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Gendered divisions of labour
and the intergenerational
transmission of inequality
Jonathan Gershuny
Centre for Time Use Research
Department of Sociology
University of Oxford
For GENET Conference, December 2009
This Talk
• Proposition:
– National systems of regulation of access to
work have effects on life chances which differ
markedly by gender and class-of origin.
• Based on two unpublished papers:
– Man-Yee Kan, Oriel Sullivan, JG; “Gender Convergence
in Domestic Work” (2009)
– JG; “Dynamics of Social Position” (2008)
Kan, Sullivan and Gershuny are in the Sociology
Department and Centre for Time Use Research,
University of Oxford.
Definitions
•
Portable or Embodied (vs Fixed) capitals:
•
•
•
“human” (Becker, Mincer) or
(1) “economic”, (2) social, (3) cultural (Bourdieu)
Embodied capitals formed:
1. In household of origin…
2. …then through the formal educational system…
3. …and recursively through practices of daily life.
•
time-use gives empirical estimates of practices
•
Embodied capital dynamics  life chances
•
•
•
Good/bad outcomes result from current capitals
Capitals indicate advantages and outcomes
Hence, new approach to intergenerational social mobility.
The day and the lifecourse
Theoretical intuition:
Daily choices among paid work, unpaid
work, leisure/consumption
 capitals form at differential rates
 differentiate individual life-chances
consequences for transmission of
position to children
Two steps (two data sources)
• STEP 1 (Multinational Time Use Study)
– Typologies of national systems of work
regulation and gender ideologies…
– …are strongly associated with different
historical changes in work patterns
• STEP 2 (British Household Panel Study)
– Lifecourse changes in gender work-sharing…
– …polarise class mobility and life-chances
The Multinational Time Use Study @ December 2009
N of Days
Canada
Denmark
France
Netherlands
Norway
UK
USA
Finland
Italy
Australia
Israel
Sweden
Germany
Austria
South Africa
Slovenia
Spain
Column total
N of surveys
1970-74
2138
4173
2898
1975-84
2682
1985-89
9618
3584
4633
6516
9292
2021
4019
6068
14898
7010
11908
1491
3263
9206
4935
15219
37764
3181
3687
22071
5
1990-94
8936
14778
4
46585
6
86770
8
3158
6129
9386
13937
3126
7065
22554
25162
99453
9
1995-99
10726
14631
3227
1962
1151
8354
2000-04
11851
7904
17248
20340
1686
51206
14315
7747
35813
54366
7
14217
12273
46774
227059
11
total
34100
7757
22162
25518
26617
52606
44843
37167
88970
32924
3126
14812
62054
25162
14217
12273
46774
551082
50
all unpaid work, women 20-59
all unpaid work, men 20-59
180
Canada
450
Canada
Denmark
Denmark
France
France
160
Netherlands
400
Netherlands
Norway
Norway
UK
UK
USA
Finland
120
Italy
Australia
mins per day
mins per day
140
USA
350
Finland
Italy
Australia
300
Israel
Israel
100
Sweden
Sweden
Germany
80
Austria
Germany
Austria
250
South Africa
South Africa
Slovenia
Slovenia
60
1961-69 1970-74 1975-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Spain
Spain
200
1961-69 1970-74 1975-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Welfare Regimes and Gender Ideologies
• liberal market regimes:
– UK, the USA, Canada and Australia
– modified breadwinner gender ideology, women both paid
work & caring roles
• social democratic nordic regimes:
– Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden
– dual earner family model, high employment rate of both
women and men
• conservative/corporatist regimes:
– Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria
– weak familist gender ideology, men primary breadwinners,
women carers
• southern regime: (later addition to typology)
– Spain, Italy and Israel
– traditional familist gender ideology, stronger emphasis on
women’s family role
Women’s proportion of all unpaid work (men and women aged 20-59)
a. Nordic w om en's proportions of
all unpaid w ork
b. Liberal w om en's proportions
of all unpaid w ork
85
85
Denmark
Norway
85
France
Netherlands
Germany
80
80
Austria
USA
Slovenia
Sweden
Australia
75
modeled
nordic
ew
70
85
UK
80
Finland
%
d. Southern w om en's prop. of all
unpaid w ork
Canada
80
75
c. Corporatist w om en's prop. of
all unpaid w ork
%
e
70
modeled
corporatist
75
modeled
liberal
%
75
%
70
70
Italy
Spain
65
65
65
65
modeled
southern
60
60
55
60
55
1961-69 197074
60
55
55
1975-
1985-
1990-
1995-
2000-
1961-
1970-
1975-
1985-
1990-
1995-
2000-
1961-
1970-
1975-
1985-
1990-
1995-
2000-
1961-
1970-
1975-
1985-
1990-
1995-
2000-
84
89
94
99
04
69
74
84
89
94
99
04
69
74
84
89
94
99
04
69
74
84
89
94
99
04
Step 1. Public regulation matters
Note:
– corporatist, liberal and nordic groups all start
out rather similar in the 1960s
– Gender equality in total work (“isowork”)
Implications:
1. Public policy has a real effect on gendered
balance between paid and unpaid work
2. Gender differentials in rates of accumulation of
economic capital affected by regime choices.
