Transcript Chapter Twenty-Seven: The Global Crisis, 1921–1941

Chapter Twenty-Five:
The Global Crisis, 1921-1941
Chapter Twenty-Five:
The Global Crisis

The Diplomacy of the New Era
– Limited Internationalism
 Henry Cabot Lodge: This senior U.S. senator from
Massachusetts was chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and he led the fight against the
ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and U.S.
membership in the League of Nations. He was not an
isolationist, but he did believe that the U.S. should
remain free of any obligations to any foreign powers
and follow an independent path on the world stage.
– U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1920s
 Contradiction: While critics of U.S. foreign policy in Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge
the 1920s accused the Republican administrations of
(R), 1850-1924
isolationism, the U.S. in fact was playing a greater role
on the world stage than it ever did previously.
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
Charles Evan
Hughes
(1862-1948)
in 1921
The Diplomacy of the New Era
– Replacing the League
 Charles Evans Hughes: The former governor of New York and 1916 Republican
presidential candidate became Secretary of State under Harding in 1921, and wanted
to find a way of replacing the League of Nations as means of keeping the peace.
 Washington Conference of 1921: Hughes wished to prevent a destabilizing naval
arms race between Japan, Great Britain, and the U.S. (and to a lesser extent, France
and Italy), so he called a meeting in which each party agreed to stop building new
major warships and reduce the size of its fleet. To everyone’s surprise, all attending
powers signed the Five-Power Pact of February 1922, agreeing to limits on warship
construction.
 Kellogg-Briand Pact: In 1927, when French foreign minister Aristide Briand asked
then U.S. Secretary of State Frank Kellogg (1856-1937) to have the U.S. join an
alliance against Germany, Kellogg instead proposed a multi-lateral treaty outlawing
war as an instrument of policy. On August 27, 1928, fourteen nations signed the
agreement; forty-eight signed it later. The pact had no enforcement mechanism.
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The Diplomacy of the New Era
– Debts and Diplomacy
 American Commerce Abroad: Hughes, Kellogg, and other
American policymakers agreed that making sure U.S. overseas
trade faced no obstacles was the first duty of American
diplomats.
 Foreign Debt: The Allied powers in Europe were struggling with
the $11 billion in loans they had borrowed from the U.S. during
the war, while Germany was struggling paying its hefty
reparations to France and Britain, which caused hyperinflation
that made its currency nearly valueless.
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Vice President to Calvin Coolidge,
Charles G. Dawes (1865-1951)
The Diplomacy of the New Era
– Debts and Diplomacy
 The Dawes Plan: In 1924, a committee led by Vice President Charles
Dawes proposed a solution to the European debt problem: the U.S.
government would allow Germany to take out enormous new loans from
U.S. banks; it would then use this money to the reparations to France and
Germany, who in turn would agree to reduce the size of the German
payments until the German economy recovered. The Allies would also
remove troops from the highly industrial Ruhr Valley of Germany. Dawes
won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1925 for the plan.
 Economic Expansion in Latin America: During the 1920s, the U.S. doubled
its investments in Latin America, often extending giant loans that likely
would not be paid back. The U.S. also maintained military presences in
Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, etc. High U.S. import tariffs
made it hard for these countries to pay back these debts.
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The Diplomacy of the New Era
– Hoover and the World Crisis
 Rising Nationalism: In Europe and Japan, a rising nationalism began
to rise in 1931 that eventually would push the world to war.
 Roosevelt Corollary Repudiated: FDR tried to repair the damage in
Latin America by previous policies by going on a goodwill tour of the
region before his inauguration, and not invoking the Roosevelt
Corollary when foreign banks defaulted on U.S. loans, as in October
1931. He also pulled troops out from Nicaragua and Haiti by 1934.
 After the Crash: With European economies faltering, many
economists had advised advised Hoover to impose a temporary
moratorium on their debt payments, but he refused to do so.
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The Diplomacy of the New Era
– Hoover and the World Crisis
 New European Challenges: The U.S. proved
diplomatically ineffective during the 1920s,
especially dealing with two troubling
situations: the rise of the Italian fascist
dictatorship, which Benito Mussolini had
consolidated by 1925; and the highly
unstable Weimar Republic in Germany,
which by the 1920s had been largely
discredited for a variety of reasons, including
the return of inflation. Weimar would soon
follow Italian footsteps into fascism, with the
takeover of the Nazi Party led by Adolph
Hitler in early 1933.
