Transcript Schulte - Roof Vent Presentation
4/24/2020
BALANCED FIRE PROTECTION: ARE SMOKE/HEAT (ROOF) VENTS NECESSARY FOR OCCUPANT AND FIREFIGHTER SAFETY IN ONE-STORY INDUSTRIAL AND STORAGE BUILDINGS PROTECTED BY STANDARD SPRAY SPRINKLERS?
1
IBC/IFC REQUIREMENTS FOR ROOF VENTS
• Single story
industrial and storage buildings
undivided floor areas
> 50,000 SF
.
with •
High-piled storage areas > 12,000 SF
in single-story buildings protected by a sprinkler system.
•
High-piled storage areas > 2,500 SF
in single-story buildings not protected by a sprinkler system.
4/24/2020 2
•
ROOF VENT/DRAFT CURTAIN THEORY
Automatic roof vents are
heat-activated devices
.
• Each vent is
individually
activated by either a fusible link or shrinks and falls out when exposed to heat from a fire.
•
In theory
, roof vents automatically open to allow heat and smoke to be vented from the building.
•
Draft curtains
are provided to prevent the spread of heat and smoke across the ceiling allowing a deeper layer of heat and smoke to develop within the curtained area.
•
Roof vents and draft curtains are a “team”.
(The effectiveness of venting is adversely affected if draft curtains are
not
provided.) 4/24/2020 3
ROOF VENT THEORY
• The rate of smoke/heat venting provided by roof vents is determined by: •
The number of vents which open
and •
The size of the vents which open
and •
The depth of the heat/smoke layer which forms under the ceiling
and •
The temperature of the heat/smoke layer.
4/24/2020 4
TYPES OF SPRINKLERS
• •
Control Mode Sprinklers:
– Standard Spray Sprinklers
Suppression Mode Sprinklers:
– Early Suppression Fast Response (ESFR) Sprinklers •
Note:
The IBC/IFC does
not
require roof vents or draft curtains in portions of buildings pro tected by ESFR sprinklers.
4/24/2020 5
PREVIOUS IBC/IFC CODE CHANGE PROPOSALS-ROOF VENTS
• • •
Code Change
F79-00
Code Change
F164-04/05
Code Change
F124-06/07
•
Code Change Proponent (All Three Changes):
Richard Schulte, Schulte & Associates
4/24/2020 6
PURPOSE OF 2007/2008 CODE CHANGE PROPOSALS
• Incorporate the results of
interaction testing roof vent/sprinkler
conducted at Underwriters Laboratories (UL) in
1997/1998
into the code.
• Reflect changes in firefighting tactics recom mended by
NIOSH 2005-132 Firefighter Life Safety Summit
.
and the
FEMA
4/24/2020 7
4/24/2020
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
•
1979 Edition
of the
UFC
required a manually activated mechanical smoke removal system in sprinklered buildings containing high-piled storage.
• The UFC (1979 edition)
prohibited
the installation of
automatic roof vents in sprinklered buildings
con taining high-piled storage.
• In the
early 1980's
, the UFC ad hoc committee on
Article 81 (high-piled storage)
recommended that automatic roof vents sprinklered buildings.
and
draft curtains be required in 8
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
• In
1994
Corporation
have an adverse effect on the operation of sprinkler sys tems
.
, testing conducted by Factory Mutual Research
(FMRC)
determined that
draft curtains may
• In
1997/1998
, testing at
UL
sponsored by the National Fire Protection Research Foundation
(NFPRF)
confirmed FMRC’s conclusion that
draft curtains may have an adverse effect on the operation of sprinkler systems
.
• The
NFPRF tests spray sprinklers.
also determined that
automatic roof vents are unlikely to operate in buildings protected by standard
4/24/2020 9
NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
• “It had become clear by this time in the project
that the
away.
” (
vents were unlikely to open when the fire was ignited more than about 4.6 m (15 ft)
Page 54, NISTIR 6196-1
) • “. . . .it appears from the data below that the
sprinkler spray influenced the thermal response characteristics of this particular vent
fluence on similar vent designs.” (
, and it is believed that sprinklers could have a similar in-
Page 64, NISTIR 6196-1
) 4/24/2020 10
NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
• “Six other tests were performed with the fire at
this distance from the vent when
tests did the vent open
cates that
sprinklers of this type the vent was e quipped with a fusible link, and in none of these
. . . .Examination of the near-ceiling temperatures from all the tests indi-
[standard spray sprinklers]
have a significant cooling effect, and this will certainly have an effect on thermally responsive, independently-controlled vents.
