Transcript Slide 1

THE
12 DECISIVE BATTLES
OF THE
THREE INDO-CHINA WARS
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
presented
by
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS
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©
DAVE
SABBEN
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
09 – Lam Son 719
Feb - Apr 1971
BACKGROUND
South Vietnam was a different place in 1971
than it had been in the 60s – and so was
Washington. In a general view:
1968 – Khe Sanh, Tet, the battle for Hue
Citadel, then My Lai; the US public turns
against the war and Johnson hands over to
Nixon, yet the North starts to talk about Talks;
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
1969 – several operations into A Shau WAS
valley
PREPARED BY
including the Hamburger Hill debacle; Paris
Peace Talks and “Vietnamization” start,DAVE
as do SABBEN
WHOinvade
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US and Allied forces withdrawals; NVA
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
Laos & Cambodia – form Khmer Rouge;
1970 – Ops & secret bombing in Cambodia,
where pro-US Lon Nol has taken over after
coup; Anti-war demonstrations across USA,
including the Kent State shootings; Nixon has
his options restricted by Congress;
1971 – US forces mostly on defensive –
few offensive operations; ANZACs start
withdrawals; US forces down from 550k to
less than 140k.
2
BACKGROUND
South Vietnam was a different place in 1971
than it had been in the 60s – and so was
Washington: In a general view:
1968
Khe Sanh proved that the NVA couldn’t win a
conventional battle. 20k men with artillery
support didn’t even penetrate the perimeter.
1968 – Khe Sanh, Tet, the battle for Hue
Tet proved that the VC couldn’t win a guerrilla
Citadel, then My Lai; the US public turns
war. After Tet, they were a spent force and
against the war and Johnson hands over to
they never recovered.
Nixon, yet the North starts to talk about Talks;
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED
BYCitadel was taken by 10k NVA troops
Hue
1969 – the several operations into A Shau
from about 100 ARVN - and were only able to
valley including the Hamburger Hill debacle;
DAVE SABBEN
Paris Peace Talks and “Vietnamization”
start, COPYRIGHT © hold it for three weeks.
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as do US and Allied forces withdrawals;
ON CREATIVE The
CONTENT
North claimed that Khe Sanh was a decoy
for Tet but the NVA only committed 30k troops
1970 – Operations across the Cambodian
(all the rest were VC) - with 20K at Khe Sanh
border, where Lon Nol has taken over; Antiand 10k at Hue, which was the decoy?
war demonstrations across USA, including
the Kent State shootings; Nixon has his
The real loss in 1968 was of the US public’s
options restricted by Congress;
confidence in the ability of the Allied forces to
win the war. This then transferred to the US
1971 – US forces mostly on defensive –
government and senior military not as a lack
few offensive operations; ANZACs start
of ability but of a lack of willingness
withdrawals; US forces down from 550k to
3
to do what it would take to win it.
less than 140k.
1969
1968
The end result of the A Shau operations was
that the US announced its intention to
withdraw from Viet Nam. The whole rest of
the war hinged ONLY upon this decision.
Khe Sanh proved that the NVA couldn’t win a
conventional battle. 20k men with artillery
support didn’t even penetrate the perimeter.
Tet proved that the VC couldn’t win a guerrilla
In order to withdraw, two things needed to
war. After Tet, they were a spent force and
happen – Vietnamization and Pacification.
they never recovered.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED
BYCitadel was taken by 10k NVA troops
VIETNAMIZATION
Hue
As US and Allied forces were removed,
the SABBEN
from about 100 ARVN - and were only able to
DAVE
ARVN needed to be increased - and this in the
hold it for three weeks.
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face of increased numbers of NVA in the
ON CREATIVE
CONTENT
South to replace VC losses in Tet 1968.
The
The
North claimed that Khe Sanh was a decoy
fighting had to be handed over to the ARVN.
for Tet but the NVA only committed 30k troops
(all the rest were VC) - with 20K at Khe Sanh
PACIFICATION
and 10k at Hue, which was the decoy?
To reduce the scale of operations required, a
campaign was needed to capitalise on the VC
The real loss in 1968 was of the US public’s
losses during Tet – particularly in the rural
confidence in the ability of the Allied forces to
areas. More regions brought under
win the war. This then transferred to the US
Government control would mean fewer ARVN
government and senior military not as a lack
troops required to keep government control in
of ability but of a lack of willingness
4
those areas.
to do what it would take to win it.
