Transcript Situasjon og komplikasjon

So much for safety
Rolf Skjong and Knut Ronold
Det Norske Veritas
Rolf.Skjong @dnv.com & [email protected]
OMAE, Oslo, June 24-28, 2002
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Background
 Work with introducing risk assessment as basis for the
decision making process
 Formal Safety Assessment at International Maritime
Organisation
 Risk based rules & regulations
 Not initially intended to be used for individual design
 IMO is a UN organisation: Globally accepted criteria for
shipping
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Background
Formal Safety Assessment
Step 1 What might go wrong?
Step 2
How often, how likely?
How bad?
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
3
How can matters be
improved?
How much?
How much better?
What actions are
worthwile to take?
Hazard identification
Risk analysis
Frequencies, probabilities
Consequences
Risk = probability x
consequence
Risk control options
identification
Cost benefit evaluation
Recommendation
Current Approach
What did go wrong?
How can matters be
improved?
What actions are
worthwhile to take?
Status of criteria
 Industrial Self Regulation Regime
– Criteria Defined by Operator
 Safety Case Regime
– Criteria Defined by Regulator
 FSA: For use by the regulator in own decisions
– With acceptance criteria given, IMO may still
decide not to adhere strictly to criteria (will
lead to “inconsistency”)
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5
C
he
m
ic
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T
ic
al
T
an
ke
r
Ta
nk
er
1.00E-02
1.00E-04
1.00E-07
an
ke
G
r
as
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B
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on
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in
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V
es
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C
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O
il/
C
he
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O
il
Individual risk
Individual Risk
Intolerable Risk
1.00E-03
ALARP
1.00E-05
1.00E-06
Negligible Risk
Societal Risk - FN Diagrams
Oil tankers
Frequency of N or more fatalities (per ship
year)
1.0E-02
Intolerable
Chem. tankers
Oil/Chemical
tankers
1.0E-03
Gas tanker
ALARP
1.0E-04
1.0E-05
Negligible
1.0E-06
1
10
Fatalities (N)
6
100
Societal Risk - FN Diagrams
Frequency of N or more fatalities (per ship year)
1.0E-02
Bulk and ore
Container
Intolerable
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
ALARP
Negligible
1.0E-05
1
10
100
Fatalities (N)
7
1000
Individual and Societal Risk
 Individual and Societal risks are in
ALARP area
 Individual and societal risks are not
ALARP
 Cost Effectiveness Assessment (CEA)
must be carried out to arrive at
recommendations
 Societal risks for Bulk Carriers were
recently close to intolerable or intolerable
 Note: Not all ship types included
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Format in FSA Guidelines
High Risk
Low Risk
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Intolerable
Not acceptable
ALARP
Acceptable if made
ALARP
Negligible
Acceptable
Methods for deriving criteria
 Human capital approach
 Willingness to pay
 Comparing to well informed (risk informed) decisions in
democratic forum (a willingness to pay)
 Comparing to previous decision (a willingness to pay)
 Societal Indicators (a willingness to pay)
 Individual decisions
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Cost Effectiveness Criteria
Cost of averting fatalities in actual decisions
Decision
Decision
Maker
IACS and
IMO (1)
IMO(2)
Value
Strengthening Bulkheads on Existing Bulk
> $ 1.5 million
Carriers
Helicopter Landing Area on non-Ro/Ro
< $ 37 million
Passenger Ships
3 bulkheads on car deck Passenger Ro/Ro
IMO(3)
< $ 5 million
3 bulkheads + sponsons
IMO(3)
< 7.8 million
Extended sponsons only
IMO(3)
< $ 11 million
Extra Deck Officer
IMO(3)
< $ 5.5 million
Two conventional lifeboats BC
IMO(4)
> $ 1 million
Throw overboard life-raft on BC
IMO (4)
> $ 3 million
Re: (1) Mathisen et al.(1997), (2) Skjong et al.(1997), (3) DNV(1997), (4) Skjong and
Wenthworth,
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Cost Effectiveness
ORGANISATION
US Federal Highway
Administration
UK
Department
of
Transport
UK Health & Safety
Executive
Railtrack
(UK
rail
infrastructure controller)
London Underground Ltd
EU
Norway
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Table: Published CAFs in use as acceptance criteria
SUBJECT
CAF
SOURCE
Road Transport
$2.5m (£1.6m)
FHWA (1994)
Road transport
Industrial safety
£1.0 m (1998, uprated with
GDP per capita)
As above or higher
Overground railways
As above to £2.65m
Underground railways
Road Transport
All hazards
£2m
ECU 1 million (£0.667m)
NOK 10m (£0.8m)
DETR (1998)
HSE (1999)
Railtrack (1998)
Rose (1994)
from Evans (1998)
Norway (1996)
Human capital approach
 Value of man as a resource in economic production
 Has discredited cost effectiveness & cost benefit
assessment
 Contradicts ethical principle (Protagoras: “Homo
mensura” and later formulations, e.g. Kant)
 Same principle has resulted in a ban on research on
human stem-cells by many governments
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Willingness to pay
 Many forms of willingness to pay studies
– Questionnaires
– Observed behaviour (e.g. insurance)
– Implicit in previous decisions
– Implicit in existing regulations
– Etc.
