Transcript Progress meeting EISS5

Progress meeting EISS5
CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks
•Organisation and QA
•Task SL53.2: Safety Important Components (SIC)
•Task SL53.2: Safety operational limits
•Task SL53.4a: Outline of the description of the
maintenance programme
Progress meeting EISS5
CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks
Organisation and QA
•CIEMAT CO-ORDINATES, REVIEW DRAFTS, AND
ACCEPTS REPORTS PRIOR TO SUBMITTAL
–Project co-ordinator: Beatriz Brañas, assisted by Pablo
Zuloaga
–Support by Safety Department: Caridad Roldán, Paloma
Díaz-Arocas
•PUBLIC CALL FOR BIDS:
–Spec with all Project and QA requirements
–Commented by EFDA, ITER-France before consultation
–Public consultation published in Official Journal (BOE)
–Assigned to IBERTEF
•Task 53.8 (Hot cell functions during decommissioning) not
yet launched, pending on design approval).
Progress meeting EISS5
CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4a Tasks
Organisation and QA
IBERTEF (Empresarios Agrupados - Sener) QA
manual
•Three task groups with specific task leaders:
–SL53.2 SIC
Xavier Jardi
–SL53.2 OLC
J A Carretero
–SL53.4a ODMP
Olga Asuar
•IBERTEF produces draft reports sent to CIEMAT
for review, and reports including CIEMAT
comments
•CIEMAT keeps responsibility and presents
reports to EFDA ITER
Task SL53.2:
Safety Important Components (SIC)
Task Objectives:
For RPrS
 Definition of criteria for the safety classification of ITER systems and
components
 As a function of the above criteria, preparation of a list of safetyimportant systems and components (SIC), including:
– Type of component (isolation valve, cryopump, etc)
– Safety function of the component
– How the component performs its safety function
– Seismic classification
5
Task Objectives:
For support document
 Identification of applicable codes and standards
 Demonstration that the list of systems and components classified as
SIC is complete by cross-checking it with the normal, incidental and
accidental situations
6
Level of Completion
Objetive
%
Definition of criteria for the safety classification of ITER
systems and components
100%
List of systems and components with SIC classification
80%
Codes and standards
70%
Cross-checking of the list
10%
7
SIC Classification Criteria
SIC structures, systems and components are
those relied upon to remain functional during
and following the reference events to ensure:
• Confinement safety function, including
the ancillary safety functions protecting
it, and
• Personnel protection by limitation of
exposure to radiation of workers and
environment
8
Seismic Classification Criteria
Three seismic categories will be considered:
•
ITER structures that must remain integral and systems and
components (including their foundations and supports) that
must remain functional or retain their confinement barriers in
the event of a SL-2 earthquake are designated Seismic
Category I (SCI).
•
Structures, systems and components that perform no safety
function, but whose structural failure or interaction could
degrade the functioning of a Seismic Category I item to an
unacceptable level of safety are designated Seismic
Category II (SCII). These items are designed to structurally
withstand the effects of a SL-2.
•
Structures, systems and components that are not
categorized as Seismic Category I or II are designated no
Seismic Category (NSC).
