Defence Electronics

department

Closing two mayor safety gaps in helicopter VFR flights

Page 1 Presentation title – file name – date S. Scherbarth, K. Schulz, EADS Deutschland GmbH, 88039 Friedrichshafen, Germany

Defence Electronics

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The wire and pole problem in VFR flights

 The Visual Flight Regulations is based on the “see and avoid” concept for safe helicopter flight.

 Close to ground there are hard to see obstacles like poles or masts and obstacles like wires not perceivable at all by itself.  Obviously, for these obstacles see and avoid does not work due to the deficits in the unaided human “see”.

 This is clearly visible in the accident statistics: Page 2 Presentation title – file name – date

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The size of the safety gap

   The

in-flight collision with obstacles

caused 15,7% of all U.S. civil rotorcraft accidents 1963-1997. This is the second largest cause of accidents just after

loss of engine power

(28.5%) (1)

In-flight collisions with wires and poles

are the main cause of all in flight collisions with obstacles contributing to 53% of all these accidents (1) Therefore, next after

loss of engine power

we talk about the largest single safety problem causing 8.3% of all accidents 1963-1997 (1) (1) NASA/TM-2000 209597, “ U.S.Civil Rotorcraft Accidents 1963 through 1997 “ Page 3 Presentation title – file name – date

Defence Electronics

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It is time to update the VFR definition

Since the historic VFR definition, the situation has changed:  The density of poles (mobile antenna masts), windmills and wires has increased significantly and helicopter missions changed more to close to ground missions with landing in unknown terrain (EMS, SAR, Police, ..)  With active obstacle warning systems there are certified, technical means readily available to close the mayor safety gap caused by wire and pole collision. Page 4 Presentation title – file name – date

Defence Electronics

department

HELLAS – Active Obstacle Warning Product Family

HELLAS-W Navigation System AHRS Acoustic alarm generator NVG/Night mode Video Display System architecture Caution display HELLAS-A Navigation System IRS Communication Management EW System - Blanking Video Display NVG/Night mode Avionic bus Warning Management FLIR Sensor- and Electronic unit HMS/D PLT&CPLT Control Panel Warning Indicator Control Panel Collective MFD ON OFF MFD MODE WR/PL MFD OBS MAX HMS/D OBS 1O HMS/D FOV ON OFF OWS ON MFD OFF AUDIO OWS SL MARGIN 999 FT AUTO DE-ICING ON OFF DKU Page 5 Presentation title – file name – date

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HELLAS – Product Family

Performances HELLAS-W

Field of View

Vertical: Horizontal: 32 ° 31.5

°

Field of View

Vertical: Horizontal: Line of Sight range EL: +10 °/ -20° HELLAS-A Line of Sight range AZ: 42 ° 36 °  12 °

Field of Regard

Vertical: Horizontal: Max. Range of Sensor: Scan frequency: Weight: Power consumption: Window Heating 62 ° 31.5

° 1050 m 2 Hz 27,4 kg < 160 VA N/A Classification of Obstacles History function: High Risk 8 s Detection 10 mm wires up to 500 m @12km visib.

Field of Regard

Vertical: Horizontal: Max. Range of Sensor: Scan frequency: Weight: Power consumption: Window Heating 42 ° 60 ° 1200 m 3 Hz 21-24 kg < 280 VA 50 VA Classification of Obstacles History function: multiple Obstacles multiple Obstacles Detection 5 mm wires up to 700 m @12km visib.

