Transcript Document

Global Bystander to Genocide:
International Society and the
Rwandan Genocide of 1994
PH201
Spring 2011
Paul Bacon
Republic of Rwanda
Historical, Political and Ethnic Background
Era of Belgium's colonial rule after WWI
• The Tutsi minority formed the traditional political and
economic elite.
• Despite the power difference, Hutu and Tutsi intermarried and
coexisted peacefully.
• Belgium's colonial administration designated Tutsis as
'civilized' and privileged them as the ruling group, while Hutus
were labeled as an inferior race.
Independence and the rise of the Hutus
• 1959: Hutus rebel against Tutsis →violent conflicts.
• 1961: Belgian forces withdraw, resulting in the overthrow of the
Tutsi monarchy.
• 1962: Rwanda becomes independent after being under UN
trusteeship.
Ruled by the Party of the Movement and of Hutu Emancipation
Parhehuith, led by Grégoire Kayibanda
Habyarimana and the rule of the MNRD
• 1973: Major General Juvenal
Habyarimana came to power in a coup.
• Habyarimana's party, Mouvement
National pour la Révolution et le
Développement (MNRD),
had a doctrine of Hutu superiority.
However:
1.In 1990, the RPF, a group of exiled Tutsis supported by
Uganda, invaded Rwanda and a civil war began.
2.International pressure to democratize on the Rwandan
Government. In 1991, a new multi-party constitution came
into force.
The Arusha Peace Agreement
• 1992: Habyarimana entered into
negotiations with the RPF
• 1993: Habyarimana signed a peace
agreement in Arusha,Tanzania. Pressure
from France, Belgium, USA, African
states, OAU and UN.
o The power-sharing agreement with the RPF provided equal
representation between new Tutsi-friendly parties and the
former ruling party.
The MNRD extremists' response:
• Coalition pour la Défense de la Republique (CDR)
o creates organizational machinery of genocide
• Radio Television Libre Mille Collines (RTLM)
o broadcasts incitements to kill Tutsi.
What did the UN do?
Actions taken by the UN
October 5, 1993
Resolution 872 - UNAMIR
Phase 1:
“To monitor the implementation
of the ceasefire and the
movement to a transitional
Government”. 1458 troops.
Phase 2: “To oversee the
process of demobilization and
the creation of a new integrated
Army”. 2548 troops.
Actions taken by the UN
Jan 11, 1994
April 5, 1994
DPKO insists that Dallaire should only act
when permitted by Rwandan government.
Resolution 909 - Withdrawal of UNAMIR
Under strong US pressure. To be withdrawn
in 6 weeks.
April 10, 1994
Dallaire ordered to prepare for withdrawal
Meanwhile:
• April 6: Habyarimana's plane
is shot down, the identities of
those responsible remains unknown.
• April 7: Government soldiers
murder Hutu Prime Minister, Ms
Uwilingiyimana and the 10 Belgium peacekeepers
protecting her - Belgians withdraw.
Actions taken by the UN
April 20, 1994
“Special Report of the Secretary General on
UNAMIR”
3 Options:
1. A massive deployment of troops and a change of
mandate
2. Scale down UNAMIR to a force size of around 270,
mandate to negotiate with the parties and assist with
humanitarian relief efforts
3. Complete withdrawal of UNAMIR
Meanwhile:
• Dallaire continues cabling to warn about killings with an
‘ethnic motivation’ and noting that UNAMIR camps had
become safe havens.
Actions taken by the UN
Night of April 20 SG's military adviser Baril's briefing to non-P
members on the ‘terrible conditions under which
the peacekeepers were operating’.
April 21, 1994
Resolution 912 - UNAMIR reduction to 270
Result: Many civilians under their protection were
immediately killed.
Actions taken by the UN
28/29 April 1994
Czech Ambassador Kovanda and Council
President Keating appeal to the SC to use the term
‘genocide’ - but this request is rejected.
Actions taken by the UN
May 13, 1994
“Report of the Secretary General on the
Situation of Rwanda”
Recommended increase of troops to 5,500
and the creation of safe havens.
May 17, 1994
Resolution 918 - Increase numbers to 5,500,
UNAMIR II
Mandate to provide humanitarian assistance
Actions taken by the UN
June 8, 1994
Resolution 925 - Deployment of 5,500 troops
June 21, 1994
Resolution 929 - Opération Turquoise
July 1994:
• The RPF captures Kigali. The Hutu government flees to Zaire
(now DRC), followed by a tide of refugees.
• The French end their mission and are replaced by Ethiopian
U.N. troops.
• The RPF declares a ceasefire and
sets up an interim government of
national unity in Kigali.
What should the UN have done?
The UN should have...
1. Given a mandate to protect human rights,
2. Sent more troops and resources,
3. Explicitly used the term ‘genocide’
4. Referred to the 1948 Genocide Convention and drafted a
resolution upon it,
5. Considered genocide as a threat to international peace and
security of Article 39 and triggered a Chapter VII mandate.
