Transcript Instituting a Safety Culture in our Transportation System

Instituting a Safety Culture in
our Transportation System:
Parallel Visions
Khalil J. Spencer
Chair, Los Alamos County Transportation Board
Information taken from ongoing projects by the
National Center for Bicycling and Walking and
The American Automobile Assn. Foundation
AAA Foundation Statement
• …to elevate …traffic safety on the national
agenda
• break through the collective acceptance of
and/or complacency over the toll of crashes on
our society (including roughly 43,000 annual
fatalities),
• motivate U.S. decision makers and motorists to
acknowledge traffic safety as a legitimate
priority.
• …(sponsor) highly visible, long-term work that
aims to ignite and sustain a serious dialogue
about and demand for traffic safety at all levels
of our society.
NCBW Vision Statement
• … adopting a vision that these (traffic)
deaths and injuries can be predicted, have
causes, and are preventable.
• …traffic crashes are not accidents.
• … what measures are necessary to
eliminate virtually all such incidents,
• (apply) the same standard we impose on
our airline and nuclear industries.
Parallel Visions: AAA and
NCBW
• AAA:
• promote a “safety culture.” (develop) a Safety
Culture Index (SCI), with which to quantify the
present state of affairs ...
• (focus) upon developing safety cultures in
highway safety agencies at the state and local
levels
• NCBW…
• a campaign to redefine our societal perspective
on motor vehicle crashes, substantially reducing
their occurrence, and thereby significantly
decreasing the attendant number of injuries and
fatalities.
Measurable Outcomes (NCBW)
• 1.U.S. road-crash deaths plummet from the current
40,000-45,000 a year to 30,000 by 2016 and 20,000 by
2026; serious-injury accidents decline similarly.
• 2. U.S. population-based traffic fatality rate (currently
~15 / 100,000) falls to the same level as Canada and
Australia (~9 / 100,000) by 2016, and to the same level
as the U.K., Scandinavia, and The Netherlands (~6 /
100,000) by 2026.
• 3. Share of U.S. children who get to school each day
under their own power doubles from its current 10% level
to 20% by 2016, and doubles again by 2026.
• 4. Percentage of U.S. road-traffic fatalities that are
adjudicated with someone held accountable doubles by
2016, and doubles again by 2026.
Other benefits
• Encourages walking and biking, thus
improving fitness and conserving energy
• Will not need a massive vehicle to feel
safe, thus encouraging fuel conservation
and lowering people’s driving costs
• Will let LSV’s, small cars better compete in
the safety realm
ALARA: A specific tool for this task
• “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” as an
outcome
• What do we need to do to achieve this
goal?
• ALARA looks at specific kinds of safety
thinking
• Engineering, Education, Enforcement,
Encouragement (4-E’s)
Substitution of a less dangerous
device
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Replace private vehicle transit, when possible, with
transit systems operated by highly trained
professionals.
Use a small vehicle rather than a large one, thus
mitigating the amount of vehicle energy that has to be
dissipated in a panic stop or a crash.
Walk or ride a bicycle (i.e., a small, low mass vehicle)
over short distances, further reducing mass.
Mandate energy absorbing panels on the outside of all
vehicle front ends to mitigate crashes with pedestrians,
cyclists, and other vehicles.
Engineering Controls
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antilock brake systems,
dual and redundant brake lines,
run-flat tires,
shatterproof glass,
stability management systems,
divided highways,
pedestrian overpasses,
Front/back “radar” that reacts to impending collisions,
bulbouts or speed bumps that force vehicles to reduce speed.
Vehicle Data Recorders that save crash data and govern
performance
• BUT, these controls inconsistent with “bigger, faster, more
powerful” and “closed course, don’t try this at home” goals and
attitudes
Administrative Controls
• Rules and regulations. Ideally, they should
augment and compliment engineering controls.
• These can clearly articulate goals, hazard
analyses, and direction.
• Unless a strong safety culture is present, can be,
ignored or “pencil-whipped”, impart a false
sense of security
• Are weak, if recipient is receiving mixed signals,
i.e., “closed course, don’t try this at home”.
Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE)
• Last layer of defense from likely accident
scenerios.
• Properly designed and worn PPE are a sign that
a safety culture is in place and valued.
• Seat belts, air bags, helmets, leather jackets,
etc.
• Large vehicles can defeat PPE in small vehicles
• Weakness is that if taken alone, are passive
rather than active defenses, i.e., you assume
they will protect you even if you do nothing.
Training and Awareness
• Ensures individual and group competence during routine
operation,
• Provides emergency preparedness via drills and “what if”
exercises,
• Ensures participants are knowledgeable and can “think
on their feet” in an emergency.
• Present low level of training for motorists, and virtual lack
of training for pedestrians and bicyclists, does not inspire
confidence that roadway users are fully competent, or
prepared for real-world crises
• Example: take a road test in a Civic, drive a Hummer the
next day. Should we have more graduated licensing?
Accountability
• Repeat violators, weak sentences, “no fault” mentality
implies a casual attitude; deaths or injury are “no one’s”
fault.
• Contrast to airline or nuclear industry, where zero
accidents are the goal and people held accountable for
ignoring safety
• Crashes or moving violations investigated, operators
held accountable for misbehavior, especially when injury
or intimidation results. Use Data recorders to establish
cause.
• Change the prevailing “no fault” paradigm.
• Change what is considered acceptable advertising, i.e.,
“closed course, don’t try this at home”.
• Paradigm-shift in DWI is a good model, i.e., what sorts of
Conclusions
• We need to institute a safety culture in transportation
practice
• ALARA requires a careful evaluation of risk factors and
a clear understanding of how traffic works BEFORE
operational decisions are made.
• Once the ALARA process begins, feedback is used to
modify, replace, or improve safety measures taking into
account unforeseen events.
• Cooperation needed among all of the participants (traffic
engineers, vehicle manufacturers, law enforcement, endusers, lawmakers, health professionals, safety modelers,
etc.)
More conclusions…
• Proposed model: Sweden:
• The concern for human life and health is an
absolutely mandatory element in the design and
functioning of the road transport system. This
means that a road traffic safety mode of thinking
must be clearly integrated into all the processes
that affect safety within the road transport
system. The level of violence that the human
body can tolerate without being killed or
seriously injured shall be the basic parameter in
the design of the road transport