Transcript Possible International Workshops On Critical Cyber Policy

Possible International Workshops
On Critical Cyber Policy Issues
John C. Mallery ([email protected])
Computer Science & Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Presentation at the Fourth International Forum “Partnership between State Authorities,
Civil Society, and Business Community in Ensuring Information Security and Combating
Terrorism” Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, April 12-15, 2010 .
Version: 7/17/2015 7:50:10
PM
Contents
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Background
Proposed Approach
Principles
Workshop Topics
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Cyber Definitions
Cyber Crime
Cyber Terrorism
Escalatory Models
Civilian Infrastructures
Industrial Espionage
Technical Cooperation
Codes of Conduct
Cyber Law
Protection of the Commons
Building Confidence Through A Sequence Of Cyber Workshops
Russian Reaction
Mallery Assessment
Conclusions
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Background
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Discussions during 2009 with Alexey Salnikov
(LMSU) and Chuck Barry (NDU) about
possible workshop topics addressing:
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Key aspects of cyber policy
Building mutual understanding
Reducing risk of accidental conflict escalation
Promoting orderly international cyber relations
Mallery was asked to generate a set of
possible workshop topics for international
dialogues
The list builds from an earlier set Russian
topics and adds more
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Proposed Approach
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Assumptions:
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Ubiquitous low-cost computing and networking is
increasingly woven into the fabric of social,
economic and political systems
These historic cyber-cognitive transformations pose
significant learning challenges for inter-state
systems
Governments are constrained in their ability to
openly think through sensitive or difficult issues
Supplement G2G dialogues with largely nongovernmental workshops that discuss and
analyze:
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Critical cyber issues
Cyber challenges to international relations
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Managing Interstate Competition In Cyberspace
by Movement Towards Transparent Cooperation
Transparency
Legal / Overt
Strategic
Communication
Internet
Governance
Information Control
& Filtering
Globalization
Deterrence
Competition
Compellence
Political
Activism
International
Treaties, Law
Codes of
Conduct
Protection
of Commons
Anti-Crime
Coordination
Technical
Cooperation
Cooperation
PSYOPS
Terrorism
Arms Races
Information
Warfare
Less Stable
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Cultural
Interchange
More Stable
Industrial
Espionage
Secret
Coordination
Espionage
Opacity
Extra-legal / Covert
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Attacker Resources
Required for Cyber Impacts
Low Frequency
Low Frequency
Cyber War with
Major Powers
High
Disruption of Global
Communication
Dangerous
I c
m t
p
a
Destabilizing
Major Critical
Infrastructure Attacks
Cyber Terrorism?
High Frequency
Cyber War
Hostility
Perception
Cumulative?
Large-scale
Espionage
Espionage
Industrial Espionage
Cyber Crime
Low
Increasing
Sophistication
Narrow
Focus?
Moderate Frequency
Low
Attacker Resources
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Building Confidence and Understanding
Through a Sequence of Cyber Dialogues
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Mutual understanding is enhanced by knowledge of each others
perspectives:
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Near-term workshops address immediate concerns of states:
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Cyber Crime
Cyber Terrorism
Medium-term workshops lay intellectual foundations for mutually
beneficial cooperation and international stability:
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Cyber Definitions
Civilian Infrastructures
Escalatory Models
Industrial Espionage
Technical Cooperation
Long-term workshops develop universalizable principles
necessary for international law:
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Codes of Conduct
Cyber Law
Protection of the Commons
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Principles
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Originality: Workshops should make original scientific
contributions to systematic thinking about cyber policy
and cyber international relations
Technical Grounding: Approaches must be realistic
with respect to current or future technologies
Multidisciplinary: Experts should bring to the
discussions deep knowledge across relevant technical
or social science disciplines
Impartial Funding: Prefer independent or joint
sources of funding to reduce any perception of bias
Non-governmental: Participation should emphasize
non-government experts
Well-informed: Experts should be familiar with official
positions and interpretations of their governments
Coherence: Workshop participation should be relevant
to the topic and dialogues focused (20-30 participants)
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Workshop Topics
1. Cyber Definitions
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Review national definitions of information
security, information warfare and cyber
defense:
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Definitions of national cyber security
Doctrines of information warfare
Legitimate postures for cyber defense
Compare national legal frameworks governing
cyber crime, information warfare & exploitation,
and cyber cooperation
Compare interpretations and measures of
intensity for cyber actions or interactions by
states, whether conflictual or cooperative
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2. Cyber Crime
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Examine legal and technical coordination
against cyber crime:
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Enhance cooperation on investigations of crossboarder crime, including preservation of evidence,
forensic standards
Share data on cyber crime in support of warning
about and policing of criminal activity
Coordinate medium-term policy to raise barriers to
entry for criminals into cyber crime and terrorists
into cyber terrorism
 Suppression of international black markets for cyber crime
(e.g., tools, data, expertise, platforms).