Role of other key international actors
The US and Clinton Administration
• The Somalia incident turned US against support of UN
operations.
• The US insisted on the Arusha Agreement and kept costs low,
when military equipment was needed.
• Mobilized against naming Rwanda a genocide.
• May 1994: Agreement on Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD25), putting
strict limits to US participation in future
UN PKOs.
As a permanent member of UNSC, US
hindered UN from intervening effectively
in Rwanda.
France
• Very close political and economic links with the Habyarimana
government.
o
Military support, training the Presidential Guard and militias
• Therefore, a realistic candidate for leading an intervention
o
Also capability of rapid reaction force in the region - could have
quickly supported UNAMIR.
Their long awaited intervention,
Opération Turquoise, was too
late and militarily inefficient to
be justified as an carried out
solely to save human lives.
Others..
• African States
o In the absence of Western intervention, the only alternative was
African states.
o Troops offered to UNAMIRII, but dependent on UN and the
West for financing military equipment.
• Belgium
o With their departure after the killing of the Prime Minister and
their soldiers, UNAMIR’s strength was significantly depleted.
• UK
o Strongly opposed a UN intervention and usage of the term
‘genocide’.
• Human Rights groups and NGOs
o Reported and verified the genocidal nature of the killings
through communications with the UNSC or briefing UN
individuals.
The Media
• The killings began to attract serious media coverage
o
Journalists covering the historic election in South Africa visited
Rwanda on the way home
• New York Times did invoke the language of ‘genocide’,
but strongly opposed US intervention
o
Claimed there were no clear political and military objectives.
• In the end, media coverage finally galvanized the UN into action.
[UNAMIR I & II]
How were humanitarian
justifications for non-action
explicitly expressed?
[Opération Turquoise]
How were humanitarian
justifications for action explicitly
expressed?
[UNAMIR I & II]
Justifications for non-action
• [USA in SC informal consultations] Congress
would not pay for any new operations and
that the UN was in danger of becoming overcommitted.
• [DPKO] “Not Somalia again…” The organization would suffer a
possible fatal blow to its credibility.
• No legal precedent to use Chapter VII Article 39 to argue that the
risk of genocide constituted a threat to international peace and
security.
• [Secretariat] Naming the violence as a civil war and not a genocide
legitimated their inaction
• [4/20 Hannay in SC informal consultations] “Think back to Somalia
and think about what you would ask these troops to do”.
[UNAMIR I & II]
Justifications for non-action
• [Michael Barnett] Any more peacekeeping fatalities .. would
undoubtedly mean more criticism and fewer resources for the UN
• [Clinton Administration] Haunted by Somalia and the 18 lost
soldiers
• [Hannay] “were the Council to use the word ‘genocide’, it would
become a laughing stock. Having failed to find any troops for
intervention, the SC would lack all credibility if it was then to
name Rwanda a genocide”.
• [US Ambassador Albright in the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee] ‘folly’ for the USA to venture too quickly into this
African maelstrom. Essential for the UN to not overreach in
Rwanda and jeopardize its future credibility.
[Opération Turquoise]
Justifications for action
• [French Ministers] “To save lives”
• [French Foreign Minister Alain JUPPE wrote in Liberation 6/16]
“France had a real duty to intervene in Rwanda .. to put an end to
the massacres and protect the populations threatened with
extermination”.
[Opération Turquoise]
Justifications for action
• The real purpose of France’s ‘humanitarian’ mission was to save
its client government that was losing the war with RPF.
• To 'prop up‘ a failing French ally.
• French policy makers were determined to stop the triumph of the
'Anglophones' in what they viewed as their part of Africa.
• The mission was to maintain what was left of French influence.
• France was no paper tiger and it could project power rapidly on
the continent.
Responsibility to Protect
• Remember that the responsibility to protect is further
divided into three:
– The responsibility to prevent.
– The responsibility to react.
– The responsibility to rebuild.
• People often, understandably, think of Rwanda as a case
of a failure to react. This is true.
• However, less obviously, Rwanda is also an example of
the failure of the responsibility to prevent.
Key decision points
• The Arusha Accords, and the design of the deal (failure of
prevention).
• The initial size of the peacekeeping force (failure of prevention).
• The failure to heed Dallaire’s warning, based on credible
intelligence, that the Hutu were planning a genocide (failure of
reaction).
• The failure to respond with a significant increase in troop
numbers two weeks into the genocide, when several hundred
thousand lives could still have been saved (failure of reaction).
• The decision to allow the French to secure a cordon through
which the Hutu genocidaires could escape to the DRC.
- Between April and June 1994, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the
space of 100 days.
"The whole world failed Rwanda…"
Words attributed to UN staff members by Philip Gourevitchin Annals of Diplomacy: The Genocide Fax, New Yorker, 11 May 1998.