Transcript Document

Flights of Fancy
Who knew what when between
8:14 and 10:03 AM
on September 11?
1
Understanding
what should have happened
• The flights -- destinations and times
• The players -- civilian and military
• The protocols -- emergency vs. hijack
2
Flight Crashes
•
•
•
•
American Airlines 11
United Airlines 175
American Airlines 77
United Airlines 93
(Pennsylvania)
North Tower 1
South Tower 2
Pentagon
?
3
11: Boston -> LA
175: Boston -> LA
77: DC -> LA
93: Newark -> SF
Flight
Paths
per 9/11
Commission
4
Flight Times
per 9/11 Commission
Flight
•
•
•
•
AA 11
UA 175
AA 77
UA 93
Takeoff Takeover
7:59
8:14
8:20
8:42
8:14
8:42+
8:51
9:28
Crash
8:46:40
9:03:11
9:37:46
10:03:11
5
The Civilian Side:
Federal Aviation Administration
• Boston Air Traffic Control Center....Nashua NH
• Herndon Command Center...............Herndon VA
(DC area)
• FAA Headquarters.............................DC
6
The Civilian Side:
FAA Regions
7
The Civilian Side:
People
• Colin Scoggins -- military liaison to FAA in
Boston
• Ben Sliney -- operations manager at FAA
Command Center (Herndon, VA)
• Monte Belger -- Acting FAA Deputy
Administrator
• Terry Biggio -- operations manager at FAA
Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center
(Nashua, NH)
• Robin Hordon -- former Boston ATC
8
The Military Side:
Agencies
• NORAD
North Amer. Aerospace Defense Cmd
(Colorado Springs, CO)
– NEADS
Northeast Air Defense Sector
(Rome, NY)
• NMCC
National Military Command Center
(Pentagon)
9
The Military Side:
NEADS
10
The Military Side:
Nearby Air Force Bases
•
•
•
•
•
•
Andrews AFB
Bolling AFB
Dover AFB
Hanscom AFB
Langley AFB
McGuire AFB
11 mi SE of DC
3 mi S of US CAPITOL
3 mi SE of Dover, DE
17 mi NW of Boston
3 mi N of Hampton, VA
18 mi SE of Trenton,NJ
11
The Military Side:
People
• Gen. Richard Myers -- acting chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff (confirmed 2 days later, Medal of Honor
2005)
• Gen. Larry Arnold -- Head of NORAD Continental US
region
• NMCC
– Gen. Montague Winfield, Deputy Dir. of Ops
– Capt. Charles Leidig -- asked by MW on 9/10 to
take his place at 8:30am on 9/11
• Col. Robert Marr -- NEADS battle commander
• Maj. Kevin Naspany -- Otis AFB fighter team
commander
12
Standard Operating Procedure
“in-Flight Emergency” Criteria
• Loss of radio contact -- OK for few minutes
• Loss of transponder transmission -- OK for
few minutes
• Failure to respond to radio transmission or
obey a repeated ATC order -- OK for few
minutes
• Course deviation (15deg or 2mi) -- serious
13
Standard Operating Procedure
Emergency Protocol: fast
1. ATC controller notifies superior
2. Superior notifies NORAD (NEADS)
3. NEADS launches fighters
14
Emergency Interception
Launch within minutes
• In open hangar at end of runway
• Flight crews within a few minutes
(“jump out of shower unrinsed”)
• Planes kept mechanically fit and
warmed up to start
• Fly to target at top speed
• Pull alongside, assess, communicate
-- Robin Hordon, former ATC , p.39
15
Emergency Interception
Speed to airborne
• NORAD -- command/control break-down
caused 5 min instead of 2-3 mins
(2000 press release)
• Otis AFB -- 24hr/day, airborne in 5 mins (Cape
Cod Times, 9/15)
• USAF -- F15’s scramble to 29K in 2.5 mins
(website prior to 9/11)
• Florida ANG --“If needed, we could be killing
things in five minutes or less”
(AF web: Capt. Tom Herring, full-time alert pilot)
16
Emergency Interception
Speed to airborne: 9/11
• Scoggins: asked Otis and NEADS
several times why no launch yet
(seemed an eternity)
• Otis pilots sitting in jets “straining at
the reins” for 6 mins
17
Emergency Interception
Quality
• Most important elements: speed,
efficiency, timeliness of launch and
interception
• Years of practice, experience
• Pilots, mechanics, aircraft, airport
configurations and NORAD/FAA
radar procedures honed to save time
in seconds
