour Status last briefed

L 5 Establish coalition ISR matrix L 7 Demonstrate resolve and capability Internal M 10 Establish zone of separation 22ISMOR

Objectives & Success Indicators • Traffic Light system used.

• May include – Confidence level – Expected value 22ISMOR

Objectives & Success Indicators 2 Key B Black Objective Not Yet Undertaken R Red No indications of Expected Effects (for given stage of Ops) A Y Yellow Effects Approaching those Finally Expected G Green Achieving Effect Required W Amber White Effects Well short of those Finally Expected (not necessarily an issue No Data (INTEL) for Assessment 22ISMOR

Tactical Tasks & MOEs • Achievement of Tactical Tasks and their associated MOEs are shown by a slider bar – Colour of Bar is colour of overarching objective.

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Tactical Tasks & MOEs 2 O - On Time A - Ahead Planned Effort B - Behind Planned Effort ETC - Estimated Date of Completion Previous assessment ETC ATO D A 0% 40% 80% Position of bar indicates achievement 22ISMOR

CAPT • Prototype tool • Database to hold Strat to Task Hierarchy and associated metrics.

• Allow analyst to record assessments against metrics • Produces powerpoint briefing with hyperlinking of hierarchy 22ISMOR

Shortcomings of Current Approach • Unwanted effects are non considered in a formal way • Management of Risk 22ISMOR

Management of Risk • Consider the JFACCs problem when managing risk • If a Weapon system has been destroyed it can’t be used - Risk is low • If that weapon system has been neutralised by (say) the operator being convinced that it would be a bad idea to use it, then the risk of that weapon being used is higher 22ISMOR

Problems and Issues with EBO from the JFACHQ Perspective • EBO is immature.

• EBO doctrine is still emerging. Good work has been done but more remains • The UK does not conduct operations using all instruments of power in a coherent way • Assessment of EBO is not yet ‘joined up’.

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Problems and Issues 2 • EBO will require a large and diverse range of data sources. Developing this set will be a challenge.

• Adding ‘cognitive’ type effects to exercises will be difficult. This will impact on training and the development of OEA 22ISMOR

The Future for OEA • Need to ensure that we keep abreast of developments in EBO • Need to ensure that any OEA toolset is integrated into other Air C2 systems • Need to develop relationship with other component HQs • Need to establish ways of training and exercising capability 22ISMOR

Haven’t We Always Done EBO?

• In 1944 603 Sqn were tasked against Greek Town of Kalymos (held by the Germans).

• “Four Beaufighters are to demonstrate over the target area from 1645 to 1700 Oct 17. Aircraft are not (repeat) not to open fire but are to leave no doubt in the minds of the enemy that their fate is sealed if resistance continues” 22ISMOR

22ISMOR Questions ?