Transcript Diapositiva 1

Rio, Kyoto, Copenhagen, Cancun,
Durban ..... what's next?
A skeptical view on climate
negotiations.
Carlo Carraro
President, University of Venice
Vice Chair, IPCC WG III
Chairman, Scientific Advisory Board, FEEM
Introduction
- Climate change problem is an important but difficult
challenge for human beings/our societies
- Climate change control is a global public good
- Long term dimension of the problem
- Pervasive uncertainties on the physical and economic
dimensions of the climate change problem
1
International Negotiations
 In 1997 all UNFCCC countries (189) approved the Kyoto Protocol
that entered into force in 2006. The Kyoto Protocol however has a
minor impact on GHG concentrations and temperature
 At the G8 meeting in L’Aquila, then in Pittsburgh at MEF, and finally
in Copenhagen at COP XV, main countries agreed to stabilise
temperature increase at 2°C (no more than 2°C...)
 Same principles have been reaffirmed in Cancun at COP XVI.
However, G8/G20 countries failed to deliver an international
agreement on policy and measures to achieve such target.
2
3.
The arithmetics of climate
Concentrations of GHG
(ppm CO2-eq)
Most Likely
Very Likely Above
(>90%)
Likely in the Range
(>66%)
350
450
550
650
750
1000
1200
1.0
2.1
2.9
3.6
4.3
5.5
6.3
0.5
1.0
1.5
1.8
2.1
2.8
3.1
0.6 - 1.4
1.4 - 3.1
1.9 - 4.4
2.4 - 5.5
2.8 - 6.4
3.7 - 8.3
4.2 - 9.4
Table 1. Most likely, likely and very likely bounds/ranges of global mean equilibrium
surface temperature increase in degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperature for
different levels of CO2 equivalent concentrations (ppm). Source: IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report, WG I, Chapter 10, Table 10.8 .
The present level of concentrations is about 430 ppm CO2-eq
Uncertainty of the emissions-temperature nexus is relevant
3
2 °C target … some basic numbers
 According to IPCC, in order to keep temperature increase below
2°C with good probability, concentrations of GHGs should not
exceed 380-390 ppm CO2-eq.
 If we accept the possibility of overshooting the target, the level of
concentrations can be higher but not greater than 450 ppm.
 The present level of GHG concentration is 430 ppm CO2-eq (390
CO2 only), well above the 380-390 ppm level necessary to make a
temperature increase above 2°C unlikely.
 450 ppm CO2-eq will be reached within six years, whatever world
leaders decided in L’Aquila and in Copenhagen.
 If 550 ppm CO2-eq are reached, there is little chance to stay below
2°C.
4
Reality check….
- If we assume that emissions will halve by 2050, declining at a
constant pace from 2010, concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere
will be 40 ppm higher in 2050.
- This implies that all GHG concentrations will reach 470 ppm CO2-eq
in 2050, assuming that emissions of non CO2 gases are heroically cut
to zero starting from 2010.
- The emissions path envisaged by MEF leaders is thus in line with a
550 ppm target by the end of the century. Hence, more than 2
degrees...
5
Even a 550 ppm target would be
very difficult to achieve…
 Given the projected dynamics of world population and economic
growth, the objective of limiting concentrations below 550 ppm CO2eq implies that average per capita emissions in the second half of
this century are to be reduced from about 2 to about 0.3 tC per
year.
 In other words, the world will have to emit not more than today’s
India’s average – quite a significant reduction for most
industrialised countries (US average per capita emissions are about
6 tC) and for countries that aim at similar lifestyle standards.
 Just to provide another benchmark, 0.3 tC is the amount of GHGs
emitted by an individual flying – one way – from the EU to the US
East coast!
6
Required emission reductions
1200
1000
GtC
800
600
400
200
0
emissions since 1751
abatement to 2100
7
If China and India don’t reduce their own emissions,
there is no chance to reach even the 550 ppm target
18
16
BaU
14
Other Non Annex 1
12
Gton C
SASIA
10
Targets
China
3.7 Rad Forcing
8
6
3.5 Rad Forcing
OECD countries
Total
India
Other LDCs
4
2
0
2005
China
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
8
9.
The climate equation in brief
Emissions
Concentrations
Temperature
Climate
Emissions of Greenhouse Gasses (carbon dioxide, methane, ...)
remain in the atmosphere for decades or even centuries
Natural absorption is very slow for carbon dioxide
Temperature is a function of concentrations, not of emissions
In order to achieve the most ambitious targets (1.5 - 2.0*C) it is
necessary to reduce the stock of GHGs: negative emissions
9
10. GHGs emissions
Fonte: IPCC AR4 (2007).
10
Fonte: IPCC AR4 (2007).
We need global action
11
What’s behind the increase in emissions?
…strong pressure on energy supply
Increasing role of renewables … but the energy mix will be dominated
by fossil fuels if their negative environmental effects are not
internalized through appropriate climate policies
Source: WEO 2009
Increase will be large particularly in developing
countries
Source: WITCH model
Energy poverty map
About 1,8 million people without access to electricity …
Population growth
Three more billion people on Earth….