-- Robin Hordon, former ATC
18
Emergency Interception
Permission 1
4.7. Requests for military assistance should be made and
approved in the following ways:
4.7.1. Immediate Response. Requests for an immediate
response (i.e., any form of immediate action taken by a DoD
Component or military commander to save lives, prevent
human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under
imminently serious conditions) may be made to any
Component or Command. The DoD Components that
receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in
an exigent emergency may initiate informal planning and, if
required, immediately respond as authorized in DoD
Directive 3025.1 . [see next slide]
-- DOD Directive 3025.15 2/18/97, p.4 19
Emergency Interception
Permission 2
4.5.1. Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil
emergency or attack may require immediate action by
military commanders, or by responsible officials of other
DoD Agencies, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or
mitigate great property damage. When such conditions
exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher
headquarters, local military commanders and responsible
officials of other DoD Components are authorized by this
Directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may
be provided by their DoD Component, to take necessary
action to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such
necessary action is referred to in this Directive as
"Immediate Response.”
-- DOD Directive 3025.1 1/15/93, p.7
20
Emergency Interception
Permission 3
(See “Hijacking -> Secy of Defense”)
21
Standard Operating Procedure
Hijacking Protocol: slow
1. Harder to establish “hijacking”
2. ATC notifies hijack coordinator at FAA HQ -directly or thru Herndon
3. FAA HQ notifies NMCC (military)
4. NMCC forwards to Secy of Defense for approval
(see next slide)
5. If approved, NMCC notifies NEADS
6. NEADS scrambles fighters
7. Fighters stay behind target, “escort”
22
Standard Operating Procedure
Hijacking -> Secy of Defense?
Did Rumsfeld pull a fast one on 6/1/01 by changing
hijacking procedure to require that approval of FAA
requests for military assistance go through the
Secretary of Defense -- i.e. did NEADS need to get
SoD permission (or even NMCC permission)?
“The sector commander would have authority to
scramble the airplanes.” -- Air War Over America
(intro for which was written by NMCC’s Genl. Arnold,
yet Arnold implied (testimony) NEADS needed permit)
23
Standard Operating Procedure
Hijacking -> Secy of Defense?
In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by
the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will
monitor the situation and forward all requests or
proposals for DOD military assistance for aircraft piracy
(hijacking) to the Secretary of Defense for approval.
-- DOD hijacking Directive 3610.01, 7/31/97, par 4a
In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by
the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will,
with the exception of immediate responses as authorized
by reference d [3025.15], forward requests for DOD
assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval.
-- DOD hijacking Directive 3610.01A, 6/1/01, par 4a
24
So . . .
Was it an emergency,
or a hijacking?
25
What should have happened
with Flight 11
• 8:14 -- order to climb ignored, radio contact
apparently lost
• 8:18-8:20 -- emergency protocol: supervisor
contacts NEADS, scramble order given
• 8:21 -- loss of transponder signal (not vital)
• 8:25 -- sounds like hijacking (4-11 min after
emergency protocol should have started)
• 8:26 -- interceptors airborne (assume 6 min)
• 8:39 -- over NYC (153mi @ .9mach = 13 mins)
• 8:46 -- crash (7 min later @ 500mph = 60 miles)
26
The three stories
and their problems
27
Review: Evidence/testimony credibility
Story changes
• Where were you the night of the crime?