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Mussolini in 1925
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The Diplomacy of the New Era
– Hoover and the World Crisis
 Crisis in East Asia: In the early 1930s, The Japanese were suffering from
a severe economic downturn and were concerned with expanding Soviet
power and the Nationalist Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek
(Jiang Jieshi) reasserting its influence in Manchuria, a peninsula over
which the Japanese had had informal economic control since the end of
the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.
 Manchuria Invaded: By September 1931, Japan’s military leaders were
growing more and more assertive over the civilian government. They
used the pretext of an explosion on a Japanese-built railroad that became
known as the “Mukden Incident” to invade Manchuria.
 U.S. Reaction: Secretary of State Henry Stimson (1867-1950) issued
sharp rebukes about the invasion, but Hoover did not allow him to
cooperate with the League of Nations to impose economic sanctions. By
early 1932, they had reached Shanghai, where they killed thousands.
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Isolationism and Internationalism
– Depression Diplomacy
 Dual Challenge: FDR’s new administration not only had to deal with a
global economic crisis in 1933, but also the decaying international system
of relations that had been set up at the end of World War One.
 FDR’s “Bombshell Message”: Roosevelt attended the World Economic
Conference in London in June 1933, and decided that the gold value of
the dollar had to be allowed to fall to make U.S. goods competitive on the
global market. Most conference attendees had the conservative goal of
wanting to stabilize currencies, but not Roosevelt. His “bombshell
message”—outlining his plan to let the dollar to drop—shocked them,
and triggered a quick dissolution of the conference.
 Stopping Growth of American-Owned European Debt: In April 1934,
Roosevelt signed a prohibiting U.S. banks from extending loans to
countries already in default. War debt payments lurched to halt shortly
afterward, with only Finland continuing.
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Isolationism and Internationalism
– Depression Diplomacy
 Soviet Union Recognized: The U.S. had still not recognized the
Soviet Union as of 1933, but some advocates were for its recognition
since the U.S.S.R. was a possible source of trade. The Russians
wanted American help in containing Japan. By November, formal
diplomatic relations had been established, although the
rapprochement was short-lived, souring by the end of 1934: trade
never took off, and the U.S. was not interested in containing Japan.
 “Good Neighbor Policy”: FDR’s administration reversed older Latin
American policy by signing an agreement at a 1933 Inter-America
Conference in Uruguay that stated, “No state has the right to
intervene in the internal or external affairs of others.” This repudiated
the old “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine.
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Isolationism and Internationalism
– The Rise of Isolationism
 Sources of Isolationism: Some Wilsonian internationalists had grown
weary of the League of Nations and its inability to stop Japanese
aggression, while others believed that business interests had tricked the
public into supporting World War I, especially bankers who wanted to
protect the loans they had extended to the Allies.
 Neutrality Acts: As Mussolini prepared to invade Ethiopia in the summer
of 1935, many Americans feared that another European war would break
out. Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 1935 to try to keep the U.S.
out of a war: it set up a mandatory arms embargo on both sides of the
conflict, and directed the president to warn civilians not travel on the
ships of warring parties. In 1937, another Neutrality Act was passed that
allowed warring parties to buy non-military material from the U.S. on a
“cash-and-carry” basis, and if they shipped it themselves; the law
prohibited U.S. vessels from entering a war zone.
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U.S.S. Panay, sunk
by the Japanese
on Dec. 12, 1937
Isolationism and Internationalism
– The Rise of Isolationism
 Spanish Civil War: The Falangists of General Francisco Franco—a
Spanish group much like the Italian fascists—revolted against the
democratically elected Spanish government in July 1936. Italy and
Germany openly supported Franco, but the U.S. joined Britain and
France in agreeing to offer no assistance to either side (this did not keep
some U.S. citizens from volunteering to fight for the republic).
 “Quarantine” Speech: In the summer of 1937, Japan intensified its
military operations in China, attacking all five of the the country’s
northern provinces. In a speech in October 1937, Roosevelt said the
Japanese should be “quarantined” to prevent the contagion of war from
spreading, but was deliberately vague about what this meant. Roosevelt
backtracked from the speech when it was met with hostility by the public.
