Transcript EIS_Kappenman_Hardening1030

Options for Protection: Protecting National
Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures
Bronius Cikotas
John Kappenman
An Overview of Space Weather & EMP Risks
and the US Electric Power Infrastructure
Comparing Space Weather Threat to Other Power System
Threats
Conventional Terrestrial Threats
Geomagnetic Storm Threats
High Winds & Ice Loading – Design Code
Storm Development
Lightning – Shield Wires & Lightning
Arresters
Electromagnetic Processes nearly
Instantaneous
Seismic – Design Code
Terrestrial Weather – Air mass related that
can take many days to evolve - Hurricanes
Geographic Extent
Planetary Scale - Impact at each station –
with Large Cumulative Impact
Industry Design Approach
Severe Threats are geographically confined
Continuously monitor and base operational
decisions on Terrestrial weather conditions
Design Evolutions have unknowingly
Escalated GIC Risks and Potential Impacts
Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design
Code Yet to minimize this Threat
Common Solution Approaches - Overview
•
Hardening the Power Grid for Naturally Occurring Geomagnetic Storms
also Hardens against slow pulse or E3 portion of EMP
•
Hardening the Power Grid for Fast Pulse or E1 portion of EMP Threat
also diminishes Threat from RF Weapon Attacks (IEMI)
•
Proximity Control – important for Physical Attacks also diminishes Threat
from IEMI
•
Layered Mitigation Approach for both Geomagnetic Storms and EMP
– Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is
readily available
(Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous K
Indices)
– Hardening - Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm-Related
Catastrophic Failure - Remedial Design measures for the Grid (transformer
neutral devices) are readily feasible and cost effective
Common Solution Approaches - Overview
•Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large Storm Event is a
Certainty – with Significant Consequences for Society
•Power Grid has not been designed for Terror or War Fighting
Mission, but it does provide an attractive and asymmetric target.
• Proliferation of Nuclear Materials & Designs is a reality
• Non-Nuclear Device Options are readily available & growing
in unchecked capability
•Methods for Hardening Infrastructures are known and readily
available – not a Technology Push
•International Standards & Guidelines exist for Hardening
against EMP and IEMI Threats
Common Solution Approaches – GIC Blocking
• Blocking Devices will Protect Transformers and Grid from
Damage
• Devices were originally developed in early 1990’s
• At Present Only Limited Numbers of Devices are installed
• Wide-Spread Installation Needed to Reduce GIC Flows
• Appropriate & Robust Design will work to Block GIC from
Storms and EMP
• Can be easily applied Remedially to Today’s Power Grids
GIC
Blocking
Capacitor
Hi-Speed
ByPass
Electron Tube is Critical
High Speed / High
Current Technology
Improved Situational Awareness
View of Storm Environment - May 4, 1998
Provides Details on
Impacted Region to
End-Users
Synoptic Condition Map provides Ability for End-Users to Quickly make
Situational Assessments
Improved Situational Awareness
Storm and GIC Flows in New England
Transformer GIC
Red & Green Indicate
Polarity of GIC – Red Into
Transformer, Green Out of
Transformer
Geo-Electric Field
Orientation and Size of Vector
Indicate Relative Direction
and Intensity of Field
Power Grid State Estimation at 4:16 UT May 4, 1998
Improved Situational Awareness
Other Critical Infrastructures
•
Improved Situational Awareness – End
Users of Electric Power with Critical
Functions
• Examples are various IT,
Telecommunications, SCADA centers
•
Critical Systems which have UPS
(Uninterruptible Power Supply) and Back-Up
Generation Capability
• “Island or Disconnect from the Grid” for
extra protection
•
UPS’s general vulnerabilities to Harmonic
Distortion due to Geomagnetic Storms (from
Defense Dept work)
Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI
Hardening
• Shielding Structures
• Filtering
• Zoning or Nesting of Multiple Barriers
Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI
Hardening
Concept of Layered Mitigation
Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI
Hardening
Cable Management
• Power cables
• Data communications (e.g. IT
networks)
• Auxiliary circuits (e.g. door
openers, fire alarm)
• Sensitive circuits
Widespread migration to Fiber Optic-based Data and
Signal Cabling is an important improvement in Robust
Hardening for E1 & IEMI Threats
Example of Bulkhead Device for EMP Protection for Power Supply
to Secure Facility
4138 Bi-tron™Series Configuration
13.8kV
Power In
13.8kV
Power
Out
Flange Provides secure grounding of
power feed penetrations at Facility Wall
Perimeter
Time Scale of EMP Protection
New Advanced Fusion
Systems technology
significantly improves
Protection margin
compared to MOV
MOV – much slower