– I was at the theater.
• The theater was closed.
– Oh, that’s right, I was with my girlfriend.
• She says she was with her husband.
– Oh, yeah, I was home reading the Bible.
-- from David Ray Griffin, 9/11 Myth and Reality
28
Story # 1 -- September 11
No planes were launched before
the Pentagon was hit (9:38)
-- JCS Chief Gen. Richard Myers
-- NORAD Spokesperson Mike Snyder
29
Story # 1 Problem 1: 9/12
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/articles/timeline.html
Washington Post -(citing witnesses, authorities & media reports)
8:38 -- FAA notifies NEADS of hijacking #1
8:43 -- FAA notifies NEADS of hijacking #2
8:53 -- Otis jets airborne for NYC (15 mins?)
9:10 -- 77 heading E over WVa on radar
9:25 -- FAA notifies NEADS 77 is heading to DC
9:35 -- Langley jets airborne for DC
30
Story # 1 Problem 2: 9/14
http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/planes/defense/cbs_otis_scramble.html
”Pentagon sources told CBS’s Bob Orr that
contrary to early reports, US Air Force jets did
get into the air on Tuesday while the attacks
were underway.”
-- Dan Rather
8:38 -- FAA notifies military
8:44 -- Otis AFB F-15s scrambled
8:52 -- airborne (still 70 mi away @ 175 crash)
9:30 -- Langley AFB F-16s launched (150 mi)
10:00 -- arrive over DC (5 mi/min?)
-- Bob Orr
31
Story # 2 -- September 18
NORAD issues timeline which
implies FAA notifications were
too late.
32
Speeds
• Mach 1 = 761mph ~ 12.7 mi/min
• Mach .9 = 11.4 mi/min
• F-15 max
– hi altitude = mach 2.5 = 32 mi/min
– lo altitude = mach 1.2 = 15 mi/min
• F-16 max: mach 2 = 25 mi/min
33
Story # 2 Timeline
http://911research.wtc7.net/cache/planes/attack/presrelNORADTimelines.htm
Flight
11
175
FAA->NEADS
8:40
8:43
Scramble Order
8:46
Location
Otis (MA)
Equip
2 F15s
Airborne
8:52
Distance (mi)
153
71*
Time (.9mach)***
(17)
8
Poss. Arrival
(9:09)
9:00
Crash
8:46
9:02
* 153 vs 71?
** from DC
77
93
9:24
n/a
9:24
Langley (VA)
2 F16s
9:30
105
100**
12
11
9:42
-9:37
10:03
***~12mpm
34
Story # 2 Problems
• Contradicts many testimonies by
FAA and others
• Even if true, there still would have
been time for interceptions
35
Story # 3 -- July 04
according to the 9/11 Commission,
based on the finally-released NORAD/FAA tapes
• Focus on hijack (not emergency)
protocol
• Boston ATC calls Herndon CC
• Herndon CC calls FAA HQ in DC
• FAA HQ does NOT call NEADS
• Boston ATC calls NEADS direct
(8:38)
36
Story # 3 Problems
The FAA Tapes
• Boston has 130-150 positions with “hot
button to NEADS, each w/dedicated tape
channel -- where?
• Flight 11 tape starts in middle of furniture
conversation at 8:26
– normally only record when mike keyed
– if that not done, why do the tapes start midconversation instead of shift start?
• Few of these tapes have been made public
37
Story # 3 Problems
The NORAD Tapes:
“authentic history of 9/11”
DON’T INCLUDE
• NMCC -- the military/FAA “focal point”
– particularly Marr/Arnold
• NORAD between its facilities
• Communication with Secret Service
• Don’t include higher-ups (JCS Myers,
Rumsfeld, Cheney, Bush)
38
Hijacking vs/& Emergency?