When the Japanese bombed a U.S. gunboat on the Yangtze River near
Nanjing, China, in Dec. 1937, FDR quickly accepted their apology.
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Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain
(1869-1940)
Isolationism and Internationalism
– The Failure of Munich
 Hitler’s Posturing: In 1936, Hitler moved the revived German army into the
Rhineland, which Germany had been forbidden to do by the treaty of
Versailles. Beginning in March 1938, Hitler started his quest for
“lebensraum” by marching the German army into Austria, creating a “union”
(anschluss), which was also forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. In
September 1938, Hitler demanded that Czechoslovakia cede its western
border territory known as the “Sudetenland,” which was heavily populated by
German-speaking peoples, but without which the country was indefensible.
Czechoslovaks were ready to fight, but needed outside assistance (they had a
treaty of mutual defense with the French).
 “Appeasement”: On Sept. 29, the leaders of France and Britain met with
Hitler and agreed to German demands in exchange for Hitler’s promise that
his expansionist program would cease. This policy came to be known as
“appeasement,” and was most associated with Neville Chamberlain, the
British Prime Minister, and viewed as a haunting failure for decacdes.
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On September 29, 1938, Mussolini, Hitler, Daladier, and Chamberlain prepare
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to sign the Munich agreement.
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Isolationism and Internationalism
– The Failure of Munich
 Poland: Hitler next started making threats against Poland, and France and
Britain quickly affirmed that they would come to Poland’s aid if it was
attacked; an attempt to bring the Soviet Union into the pact failed as
Stalin did not think he could trust the West as he was not even invited to
Munich. In August 1939, the Soviets shocked the world by signing a
nonaggression pact with the Germans, freeing Hitler at least temporarily
from a two-front war.
 War Breaks Out: In late August, Hitler staged an incident on the border
that allowed him to make the claim that Germany had been attacked. On
September 1, Hitler launched a full-scale invasion of Poland. Britain and
France stayed true to their promises and declared war on Germany two
days later. While war had been underway for roughly eight years already
in East Asia, the war in Europe was just beginning.
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From Neutrality to Intervention
– Neutrality Tested
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 Cash-and-Carry: FDR believed that the U.S. should make armaments
available to the Allies, and needed to revise the Neutrality Acts. In Sept.
1939, he asked Congress to do away with the prohibition on selling arms
to combatants, which it did, but it retained the clause forbidding U.S.
ships to enter a warzone. It did permit combatants on a “cash-and-carry”
basis as before—no credit would be extended.
 Fall of France: After the quick defeat of Poland, the war entered a phase
of quietness that some called “the phony war.” But in the spring of 1940,
the “blitzkrieg” started again with a vengeance. The Germans first
attacked Denmark and Norway, and then swept across the Netherlands
and Belgium. In May, Hitler’s forces swept into France from the north,
crushing resistance (300,000 French and British forces barely escaped to
Britain at Dunkirk). Mussolini’s forces invaded from the south on June
10. By June 22, France surrendered. A puppet government controlled by
the Nazis was set up in the French city of Vichy.
Chapter Twenty-Five:
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French citizens look on in horror as Germans
march into Paris, June 14, 1940
Hitler posing in front of the Eiffel Tower
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From Neutrality to Intervention
– Neutrality Tested
 Circumventing Neutrality: Roosevelt requested and received $1 billion in
defense spending from Congress on May 16, 1940, during the German
offensive. Some Americans—like Ambassador to the U.K. Joseph P.
Kennedy—thought that Britain would fall next, but FDR wanted to step
up aid. He gave the British fifty destroyers in exchange for the U.S. being
able to build bases in British Caribbean territories (Antigua, Jamaica,
Trinidad, etc.)
 Burke-Wadsworth Act: By July, 1940, 66 percent of the public viewed
Germany as a threat to the U.S. In September, Congress passed the first
peacetime draft measure.
 America First: Despite shifting public sentiment, the isolationist America
First Committee was formed in Sept. 1940 by students at Yale Law
School and gained national popularity, with aviator Charles Lindbergh as
its chief spokesperson.
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Iconic images of St. Paul’s
Cathedral unharmed by a Blitz
bombing raid in December 1940.
First Mass Air Raid on London, September 7, 1940; this raid
commenced “The Blitz,” a German bombardment campaign that
lasted until May 1941.