1969
The end result of the A Shau operations was
that the US announced its intention to
withdraw from Viet Nam. The whole rest of
the war hinged ONLY upon this decision.
1970
VIETNAMIZATION
In June 1968 (after Tet) the South had brought
in “general mobilisation” – military service was
obligatory for all males 16 to 50.
From 643k in 1968 to over 1 million in 1971.
In order to withdraw, two things needed to
As the US and Allies wound down, all their
happen – Vietnamization and Pacification.
equipment was handed to the ARVN.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
But the ARVN was already corrupt and
infiltrated.
Expansion did not alter these flaws.
WAS PREPARED
BY
VIETNAMIZATION
Besides, desertion rates were huge, and the
As US and Allied forces were removed,
the SABBEN
DAVE
ARVN needed to be increased - and this in the new units needed battles to prove themselves
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and become self-confident and self-reliant.
face of increased numbers of NVA in the
ON
CREATIVE
CONTENT
South to replace VC losses in Tet 1968. The
PACIFICATION 1
2
fighting had to be handed over to the ARVN.
The
reduced
influence
after
Tet resulted
After
Tet 68,VC
huge
volumes
of captured
VCin
more
villages and
hamlets
under
documentation
became
thecoming
basis of
the
PACIFICATION
government
control. variously
A massivedescribed
clearing and
“Phoenix Program”,
as
To reduce the scale of operations required, a
building
program
launched to
the hunt
for VCwas
sympathisers
orrebuild
just
campaign was needed to capitalise on the VC
homes and
“payback”.
Byre-establish
early 1970, infrastructure.
some 150k had
losses during Tet – particularly in the rural
By 1971,
it is estimated
been arrested
or killed.
It was and remains
areas. More regions brought under
thatbeing
only 5%
of theofSVN
controversial,
accused
devolving into
Government control would mean fewer ARVN
population
remained
under
those in power
ensuring
troops required to keep government control in
5
Communist
they
stayed incontrol.
power.
those areas.
SIDETRACK: CAMBODIA
Up to 1970, Cambodia had been ruled by
Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Nominally neutral,
he shifted his allegiance to suit his own
perception of Cambodia’s needs. While he
saw the North winning, he supported them
and permitted their presence in Cambodia. By
1969, he saw the North losing and switched
allegiance to the South and the US.
THIS
SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
Border violations, hitherto expressly
forbidden,
WAS PREPARED BY
were approved. Nixon ordered B-52 strikes
against NVA sanctuaries. The NVA reaction
DAVE SABBEN
was to confront Sihanouk and seek
shelter
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deeper inside Cambodia.
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The Khmer Rouge was Cambodia’s equivalent
of SVN’s VC, but they were also rivals of the
NVA – at least until the NVA turned against
Sihanouk. The two then joined forces against
the Cambodian Army.
In 1970, Sihanouk left the country and was
deposed by pro-US Marshal Lon Nol (the coup
was commonly thought to be CIA backed).
After this, the Khmer Rouge grew in power.
6
1969-70
VIET NAM / CAMBODIA
Intelligence started to collect evidence that
the NVA were gathering in Cambodia, ready
to advance on Saigon when the US left.
With the new Cambodian support, the US
and ARVN took advantage of the opportunity
– a joint US/ARVN incursion into Cambodia
would serve two purposes:
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY 1)It would disrupt NVA plans, and
2) it would boost the ARVN’s confidence.
DAVE SABBEN
In April, ©
May & June of 1970, there were two
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major US/ARVN operations into Cambodia –
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
one at “Parrot’s Beak” and the other at “Fish
Hook”. 32,000 troops. In
both cases, the NVA
dispersed and did not
defend their positions.
In both cases, huge
caches of installations
and supplies were
found, including
“The City”
7
at “Fish Hook”.
1969-70
WASHINGTON
When these new Operations were announced,
there was an instant crisis in Washington.
Renewed anti-war demonstrations led to civil
disobedience.
On 4 May 1970, four students were shot dead
THIS
at Kent State (see separate slide
at SLIDE
end). AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
On 24 June 1970, Congress repealedDAVE
the SABBEN
1964 Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution, WHO
stopping
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Nixon’s power to commit forces without
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Congress approval.