9
Systems classified (1/2):
WBS
System
SIC
1.1
Toroidal Field (TF) Coils Systems
SIC
1.2
Poloidal Fiel (PF) Coils Systems
SIC
1.3
Central Solenoid System (CS)
SIC
1.5
Vacuum Vessel
SIC
1.6
Blanket
non SIC
1.7
Divertor
non SIC
1.8
Fuelling and Wall Conditioning
SIC
1.9
Plasma
non SIC
2.3
Remote Handling Equipment
SIC
2.4
Cryostat
SIC
2.6
Cooling Water Systems
SIC
2.7
Thermal Shields
non SIC
3.1
Vacuum Pumping and Leak Detection Systems
SIC
3.2
Tritium Plant
SIC
3.4
Cryoplant and Cryodistribution
SIC
10
Systems classified (2/2):
WBS
System
SIC
4.1
Coil Power Supplies
SIC
4.2
Heating and Current Drive Power Supplies
non SIC
4.3
Steady State Electrical Power Network
SIC
4.5
Supervisory Control System
non SIC
4.6
Interlock System
SIC
4.7
Poloidal Field Control
non SIC
5.1
Ion Cyclotron H&CD
SIC
5.2
Electron Cyclotron H&CD
SIC
5.3
Neutral Beam H&CD
SIC
5.4
Lower Hybrid H&CD
SIC
5.5
Diagnostics
SIC
5.6
Test Blankets
SIC
11
Systems to be classified:
WBS
System
SIC
6.2
Buildings
SIC
6.3
Hot Cell Processing and Waste Treatment
SIC
6.4
Radiological Protection
SIC
6.5
Liquid
SIC
6.6
Gas Distribution
SIC
6.7
Plant Sampling Systems
SIC
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Task sample for RPrS : WBS 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3
SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY
Main Components
SIC
Classific
ation
Safety Function
Safety Requirements
Seismic
Classificati
on
WBS 1.1: TOROIDAL FIELD (TF) COILS SYSTEM
1.
TF coils
non SIC
-
-
NSC
2.
Feeders through the cryostat
SIC
Confinement
Confinement function with cryostat
SCI (S)
3.
Other auxiliary systems
non SIC
-
-
NSC
4.
Magnet gravity supports
SIC
-
-
SCI (S)
5.
Other mechanical structures
non SIC
-
-
NSC
WBS 1.2: POLOIDAL FIELD (PF) COILS SYSTEM
1.
PF Coils
non SIC
-
-
NSC
2.
Feeders through the cryostat
SIC
Confinement
Confinement function with cryostat
SCI (S)
3.
Other auxiliary systems
non SIC
-
-
NSC
4.
Correction coils
non SIC
-
-
NSC
WBS 1.3: CENTRAL SOLENOID SYSTEM (CS)
1.
Central solenoid
non SIC
-
-
NSC
2.
Feeders through the cryostat
SIC
Confinement
Confinement function with cryostat
SCI (S)
3.
Other auxiliary systems
non SIC
-
-
NSC
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Task sample for RPrS : WBS 2.6 (1/2)
SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY
Main Components
SIC
Classifi
cation
Safety
Function
Safety Requirements
Seismic
Classifica
tion
WBS 2.6: COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
4.
4.1
Vacuum vessel primary heat transfer system
(PHTS)
Circulating pump
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (S)
Water-Air Heat Exchangers (3 per loop)
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (S)
Electtrical Heater
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms.
SCI (S)
Pneumatic Pressurizer
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (S)
Isolation Valves
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (SF)
Control valves
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (SF)
Piping and associated valves
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (S)
Filter
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms
SCI (S)
Relief valves
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (S)
4.10
Pressure relief tank
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms
SCI (S)
4.11
Drainage tank
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of in-vessel source terms and hydrogen
SCI (S)
4.12
Drain sump tank
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms
SCI (S)
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
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Task sample for RPrS : WBS 2.6 (2/2)
SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY
Main Components
SIC
Classifi
cation
Safety
Function
Safety Requirements
Seismic
Classifica
tion
WBS 2.6: COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
4.13
Sump pump
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms
SCI (S)
4.14
Drain cooler
SIC
Confinement
Prevent coolant loss
SCI (S)
4.15
Isolation valves from/to HXs
SIC
Confinement
Prevent coolant loss
SCI (SF)
Isolation valves to N-VDS
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (SF)
Isolation valves to associated CCWS
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (SF)
Associated loops of Draining & Refilling
System
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms
SCI (S)
4.16
4.17
4.18
4.19
Helium Supply System
non SIC
4.20
Isolation valves to Helium Suply System
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms
SCI (SF)
4.21
Associated loops of Drying System
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms
SCI (S)
Isolation valves (Evacuation Unit)
SIC
Confinement
Confinement of HTS source terms. Provide heat removal by natural
circulation under accident
SCI (SF)
4.22
15
SIC Classification Summary (sample)
SIC CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY
Main Components
SIC
Classification
Safety Function
Safety Requirements
Seismic
Classification
Codes and Standars
WBS 2.4: CRYOSTAT
1.