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From Neutrality to Intervention
– The Campaign of 1940
 FDR Runs Again: FDR had not been forthcoming about whether or not he
would break with tradition and run for a third term, so no Democratic
candidate emerged to replace him. At the convention in July, he said he
would accept a “draft” from his party. Party leaders even accepted FDR’s
choice of Agriculture Secretary Henry A. Wallace (1888 - 1965) of Iowa,
who most felt was too controversial.
 Wendell Willkie (1892-1944): The GOP ran this liberal Republican
corporate lawyer from Indiana—who had never held political office
before—as a “dark-horse” candidate for president. Willkie was a good
campaigner, but his internationalist position did not appeal to the
Republican isolationist base.
 FDR’s Victory: Roosevelt won 55 percent of the popular vote to Willkie’s
45 percent; 38 states to Willkie’s 10, and 449 electoral votes to Willkie’s 82.
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A lend-lease tank
being loaded on to
a ship in a U.S.
Atlantic port
From Neutrality to Intervention
– Neutrality Abandoned
 “Lend-Lease”: FDR proposed a system changing the Neutrality Laws in
which the U.S. could lend or lease weapons to countries “pivotal to the
defense of the United States” as long as they were returned at the end of
the conflict. Congress passed this bill in March 1941.
 Submarine Attacks: German submarines in the North Atlantic were
having a devastating effect on British shipping. Roosevelt declared that
the safety of the Atlantic west of Iceland was the responsibility of
American nations, so U.S. ships began patrolling this region as of July
1941. In September, Nazi subs started targeting U.S. ships.
 The Atlantic Charter: In August 1941, FDR and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill (1874-1965) met on a ship docked off Newfoundland,
Canada. They hashed out a statement that became known as the “Atlantic
Charter,” which affirmed American support for Great Britain, outlined
war aims, but also goals for the postwar world, including decolonization.
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From Neutrality to
Intervention
– Neutrality Abandoned
German Troops in Russia, 1941
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 Lend-Lease Extended to the
Soviets: The Nazis broke the
Non-Aggression Pact that
they had signed with the
Soviets in 1939 and invaded
the Soviet Union in June
1941. When the Soviets
refused to surrender, FDR
convinced Congress to
extend Lend-Lease privileges
to them.
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From Neutrality to Intervention
– The Road to Pearl Harbor
 Tripartite Pact: In September 1940, Japan signed a loose defensive
alliance agreement with Germany and Italy.
 Southeast Asia: The Japanese invaded French Indochina (Vietnam) in
July 1940. The U.S., having broken some Japanese codes, knew that the
oil-rich Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) was next. FDR froze all Japanese
assets in the U.S. in response, limiting the Japanese ability to buy
supplies (including oil) from the U.S.
 Japanese Assets Frozen: U.S. supplies were critical for Japan’s continued
imperialists war drive, so it had to either repair relations with the U.S. or
find other sources of supplies, namely Dutch and British possessions in
the Pacific. In October, a militant general, Hideki Tojo, replaced a more
moderate prime minister as Japan’s leader.
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From Neutrality to Intervention
– The Road to Pearl Harbor
 Imminent Attack: The U.S. gave up on a peaceful solution and
understood from intercepted and decoded messages that a new Japanese
attack was imminent, but not necessarily on the U.S. (many though
British or Dutch territory was more likely).
 Pearl Harbor Attacked: On 7:55 a.m. on December 7, 1941, a wave of
bombers attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, followed by a
second wave an hour later. The U.S. lost 8 battleships. 3 cruisers, 4 other
vessels, and 188 airplanes, and more than 2,400 soldiers and sailors had
died. Fortunately for the U.S., all three aircraft carriers of the Pacific
Fleet had been out to sea on December 7.
 War Declared: On Dec. 8, Roosevelt gave his stirring “a date which will
live in infamy” speech, which was followed by the Senate voting for a
declaration of war unanimously, and the House voting 388 to 1. Germany
and Italy declared war on the U.S. on Dec. 11.
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Debating the Past:
The Question of Pearl
Harbor
 Historians on Whether
or Not FDR Knew of
the Impending Attack:
From what you’ve
read, what do you
think?
U.S.S. Arizona sinking in
the wake of the attack
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