• Sliney: FAA Center reporting a hijacking always
calls military, NORAD was called
• Both in parallel
– Hijack: Biggio called FAA Reg.Op.Ctr
– Emergency: Scoggins: not my job to call
NMCC, I have agreement w/NEADS to call, and
I did
• Hordon: Emergency situation preceded
awareness of hijacking, many ATC’s know
something was wrong, are suppressed*
* http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/december2006/141206trafficcontroller.htm
39
Story #3 Timeline
Boston
•
•
•
•
8:28: Boston calls Herndon
8:32: Herndon calls FAA HQ
8:34: Boston calls FAA Cape Cod
8:38: Boston calls NEADS (see next slide)
– NEADS calls Marr, who orders battle stn
– Marr calls Arnold (NORAD), Arnold tells Marr to
scramble
• 8:46: Scramble
• 8:53: F15s in air, no idea of target
40
Story # 3 Problems
When was NEADS notified?
• 8:38: Boston calls NEADS (9/11 Comm)
• 8:34
– Jane Garvey (FAA head)
– Boston calls Otis at Cape Cod (911C says only called FAA
Cape Cod facility, Scoggins says made several calls to Otis)
– Otis pilot Tim Duffy: got call “about 8:30,8:35,” gave call to
commander Treacy, called NEADS
• 8:28/29
– NORAD tapes: Scoggins tells NEADS 11 is 35mi N of JFK
– Scoggins 1st call: 11 90 mi north of that (11 min @ 500mph)
• 8:27/28
– Scoggins: Cooper called NEADS before Scoggins arrived
41
Story # 3 Problems
Otis delay: NEADS can’t find 11
• Military scopes older than FAA’s (but system was
state of the art)
• Naspany: “Thousands of blips” (but breakdown
into sectors means only a limited number)
• No transponder (dashes instead of dots)
– How would military track enemy planes?
– Boston provided numerous physical position points
• 8:43: Naspany orders launch anyway
– better to have them in the air
– but why not at 8:38?
42
Story # 3 Problems
Time to target
• “I just wanted to get there. I was in fullblower all the way.”
-- Lt.Col. Tim Duffy, Otis F15 pilot
43
Story #3 Timeline
Washington
• 8:54: Indianapolis ATC loses 77, doesn’t know about WTC,
thinks 77 crashed, later notifies Herndon
• 9:20: FAA teleconference set up
• 9:25: Herndon calls FAA HQ
• 9:28: Cleveland ATC hears screams on 93
• 9:32: “when hears about bomb on 93, tells supervisor, who
notifies FAA HQ
• 9:34: NEADS (on call to FAA HQ) hears that 77 was lost
• 9:36: Herndon tells Cleveland FAA superiors need to make
decision on call to military about 93
• 9:49: Herndon/FAA HQ waffling about calling military on 93
• 10:07: NEADS notified of 93 hijack
• 10:25: Cheney gives Clarke shootdown authorization
44
Story # 3 Problems
77 notification
• 8:25-30: FAA notifies regional centers (incl
Indianapolis) of 11’s hijacking
• 8:46: goes off course for 4 minutes, then
transponder lost
• 8:50: approx time of FAA phone bridge (next
slide)
• 9:20: FBI notified of 77 hijack (says FBI)
• 9:24: NORAD’s initial claim of notification
45
Story # 3 Problems
Laura Brown memo, 2003
http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=126363
• After WTC1, FAA establishes phone bridges:
–
–
–
–
FAA field facilities
DOD
FAA Command Ctr Secret Service
FAA headquarters
other government agencies
USAF liaison joins -> NORAD
• FAA shares real-time info on flights of interest
– loss of communication
– loss of transponder
unauth’d course changes
other info
• Other agencies share their info
• FAA -> NORAD about 77
– formal = 9:24, but much earlier informally
46
Story # 3 Problems
93 notification
