Transcript Informacje i dezinformacje o katastrofie w Smoleńsku

INFORMATION AND
DISINFORMATION ABOUT THE
SMOLENSK CATASTROPHE
Katyn2010 Families Association
Graphics and multimedia: Marek Dabrowski
July 2011
16 April 2010 (Colonel Rzepa – military public prosecutor)
 “Colonel Rzepa, when asked if conversations recorded from the cabin crew
were conversations between the crew or between the crew and some of the
passengers, he answered: ‘I am sure they were only conversations between
the crew’
15 May 2010 (Edmund Klich – Polish accredited representative to IAC)
 “… E. Klich confirmed that while listening to the recording of the crew’s
communication he didn’t hear anyone but the crew.” E. Klich: “I’ve been
listening to the whole recording and I noticed just the conversation between
the crew, and the crew and ground controllers. I didn’t hear anything except
for that…”
“Pressure” evaporated with the
Smolensk fog
JUNE 2010
Despite many requests and motions Poland
received only a copy of recordings and transcripts
of crew conversations.
 The transcripts were subsequently published.
 There are sentences in the transcripts of crew
communication allegedly credited to passengers
 The media attack on crew and passengers starts

.
Pressure” evaporated with the
Smolensk fog
Experts are curious about the length of the
recording time: 38 minutes instead of 30 minutes.
 Russians explains that the magnetic strip had been
replaced but there is no evidence of such
replacement.
 The delivered copy is flawed. Minister Miller travels
three times to Moscow for a replacement copy.

Pressure” evaporated with the
Smolensk fog

The Polish government keeps silent over media
attacks on crew and passengers based on the
content of the transcripts.

TVN station and „Gazeta Wyborcza” daily reports
new not confirmed revelations from transcripts
which allegedly prove both the submission and
bravado of the crew: ‘He will kill me if I do not
land’, “Watch the best men landing!”
”
Pressure” evaporated with the
Smolensk fog
JANUARY 2011 – Moscow. IAC REPORT IS BEING
PUBLISHED
The IAC bases their report on the June
transcripts and suggests that the catastrophe was
caused by the submission of the crew to pressure
from the passengers.
 Moscow continuously ignores Polish motions and
requests for access to the originals.

“Pressure” evaporated with the
Smolensk fog
January 2011 Warsaw Polish committee presentation.
(…) The navigator of the Polish aircraft was not afraid during
the flight to Smolensk that the “President (61) would go crazy”
and the Pilot in Command did not ask the Director of
Diplomatic Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Mariusz
Kazana (50), for “asking the boss what to do”. These words,
contrary to what the Russians claimed, are not on the records
presented by the Polish commission.
In the fragments on which Russians based their report and
formed the evidence of the pressure on Polish crew, our experts
heard different words than the IAC heard. – These readings
undermine the Russian version about the pressure exerted –
says Major Fiszer on the TVN24 TV channel
Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the
investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101
8) regarding Page 117 of the Report.
The inadequate decisions taken by the PIC and the crew actions were backed up by high
level of psychological stress included by the understanding of importance of landing at the
destination aerodrome as well as by the presence of high-ranked officials in the cockpit.
During the approach the latter not once discussed with the crew the weather conditions,
the decisions to continue the flight and the possible negative reaction of the Main
Passenger.
The record of the on-board voice recorder located in the cabin of the
aircraft Tu-154M (CVR) did not reveal any passage confirming the
attempt to influence the actions of the crew by third persons, including
the Main Passenger.
“Pressure” evaporated with the
Smolensk fog
General Blasik’s voice disappears from the recorded material.
On the Polish CVR copy of the readings at the presentation it is
significant that the only sentence attributed to General Blasik
does not exist.


08:39:02,2-08:39:08 Navigator. Cabin. Landing gears, flaps
extended.
08:39:07,5-08:39:10,7 Anonymous. Flaps to be used to
(incomprehensible) [voice in the chart reading background –
General Blasik]
“Pressure” evaporated with the
Smolensk fog
The words about the wing mechanisation which were allegedly
credited to General Blasik in the Polish version are shorter and
formulated by the Navigator and the co-pilot. The navigator’s
expression starting with the word: “cabin” and the alleged
comment by General Blasik from the Russian version do not
exist.
In fact the communication appears as follows:


08:39:02 – 08:39:03
08:39:03 – 08:39:04
Navigator Flaps extended.
Co-pilot
Flaps extended.
“Pressure” evaporated with the
Smolensk fog

There is no evidence supporting alleged “pressure”
from the passengers.

