HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN FRANCE

Christian NADAL President EDF INA [email protected]

Nuclear Energy in France Today

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19 plants - 58 Units

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Installed capacity: Total = 110 GW Nuclear = 63 GW (57%)

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Net Electric generation: Total = 549 TWh Nuclear = 429 TWh (78%)

Sources: EIA, 2004 - IAEA,2006 - EDF

Nuclear Energy in France Today

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Around 40% of total primary energy supply in 2006 (117 Mtep)

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Low Carbon Intensity: 0.26 Metric ton/Thousand $2000 (US = 0.55) and less than 80 Metric tons of CO2 per GWh of electricity in 2004 (t CO2/GWh) CO2 intensity of power generation (t CO2/GWh) Nuclear share in generation mix Renewable share in generation mix

Source: International Energy Agency, 2004

THE PIONEERS

THE TRANSITION PHASE

THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

1945 1960 1973 1974 1985 1990

ENERGY

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France has no Natural Resources

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Independence is key issue for French Politicians since WW I

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e.g. Oil Sector Reorganization Act – 1928

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Stability of Supply

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Nuclear is no exception

Nuclear Energy

Pre WW II Uranium fission results in multiple neutron emission (F. Joliot & al 1939) Chain Reaction possible

Nuclear Energy

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Pre WW II (Cont’d)

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Patents describe main Features of a Nuclear Reactor

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Young scientists hired for designing/building a nuclear reactor (F. Perrin – 1940)

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Secure Heavy Water supply

THE PIONEERS THE PIONEERS

BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE 1945 - 1973

KEY DECISIONS

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End of WW II sees French economy left in shambles

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Priority is rebuilding French Infrastructure

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Crediting French Historical Tradition

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Strong Government involvement

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Centralized decisions

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Create two Government-owned entities

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CEA (Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique 10/18 1945)

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EDF (Electricite de France 03/29 1946)

CEA and EDF

R&D

Science Industry

Defense CEA Radiation Protection Standards Raw Material Supply

Prospection Mining

Design, Build industrial Scale Nuclear Units Advise French Government for International Agreements EDF Monopolies

Generation Transmission Distribution Imports & Exports

Design Build Generating Units Operate

POLICY

• • •

Need Long-Term Vision Dictated by French Situation

– 

Uranium Enrichment not Practicable

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Industrial Capability not adequate

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Funding unreasonable Natural Uranium is the only solution Confirmed by International Environment

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Mc Mahon Act (08/01 1946)

POLICY

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Consequence is Plutonium

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Defense

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Civilian use

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Evaluate consequences of Strategic Orientations

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Fuel Reprocessing

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Interest for LMFBRs

POLICY

Practical Implemention Quinquennial Planning

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General Trend constant

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Natural Uranium

» »

Plutonium Separation as an objective LMFBRs contemplated as early as 1953

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Periodic Reassessment

POLICY

Practical Implementation Quinquennial Planning

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Marginal modifications tolerated

• •

Scheduling Technical

– –

Moderator type (Heavy Water [EL] or Graphite [G]) Output



No Standardization

The Gravelines site (early 80s) The Chinon site (mid 60s)

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EDF’s APPROACH

Long-term priority is cost-effectiveness CONTROL PROCESS ENGINEERING CAPABILITY

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General orientations MASSIVE DEPLOYMENT (PRICE PERMITTING) 1955 LEAD CONTRACTOR A.I. (1954) PAY OVERHEADS FOR FIRST UNITS BASELOAD ENTIRELY WITH NUCLEAR UNITS

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The 50s open new perspectives

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Atoms for Peace

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Geneva Conferences

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1953

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1958

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EURATOM Treaty (03/25 1957)

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Open door for evaluating US technologies

KEY MILESTONES

• • • • • • • • • •

G1 (2 MWe – GG) G2 (40 MWe – GG) G3 (40 MWe – GG) Chinon 1 (70e MW - GG) Chinon 2 (180 MWe - GG) Chinon 3 (360 MWe - GG) SL1 (390 MWe – GG) SL2 (450 MWe – GG) Bugey 1 (540 MWe – GG) Brennilis (70 MWe – HW) 1956-1968 1959-1980 1960-1984 1963-1973 1965-1985 1967-1990 1969-1990 1971-1992 1972-1994 1967-1985

THE PIONEERS THE TRANSITION PHASE

THE TRANSITION PHASE TIME FOR DIFFICULT DECISIONS 1960 - 1974

THE NEW CONTEXT

The 60s confirm need for change

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Development of Uranium Enrichment techniques is first step for contemplating LWRs (1967)

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EURATOM treaty gives opportunity for testing US LWRs

– –

CHOOZ (beginning of construction - 1962) TIHANGE (1967)

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Gas-Graphite technology limited to # 700 MWe

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LMFBR technology (longer term)

– –

RAPSODIE (beginning of construction - 1961) PHENIX (beginning of construction- 1967)

STRATEGIC APPROACH

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The PEON (1) Committee

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Reevaluate available options and propose graded approach crediting

• • •

Security of Supply Political Independence Economic Independence (Hard Currency)

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Instability of Fossil Fuel markets

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French Economy Capabilities

– – –

Budget Industry Cost-effectiveness

(1) Committe advising the French Government for Nuclear

STRATEGIC APPROACH

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Most Significant Conclusions

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Keep all options open for further decision

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Access to Plutonium remains an objective

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Fast breeders development needed

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Light Water Technology consistent with strategic issues

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BWRs, PWRs potential candidates