16. Energy and development - 2
1979
6000
Energy use per capita
(kg of oil equivalent)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
Carraro and Massetti (2010)
0
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
GDP per Capita 1960-2005 (constant 2000 US$)
16
World
High Income
Low & Middle Income
30000
17. CO2 emissions and development
CO2 emissions per capita (Ton)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
Carraro and Massetti (2010)
0
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
GDP per Capita 1960-2000 (constant 2000 US$)
World
17
High Income
Low & Middle Income
30000
Why it is hard to build an
international agreement?
18
19.
Why it is hard to build consensus?
Strong inertia of the climate system requires to take costly
measures now, to enjoy benefits one century from now:
 intergenerational coordination problem
GHGs emissions get perfectly mixed in the global
atmosphere:
 international coordination problem
Large uncertainty on cost of mitigation
19
The most ambitious targets appear highly unrealistic:
 we are about to pass the level of concentrations that would
prevent the attainment of the +2ºC target with high probability
20. Act now or later?
20
KAL's cartoon, Jun 17th 2010 | From The Economist print edition
21. The importance of participation
NON-OECD Emissions Trajectories
18
16
14
GtC
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2010
2015
2020
2025
Stabilization at 550 ppm CO2-eq
NON-OECD ‒10% at 2050
NON-OECD ‒30% at 2050
NON-OECD ‒50% at 2050
21
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
NON-OECD - BaU
NON-OECD ‒20% at 2050
NON-OECD ‒40% at 2050
Figure 1. Emissions pathways compatible with a stabilization target at 550 ppm CO2 eq at 2100
and emissions trajectories of Non-OECD countries with various degrees of commitment. Source:
WITCH model, FEEM.
Carraro and Massetti. www.voxeu.org, 3 September 2009.
22. The cost of mitigation
• Strong increase of costs as
the target becomes more
stringent
Fonte: RECIPE Project (2009); Discounted consumption loss; 3% discount rate. Concentrations level of only CO2.
22
23. Delayed action
If there is delay, or noncoordinated action costs
increase considerably
Delaying action beyond
2030 makes it impossible
to achieve the 450ppm
CO2 only target.
Source: RECIPE Project (2009); Cost of stabilizing CO2 concentrations at 450
ppm, with different hypothesis of international cooperation.
23
24. The technology puzzle
• Problems in the
deployment of key
carbon-free
technologies increase
costs
24
Source: RECIPE Project (2009); cost of stabilizing CO2 concentrations at 450
ppm, with different hypothesis on the availability of technologies.
The incentives to
participate in a global
agreement
25
26. Climate change impacts
Climate change impact
1.00
LAM
Percentage loss in GDP
0.00
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060 2065 2070 2075 2080 2085 2090 2095 2100
SEASIA
CHINA
-1.00
SASIA
-2.00
SSA
-3.00
MENA
TE
-4.00
JPNKOR
-5.00
AUCANZ
-6.00
EEURO
WEURO
-7.00
USA
-8.00
Time horizon
 The impacts of climate change are expected to vary widely across regions.
 Developing countries would be more affected than their developed counterparts
 Uncertainties are large, however, as reflected by the wide variance in damage
estimates across studies
26
Discounted consumption loss2
27. Abatement costs - carbon tax
Panel A. Annex I regions1
1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0
-4.0
-5.0
United States
Western EU countries
Eastern EU countries
Aus-Can-Nzl
Japan-Korea
Non-EU Eastern Europe
-6.0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Carbon Tax (2005 $US / t CO2 eq)
loss2
27
1.0
200
Japan-Korea
Non-EU Eastern Europe
28. Abatement costs - carbon tax
-6.0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Discounted consumption loss2
Carbon Tax (2005 $US / t CO2 eq)
1.0
Panel B. Non-Annex I regions
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0
-4.0
-5.0
Middle East and North Africa
Africa
South Asia
China
South East Asia
Latin America
-6.0
20
28
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Carbon Tax (2005 $US / t CO2 eq)
200
29. Free Riding Incentive on the GC
1.4%
CHINA
Free riding incentive
1.2%
TE
MENA
1.0%
AUCANZ
0.8%
0.6%
JPNKOR
0.4%
SEASIA
SSA
EEURO LAM
USA
SASIA
WEURO
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
GDP loss of a 100$/tCO2 tax
29
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
Towards a bottom-up
architecture?