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Develop technical solutions for prevention, early
detection, attribution and prosecution of criminal
acts
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3. Cyber Terrorism
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Consider international agreements to counter
non-state actors seeking to launch cyber
attacks on states or provoke conflicts among
countries using cyber means:
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Deny access to “cyber weapons” or black market
resources
Prevent proliferation of state-level cyber capabilities
by renouncing use of proxies and managing former
personnel trained in cyber offense
Share intelligence on cyber terrorism, including:
recruiting, coordination and financing
Work jointly to prevent terrorist groups from
acquiring or deploying technical means for major
cyber attacks on countries
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4. Escalatory Models
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Develop shared models of escalation and deescalation in cyber conflict, including definitions of
hostility levels:
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Identification of red lines for war
Frameworks for addressing the military instability arising from
cyber attacks on C5ISR systems, including nuclear systems,
naval forces
Status of military satellites
Dynamics in cyber space that may amplify relatively low level
attacks to produce highly negative unintended consequences
or escalations
Responsibility of national command authorities for monitoring
and controlling activities by cyber offense or exploitation
divisions, especially in times of crisis
Framework for designating actions in cyber space as criminal,
hostile or belligerent, and assigning corresponding
interpretations of intent by state actors
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5. Civilian Infrastructures
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Consider the international legal status of
civilian cyber infrastructures in the context of
peace or war:
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Identification of civilian infrastructures for protection
under international law
Responsibility by states for private offensive actions
(botnets, criminal organizations) emanating from
within their borders
Status of national and international civilian Internet
infrastructures
Status of kinetic or electro-magnetic pulse weapons
in attacks against civilian cyber infrastructures
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6. Industrial Espionage
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Explore international legal frameworks for
industrial espionage:
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Classes of industrial espionage:
 Sponsored directly by states
 Supported indirectly by states when they purchase stolen
information from proxies or criminal black markets
 Non-state actors pursuing their own goals
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Develop WTO rules for redress of grievances
against states
Differentiate isolated cases from large-scale
campaigns sustained over years
Assign implied hostile intent levels to “extraordinary”
espionage activities
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7. Technical Cooperation
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Develop concepts for international mutual assistance
across public and private spheres to:
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Respond to significant cyber failures or attacks
Enhance protection of critical infrastructures
Improve cyber situational awareness
Specifically:
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Review or extension of mutual assistance treaties or
agreements to provide rapid support to countries under cyber
attack or suffering cyber outages
Develop international standards for cyber forensics and
accountable chains of custody
Propose data sharing to improve situational awareness on
cyber crime and cyber terrorism
International long-term cooperation to increase assurance
levels to raise the resource requirements to undertake cyber
attacks or engage in cyber crime
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8. Cyber Law
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Envision international legal frameworks to
increase stability of state-state relations and
promote orderly international economic
processes
Consider cyber-specific interpretations of the
United Nations Charter to help clarify:
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Jus ad bello
 When cyber disruptions rise to the level of an “armed
attack”
 Proportionate responses to cyber attacks
 Proscribed activities related to cyber attack from a state’s
territory by non-state actors (or states) against other states
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Jus in bello
 Application of the principle of distinction to limit attacks to
military targets and protect civilians
 Prohibition on indiscriminate attacks with impacts beyond
parties to the conflict
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9. Codes of Conduct
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Develop shared international norms for
behavior in cyber space for individuals,
countries and non-state actors
States should:
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Assure cybersecurity
 Modernize national laws to prosecute cyber crime and
facilitate timely transnational investigations
 Participate in international organizations combating cyber
crime
 Develop a culture of cyber security
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Renounce use of proxies
Combat terrorism
Pursue cooperative measures
 Improve transparency
 Reduce risk
 Enhance stability
 Render assistance to states suffering outage or attack
 Share data and coordinate cyber threat reduction
 Support capacity building for less developed countries
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10. Protection of the Commons
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Devise frameworks to insulate the
technical architectures and the operation
of cyberspace from political competition:
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Provide separate mechanisms for resolving
differences or marshalling international
cooperation
Technical plane
Economic plane
Political plane
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Epilogue
Russian Reaction to Workshop Topics: 1
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Based on evaluation by their leading experts,
Russians “completely support” the topic set
(24/12/2009)
Russian prioritization of topics for discussion
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Escalation Models
Civil infrastructures
Cyber Definitions
Cyber Law
Codes of Conduct
Cyber Terrorism
Cyber Crime
Technical Cooperation
Protection of the Commons (termed “Protection of
World Community” by Russians)
Industrial Espionage
Russian reaction based on draft (2/12/2009)
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Russian Reaction to Workshop Topics: 2
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Russians believe the cyber definition topic is particularly important
and merits a joint research project entitled:
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“Comparative Analysis of Conceptual National Documents
(Strategies, Doctrines, etc.) and National Approaches to the
Definitions of Information Warfare and Cyber Security.”
Russians point out that the topic list is “a comprehensive 2-3 year
program for scientific research”
They consider this research program worthy of funding as a large
common research project under the NATO Scientific Committee’s
“Science for Peace and Security”
Russians propose establishment of an “International Cyber Space
Security Consortium” and suggest a potential list of co-founding
institutions:
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Lomonosov Moscow State University
Harvard University -- MIT – NDU
Chinese Defense Technology University
Karlsruhe University (Germany)
ICANN
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Mallery Assessment
(speaking for only myself)
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Step by step is probably the best approach
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Identify the first topic and hold the workshop
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Build on the research cases developed by the workshops
Identify relevant participants based on expertise
Work out a plausible plan for coordination of research and integration
of results
Caveats:
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Maintain momentum
Consider specific research to follow up on topics in greater detail:
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Obtain institutional buy-in
Follow on with other workshops every 6-12 months
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Demonstrate value and build towards more difficult topics
No formal institutional commitment at this time from MIT or Harvard
Any formal activities must be proposed by researchers and approved
by the institutions
Expectations:
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Some MIT or Harvard researchers may choose to participate as
individuals in intellectually exciting workshops that are aligned with
their interests
More extensive commitments, for example to joint research projects
or a research consortium might be possible in the future if scientific
benefits are clear
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Conclusions
 Dialogue
between the major cyber
powers is important to:
 Reduce risk of international conflict
 Assure orderly international economic
processes
 Dialogues
among thought leaders
from different countries can:
 Build common understandings
 Explore practical means to reduce
cyber risks
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