Page 6 Presentation title – file name – date

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HELLAS – Product Family

HELLAS-W APPROACH Command and Control NORMAL OWS NORMAL Normal Operating during Cruising Flight APPROACH Operation Take-off and Landing ON HELLAS Power ON OFF HELLAS Power OFF OFF ON HELLAS-A

MODE

STBY SN SL O W S OFF WR/PL TREE MODE: OFF STBY/SN SL WR/PL TREE Power Off Standby/Snapshot Safety Line-Mode Wire/Pole-Mode Tree-Mode HMS/D-SYM: Control for symbology on the HMS/D’s DR/WR: Setting Display Range and Warning Range

HMS/D-SYM

ON OFF CPLT MFD ON OFF MFD MODE WR/PL MFD OBS MAX HMS/D OBS 1O HMS/D FOV ON OFF BOTH PLT OWS W -

D/W

D+ W + O W S D- MFD ON OFF AUDIO OWS SL MARGIN 999 FT AUTO DE-ICING ON OFF Page 7 Presentation title – file name – date

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HELLAS – Product Family

HELLAS-W Display HELLAS-A Safety Line and Obstacles on HMS/D and MFD Safety Line Display on HMS/D Warning Indicator Indication whether there is an obstacle warning on the left, center or right field in front of the helicopter At present optional: Flight Vector Horizon Safety Line

APCH

Page 8 Presentation title – file name – date Obstacle Display on MFD

Defence Electronics

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HELLAS – Product Family

• HELLAS W is available off the shelf.

• More than 50 units sold in Europe, North America and Asia.

• Operational since 2003 • EASA and CAA certified according LBA-NTS02 (August 21, 2003) • HELLAS A is in development for NH90, first flight 2006 Page 9 Presentation title – file name – date

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Conclusion

On of the conclusions of the NASA Study on U.S. Civil Rotorcraft Accidents 1963 through 1997 was: “The authors (2) recommend that:  Flying below 750 feet (above ground level) be discouraged by the industry and regulatory agencies.

 A low-price proximity spherical sensor be developed and certified; a sensor sphere of some large radius should , in effect, cocoon the helicopter and provide the pilot with sufficient warning to avoid obstacles “ (2) Franklin D. Harris, Eugene F. Kasper, and Laura E. Iseler Page 10 Presentation title – file name – date

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Conclusion

With our HELLAS products we have developed the proposed proximity sensor to effectively cocoon the helicopter.

Therefore its now time to update the requirements for helicopters flying routinely missions below 750 feet. For these helicopters the installation of an appropriate active obstacle warning system should be mandatory. We believe its now overdue to close this mayor safety gap caused by in flight collisions with wires and poles. Page 11 Presentation title – file name – date

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The second safety issue to adress

Loss of visual reference by • Brownout (Sand) • Whiteout (Snow)

Page 12 Presentation title – file name – date

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The size of the brown out / white out safety problem

 Brown out has been a mayor problem in recent military helicopter operations.  It has been reported that “Brown-outs have claimed 28 US Army helicopters in Iraq” (3)  15% of all Class A accidents of the US-Army in 2002 – 2003 has been caused by brown outs. (4) (3) (4) Defense Helicopter, February / March 2004 US Army Combat Readiness Center Page 13 Presentation title – file name – date

Defence Electronics

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The Risk – Degraded Visual Environment

Typical Flight Scenario into Brownout Condition

Page 14 Presentation title – file name – date

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Principle of the Solution with Hellas

(3)

Step 1 Close to and during low speed landing approach the HELLAS gets a brown-out/white-out free sight to the landing area and accumulates a high resolution tree dimensional image of that area. Step 2 In case of upcoming brown/whiteout condition, the HELLAS system has gathered enough three dimensional area scan data in the internal buffer to create a HELLAS natural synthetic vision video of the landing area.

Step 3 This synthetic vision video presents to the pilots an artificial three dimensional representation of the outside view correlated to his current position and inertial reference.

(3) U.S. Patent pending Page 15 Presentation title – file name – date

Defence Electronics

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Clear view to landing zone in brown-out

Hellas brown-out support with HMSD Page 16 Presentation title – file name – date

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Conclusion

HELLAS is capable to provide continuous visual reference for landing in brown-out or white-out conditions through a virtual view.

This virtual view is generated from an high resolution 3-D image of the landing zone in same way as in a state of the art flight simulator.

With this support no critical switching from visual reference to an abstract instrument reference is required when a brown-out condition occurs.

Page 17 Presentation title – file name – date