1.1
Cryostat
Cryostat vessel
SIC
Confinement
1.2
Penetrations
SIC
Confinement
1.3
Support structure
1.4
Excryostat guard pipes
SIC
Confinement
1.5
In-Cryostat Ice Detection System
SIC
Confinement
1.6
2.
2.1
Other components not having safety function
Venting and overpressure protection system
UHV Angle valve
2.2
Back-up valve
2.3
Pump
2.4
Piping
2.5
3.
3.1
Other components not having safety function
Vacuum vessel pressure supression system
Pressure supression tank
3.2
Confinement barrier for in-vessel source term and
hydrogen including some maintenance activities
Confinement barrier for in-vessel source term and
hydrogen including some maintenance activities
SCI (S)
ASME VIII Div 2 for
vessels
SCI (S)
ASME Section III-NF for
support
ANSI/ASME B31.3 for
piping (Category M)
SCI (S)
-
Forms part of the confinement barrier for HTS source
terms; blow down path into TCWS vaults
Prevention of ozone formation from ice condensing in
high radiation fields; for protection of confinement
barriers; redundant
-
SIC
Confinement
For protection of cryostat and surrounding structures
SCI (SF)
ASME B 16.34 for valves
SIC
Confinement
For protection of cryostat and surrounding structures
SCI (SF)
ASME B 16.34 for valves
For protection of cryostat and surrounding structures
SCI (S)
Confinement
For protection of cryostat and surrounding structures
SCI (S)
ASME B73.1M/73.2M for
pumps
ANSI/ASME B31.3 for
piping (Category M)
-
-
NCS
SIC
Confinement
Limit pressure in VV under accident conditions;
Confinement of in-vessel source terms and hydrogen
during accident conditions
SCI (S)
ASME VIII Div 2
Relief pipes
SIC
Confinement
Limit pressure in VV under accident conditions;
Confinement of in-vessel source terms and hydrogen
during accident conditions
SCI (S)
ASME VIII Div 2
3.3
Rupture disks
SIC
Confinement
Limit pressure in VV under accident conditions;
Confinement of in-vessel source terms and hydrogen
during accident conditions
SCI (S)
ASME VIII Div 2
3.4
3.5
Bleed line
UHV angle valves
non SIC
SIC
Confinement
SCI (S)
ASME VIII Div 2
3.6
4.
Other components not having safety function
Thermal shield
non SIC
non SIC
-
Limit pressure in VV under accident conditions;
Confinement of in-vessel source terms and hydrogen
during accident conditions
-
non SIC
SIC
non SIC
SCI (S)
NCS
NCS
NSC
16
Sample of cross-checking:
SYSTEMS
Loss of plasma
control
1.1
Toroidal Field (TF) Coils Systems
1.2
Poloidal Fiel (PF) Coils Systems
1.3
Central Solenoid System (CS)
1.5
Vacuum Vessel
1.8
Fueling and Wall Conditoning
2.3
Remote Handling Equipment
2.4
Cryostat
2.6
Cooling Water Systems
3.1
3.2
Vacuum Pumping and Leak Detection
Systems
Tritium Plant
3.4
Cryoplant and Cryodistribution
4.1
Coil Power Supplies
4.3
Steady State Electrical Power Network
4.6
Interlocks System
REFERENCE EVENTS (INCIDENTS)
Loss of power
FW pipe break
Loss of heat
(LOOP 1h)
sink
DV pump trip
HX leaklage
Tritium leakage
17
Task SL53.2: Safety operational limits
18
Introduction
(1/2)
OLCs are a set of operating rules that include safety limits, safety
system settings and operational limits on equipment and
conditions on inventories, surveillance and administrative
requirements.