Nixon’s response to this was to accelerate the
rate of US withdrawals.
8
1971
PATHET LAO
VIET NAM / LAOS
Because the NVA chose not to fight, the two
incursions into Cambodian did not prove the
ARVN’s capability. Instead, the NVA were
moved into Laos, onto the Viet Nam border
opposite I Corps.
With the new Washington orders, Nixon could
not invade Laos. He therefore approved US
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
support for a wholly-ARVN incursion into
WAS PREPARED BY
Laos, timed for the new year (1971).
DAVE SABBEN
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©
OPERATION
DEWEY CANYON II
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
30 January – 7 February 1971
1) US forces would re-open Khe Sanh as
a helicopter base;
2) US forces would clear from Khe Sanh
to the border (Lao Bao), set up FSBs
along the border and provide air cover;
3) ARVN would enter Laos from Lao Bao;
4) No US troops were to cross the border
– at least, on the ground;
5) US to remain in SVN to protect
9
against any counter attack.
1971
WASHINGTON
From 19 to 26 April 1971, Viet Vets Against
the War demonstrated in Washington.
12 November 1971 – Nixon advised 45,000
more troops would be pulled out, bringing the
total withdrawn to 139,000.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
ANZAC
WAS PREPARED BY
On 18 August 1971 it was announced that all
ANZAC combat forces would be out ofDAVE
Viet SABBEN
Nam by the end of 1971.WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
10
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
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DAVE SABBEN
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ENOUGH OF THE BACKGROUND…
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
Operation Lam Son 719 was a pre-emptive thrust
from 8 February to 6 April 1971 into Laos along the
axis of Route 9 (which we saw when we looked at
the DMZ went from Dong Ha to Lao Bao in I Corps).
It was not named after a city or a location or even a
region – it was named after a Vietnamese victory
over the Chinese in the 15th Century.
11
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DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
The Xe Pon River valley ran East to West from
Lao Bao on the border to Tchepone some 25
Km away. Route 9 followed the river. The
valley crossed most of the Ho Chi Minh Trails
heading from North Vietnam to the South.
The valley was sparsely populated.
The hills bordering the valley were steep and
thickly covered, offering total screening from
the air for the many trails under the canopy. It
was thought that cutting the trails would
interrupt if not stop the movement 12
of men and supplies into the South.
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DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
13
HOPE
31
30
SOPHIA
LIZ
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
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LOLO
DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
The Plan was to assemble the forces on the
Viet Nam side of the border and conduct a
sudden “Blitzkrieg” style operation along the
valley. Eight FSBs would be flown in and
established on the heights overlooking the
valley in the first days of the Operation.
DELTA
HOTEL
Once established, an Armoured column would
cross the border and push West. An air
assault would seize the main village in the
valley – Aloui (no relation to the A Shau A
Luoi). The Armoured column would
14
then push on to Tchepone.
Forming up, prepared
to go…
Moving forward…
Sometimes having to
make diversions
on the run along
the way…
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
15
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The aim of the 17,000-man Operation was to
bring the NVA to battle if possible, and inflict
maximum casualties. This would prove that
the newly expanded ARVN was up to the task
of continuing the war alone.
If the NVA melted away as they had done in
Cambodia, the ARVN were to cut the roads of
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, destroy bridges, caches
& installations, and mark key points .
for future air and artillery targeting. 16
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
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DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
17
HOPE
31
30
SOPHIA
LIZ
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
LOLO
DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
FEBRUARY
The initial fly-ins established all the FSBs
against minimal opposition. The Armoured
column crossed the border and made good
progress despite poor weather and shocking
road conditions.
HOTEL
DELTA
FEBRUARY
The air assault on Aloui was successful and
the advance continued. By 6 March the target
of Tchepone had been reached and taken. By
now they were 35 Km into Laos.
Their supply line was stretched. 18
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
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DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
19
NVA
AA
HOPE
31
NVA
AA
30
NVA
AA
SOPHIA
NVA
AA
LIZ
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
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LOLO
NVA
AA
DAVE SABBEN
NVA
NVA
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AA
AA
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
MARCH
Once the ARVN column was fully extended,
the NVA counter-attacked. They placed antiaircraft batteries overlooking the road and
used AAs against FSBs, aircraft and vehicles.