”
(
Page 64, NISTIR 6196-1
) 4/24/2020 11
NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
• “
In Plastic Test P-2, the fire was ignited di rectly under a vent.
In the experiment, flames reached the top of the central array at about 65 s and the vent cavity at about 70 s. The first sprinkler activated at 100 s.
The vent did not open at any time during the 30 min test
even though another vent 6 m (20 ft) to the west of
the unopened vent opened at 6:04.” (
Page 64, NISTIR 6196-1
) 4/24/2020 12
NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
• “This data, along with the plunge tunnel mea-
surements reported in Section 3.1.4, suggests that the fusible link reached its activation tem perature before or at about the same time as the first sprinkler activated, but the link did not fuse.
It is not clear whether the link did not fuse be cause it was cooled directly by water drawn up wards into the vent cavity, or whether the sprinkler spray simply cooled the rising smoke plume enough to prevent the link from fusing. In any event, this phenomenon deserves further study.
” (
Page 64, NISTIR 6196-1
) 4/24/2020 13
NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
• “The mass flow rates [through the vents] for
Test I-10 and P-5 are relatively low compared with the theoretical maximum because
the near-ceiling gas temperatures are greatly re duced by the
[standard spray] (
Page 100, NISTIR 6196-1
)
sprinklers.
”
4/24/2020 14
NFPRF TESTS-1997/1998
• “
The significant cooling effect of sprinkler sprays on the near-ceiling gas flow often prevented the automatic operation of vents.
This conclusion is based on thermocouple measurements within the vent cavity, the presence of drips of solder on the fusible links recovered from unopened vents, and several tests where vents remote from the fire and the sprinkler spray activated.
In one cartoned plastic commodity experiment, a vent did not open when the fire was ignited directly beneath it.
” (
Page 101, NISTIR 6196-1
) 4/24/2020 15
DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
• “The experimental studies have shown that . . . .
cur rent design practices are likely to limit the number of vents operated to one and vents may in fact not op erate at all in very successful sprinkler operations.
”
(
Page 1, “Interaction of Sprinklers with Smoke and Heat Vents, February, 1999
”) • “
Eliminates Need for Manual Venting? No
we know, and what we don’t.”
) ” (
Page 42, “Sprinkler/Vent Interactions-What people think, what
4/24/2020 16
DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
• “Not only is the fear of early operation not
founded,
current design practice will likely lead to 0-1 vents operating
” (
know, and what we don’t.”
)
Page 61, “Sprinkler/ Vent Interactions-What people think, what we
• “
Revised design methods for early operation of vents are needed
” (
and what we don’t.”
)
Page 61, “Sprinkler/Vent Interactions-What people think, what we know,
4/24/2020 17
DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
• “In tests where the
vents were opened by fusible link a number of the vents failed to open,
cooling effects of the sprinklers on the smoke layer or direct
spray cooling of the fusible links.” (
attributed to either the
NFPA 204-26 Log #21, NFPA 204, 2007 edition
) • “The effect of sprinkler cooling
vents opening if control is only by fusible link or if drop out panels are used.
ating temperature is equal to or higher than the sprinkler bulb operating temperature then vents outside the outer ring of operating sprinklers are unlikely to open.
significantly limit the effectiveness of the smoke vent sys tem.
” (
may limit the number of
If the fusible link or drop out panel oper-
This could
NFPA 204-26 Log #21, NFPA 204, 2007 edition
) 4/24/2020 18
DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
•
Q.
“The
effectiveness
of the system depends to some extent on the depth of the draft curtain, the size of the compartment that is created by the
draft curtain?” •
A.
“
Well, the two things that are important are the depth of the draft curtains and the number of smoke and heat vents that will operate within the curtained area.
et. al.
” (
Beyler deposition, Ian David McAuslin, et. al. v. Grinnell Corporation, [McFrugal’s Warehouse Fire-1996] , 1999
) 4/24/2020 19
DR. CRAIG BEYLER QUOTES
•
Q.
“But the
effectiveness of smoke and heat vents in conjunction with draft curtains
depends upon the sprinkler system at some point con-
trolling the fire.[?]” •
A.
“
It depend[s] on the fire being controlled. . . .
By manual and/or automated methods.
Corporation, et. al.