Objectives:
• To ensure safe operation and protection of site personnel,
the public and the environment from radiological hazards
• To guarantee the required operation flexibility
Most of the limits are controlled automatically, such as for
pressure or concentration. Others (such as inventories) are
controlled through administrative procedures.
19
Introduction
(2/2)
OLC interrelationship
LD
LS
OLC classification in France:
LC: limites de conduite
LF: limites de fonctionnement
LS
LF
LS: limites de sûreté
LD: limites de dimensionnement
LF
LC
20
Task Objectives:
OLCs updating
(1/2)
Review of previous study of operational domain
(Definition of Authorized Operational Domain for ITER
licensing, final report of task EFDA 93/851-JA (2005))
 Review and updating of OLCs based on current
project documents: PSR, GSSR, DRG1, DRG2,
PID, DDDs
OLCs
 Incorporating of OLCs resulting of new
experiments: TBM (Test Blanket Module), NBI (Neutral
Beam Injection), diagnostics, etc, and DCR (Design
Change Request)
21
Task Objectives:
Top Safety OLCs
(2/2)
Selection of a series of limits more representative for
safety (Top Level Safety OLCs), combining them in a
reduced group of parameters
 With a view to their inclusion in the DAC
(Décret d´Autorisation de Création)
 The result has been embodied in a report
(Top Level Safety OLCs)
22
Review of Input Documents
 Input data: ITER Technical Web (Baseline Documentation)
 New versions:
PID: Project integration document, Release 2.0
September 2005
No OLC changes
 Other/New Inputs ?
 New experiments, Test Blanket Module, Neutral Beam
Injection, diagnostics, DCR…
Open issue
23
Safety Top OLCs:
Methodology
1. OLCs of the various systems were grouped per
parameter (for example: tritium inventory and content, dust
amount, dose, pressure, loads, temperature, leaktightness,
etc).
2. The most significant parameters for safety (confinement,
limitation of external exposure, residual power evacuation)
were selected.
24
Safety Top OLCs:
List (1)
Tritium inventory in vacuum vessel, tritium plant and hot cell
Tritium concentration in water systems
Tritium concentration to isolate and initiate ADS
Efficiency of Detritiation System
Dust and activated products in vacuum vessel and water
systems
25
Safety Top OLCs:
List (2)
Radiation and dose levels for personnel evacuation
Leak tightness in system components forming part of
primary or secondary confinement barriers, in tritium plant,
ventilation and detritiation, in cooling water and heat rejection
system and in buildings
Pressure of primary and secondary confinement barriers
VVPSS bleed and drain line actuation pressure, and
opening pressure of VVPSS rupture disks
Level of water in VVPSS tank
26
Activities in course
 Documentation of the cross-checking performed between
Top OLCs and the Reference Events.
 Table of the surveillance method / instrumentation foreseen
in the project for Top OLC.
27
Safety Top OLCs:
List (3)
VV temperature in Baking
Degraded levels of Voltage/Time delays for initiating full
transfer/start of Class III loads (switch DG)
Time intervention of Fusion Power Shutdown System
 Top OLCs to be discussed
 Maximum fusion power
TF magnetic energy dumping
VV heat transfer system
28
Top Level OLCs EX Table Sample
Top Level OLC
Limit
Possible instrument or
procedure to measure
the limit
Rationale for choice of the limit
Tritium inventory in the vacuum
vessel
< 450 g
The amount of tritium is
assessed monitoring
inventories and flows
Radiological consequence assessments
remain valid provided that these
inventories remain lower than
the specified limits (maximum
inventory project guidelines).
For the safety assessment in
GSSR, as noted in Volume III,
assessment inventory values
are used to provide margins for
uncertainty
PSR, GSSR
I.5.2.1, PID
3.1.1.2
Tritium content in Cooling water
VVPHTS (Vacuum vessel
cooling system).