They also counter-attacked with Soviet tanks.
DELTA
NVA
AA
HOTEL
The ARVN column began a retreat but
burdened down with 17 damaged vehicles on
tow, the retreat soon became a rout.
The NVA leap-frogged ahead and set
up an ambush at a river crossing
20
between Aloui and Lao Bao.
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DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
21
HOPE
31
30
SOPHIA
LIZ
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
LOLO
DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
The ambush was sprung with rockets and AA
fire. Caught while crossing, the towing
vehicles were soon destroyed. The 17
damaged vehicles were abandoned and had
to be later destroyed by US Cobra gunships.
HOTEL
DELTA
The NVA counter-attacked the FSBs as well,
causing hasty withdrawal of most and in some
cases, abandoning the FSB equipment. From
the ambush site, the NVA gave
22
continual chase to the border.
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23
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
The Operation ended in a shambles. SVN lost
50% of its men (1529 KIA, 5438 WIA), 50%
Tanks, Artillery & APCs. There had been 100
US choppers shot down and over 600 others
damaged. It was a disaster. NVA losses(from
60,000 in area) were not reliably assessed.
It was believed most likely that sympathisers
within the ARVN command had leaked
the full plan details to the NVA, who had
then been able to gather equipment & men
and prepare the counter-attacks 24
for some weeks beforehand.
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DAVE SABBEN
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
25
Why decisive?
The battle became a turning point in the war because:
The weakness of having Communist sympathisers within the
ARVN command structure was demonstrated and un-solvable;
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
The ARVN units that were newly
up (as
WASmade
PREPARED
BY distinct from the “older” units)
lacked the training and morale to carry out their missions
DAVE SABBEN
(in the context of their enemy being older and more experienced in combat);
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ON CREATIVE CONTENT
Even with US fire support, the ARVN demonstrated an inability
to operate on extended and wide-ranging offensive operations;
The US forces in support were swamped with calls for support –
What should have been on-call assistance became total dependence;
The US saw that there would not be a time when the ARVN would be
able to operate without US support (and plenty of it!).
26
1975
CAMBODIA - In April 1975, the Khmer Rough took over Phnom Penh.
Lon Nol fled the country and power was taken by Pol Pot.
LAOS - In 1975, the Pathet Lao formed a coalition with the Communists and the Monarchists.
This was short-lived and after about four months the Pathet Lao took complete control.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WASCambodia.
PREPARED BY
On 30 April 1970, Nixon sent troops into
The US anti-war protesters predictably
reacted. On 1 May at Kent State, history
graduate
students organised a rally in the middle of
DAVE
SABBEN
the campus. 500 attended, then
That night,
WHOdispersed.
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© there were riots in the town.
The mayor declared a state of emergency
and
alerted the Ohio National Guard (NG).
ON CREATIVE
CONTENT
On 2 & 3 May the students again demonstrated, cleared by the NG and remained contained.
On 4 May, 1500 to 3000 gathered, calling for the release of arrested students and for the right to
present anti-war case to the mayor. The NG took over responsibility for the campus. When the
demonstration turned violent, the NG called for the crowd to disperse. When they would not,
tear gas was used. When the violence escalated, 69 rounds were fired: 4 dead,10 wounded.
The FBI later said that the shootings were not necessary, but all brought to trial were acquitted.
The Kent State shootings were the result of civil disobedience, not the Viet Nam War.
27
THE
12 DECISIVE BATTLES
OF THE
THREE INDO-CHINA WARS
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
presented
by
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS
COPYRIGHTMG
©
DAVE
SABBEN
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
09 – Lam Son 719
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THE “COMMERCIAL”
This Powerpoint show is copyright to Dave Sabben but is freely
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As at 2011, Dave Sabben leads one tour per year (second half of
October) to visit some of the areas of Australian/ANZAC
operations of 1966-1971. The highlight of these tours is to walk
the Long Tan battlefield with Dave (a platoon Commander in that
battle). The walk takes about 4 hours – about the time of the
battle – so the group goes to all the key locations of the battle and
hears about what happened pretty much in “real time”.
It was prepared for presentation to those who join his Decisive
Battlefields and Long Tan Trek Tours of Viet Nam (see other panel
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An optional extension to the Long Tan Trek Tour takes in the main
or even as fully comprehensive views.
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