” (
Beyler deposition, Ian David McAuslin, et. al. v. Grinnell [McFrugal’s Warehouse Fire 1996] , 1999
) 4/24/2020 20
• • • • • • •
TEMPE, ARIZONA FIRE MARCH 19,1998
100,000 SF building; 24-29 foot ceiling height Sprinkler design: 29 high temperature (
286F
) large orifice standard spray sprinklers assumed to operate
66 sprinklers actually operated
29 roof vents (4 x 8 feet) provided;
165F fusible links Only 3 roof vents and one skylight open
Building filled with smoke from floor to roof at the time the fire department arrives
Zero visibility at the floor at the time fire department arrives
(
NFPA Fire Investigation Report
) 4/24/2020 21
NIOSH 2005-132
• “
Fire fighters should be discouraged from risking their lives solely for property protec tion activities.
” (
Page 7
) • “
Lives will continue to be lost unless
partments make appropriate fire de-
fundamental changes in fire-fighting tactics
es.” (
Page 8
)
involving truss-
4/24/2020 22
NIOSH 2005-132
• “
NIOSH recommends that fire departments
, fire fighters, building owners, and managers
minimize the risk of injury and death to fire fighters during fire fighting operations
involving structures
with truss floor and roof systems. . . .” (
take steps to
Page 8
) • “
Use defensive strategies
exposed to fire or structural integrity cannot be veri fied.
whenever trusses have been Unless life-saving operations are under way,
evacuate fire fighters and use an exterior attack
.”
(
Page 9
) 4/24/2020 23
NIOSH 2005-132
• “Ensure that firefighters performing
firefight ing operations under or above trusses are e vacuated as soon as it is determined that the trusses are exposed to fire (not according to a time limit).
” (
Page 9
) 4/24/2020 24
FEMA FIREFIGHTER LIFE SAFETY SUMMIT
• “The willingness of firefighters to risk their own lives to
save others must never be used as an excuse to take unnecessary risks. Firefighters are highly respected for being willing to risk their own lives to save others, but
that cannot justify taking unnecessary risks in situa tions where there is no one to save and nothing to be gained. In too many cases firefighters lose their lives while trying to save property that is already lost or to rescue victims who are already dead.
While these
efforts are valiant, they are also futile.” (
FEMA Fire fighter Life Safety Summit, April 14, 2004
) 4/24/2020 25
FIRE DEPARTMENT CAPABILITIES
• “
Sufficient resources required to provide safe manual fire suppression activities are not cur rently available in most municipalities de fended by full time firefighting personnel.
”
(Code Change Proposal Finnegan, representing the
RB4-06/07
, Joseph
Firemen’s Associa tion of the State of New York
) 4/24/2020 26
FIRE DEPARTMENT CAPABILITIES
•
“
In ideal circumstances, the best trained and equipped fire departments arrive at fires ap proximately seven minutes after ignition of the fire.
Most departments do not operate
under ideal conditions.” (Code Change Pro posal
G99-06/07
,
National Association of State Fire Marshals
) 4/24/2020 27
SPRINKLER SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
• “Sprinkler protection installed as required in this
standard is expected to protect the building occu pancy
without supplemental fire department ac tivity.
” (
NFPA 13
) • “During the [rack storage] testing program, the
installed automatic extinguishing system was
ca pable of controlling the fire and reducing all temperatures to ambient within 30 minutes of ignition.
” (
NFPA 13
) 4/24/2020 28
SUMMARY
• Standard spray sprinklers are capable of con trolling and extinguishing a fire within 30 min utes
without supplemental fire department activity
. (
NFPA 13
) • Automatic roof vents will likely lers. (
not
operate in buildings protected by standard spray sprink-
NISTIR 6196-1; Dr. Craig Beyler; NFPA 204
) 4/24/2020 29
SUMMARY
• Interior manual firefighting is
not
recommended in buildings with
non-rated roof construction
if the sprinkler system fails to control the fire. (
NIOSH 2005-132; Firefighter Life Safety Summit
) • Most
paid fire departments
in the US do
not
have adequate resources to safely fight building fires in large buildings
in the event that the sprinkler system fails to control the fire
. (
Code Change Proposal RB4 06/07
) 4/24/2020 30
CONCLUSIONS
• Firefighters should
not
go on the roof to manually open roof vents which
until the fire is extinguished by operation of the sprinkler system
.
do not open automatically
• Providing automatic roof vents in buildings pro tected by standard spray sprinklers provides
no
additional protection for a building (
system successfully controls the fire because the roof vents will not automatically operate if the sprinkler
).
4/24/2020 31
CONCLUSIONS
• Providing automatic roof vents in buildings protected by standard spray sprinklers will
not
assist manual firefighting (
because the roof vents will not automatically operate if the sprinkler system successfully controls the fire
).