Human capital: the “Essex Score”
Data from British Household Panel Study
– 5000 UK households, 1991—present
Variables in the model:
• Age, age squared, Education dummies
• MOW scores (mean occupational wage, 2 digit
categories, standardised to 0-100)
• Work, family care months over past 4 years
• Dummies for top MOW decile and deciles 7 to 9
• Product of MOW dummies and age, age squared
• Sex only in selection equation
Kan and Gershuny ISER WP 2006-03
BHPS longitudinal evidence
all couples, hum an capital before and
after first birth
11
woman
man
9
8
7
6
10
8
6
4
2
5
be
fo
re
human capital score
10
Contrasting “leavers” and “stayers”
• Consider all women in employment at time
of BHPS interview before first birth:
– “leavers”—women not in employment the year
after first birth.
– “stayers”—women in employment at all of six
subsequent annual interviews.
– Note third intermediate category: non-leavers
with various other post-birth strategies.
(details of regression modelling available on request)
Alternative household work
strategies
all couples, w ife not in em ploym ent year
after first birth
all couples, w ife em ployed first 6 years
after first birth
11
11
woman
man
10
human capital score
10
9
8
7
6
man
9
8
7
6
5
10
8
6
4
2
be
fo
re
10
8
6
4
5
2
be
fo
re
human capital score
woman
all women, parents in bottom human capital quintile
born in 1920s
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
1
fo
re
2
years before/after first childbirth
years before/after first childbirth
9
8
7
6
5
2.00
4.00
born in 1950s
4
2.00
5.00
before
3.00
6.00
born in
1920s
born in
5.00
1930s
born in
1940s
4.00
born in
1950s
3.00
6.00
born in 1930s
born in 1940s
3
7.00
2
7.00
1
8.00
humasn capital score
8.00
be
human capital score
all women, parents in top human capital quintile
top parental human capital quintiles: stayers vs leavers
8.00
modelled human capital score
stayer 1950s
7.00
leaver 1950s
6.00
5.00
stayer 1950s
4.00
leaver 1950s
3.00
2.00
b
r
e
or afte
f
e
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
years before/after birth of first child
9
top parental human capital quintiles: stayers vs leavers
8.00
stayer 1950s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1950s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1940s
stayer 1920s
6.00
5.00
stayer 1920s
leaver 1920s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1930s
leaver 1930s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1920s
leaver 1940s
stayer 1950s
4.00
leaver 1950s
3.00
years before/after birth of first child
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
af
te
r
2.00
be
fo
re
modelled human capital score
7.00
top parental human capital quintiles: stayers vs leavers
bottom parental human capital quintiles, stayers vs leavers
8.00
8.00
stayer 1920s
7.00
stayer 1940s
6.00
leaver 1950s
stayer 1930s
leaver 1920s
7.00
stayer 1930s
stayer 1920s
5.00
leaver 1930s
leaver 1920s
4.00
3.00
modelled human capital score
leaver 1930s
stayer 1920s
6.00 leaver 1920s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1940s
stayer 1940s
stayer 1930s
stayer 1920s
leaver 1940s
4.00
leaver 1950s
stayer 1940s
leaver 1930s
5.00
stayer 1950s
stayer 1950s
stayer 1930s
stayer 1950s
leaver 1950s
leaver 1950s
leaver 1930s
3.00
2.00
leaver 1940s
leaver 1920s
years before/after birth of first child
years before and after first birth
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
af
te
r
be
fo
re
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
2.00
af
te
r
be
fo
re
modelled human capital score
stayer 1950s
Leaving-vs-staying penalties,
women with parents in the top human capital quintile
Leaving-vs-staying penalties,
women with parents in the bottom human capital quintile
0.40
0.80
born in 1950s
born in 1930s
0.70
0.35
born in 1930s
0.25
0.20
born in 1920s
0.15
stayer hc/leaver hc -1
0.30
0.60
born in
1920s
born in
0.50
1930s
born in
0.40
1940s
born in
1950s
0.30
born in 1940s
born in 1920s
born in 1920s
born in 1930s
born in 1940s
born in 1950s
0.20
born in 1950s
0.10
ye
years after first childbirth
ar
years after first birth
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
af
te
r
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
af
te
r
0.10
ar
ye
stayer hc/leaver hc -1
born in 1940s
Step 2. Gender balance matters
UK as example of liberal regime lacking strong
childcare & paternity leave regulations:
• For women with parents in top quintile:
– Income (humcap) penalties falling from the
1930s to 1950s birth cohorts, to around 20%.
• For women with parents in bottom quintile:
– penalties rising from 1920s to 1950s birth
cohorts, from 40% to 70% 7 yrs after birth.
L/S penalties interact with parents’
class situation and regimes
Conclude: gendered polarisation
in intergen. transmission of life chances…
• … results from choices made under
constraints of national system of regulation
• …and this effect is intensified by
concurrent rise in marital dissolution:
• He leaves with the human capital
• She’s left with the baby…
• …and another child grows up in poverty.