The daily sensationalism of TVN TV and Gazeta
Wyborcza is not true.

The Russians continue to deny the Poles request
for access to the originals of black boxes.
PRESSURE ON AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS



The IAC hid the fact that there was pressure placed on the
air traffic controllers and a breach of procedures in the air
traffic control tower.
The information about the role Colonel Krasnokucky played
in the air traffic control procedures, as described in the IAC
final report, is untrue. The Russians declared that this person
did not take any direct part in managing the air traffic, but in
fact that person was the most active participant in the
process.
All the information about the pressure placed on the air
traffic controllers comes from the evidence based on voice
recordings from the air traffic control tower published by the
IAC after acknowledging the Polish services were in
possession of such recordings.
Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the
investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101
This is inconsistent with the information contained in the Report that the role of Col.
Krasnokutski was only to provide information - coordinating without engaging in
directing air traffic:
This person was not directly involved in directing air traffic. (P. 145)
IAC to date has not responded to the question about the role and powers
of Col. Krasnokutski. According to extracts of the Report (page 145):
“During the flights of 10.04.2010, according to the ATC recorder and his own explanations, this
person was at the BSKP from time to time (including the time of the accident) providing general
coordination of various services, informing (by phone) of different officials on the actual
situations concerning the accepted flights and weather conditions as well as coordination of
alternate aerodromes. He was not directly involved in the air traffic control.”
According to the recordings (reel 9 channel 4) he took an active part in conducting
radio communications, despite several suggestions from the CATC
to discontinue the approach the Tu-154M aircraft by a clear command
“Allowing them till 100 m only, 100 m no questions.” and cuts off
any further attempts of CATC to send the aircraft to a reserve aerodrome.
PRESSURE ON AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS

Despite repeated suggestions by the Air Traffic Controller to
stop the landing approach procedure at 08:26:17, 15 minutes
before crashing, Colonel Krasnokutsky’s unambiguous
command ended up the conversation: “Allowing them till 100
m only, 100 m no questions”.

Members of the Polish committee confirm unambiguously that
Colonel Krasnokutsky’s command “Allowing them till 100 m
only, 100 m no questions” ended all the Air Traffic Controller’s
attempts to send the aircraft to the reserve airfield, which was
in violation of the regulations.
PRESSURE ON AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS
Simultaneously, Colonel Krasnokutsky gives information about
the situation regarding the Polish aircraft’s positioning and the
landing conditions at the airport to an unidentified General.
Seven minutes after pacifying Air Traffic Controllers, at 08:33:52
he reported: “Everything’s ready Comrade General, he is coming up
to the traverse, everything switched on.”

The Russian side has refused to deliver any
information about whom Colonel Krasnokutsky
contacted and on what legal grounds during the
conduct of events.

In the final report of the Interstate Aviation Committee it
states that the Chief Air Traffic Controller and Landing Zone
Controller underwent medical examinations and were
authorised for air traffic control by a doctor on duty at the
medical point of military unit 06755.

According to the statement given to the Russian Federation
public prosecutors on 10 April 2010 the medical point was
closed at that time.

Both controllers decided themselves that ‘there were no
obstacles to fulfil their duties’ judged on their wellbeing.

The IAC report dismisses important and vital information
such as allowing the Chief Air Traffic Controller (CATC) to
perform his duties at the airport. There is no record of any
existence of authorisation which permitted the Air Traffic
Controller to work under difficult meteorological conditions.