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Previous decision
Results from Tengs et al. (1995)
“Five Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and their Cost Effectiveness”
Number of measures studied
Range of cost effectiveness
Median Value
Median for Medical Interventions
Median for Injury Prevention
Median for toxic control
587
Negative to $10 billion/life year
saved
$ 42.000/life year
$ 19.000/life year
$ 48.000/life year
$2.8 million/life year
•By reallocation 40.000 lives could be saved annually in the US
•$ 42.000 •35 = $ 1.5 million
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Societal Indicators
 Societal Indicators used to rate “quality of life” in
countries
 Published by e.g. UN (UNDP)
 Many different indictors exist
 Include such parameters as: GDP/Capita, Life
Expectancy at Birth, literacy etc.
HDI (1999)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
16
Norway
Australia
Canada
Sweden
Belgium
United States
Iceland
Netherlands
Japan
Finland
Switzerland
0.939
0.936
0.936
0.936
0.935
0.934
0.932
0.931
0.928
0.925
0.924
Social Indicators
dL
dg
de
w
 (1  w)
L
g
e
w 1 w
Lg e
ge 1  w
NCAF  g max  e 
4 w
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18
0
Average OECD
United States
United Kingdom
Turkey
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Portugal
Poland
Norway
New Zealand
Netherlands
Mexico
Luxembourg
Korea
Japan
Italy
Ireland
Iceland
Hungary
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Czech Republic
Canada
Belgium
Austria
Australia
Societal Indicators
CAF for OECD Countries ( $ million )
4,5
4
3,5
3
2,5
2
1,5
1
0,5
Individual Decisions
 Also individuals take decision that increase life
expectancy and reduces accident frequencies
 For example:
– Buy safer cars
– Buy more healthy food
– Go to the doctor more frequently
– Etc.
 How much increase in purchasing power is necessary
to increase the life expectancy in a population by “e”
 Effect demonstrated in the US (Keeney, Lutter, see
references)
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Individual Decisions
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
20
5000
10000 15000
20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Au
st
ra
li
Au a
st
ri
Be a
lg
iu
C
ze Ca m
ch na
R da
ep
u
D bli c
en
m
ar
Fi k
nl
an
Fr d
a
G nce
er
m
a
G ny
re
e
H ce
un
ga
r
Ic y
el
an
Ire d
la
nd
Ita
ly
Ja
pa
n
Lu Ko
r
xe
e
m a
bo
ur
M g
e
N
et xic
he
o
N
ew rl an
Ze ds
al
a
N nd
or
w
ay
Po
la
Po nd
rtu
ga
Sp l
a
Sw in
Sw ed
i tz en
er
la
nd
U
Tu
ni
te
d rke
Ki
y
ng
U
ni
d
Av ted om
er St
ag a t
e
e
O s
EC
D
$US million
Societal Indicators
18
16
21
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
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In
di
Co
a
te
d'
Ce
Iv
oi
nt
Az
re
ra
lA
er
ba
fri
ca
ija
n
n
Re
pu
Tu
bl
rk
ic
m
en
is
ta
n
Se
ne
ga
l
Cu
Av
ba
er
ag
e
[1
00
]
Ca
m
er
oo
n
Pa
kis
ta
n
M
au
r it
an
ia
G
ha
na
Vi
et
na
m
$US million
Societal Indicators
1,4
1,2
1
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
0
The new Format
High Risk
Intolerable
Not acceptable
Life/Life
ALARP
Acceptable
Life for $ if made
ALARP
$ value of Life
Negligible
Low Risk
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Acceptable
Conclusion
 An upper limit on investing in safety exists, where self
protective measures are more effective
 No regulator should implement less effective measures
– New meaning to “Born free, taxed to death”
 Different methods for defining criteria give similar
results
 For an OECD member country (excluding the newest
members) the criteria is somewhere in the range $ 1.5
-3.0 million
– Some uncertainties relates to:
• Fatalities as indicator or actual fatalities
• NCAF or GCAF
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• Assumptions used in derivation
Conclusion





Human Capital Approach ~ ge/2
Life Quality Index/Human Capital Approach ~ 10/3
Self Protective Measures/Life Quality Index ~ 10/3
This is a narrow band!
Published criteria are in the range between the Human
Capital and Life Quality Index approaches
 A measure that should be implemented in a wealthy
country, may be a “net killer” in a less developed
country, as self protective measures give better effects
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