30
Future challenges:
 More energy, to meet an increasing energy
demand
 A “clean” energy, to control climate change
 A more equally distributed energy to favour
economic development in poorer region
and thus global economic growth
31
Obstacles:
 High financial needs for investments in the
energy sector
 Insufficient and weak governance of global
issues implies unavoidable climate change
(more than 2 degrees C)
 Resources are also needed for investments in
adaptation to climate change
32
Investments in the energy sector to stabilize GHG
concentrations at 450 CO2 eq.
additional annual investment needs in lowLevel
carbon technologies and energy efficiency
total investment in the 450 scenario in low-
incremental investment cost in
relative to Reference Scenario to meet 450
carbon power generation over 2010-2030
GDP terms
almost $ 6600 bln
2020: 0.5% of GDP
(72% renewable, 19% nuclear, 9% CCS)
2030: 1.1% of GDP
almost $ 3100 bln
2020: 0.4% of GDP
(65% renewable, 20% nuclear, 15% CCS)
2030: 0.8% of GDP
almost $ 1100 bln
2020: 0.5% of GDP
(53% renewable, 27% CCS, 19% nuclear)
2030: 1% of GDP
almost $ 1300 bln
2020: 0.3% of GDP
(77% renewable, 7% CCS, 16% nuclear)
2030: 0.6% of GDP
almost $ 200 bln
2020: 0.3% of GDP
(50% renewable, 4% CCS, 46% nuclear)
2030: 0.6% of GDP
almost $ 1500 bln
2020: 0.8% of GDP
(73% renewable, 5% CCS, 22% nuclear)
2030: 1.5% of GDP
almost $ 550 bln
2020: 0.9% of GDP
(83% renewable, 2% CCS, 16% nuclear)
2030: 1.4% of GDP
almost $ 220 bln
2020: 0.3% of GDP
(58% renewable, 12% CCS, 30% nuclear)
2030: 1% of GDP
Scenario in 2020
33
World
$430 bln
OECD+
$220 bln
US
$ 90 bln
EU
$ 70 bln
Japan
$ 17 bln
China
$ 80 bln
India
$ 25 bln
Russia
$ 8 bln
Investments to adapt to climate change
Source IIED (2009)
SECTORS
UNFCCC
ESTIMATES
NEW IIED COST ESTIMATES
Agriculture
$11.3-12.6
billions/year
Adaptation deficit  recovering it could
cost up to $40-60 billions
$11.3-12.6 + $40-60 billions
Water
$11 billions/year
Transfer of water across countries, no
adaptation to altered flood risk
Significant underestimation, more
studies needed
Human health
$4-12 billions/year
Population grows but share of illnessrelated deaths remains constant
30-50% increase in costs
Coasts
$11 billions/year
Infrastructures $8-130 billions/year
Ecosystems
34
SOURCES OF UNDERESTIMATIONS
$65-80 billions/year
for protected areas
Sea level rise (SLR) faster than foreseen,
Overall costs could double
residual damage estimation ($1 billion/year) depending on speed of SLR, residual
too optimistic
damage costs t $2-3 billions/year
Infrastructural deficit  removing could
cost up $315 billions/year
Besides deficit, $16-63 billions/year
Exclusion of adaptation costs for nonprotected areas ($290 billions/year)
$65-80 + $290 billions/year
About 175 billions per year
R&D investments
0.12%
0.10%
0.08%
0.06%
Decarbonization
0.04%
Efficiency
0.02%
0.00%
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Historical
BAU
Tot Energy R&D A1 CC
Energy Intensity R&D A1 CC
Source: WITCH model
Roughly 50 Blns a year of energy innovation investments in the next two decades
35
 for a total of about 650 billions/year…
Investments: some conclusions
Climate policy will induce higher investments in the energy sector (with
respect to the BaU scenario)
Low-carbon world requires a new energy mix: conventional fossil fuels
power plants are substituted by nuclear, coal power plants with CCS and
renewable sources
Large investments have to be diverted – in a relatively short time frame –
towards complex and risky technologies
Significant innovative efforts are required especially outside the power
sector
36
Green stimulus of national recovery package
Ratio of green stimulus of national recovery packages, absolute volumes in bn€
37
The green share of the European recovery plan (58.7% ) is high wrt
other countries’ package
Source: GEF 2009, based on Bernard et al. 2009; data from HSBC 2009
Conclusions
Both the increased energy demand and the climate challenge require
additional investments in the energy sector
At the same time, policy signals are necessary to divert investments
that would be undertaken anyway
The development and application of green technologies can be an
opportunity for Europe: it does not require additional investments but a
reshuffle of their mix
Net positive effect on employment
Investments in energy innovation and in climate adaptation are also
necessary
Carbon markets can be an important source of revenue to finance part
of these investments
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Thank you!
Corso Magenta 63, 20123 Milano - Italia - Tel +39 02.520.36934 - Fax +39 02.520.36946 - www.feem.it
40. Title
 The realism of negotiations’ objectives. Can the 2 degree
targets actually be achieved? Is the focus on a global
agreement meaningful?
 The incentives for different countries or regions to participate in
a climate agreement
 The financial resources needed to stabilize GHG
concentrations
 The time horizon of climate negotiations and the likelihood of a
climate agreement in the next decade
 The possibility to move away from traditional global
negotiations, by focusing on a bottom-up domestic policydriven approach
 The necessity to invest more resources on adaptation to
climate change
40