• ??: Gen. Winfield: NMCC heard about 93 transponder loss and
heading to DC
• 9:03+: Arnold: military notified of possible hijack shortly after
WTC2 hit
• 9:16: Military learns of 93 hijack (according to NORAD)
• 9:20: FAA phone bridge started (911 Commission version, not
FAA’s 8:50)
• 9:34: FAA knew of 77 (911 Commission)
• 9:34: 93 passenger’s wife tells FBI about hijack
• 9:35: in Clarke’s White House videoconference (which includes
Rumsfeld & Myers) -- Jane Garvey notes 93 potential hijack
• Above all, military liaisons present at Herndon -- Belger and Sliney
(omitted from 9/11 Commission Report)
47
Story # 3 Problems
Secret Service
• Arrangement w/FAA to monitor FAA radar
(acknowledged by Barbara Riggs, deputy
director of SS)
• Also Cheney: “The Secret service has an
arrangement with the FAA. They had open
lines after the WTC was...”[stop]
• 9:30: SS notifies Clarke about errant plane
heading towards DC
48
Shootdown
Story 3 version
• Cheney issued authorization, but didn’t
get the situation room until 10:00
• NEADS didn’t learn about 93 until 10:07,
so couldn’t have been tracking 93
• Cheney notified of 93 at 10:02
• Cheney gave authorization 10:10-15
49
Shootdown
Story 3 problems
• Cheney was in the situation room before 9:20 (Mineta)
• Arnold (Air War Over America): tracking 93 even
before off course (at 9:36)
• Myers (9/13): had a fighter close to 93 when it crashed
• Pilot of an E-3 with 2 F-16s near Pittsburgh ordered to
shoot down an airliner
• North Dakota National Guard General: Secret Service
told his F-16s to “protect White House at all costs,”
only the crash made this unnecessary
50
Shootdown
Story 3 problems
• In situation room, staffer kept providing updates on
93, shootdown decision made and passed to military
(Cheney, Rice, Card)
• Bolton: the military asst kept asking (and getting)
shoot-down authority
• Clarke: received authorization 9:45-55
• Marr & Arnold: we had authorization and ND F-16’s
would have shot 93 down if continued to DC
• Winfield (NMCC) had permission to shoot down
civilian planes threatening DC, FAA informed of
fighters getting “closer and closer...”
51
Story # 3 Problems
Phantom Flight 11
per 9/11 Commission (via NORAD/FAA tapes)
• Reasons given for Langley scramble:
– NORAD (2001): Flight 77
– General Arnold, (to 911 Comm, 2003): Flight 93
• But tapes say “no scramble until after
Pentagon”
• All flights used up, need something else:
hence Phantom 11
52
Flight 93
53
Flight 93
Flight Path
54
Flight 93
Shanksville Map
55
Flight 93
Flight Path
• NTSB: FDR says 93 came in from
North
• Some witnesses say from East
• Fisherman at marina says it flew
right over the Indian Lake
56
Flight 93
The hole
57
Flight 93
The hole, debris?
58
Flight 93
Debris
• Mostly paper, virtually no metal
• Metal parts began showing up after
reached a certain level of digging
• This occurred after there had been
a hiatus in the digging
59
Flight 93
Debris
• Debris in Indian Lake
• Wind was not blowing in right
direction
• Debris field 8 miles away over a
ridge, cordoned off by FBI, no
admittance
60
Flight 93
Debris fields
61
Flight 93
Shot down?
• NSA personnel: shot down by Andrews AFB
jets
• Charles Lewis at LAX overhears report of
shoot-down on security guard’s radio
• 3 AF pilots say they were given direct orders to
shoot down an airliner
62
The Phone Calls
Were they possible?
Were they fake?