• Since most paid fire departments in the U.S. lack sufficient resources to ations,
safely
conduct interior manual firefighting oper-
providing automatic (or manually operated) roof vents will not assist interior manual firefighting operations
the event of sprinkler system failure.
in 4/24/2020 32
CODE CHANGE F124-06/07 DISAPPROVAL REASON
• “
There was no definitive information pre sented that smoke and heat vents do not con tribute to fire control.
” (
NISTIR 6196-1; Dr.
Craig Beyler; NFPA 204
) • “In cases where the sprinkler system does not
suppress the fire but, rather, controls it, smoke
continues to be generated.” (
NFPA 13; NISTIR 6196-1; Dr. Craig Beyler; NFPA 204
) 4/24/2020 33
•
CODE CHANGE F124-06/07 DISAPPROVAL REASON
“
The discussions have focused on everything but the safety of the occupants, including firefighters.
”
(
NIOSH 2005-132; Firefighter Life Safety Summit
) • “Smoke and heat vents provide the fire department
with an important tool to remove the smoke for
occupant safety
and
enhanced fire attack access
, especially in very large area buildings where access
from the exterior is limited at best.” (
NIOSH 2005 132; Firefighter Life Safety Summit
) 4/24/2020 34
CODE CHANGE F124-06/07 DISAPPROVAL REASON
• “Firefighter safety is also improved by providing a
faster, safer method of fire ventilation than
cutting one or more holes in the roof.” (
13
)
NIOSH 2005-132; Firefighter Life Safety Summit; NFPA
• “
The current text presents a balanced approach between firefighter safety and building safety.
”
(
NFPA 13; NIOSH 2005-132; Firefighter Life Safe ty Summit
) 4/24/2020 35
CODE CHANGE PROPOSAL
•
Five alternative methods
of providing smoke removal for sprinklered buildings proposed: 1. Automatic smoke/heat vents 2. Manual smoke/heat vents 3. Manually activated mechanical smoke removal system 4. Manually openable louvers in exterior wall
5. Manually openable exterior doors and windows
4/24/2020 36
CODE CHANGE PROPOSAL
• Purpose of the smoke removal methods listed on the previous slide is to provide
a means of providing ventilation for the building after the fire has been controlled and extinguished by the sprinkler system.
4/24/2020 37
TRAVEL DISTANCE INCREASE FOR VENTS
• Travel distance permitted to be increased from 250 feet to 400 feet when automatic roof vents are provided in an industrial or storage building protected by a sprinkler system.
• NFPRF tests demonstrated that automatic roof vents will likely
not
operate in a sprinklered build ing.
Hence, the automatic roof vents do not pro vide any additional protection for building occu pants.
4/24/2020 38
TRAVEL DISTANCE INCREASE FOR VENTS
• Code change proposes to
delete
sions which permits the increase in travel dis tance when sprinkler protection and auto matic roof vents are provided.
the provi • Code change proposes to tance of 400 feet in single-story industrial and storage buildings (without roof vents) pro tected by a sprinkler system.
allow
a travel dis 4/24/2020 39
RESUME RICHARD C. SCHULTE
• Bachelor of Science Degree, Fire Protection Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT), 1976.
• Registered professional engineer in fire protection engineering, State of California, May 1980.
(Registration no longer maintained.)
• Fire protection engineer, San Jose Fire Department, 1980-1982.
4/24/2020 40
RESUME RICHARD C. SCHULTE
•
Member of UFC Ad Hoc Committee on Article 81 (high-piled storage) representing the Northern California Fire Prevention Officers, 1981-1982.
• ENR Top 25 Newsmakers of 2004 award (World Trade Center towers collapse).
• AISC Special Achievement Award, 2006 (World Trade Center towers collapse).
4/24/2020 41
•
Richard C. Schulte Fire Code Consultant
After the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that destroyed New York City’s World Trade Center and killed 2,700 occupants, the building design and construction community was besieged by criticism that the buildings themselves were at fault. While aware that totally de fensible buildings are an impossible dream, industry professionals feared responding because some critics are family members of 9/11 victims. Fire code consultant construction. . . .
Richard C. Schulte
used his profession al training, experience and logic to advocate that the public was being misled into believing that tall buildings could, and should, be made terrorist-proof. His words have resonated with the industry, and Schulte, who runs a one-man operation near Chicago, has come to symbolize the frustration and concern of professionals coming to terms with the attack’s impact on future building design and
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