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Costs will govern decisions

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Develop technologies for Front/Backend of the Fuel Cycle

MILESTONES

– – –

12/1967 – Authorization for two Gas Cooled Reactors (GCRs) at Fessenheim (FSH) 07/1968 – Appropriateness of GCRs at FSH questioned 05/1969 – PEON Committee recommends

• • •

Development of FBRs (Beyond PHENIX) Order for 4 to 5 LWRs before 1975 Decisions on GCRs and Heavy Water Reactors before 12/1970

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Purchase licenses from US vendors

MILESTONES

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11/1969: French Government decides for Light Water Reactors (LWRs)

• •

De facto stop for Natural Uranium GCRs Nuclear Leadership transfered to EDF

– – –

1970: 2 PWRs at FSH 1971: 1 PWR at Bugey (BGY) 1972: EDF decides for 2 nd PWR at BGY, instead of BWR

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Cost was decisive

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08/1975: French Government decides for PWRs

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Cost is the most important parameter for decision

THE PIONEERS THE INDUSTRIAL

THE TRANSITION PHASE

PHASE THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE

THE PWR CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 1973 – 1990

TIME FOR DECISIONS

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1973

– –

Oil share in energy consumption is OIl prices triple (unacceptably high) 69%

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1974

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Decision to develop a Nuclear Program

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Political Majority is pro-Nuclear Political Minority Reluctant

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Objective is 30% Nuclear of primary energy supply by 1990 1975

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08/06 French Government choose PWRs

FRENCH PWR PROGRAM

36 U + SPX (LMFBR) 12 U 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 6 U 4 U

TRENDS AND FLUCTUATIONS

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Before 1981

– – –

42 units decided by the French government Superphenix All orders confirmed except 1 (900 MWe) After 1981

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Program Reevaluation

• •

Political Reasons (e.g. Plogoff canceled) Economics: Consumption Growth less than anticipated

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Orders on a Need to Basis

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Last 3 1400 MWe units delayed by EDF

FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM

WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?

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Main reason is

Political

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Government

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Controlled CEA and EDF

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Enforced key Decisions

• • • •

Made all decisions Kept program on track Provided help for enforcing decisions (at sites) Industrial Policy (Infrastructure)

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French Society

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Favored the Nuclear option

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Though opposition did exist

WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?

Creusot Workshop in the 70s

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Second reason is

technical

Standardized Program (series)

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Engineering and Construction cost

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Construction time

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Operating and maintenance cost

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Safety

Fleet Standardization 32 3-Loop 900 MWe 20 4-Loop 1300 MWe 4 4-Loop 1450 MWe Gravelines Site Chooz Site Paluel Site

WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?

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Third reason is

EDF policy

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Strong involvement in local development

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Relationship with local authorities (information + development)

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Contracts with small businesses

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Public acceptance

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‘Open door’ policy / transparency Relations with opinion leaders and scientists Gravelines, France

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Maintaining Infrastructure Capability

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Maintenance policy

COMMENTS

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French Government didn’t provide subsidies or tax credits

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Program mostly financed by debt

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‘Advised’ EDF towards loans in $

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Huge financial impact

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Authorized retail prices didn’t reflect real program costs (increases moderate)

THE PIONEERS LOOKING

THE TRANSITION

AT THE FUTURE

PHASE

THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE

THE REP 2000 PROGRAM 1985 – 2007 GEN IV

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

The CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT (1986)

• • •

Huge impact on the european public

– –

Poor Communication by most organizations Increased NIMBY, BANANA Need to factor Severe Accidents into Design Realization that nuclear issues are transnational

PROGRAM SHAPING

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Discussions with several Countries

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Agreement with Germany (Political)

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Design Approach (EPR)

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Regulatory Approach

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Agreements with Belgium, Germany, UK, Spain, Italy (others later)

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International Programs (LWRs)

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Common Utility Requirements (EUR)

NUCLEAR WASTES

– – –

Waste issue is key for nuclear Approach must credit former decisions Outcomes are

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12/30/1991 Law (1 st Bataille Act)

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Defines R&D orientations Defines Administrative Measures

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06/28/2006 Law (2 nd Bataille Act)

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Confirms R&D orientations Sets Deadlines

» » »

Technical Feasibility of Contemplated Solutions Site Selection Facility Commissioning

GEN IV

– – –

Objectives well in line with France’s strategy France decides to join GIF (2000) French proposals reflect constant strategy

• •

Fuel cycle closure (Gas-Cooled Fast Reactors) Waste management (Molten Salt Reactor)

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Former President Chirac decides GEN IV Reactor connected to the grid by 2020

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Only available technology is LMFBR Renewed interests in LMFBRs

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Agreements underway for

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Delineating R&D program Recreating industrial infrastructure

CONCLUSION

Nuclear Program was a success

• •

Expertise existed National Commitment

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Long-term Strategy

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Capability to build on experience

– –

Stick to fundamentals Accept failures in the approach(Gas-Cooled Reactors)

– –

Endorse alternatives when needed No stone unturned

»

Frontend / Backend of the Fuel Cycle

CONCLUSION

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Program was a success (Cont’d)

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Public support

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But Chernobyl modified perspective

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Support for operating plants remained strong Less support for new constructions

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EDF policy with small business and local communities

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EDF’s Industrial Policy

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Applied research on anticipated technologies

– –

Lead contractor / Vendors Standardization

CONCLUSION

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Program remains a success

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Financial performance / largest shareholder company in Europe

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CONCLUSION

Program remains a success (Cont’d)

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Stable electricity prices over long time period