Transcript First Steps in Response to a Radiological Terrorist Incident

First Steps in Response to a
Radiological Terrorist Incident
Dale Dusenbury,CHP
North Carolina Division of Radiation
Protection
“Protecting America's homeland and citizens from the threat of weapons
of mass destruction is one of our Nation's important national security
challenges... prudence dictates that the United States be fully prepared to
deal effectively with the consequences of such a weapon being used here
on our soil. “
President George W. Bush
May 8,2001
Assumptions
• Success for the terrorist consists of creating
fear and disruption, no matter the damage
done or the lives lost.
• Firefighters, police, and public safety are
expected to encounter the incident initially.
• If state health physics specialists are
available, they will also be tasked to
respond to an incident of nuclear terrorism.
What We’re Doing
• The Division of Radiation is supplementing
existing capabilities in three areas:
 Applying
Guidance
 Procedure Revisions
 Dose Projection Capability
Health Physics Guidance
• The NCRP has provided Report 138 to
provide guidance in areas of:
 Definition
of Phases
 Medical Management
 Psychosocial Effects.
 Command and Control
 Public Communication
 Dose Limitation
Phases of Terrorist Incident
• Early Phase-Begins with start of incident
and continues while material is released.
• Intermediate Phase-Begins when release has
ended, cloud of contamination has settled,
and rescue efforts have been terminated.
• Late Phase-material has been incorporated
into environment and sampling results are
available. Ends when restrictions lifted.
Early Phase:Defining the Incident
• Two dose rate levels used by first
responders:
– 10 mrem/hr(0.1 msV/hr) for Control area
– 10 rem/hr(0.1 Sv/hr) for Turnback area.
• Evacuate or shelter areas downwind, set up
control area. Set up monitoring/decon
stations.
• Dose projection should be performed for the
communities downwind
Intermediate and Late Phase
Activities
• Environmental radiation measurements
needed to define the contamination zone.
• Carry out evacuation and food interdiction
actions to prevent public exposure.
• Assemble a plan to conduct further surveys
and environmental sampling.
• Model deposition via AMS data & in-situ
measurements.
• Set up Assessment Center
Medical Management
• First, of all stabilize those with life
threatening injuries.
• Use standard triage to assign priority to
those with other injuries.
• Separate contaminated from noncontaminated patients, allowing for
preliminary decon.
• Patients with wounds require special
care.Clothing and excreta should be
collected.
Radiological Assessment and
Decon
• Use detector sensitive to alpha,beta, and
gamma i.e. Thin window GM.
• Map contamination on body.
• Remove clothes and store for disposal.
• Decon using tepid water, w/ or w/o
detergent.
• Remove hair by cutting. Amputation not
recommended to remove contamination.
Psychosocial Effects
• Without considering psychosocial effects,
your response can be technically “correct”,
yet people will still get sick and mistrust
you.
• Examples:
Chronic stress, with or w/o exposure
Survivor Guilt
Mental Health Problems & PTSD
Stigma(Goinea Residents)
Prevention
• Plan to deal with these issues as part of
exercises, etc.
• Openness in decision making is required, so
identify stakeholders if possible.
Command and Control
• States often use an ICS (incident command
system) to respond.
• Although the states keep public health
responsibilities, a terrorist incident requires
federal response.
• The Attorney General has been given
responsibility to lead such a response
through the FBI.
Public Communications
• Goal:Achieve trust and credibility.
• State, Federal, Local governments need to
establish communications plans before an
event.
• Coordinated information release is to be
done by JIC, which can adapt to long term
needs.
• An Internet template for JIC should be set
up and exercised.
Dose Limitation Concepts
• Philosophy(based on ICRP system):
– Prevent occurrence of deterministic effects due
to radiation exposure.
– Limit stochastic effects, such as cancer and
genetic effects to reasonable levels.
Dose Limitation Concepts
• Philosophy(based on ICRP system):
– When 5 Rem/yr(50 mSv/yr) for workers of 100
mrem/yr(1 msV/yr) for public exposure may be
exceeded a different concept is required.
– Dose reductions should outweigh disadvantages
of intervention actions.
Emergency Worker Guidance
• Exposures should be kept less than the
occupational limits when lifesaving/rescue
is not involved.
• Where it is not possible to carry out the
above, ICRP recommendations(1991) are:
– 50 Rem(0.5 Sv) effective dose
– 500 Rem(5 Sv) equivalent dose to skin
– Knowledgeable volunteers should be used.
Protecting Emergency Workers
• Two limits:
Control Area Limit: 10 mrem/hr(0.1 mSv/hr)
to define exclusion area.
Turnback Level-10 rem/hr(0.1 Sv/hr) and 10
rem(0.1 Sv) total dose. Allows for work
inside the zone.
NCRP 138-Recommendations
• General Public Countermeasures(Effective
dose)
Sheltering: 0.5-5 Rem(5-50 mSv)
Evacuations:5-50 Rem(50-500 mSv)
KI(special populations):5 Rem-50 Rem(50500mSv)
Relocation:1 Rem/month(10 mSv/month) or
100 Rem(1000mSv) total
NCRP 138-Recommendations
• Recovery Workers
Countermeasures(Effective dose)
Annual Limit: 5 rem/yr(50 mSv/yr)
• Recovery Workers(Emergency Actions)
50 rem(500 mSv).
• Single Foods: 1 rem/yr(10 mSv/yr).
Procedure Evaluation
• Currently reviewing procedures
incorporating response to nuclear weapons
accidents used to support FRMAC.
Example: DOD 51 00.52-M Radiological
Hazard and Safety Environmental
Monitoring
Tools: The HOTSPOT Codes
• Designed for short term events(< 24 hours)
• Uses Gaussian Plume model for dose
projection. Uses editable library.
• Does not calculate shine doses from
elevated plume.
• Calculates effective doses.
• Models fire, explosion, tritium release,
weapons detonation.
References
• www.llnl.gov/nai/technologies/hotspot/
• http://web7.whs.osd.mil/text/p31508m.txt