There is no documentation proving that the Landing Zone
Controller had ever been trained or authorised to operate
and supervise the Precision Approach Radar RSP-6M2 system
in Smolensk.
Requests filed by Polish commission to access these
documents have been ignored by Russians.
222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222
refused or ignored


In its final report the IAC declared that the co-operation with
the Polish side was model and the Polish side had access to all
required information needed.
The Poles acting through their representatives aimed to
realise its defined powers on the grounds of Article 5.25 of
Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention and filed a dozen
motions enquiring about 222 specified problems from which
only 34 have been answered in full.
The Russians have ignored or refused to acknowledge
169 enquiries; in the rest of the cases the information
delivered was not satisfactory.
222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222
refused or ignored
IAC refused to authorise access to:
 Video recordings of radar to check the compliance of
the aircraft blip on the landing radar with the actual
aircraft position by the Chief Air Traffic Controller
(landing approach of Il-76,Yak-40,Tu-154M flights)
 Authorisation
for servicing on two positions
simultaneously (Chief Air Traffic Controller and Landing
Zone Controller)
 Data from the fly-around subsequent to the crash and
the inspection of communication and navigation aids.
222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222
refused or ignored
The Polish authorities have not received a
technical expert analysis of the wreckage debris.

The motion to authorise Polish specialists and
accredited representatives to take part in the fly-around
was refused. A protest after the refusal was ignored as
well as the protest against the refusal to allow an
inspection of the RSP-6M2 radar system in Smolensk on
10 April.

Photographic documentation from the crash scene.
222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222
refused or ignored




All filed motions for enabling the Polish accredited
representative (and his advisers) to fulfil his rights and
duties on the grounds of Annex 13 of the Chicago
Convention.
No information about the rescue and extinguishing of
fires has been provided.
No evidence regarding the presence or any traces of
explosive materials has been provided.
No full post-mortem reports or other examinations
have been provided.
Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the
investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101
1.17.5 Findings of the Ballistic and Pyrotechnic Expertise.
The investigation team was provided the copies of conclusions of judicial expertise(ballistic
and pyrotechnical) for criminal case No. 201/355051-10 in the letter from the Deputy
Head of the second administration for investigation of VIP cases on crime against personal
and common safety of the Main Investigation Administration of the Inquest Committee at
the Main Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation No. 201/355051-10 of
14.05.2010.Expert conclusions No. 897 of 13.04.2010 and No. 3451 of 23.04.2010 on
the pyrotechnical expertise contain conclusions that no explosives (trotyl, cyclonite or
octogen) were found in the wash-offs of the Tu-154M 101 aircraft parts. The findings of the
ballistic expertise confirm the presence of weapon (several handguns) and ammunition
(cartridges). It was impossible to identify the date of last shots made from those guns.
In the Report, the Russian side did not provide detailed
information about investigative activities conducted at the
scene of the accident. Data on ballistic and pyrotechnics tests
are in fact not verifiable by the Polish side because the
Russian side had not provided it with source materials.
222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222
refused or ignored

Polish prosecutors on 10 April – immediately following
the crash they requested the return of the black boxes.

They repeated this request with less stringent demands.
The motion filed in June 2010 mentioned a loan for 60
days to permit examination by Polish specialists, but this
was deemed to be a problem.

The last motion was filed in January 2011. The Russian
side ignored it.
222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222
refused or ignored

In mid March 2011 Prosecutor General Andrzej
Seremet intervened in the case by contacting
Aleksander Zviagincev – Russian Vice-General
Prosecutor.

The answer was ambiguous.

The wreckage and black boxes remain to this day
in Russian hands.
Passed over in silence fragments of the crew
communication.
The IAC and media have suggested from the very beginning that the crew
was misled by the topography of the terrain – descent of the terrain close
to the runway threshold.
Both IAC transcripts and report hide the information that the crew knew
the topography of the terrain perfectly, which is supported by following
transcript quotation (no existing in the Russian version), 5 km from the
runway threshold at 08:40:10


Co-pilot:There is a descent,Arek
Pilot in Command: I know, it will be soon, there is such…
This interchange of information was published during Polish commission
presentation while completely omitted in the IAC report and transcripts.
Rescue operation.
The plane crash landed at 6:41:05 UTC, 400 hundred metres
from the runway beam.

As detailed in the final report, the PCz-3 rescue services unit
was on duty all day on 10 April at the aerodrome. The unit
was not summoned until 6.50 UTC, 9 minutes after the
crash.

The information eventually reached the unit, but according
to witnesses’ testimonies, they headed in the opposite
direction and had to do a U-turn. Finally it reached the scene
14 minutes after the accident took place.
Rescue operation.

Instead of alerting the unit, the Chief Air Traffic Controller
commanded units stationed further away from the town
location and they were at the scene 44 minutes later.

The Russians have not supplied any details of the rescue or
actions taken to extinguish fires at the scene.