63
Phone calls
mechanism in 2001
• Phone contacts tower 1
• Electronic handshake (~8sec)
• If phone moves, when it gets out of
range of tower 1, call is handed off
to tower 2
64
Phone calls
Flight 93 parameters
• Altitude: 34,300 -> 40,700
• Speed: ~500 mph
65
Phone calls
A.K Dewdney experiments
http://www.physics911.net/projectachilles
• Canadian mathematician & computer scientist,
Scientific American column
• Single engine
–
–
–
–
< 2000’: likely (75%)
2-8000’: unlikely (13%)
> 8000’: very unlikely
20,000’: < 1% getting to ground & tower
• Double engine
– 2000’: 95% success
– 6000’: 10%
5000’: 44%
7000’: 0%
66
Phone calls
Speed issue
• Marco Thompson, president of
San Diego Telecom Council
– Cell phones not designed for planes
– Maximum speed of 60-100 mph
67
Phone calls
When was tech possible?
• 7/15/2004 -- Demonstration of third
generation “pico-cell network”
– Plane has base station
– Communicates via satellite
• Commercial availability: 24 months
• Why a big deal if already possible?
68
Phone calls
Story changes
• 2001: 9 cell phone calls from 93
• 2006: 5 cell calls (United 93 film)
• 2006: 2 cell calls (Moussaoui trial)
– made at 9:58 after down to 5000’
– earlier ones, essential to details of story,
included those with cell-phone caller-ID
– 35 others made from air phones
69
Phone calls
Voice morphing
• 1999: 10-min sample enables cloning of speech
patterns, make accurate facsimile
• “Gentlemen, we have called you together to
inform you that we are going to overthrow the
U.S. government”
-- “Gen. Steiner,” former Commander-in-Chief of US
Special Operations command
• NSA eavesdropping
70
Phone calls
Ted & Barbara Olson 1
• Ted: solicitor general, Barbara: conservative TV
commentator
• 9/11: she “called him twice on cell phone”
• 9/14: called Justice Dept collect, must have been
using airplane phone, didn’t have credit card
• 9/14: second call went dead because cell calls don’t
work well on airplanes
• later: collect call must have been seat phone and she
didn’t have her purse
71
Phone calls
Ted & Barbara Olson 2
• AA: no seatback phones on 757’s, passengers used
their cell phones
• FBI 9/11: interviewed Olson, said he reported two
calls
• FBI at Moussaoui trial: phone records indicate only
one call, “unconnected,” lasted “0 seconds”
• Pentagon 9/11 (history by DoD) -- insists the pilots
did not give up the plane and go to the back, as
Olson said he’d been told
72
Phone calls
Other calls
• Tom to Deena Burnett
–
–
–
–
–
Mentions her name, no others
Hijackers on suicide mission, will crash into ground
10min later: passengers must try to gain control
10 min later: Kids want to talk to him
Says he’ll “talk to them later”
• Honor Wainino to stepmother Esther Heyman
– Remarkable calm through whole call
– Couldn’t hear anyone else
73
Phone calls
Other calls
• Mark Bingham to mother Alice Bingham via Aunt
Kathy Hoagland
– KH: sounds matter-of-fact
– AB: Hi Mark
– MB: Hi, Mom, this is Mark Bingham
• Alice Bingham still believes it was Mark
74
Phone calls
Other calls
75
11 & 175 at the WTC
Were the speeds practical,
or even possible?
Pilots for 9/11 Truth
76
11 & 175 at the WTC
Speeds
NTSB: Radar Data Impact Speed Study
used Airport Surveillance Radar
(highly accurate)
Flight 11: 404 knots
Flight 175: 510 knots
(1 knot = 1.15 mph)
77
11 & 175 at the WTC
Speeds
Maximum Operating Speeds
Vmo: velocity max op speed
at sea level
Mmo: Mach max op speed
at high altitudes
78
11 & 175 at the WTC
Speeds
79
11 & 175 at the WTC
Speeds
For Boeing 757:
Vmo: .86 Mach Mmo: 360 knots
80
11 & 175 at the WTC
Speeds
• Egypt Air (only available comparison)
– Suicide dive by officer
– FDR: highest speed .99 Mach at 22,000
• .86M = 522 knots at 22K’, 369 knots at sea level
• .99M = 600 knots at 22K, 435 knots at sea level
– Indications that the plane fell apart
• Loss of power
• Two debris fields
81
11 & 175 at the WTC
Speeds
• Contradiction of this line
– Australian aeronautics engineer
– Claims max-op-speeds are not actually that
– Ran test in state-of-art simulator (737, but
close)
– Got up to .86M at 2000’, found easy to control
http://911blogger.com/node/20232
82
11 & 175 at the WTC
Speeds
• Contradiction of that:
– Misrepresentation of max-op-speed
– Description of test stated that the over-speed
warnings were disabled so as not to be
annoying
– Did this disable the simulator’s crash logic ?
