Transcript Document

Orthodox / Traditional
(Western Liberal)
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Aggressive expansionist actions of
Stalin  Break up of Grand Alliance,
Russians responsible for Cold War
Until 1947: USA = Passive & wanted
cooperation w/ USSR
Communist aggression prompted USA
to react & defend democracy
USA not motivated by self-interest or
territory, innocent in world affairs
Post-WWII policy of universalism 
rejected spheres of influence
Soviet union = responsible for the Cold
War
USSR = expansionist, Suspicious of the
West, Marxist revolutionaries bent on
world domination
Stalin – violated Yalta & Potsdam &
plotted to take over the world with
Moscow at the center
The US had to act defensively  Truman
Doctrine, Marshall Plan, NATO
Key figures: Arthur M Schlesinger Jr,
Louis Halle, Herbert Feis, Joseph Jones,
WH McNiell, Hans Morgenthau
Emergence of revisionists put Orthodox
historians on the defensive
Revisionist
Formal Antithesis to Orthodox
1959, 1960s, 1970s
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William Appleman Williams: The Tragedy of
American Diplomacy (considered heretical at
the time)
Sweeping re-evaluation of American policy
since the 1890s (Open Door expansionism as
basis for 20th century American empire)
Post-revisionist
1970s+
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USSR & Stalin = not solely responsible
Not as simple as preserving freedom (such a
view does violence to the historic record)
FDR & Truman not innocent
US commitment to universalism = haphazard
& hypocritical
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USA = responsible for the cold war
Dollar diplomacy – US actions tied to
capitalism
Containment of communism = driven by a US
desire to secure markets for free trade and
penetrate Eastern Europe (Williams)
Open Door Policy
Soviet actions less relevant to US policy –
Capitalist drive (Kolkos)
Coercion characterized US reconstruction
diplomacy (Patterson)
Stalin = pragmatic, would have made
concessions if US had understood him
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Key Figures: Michael Parenti, Gabriel and Joyce
Kolko, Fred Block, William Appleman Williams,
Gar Alperovitz, Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber,
Barton Bernstein
Wisconsin School of diplomatic history:
Williams, LaFeber, Gardner, McCormick
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Mast Radical = Gar Alperovitz  advanced
theory by British Physicist PMS Blackett, Abombs on Japan = not the end of WWII, but
the start of the Cold War (Japan = already
defeated, bombs to scare USSR)
Impact  dispute orthodox interpretation on
all counts
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Attempts at synthesis
John-Lewis Gaddis: The United States and Origins of the Cold
War, 1914-1947, published in 1972
Gaddis = father of post-revisionism
George Herring: Aid to Russia, 1941-46: Strategy, Diplomacy,
and the Origins of the Cold War, published 1973
USA used economic instruments to secure political ends
Stalin had no ideological blueprint for communist world
revolution  he was an opportunist who exploited openings
Confirm revisionist contention that USA did exaggerate
danger of communism to advance political objectives
Accept existence of American empire, although contend it
was primarily defensive – invitation not coercion
Does not exactly combine orthodox and Revisionist
Does stress that neither USSR nor USA = solely responsible
Consensus of opinion
Misconceptions played a key role, superpowers overestimated
strength & threat of the other, pattern of action &
reaction(Gaddis & LaFeber)
Both sides = improvising, rather than following a well defined
plan of actio
Stalin’s search for security was not deterred by drawing lines
The west did not fully recognize Stalin’s motives
Domestic policies, bureaucratic inertia, quirks of personality,
and innacurate as well as accurate perceptions of Soviet
intentions = all important in shaping US policy (Gaddis)
Strategic security interests not economic interests drove US
policy (Pollard)
Both security and economic concerns were important in
formulating strategy - not to balance power but achieve a
preponderance of it (Leffler)
Ideological differences = important (orthodox view)
Ideology = insufficient to explain intensification of Cold War
US & USSR emerged as strongest military powers, relatively
isolated before war, collide in post-war power vacuum
US used economic power to fashion a world friendly to
American capitalism (revisionist view)
Stalin’s immediate post-war aims were limited (revisionist
view)
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Key Figures: John Lewis Gaddis, Walter LaFeber, Gier
Lundestad, Maelvyn Leffler, Robert Pollard,
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The synthesis that represents a new consensus
Post Cold War
1989/1991+
Reevaluate previous
ideas
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Fall of USSR
New Soviet sources
made available
Russian historians = free
to write without
communist party
censorship
Post-Soviet era Russian
historians
Led Gaddis to modify
some initial claims 
place more focus on the
role of Stalin  Stalin’s
policies +
totalitarian/authoritaria
n government drove
west into escalation of
hostilities and arms race
 also considered if
Stalin, rather than other
key leaders were
removed from the
equation (John Foster
Dulles)  Cold War
would not have started
Opening of the Soviet Archives:
The freeing up of Soviet academic life in the late 1980s and then western access to increasing
amounts of Soviet archival material since 1991 means it is now possible to re-examine the
origins of the Cold War using former Soviet sources. It should be noted that there are at present
real limitations on these sources. Only a very small amount of the archival material has been
released. There are large amounts of KGB, foreign office, military and Politburo documents that
remain highly classified. Also, access has not always been consistent: there have been cases in
which material has been released but then closed again on the grounds that it is too
controversial or that it threatens the interests of the Russian political elite. The material
certainly helps to fill in details on key events but it does not necessarily resolve everything and
in some cases it has been used to fuel further controversy. Indeed, some post revisionist
historians such as Gaddis appear to have used selected Soviet material to revert to a Cold War
interpretation from the nineteen fifties that blames the Russians for everything. See Peter
Bastian, “
Interpreting the Cold War from Soviet Sources”, Teaching History, Vol. 35, No 4. December, 2001,
pp.5-10.
http://www.anzasa.arts.usyd.edu.au/ahas/cworigins_historiography.html