There is no information about the Medical Rescue Team
present on the runway.
Rescue operation.

Polish authorities point out that the first medical rescue unit
arrived at the scene at 6.58 UTC, 17 minutes after the crash.
A further seven medical crew units appeared 29 minutes
afterwards, despite the fact that the airport is situated within
the city boundaries.

Despite requests and motions, documentation of the rescue
or actions taken to extinguish fires at the scene have not
been delivered.
Misleading directing aircraft movements.
Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the
investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101
3) regarding Page 123 of the Report.
1.The landing radar screen mounted for the experiment (and during the accident flight) had lines
approximately designating the following angles (shown in black on the chart):
- Lower line - 2°42.3’;
- Central line - 3°12.3’;
- Upper line - 3°42.3’;
2.The landing radar underrates the indication of this aircraft distance from the runway threshold by
about 90 ÷ 150 m (depending on the distance of the aircraft from the runway threshold).
In the Report, there is reference to the difference between the test fight of 25
March 2010 (performed with reference to the path of 2°40’ and on 15.04.2010
(path of 3°12.3’). There has been no analysis regarding the path of 2°40’ (±30’)
valid for the approach cards. The explanation for changes in the path of 2°40’ to
3°12.3’ may be an attempt to explain the lack of response from KSL to the
deviation of position of Tu-154M aircraft from the valid glide path outside the
permissible tolerance.
Misleading directing aircraft movements.
Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the
investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101
Analyses of the glide path of 3°10’ do not correspond with
the valid and the published path of 2°40’.
The information presented by IAC indicates that the aircraft
blip was outside of the permissible error area of the
linear deviation, even for the path of 3°10’, which is not
commented by the authors of the Report. The results of
calculations carried out by the Polish side, taking into account
the position of the aircraft in relation to the glide path of
3°10’, are presented in the table.
.
Misleading directing aircraft movements.
Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the
investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101
Location of the blip on the indicator corresponds to the position “on the glide path”
when the permissible error of linear deviation does not exceed 1/3 of the linear
dimensions of the zone of tolerance”. (in accordance with paragraph 115 of
FAPPPGosA)
For the path of 3°10’ at a distance of 3.3 km to the DS26 the permissible error of
linear deviation is ± 28 m, i.e. with a tolerance of 1/3 of the value that is below 9.33 m, KSL should have informed the crew of its wrong position on the path. The
conclusion is that even before reaching 3 km, KSL continued to inform the crew of
their correct position “on the course and path”, when in fact the flight of the aircraft
was lowering, increasing its vertical distance from the path.
KSL, by giving the command “on the course on track” despite the fact
that the aircraft was not there, placed the crew in the mistaken belief as
to the correct position of the aircraft.
Misleading directing aircraft movements.
Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the
investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101
Despite the crew going below the glide path at
a distance of 3.5 km from the runway
threshold the Landing Zone Controller did
not react and produced untrue information:
“on course, on glide path”, which constituted
false information about the distance from the
runway beam, which misled them still more.
Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the
investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101
The command “Level 101” (10:40:53.4) was given about 14 seconds after
informing the crew of the aircraft Tu-154M by KSL “two on
course”(10:40:39,9), when in fact the plane was already on the glide path at
an altitude of 17 m in relation to the threshold of DS 26.
The command “Level 101” was issued by KSL too late, when the aircraft’s
marker disappeared from the indicator (according to testimony).
Although the aircraft was for 29 seconds outside the zone when the
permissible error of linear deviation does not exceed 1/3 of the linear
dimensions of the zone of tolerance” (in accordance with
point 115 FAPPPGosA), KSL did not give the crew information about its
incorrect position relative to the path, still incorrectly informing it of the
correct position “on course and path.”
» The Russians have ignored in the most part any
Polish motions relating to the final report draft.
» Parts of the wreckage as well as the original
black boxes remain in the hands of the Russians
even though this is evidence which needs to be
examined by investigators in Poland. This is in
violation of Annex 13 of the Chicago
Convention.
» We believe that with international support
behind us, Russia will have no choice but to
return the black boxes and the wreckage back
to its rightful owners - Poland.
» We hope that setting in motion a credible
international committee, we can get justice for
the crew, passengers and restore Polish public
opinion.