83
11 & 175 at the WTC
Control
QuickTime™ and a
Motion JPEG A decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
84
Flight Control
Could the planes have been
remotely controlled?
http://www.journalof911studies.com/volume/2008/AutopilotSystemsMonaghan.pdf
85
Flight Control
The National System
• GPS
– originally deliberately inaccurate (~ 100 yards)
• WAAS (Wide Area Augmentation System)
– designed to replace expensive ground-based
navigational aids
– uses ground stations to correct GPS errors
– horizontal/vertical (h/v) accuracy to 1-3 meters
– FAA announced availability August 2000
• LAAS (Local Area Augmentation System)
– < 1 meter h/v
– was being used in 1999
86
Flight Control
RNP: Required Navigation Performance
“Highway of the Sky” routes
• Accuracy
–
–
–
–
–
Routes vary within 60 feet
WAAS v/h accuracy: 6-9 feet
Corridors: 243 feet wide
Runways: 150-200 feet wide
WTCs:
300 feet wide
• Waypoints at intervals:
3-D location within the National Air Space -longitude, latitude and altitude coordinates.
87
Flight Control
Final Maneuvering
• RF:
Radius to Fix
(constant radius turn)
• FAF:
Final Approach Fix
(beginning of landing
approach)
• Can be done automatic
88
Flight Control
What can it do?
The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) ... allows
pilots to fly ... approaches that cannot necessarily be flown
with current instrumentation ... Complex curved
approaches, including approaches turning to a short (less
than one mile) final ... Pathways were constructed from ...
climbing, or descending constant radius arcs ... Autopilots
could use WAAS position and velocity to fly curved
trajectories.”
-- Stanford U. Aeronautics & Astronautics Dept
after 1998 tests of prototype WAAS (activ’d 2000)
89
Flight Control
Changing routes
• DARP: Dynamic airborne reroute procedure
• Downloads new course via ground VHF or satellite
• By May 2000: Implemented in Honeywell’s Pegasus FMS
(Flight Management System)
• Honeywell, Sept 1998: American and United will be installing
Pegasus Flight Management System on their 757s and 767s
(RNP capable, 150 waypoints)
• June 2001: DARP available, not fully operational
90
Flight Control
Satellite visibility
• The accuracy of the system at any point depends on how
many GPS satellites are visible from that point.
• Coincidentally (?), the WTC and Pentagon were at or near the
maximum visibility at the 9/11 crash times
WTC
Pentagon
91
Flight Control
Pilot Override
• FMC: Flight management computer
• EGPWS: Enhanced ground proximity warnings take
control if pilot does not respond soon enough
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Flight Control
The Equipment
• Honeywell, Sept 1998: American and United will be
installing Pegasus Flight Management System on
their 757s and 767s (RNP capable, 150 waypoints)
• NASA runway approach/landing tests, 1994-2002:
757s and 767s WAAS+auto-land achieved routine
h/v accuracy of several meters or less
• FAA/OhioU, Oct 1994: 50 successful autopilot
approach/touchdowns by 757 using WAAS in
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Flight Control
What’s the point?
• The WTCs and Pentagon are waypoints in the system
• 9/11 Boeings were equipped with EGPWS and
database that contained the WTCs
• WTC strikes were exactly at bottom edge of recently
re-fireproofed areas
• Flight 77’s descending 330º spiral was declared to be
way too difficult for inexperienced pilot
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