PP-/ST-Guide - OCSI
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Transcript PP-/ST-Guide - OCSI
BSI activities in developing PPs
and the BSI-PP/ST-Guide
Frank Grefrath
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik /
Federal Office for Information Security
ICCC September 2007
Agenda
BSI-activities in PP-certification
Introduction of the PP “Digitales Wahlstift-System, V. 1.0.1“
Introduction of the BSI-PP/ST-Guide
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 2
Recently certified PPs in BSI-CC-Scheme
BSI-PP-0031-2007: “Protection Profile Digitales WahlstiftSystem, V. 1.0.1“
The PP defines the minimum requirements for IT-security of
systems for technical assistance in elections on the basis of a
digital election pen
BSI-PP-0034-2007: “Mobile Synchronisation Services
Protection Profile, V. 1.1”
The purpose of such a system is to provide secure remote
access of mobile users (e.g. using a PDA) to e-mail or PIM
(personal information management) services located in a
company’s intranet
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 3
Recently certified PPs in BSI-scheme
BSI-PP-0035-2007: „Security IC Platform Protection
Profile” (Update of BSI-PP-0002-2001)
The defined TOE is a smartcard integrated circuit which is
composed of a processing unit, security components, I/O
ports (contact-based and/or contactless) and volatile and
non-volatile memories (hardware)
Different PPs for the German electronic health systems
are currently under evaluation
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 4
Protection Profile for a digital election system
System Overview
A digital election system which is compliant to the PP
serves for electronic assistance in complex elections
The voter makes his votes with a digital pen on a special
kind of paper
The camera of the pen records his votes and then the
data is transferred to a PC
There the data is analysed, the votes are counted
automatically and a protection against manipulation of
the election result is generated
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 5
Protection Profile for a digital election system
Motivation / Benefit
Voting takes place in a familiar way for the voter making
crosses with a pen on paper
Vote counting can be carried out much faster and easier
Typical failures in manual counting can be avoided
In cases of doubt the electronic election result can be
controlled by manually counting the paper ballots
Complex elections can be conducted without great
manpower requirements
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 6
Protection Profile for a digital election system
Main IT-Security Features
Recording the votes on the paper ballots with the pen
Transferring the election data to a PC via USB
Storing the data on the PC without being traceable to the
voter
Analysing the votes and dividing them into valid,
doubtable and invalid votes
Judging of the doubtable votes by the scrutineers
Automatic calculation of the election result
Generation and display of a proof of origin
Logging of security relevant events
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 7
Protection Profile for a digital election system
Physical Boundaries of the TOE
Hardware: Digital election pens and docking stations
Firmware:
Firmware of the digital election pen
Software:
Frank Grefrath
Recording the marks on the paper
TOE application software for
Controlling the pens
Storing of the election data during the election
Judging and counting the votes
Generating a proof of origin
Logging security relevant events
September 2007
Slide 8
Protection Profile for a digital election system
TOE Security Environment
The PP contains assumptions covering the following
aspects:
Usage assumptions resulting from the German election law
Trustworthy and carefully working administrators and
scrutineers
Correctly and securely configured PC platform
The TOE counters the following threats:
Disclosure of election data and protocol data
Disturbance and manipulation of the technical procedures
Unrealised manipulation of the election pen and the
election result
Successful tracing between election data and voter
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 9
Protection Profile for a digital election system
General Regulations
Validity: Valid until June 30th, 2008
CC Assurance level: EAL 3
Combined evaluation:
EAL3-CC-certification by the BSI
Approval by the Physikalisch Technische Bundesanstalt
according to the German election law with source code
analysis and emission measurement
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 10
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Introduction
CC, Version 3.1
Intended audience for the guide:
PP/ST-readers, with less or without CC-knowledge
PP/ST-writers
Evaluators, certifiers
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 11
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Structure of the guide
What is the purpose of PPs/STs?
Which role does a PP play when purchasing a
product?
Reading PPs/STs
Writing of PPs in two different methods
Stove-piping method
Explanation method
Writing of STs
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 12
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Stove-Piping-Method
Procedure:
Determine which SFRs for the TOE and which security
objectives for the operational environment are desired
Create a single security objective for the TOE for each
SFR
Create an OSP for each security objective for the TOE
Create an assumption for each security objective for
the operational environment
Write the remaining chapters (PP introduction and
conformance claims)
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 13
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Stove-Piping-Method
Advantages:
Simple and fast method to write a PP
The PP almost automatically meets many of the
requirements of the APE-class
Disadvantages:
The question why the TOE implements the description
of the PP is not answered
The PP merely states on three different levels (TOE
security environment, security objectives, SFRs)
“This is what the TOE does.”
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 14
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Explanation Method - Overview
Focus is lying on deriving the various items in a PP,
rather than simply stating them.
Procedure (part 1):
Write the conformance claims
Analyse the OSPs
Analyse the threats
Frank Grefrath
Derive the security objectives for the TOE and the
operational environment including the security
objectives rationale
September 2007
Slide 15
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Explanation Method - Overview
Procedure (part 2):
Derive the SFRs including the Security Requirements
Rationale
Define the SARs and explain why you have chosen
them
Write the PP introduction
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 16
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Explanation Method - Analysing the SPD
Analysing the OSPs
Analysing the threats
Laws, rules, practices or guidelines
Question for definition: What happens when I don't
have a TOE?
What are the assets to be protected?
What are the adverse actions?
Who are the threat agents?
Assumptions will not be defined
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 17
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Explanation Method - Deriving the objectives
Deriving the security objectives for the TOE and the
operational environment
Frank Grefrath
Purpose:
Providing a high-level, natural language solution of
the problem
Building a bridge between the threats and OSPs
on one side, and the SFRs on the other side
Three questions:
Where will the TOE be placed and can it be
physically attacked there?
What is the purpose of the TOE?
How is the TOE managed?
September 2007
Slide 18
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Explanation Method - Deriving the SFRs
Deriving the SFRs
Not
yet worked out, but will be added in the next
version
Considered approach:
Short introducing statement to CC Part 2
Different examples for each functional class
Possibly more detailed explanations to certain
aspects like the definition of access control
policies, information flow policies or an I&A
policy
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 19
BSI PP/ST-Guide
Publication
The Guide is currently developed by the BSI in a
project
Upon completion the Guide will be published on the
BSI homepage: http://www.bsi.de
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 20
Contact
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) /
Federal Office for Information Security
Godesberger Allee 185-189
53175 Bonn
Frank Grefrath
Tel: +49 (0)228-9582-5838
Fax: +49 (0)228-9582-5477
[email protected]
Frank Grefrath
September 2007
Slide 21