<0.0001
g/m3
(~37
MBq/
kg)
Monitoring concentrations
To reduce as a mminimum if a leak in
the water-to-air heat exchanger
happens
PSR, GSSR
I.5.2.1, PID
3.1.1.2
Tritium (radioactivity) leak rate for
automatic or manual isolation
of Heat Rejection System
(HRS)
automatic
<600
MBq/
s;
manu
al
after
samp
ling
TBD
Monitoring systems to detect
large leak. Detection is
based on on-line
measurement of tritium
Safety analysis assumes automatic
isolation of HRS (two minutes’
delay in the signal and three
minutes in valve actuation are
assumed) in case of a higher
HTO leak rate (Heat exchanger
tube rupture)
GSSR VII 1.2.4,
3.4.2
Leak rate of system components
confining in-vessel source
terms, forming part of primary
or secondary barrier
<1 volume
%/da
y at
0.2
Mpa
Monitoring systems to detect
leak
This leak rate limit is required to prevent
air ingress that could result in
hazardous air/H2 mixtures and
protect against the spread of
radioactive materials.
PID 3.1.2.1
ITER safety
analysis
Documentat
ion
reference
29
Conclusions and Comments
(1/2)
• OLCs are based on the safety analysis taking into account the
provisions made in the design. Therefore, OLCs and their correlated
procedures will be updated throughout the various ITER phases, like
detailed design, commissioning test and results of specific R&D like
those on tritium and dust measurement and control.
• The surveillance programme relevant to all OLCs -including the
frequency, the detailed procedures to carry out, the evaluation of the
results and the corrective actions, when necessary- will be defined at
a later stage of the ITER project.
•In certain cases (like tritium inventory in vacuum vessel) the OLC is a
more restrictive value than the assessment used in the GSSR safety
analysis. Lower project guidelines are set to account for uncertainties
and these values are pending confirmation of feasibility.
30
Conclusions and Comments
(2/2)
TOP Safety OLC document derives a minimum set of conditions which
define the top main safety parameters that should be retained with regard
to the DAC (Décret d´Autorisation de Création), grouping various
constraints as much as practical and reducing the total list.
Therefore, this document intends to show a group of the most
representative parameters analyzed in previous study  and these top
level safety OLCs can be completed or modified in accordance with
different criteria, changes or design upgrades.
 “Definition
of Authorized Operational Domain for ITER Licensing”, Issue
Rev 0, March 2005 (Task order EFDA 93/851-JA)”
31
Task SL53.4a: Outline of the description of
the maintenance programme
O. Asuar
M. Vázquez
Task Objectives
 Identification of SIC systems and components
– Description of the systems above,
– Find their flow diagrams,
– Identification of their main components, location and amount.
 Identify
hands-on schedule maintenance
systems/components identified above
requirements
for
the
SIC
 Breakdown of the maintenance operations including:
– Objective,
– Operation sequence,
– Initial conditions of the components,
– Tools,
– Waste estimation,
– Reference documents.
 Non-active support systems (e.g., electrical systems) are excluded from this report
as they do not have any impact on worker dosis.
