Transcript WHY THE DROP IN CRIME?
Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas Sam Houston State University
PATROL RESEARCH
Dr. Larry Hoover Police Research Center Sam Houston State University
Last Year’s Program: Why the Drop in Crime?
• • • • • Social-demographic Trends Economic Conditions Drug Use Prevalence Incarceration Rates Police Programs.
STATEWIDE UCR RATE
8000 7500 7000 6500 6000 5500 5000 1990 1991 1992 1993
Year
1994 1995 1996 1997
Myth: The Police Make No Difference
• • Borne first of the lack of clear relationship between staffing levels and crime rates Reinforced by the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment and the Rand Criminal Investigation Study.
Crime-Specific Policing
• • • • • Clearly defined intervention strategies Targeted at particular offenses Committed by particular offenders At specific places At specific times.
Crime-Specific Policing is NOT:
Unfocused Strategies
• • Non-Directed Patrol Simple Saturation Patrol
Change in Style
• New York City COMSTAT Program • Houston Proactive Effort in 1992
However, Crime-Specific Policing is Not Necessarily:
• • • • Focused upon only a single offense Conducted solely by Patrol Always a direct field based intervention Antithetical to Community Oriented Approaches
We Will Examine:
• • • Neighborhood Centered Targeted Enforcement Youth & Gang Programs • Problem-Oriented Strategies • Proactive Investigative Techniques
The 25 Year Research Legacy on Patrol
A Brief Synopsis
• • • • • • • Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (1973) San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment (1975) Directed Patrol in New Haven and Pontiac (1976) Split Force Patrol in Wilmington (1976) Newark and Flint Foot Patrol (1981) Minneapolis Repeat Call Address (Recap) (1988) Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment (1993)
Other Research (examined later)
• Problem Oriented Policing in Newport News • Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment and Its Replications • Investigative Effectiveness Research
Preventive Patrol Experiment
South Patrol District Fifteen Beats Reactive Beats (5) Proactive Beats (5) Control Beats (5)
Preventive Patrol Experiment Beat Configuration R C P C R P R C R P P C C P R
Generalizing the Results
Results
• • No effect on crime No effect on citizen perceptions • No effect on traffic accidents
However
• Routine Preventive Patrol is Non-directive • • Activity varies by Dept./Shift/Officer • Only about 2 hours of an 8 hour shift Results apply only to beat level perceptions
San Diego Field Interrogation
Three Areas
• • • Control Specially Trained Officers “No” Field Interrogations
Time
• • • Pre - 7 months Experimental - 9 months Post - 5 months
Measured Suppressible Street Crime
• Part I offenses of robbery, burglary, auto theft, street rape, street theft • Other offenses included other sex crimes, vandalism, and disorderly conduct.
Effect on Crime in Experimental Areas
40 20 0 120 100 80 60
75 PRE-EXP.
63 104 83 81 63 EXPER.
POST-EXP
Other Results
• • • • • No change in control or specially trained areas About one month lag time in effect No effect on community relations In San Diego, 17% of all arrests attributed to FIs, but less than 2% of FIs result in an arrest About 3% of all citizen complaints result from field interrogations.
Directed Patrol in New Haven & Pontiac
• • Use of crime analysis to direct non-committed patrol time to problem locations • Direction by dispatchers proved problematic Reduction in criminal incidents (but lacked control areas)
Wilmington Split-Force Concept
• Bifurcated patrol, 70% in Basic, 30% in Structured • • Structured concentrated on problem areas and follow-up Patrol’s arrest rate up 4%, clearances up 105% however, detective division clearances down 61%, department as a whole down by 28% • Abandoned after one year.
Newark & Flint Foot Patrol
• No impact on crime in Newark, 9% reduction in Flint • • • Decreases in fear of crime in both cities Significantly improved satisfaction with police services in both - 33% of Flint residents knew officer by name, 50% of remainder could recognize the beat officer Newark research beget the “Broken Windows” perspective • Flint research beget the community oriented perspective.
Minneapolis Recap Experiment
• • • 3% of 115,000 addresses accounted for 50% of CFS • 5% of addresses generated 64% of all CFS Special unit of 5 officers assigned 125 residential & 125 commercial addresses After 6 months, target addresses had 15% fewer CFS, but erased after one year.
• • • • • •
Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment
July 92 to Jan 93 two extra patrol units in Beat 144 during evening Beat 144 is an 8 x 10 block area with homicide rate of 177/100,000 - 20 times national average Beat is 92% nonwhite, but 66% home ownership Gun seizures increased by 65%, gun crimes declined by 40%. No change in Control Beat, no displacement Drive by shootings & homicides dropped significantly Saturation generated 29 more guns seized, 83 fewer gun crimes, 55 patrol hours invested per gun crime prevented, traffic stops most productive - one gun seized for every 28 stops.
Efficacy of Crime-Specific Approaches
• • • • • San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment Problem Oriented Policing in Newport News Flint Foot Patrol Minneapolis Recap Kansas City Gun Reduction
Crime-Specific Policing
• • • • • Clearly defined intervention strategies Targeted at particular offenses Committed by particular offenders At specific places At specific times.
A Final Note
• • In 25 years we have learned a great deal However, we still know relatively little about what works in policing.