33
Level of Completion
OBJECTIVE
%
Identification of SIC systems and components
Identification of systems
90%
Double check against task EISS-5 SL53-2
40%
System descriptions (16 systems)
Description
100%
Flow diagrams
100%
Location of all SIC components
40%
Hands on maintenance requirements
Conventional components (pumps, valves, compressors)
80%
ITER specific components ( cryopumps, roughing pumps, ZrCo beds)
40%
Breakdown of maintenance operations ( about 30 tasks so far)
Identification of all task
80%
Task completion
50%
SUMMARY
60%
34
Document Structure
1
2
Introduction
Tokamak building
2.1 “A” system
2.1.1 Function and safety function
2.1.2 Components and maintenance requirements
(SEE NEXT SLIDE)
2.2 “B” system
3 Hot Cell building and Radwaste building
3.1 Hot Cell building
3.1.1 Function and safety function
3.1.2 Components and maintenance requirements
3.2 Radwaste building
4 Tritium building
4.1 A system
4.1.1 Function and safety function
4.1.2 Components and maintenance requirements
4.2 B system
5 References
Appendix A. Hands-on operations Task Data Sheets (SEE
NEXT SLIDES)
35
Components and maintenance requirements
Example:
Component
Safety
Functio
n
Quantity /
location
Frequency
Pressure
Suppression
tank
Y
1 (Crane
Hall,
Green,
access
zone
B,
Ref 6)
Plant
outages
During outages, visual inspection of the
surfaces (Ref 2)
Leak rate test
For maintenance operations see task 3 of
Appendix A
Seals
Gaskets
N
-
Plant
outages
When opened, visual inspection of the
surfaces (Ref 2)
Bolted
Connections
N
-
Plant
outages
Visual inspection and bolted torque or
tension test (Ref 2)
Relief Pipes
Y
3
Plant
outages
Visual inspection
Rupture discs
in the relief
valves
Y
3
Plant
outages
To be replaced in accordance with the
rules specified in ASME section XI,
division 1.(From Ref 2)
From ref 4 rupture disc are relocated
inside the NB cell for confinement
purposes. For maintenance operations of
rupture disc see section 2.14 of this
document.
and
Maintenance requirements
36
Appendix A: Breakdown of maintenance operations
Task sample : motor driven valve maintenance operations (1/3)
Task Objective:


Disassemble the motor driven valve, inspect the plant item visually in order to detect possible
problem areas.
Lube all screws and nuts
Target plant:

Generic- All plant motor driven plants
Frequency:

5 years
Start Point:



The plant in shut down operation mode
The valve is isolate, drained and without any pressure
Electrical connexions of the valves are disconnected from the grid
Assumptions:


Time consumed in each operation has been estimated
Main Issues:

There are many types of valves, operations shown in this task are based on the preventive
maintenance of valves in Nuclear Power Plants, model UN-122
37
Task sample : motor driven valve maintenance operations (2/3)
Handling Sequence:
Operation
Worker
Position
1.
Next to the
component
2
3
4
Disassembly
Estimated
Time
man-hr/task
1.1 Remove actuator
10
1.2 Remove valve cover
10
1.3 Remove valve stem and valve disc
20
Inspection
Clean all valve components
Next to the
component
2
Next to the
component
3.1 Inspect valve body and look for any cracks
using dye penetrating, if necessary.
20
3.2 Inspect valve seat.
5
Assembly
Comments
Next to the
component
4.1 Repeat operations done in the disassembly
but in reverse order
30
4.2 Lube all screws and nuts
2
38
Task aample : motor driven valve maintenance operations (3/3)
HANDLING TOOL
Tooling Function:
Characteristics
Manipulator (for handling and cleaning)
Screw driver
Outstanding Issues
Issue of concern
Resolution
Manufacturer requirements
References
1.
CE-T-MM-0271 Revisión general válvula motorizada de globo, tipo UN-122, CN Almaraz-Trillo
39
Difficulties/Issues of concern
 Estimated times
 Tools
 Which components are repaired in situ and which ones are replaced? Related with
bullet 1.
 Difficulties with general plant layout. Cannot find all components (all roughing
pumps, all cryopumps)
 Difficulties with maintenance operations of ITER specific components (cryopumps,
roughing pumps, ZrCo beds) . Designers help/inputs required.
 Difficulties with conventional components. Sometimes not enough information; e.g.
pumps: vertical/ horizontal, big/small. It´s not the same. Manufacturers information
not yet available.
 Diagnostics. Impossible to identify all of them. Not enough information
 Initial conditions of the components ( radioactivity, waste amounts…) Reference
documentation is required.
40