Transcript Slide 1

THE
12 DECISIVE BATTLES
OF THE
THREE INDO-CHINA WARS
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
presented by
DAVE SABBEN MG
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
06 – Khe Sanh
Jan – Apr 1968
CAU VIET
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN

WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
BACKGROUND
Since Operation Starlite in 1965, US forces in
SVN had been setting up the Route 9 defence
below the DMZ. Camp Carroll was the key fire
support base and Khe Sanh was the key base for
operations against the main infiltration routes into
SVN along the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail.
2
SITING KHE SANH
The US needed a launch place for their top secret
Special Forces patrols into the areas next to
Laos. Khe Sanh was a level plateau among the
hills with an existing airstrip – ideal for the job. All
the Civilian Irregular Defence Groups (CIDFs)
around the area were moved to Lang Vei.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
=====10,000 yards=====
3
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
SETTING UP THE BASE
The base was some 1750 by 875
yds and by Jan 68 contained
three Marine Battalions - about
6680 defenders.
In a series of “hill fights”, the Marines took and
placed a Company of men (about 100 each) onto
some of the surrounding peaks – hills were labelled
by their heights “881”, “861”, “558” etc . The whole
base was dug in, incl Mortars, 105s & 155s. 4
CONTROVERSY
Each side claims a different strategy in the
Khe Sanh campaign – was it a diversion for
the Tet Offensive, or was it the main game?
RESOLUTION
No orders cut before the event prove either
way. In the event, the nature of the war
changed after Tet so it became academic.
NVN
USA
(1) Make the US think they were going to
(1) Set up a base for operations into the
attack Khe Sanh, but in fact only use it
unpopulated north west of Quang Tri.
to divert attention from the upcoming Tet
(2) In the process, hope to draw the NVA
THIS
SLIDE
AND
PRESENTATION
campaign of 1968.
into a decisive set-piece battle along
WAS PREPARED
BY Dien Bien Phu lines, but which the US
(2) Contain a lot of US troops outside
the
SABBEN
cities which were the main TetDAVE
targets.
would win by fire- and air-power.
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
BUT WAS IT A “DIEN BIEN PHU”?
NVN
(yes) It was a Western army in a valley
surrounded by a Communist army.
(yes) Seizure of Khe Sanh would have
been a propaganda victory that might
have ended the war.
(no) The NVA did not own the heights or the
supply lines and the area wasn’t remote.
USA
(yes) It was the ground chosen by the US
forces and suited their defence task.
(yes) The ground occupied sat across the
NVA infiltration routes and could not be
permitted by the NVA to remain.
(no) The US had the heights, the artillery
and the air support to hold out.
5
TIMELINE – DEC 1967
By the end of December 1967, Special Forces patrols
reported large numbers of NVA entering the area from
Laos and the DMZ but not proceeding south. This
indicated a huge build-up of forces under way in the
Khe Sanh area. NVA 304 Div and 325C Div were
identified – estimated at about 20,000 men.
EARLY JANUARY 68
The Marines occupied Hill 881South
and
HillPRESENTATION
861A,
THIS SLIDE
AND
defending each with a Company (about
men) east
WAS100
PREPARED
BY
and north-west of the base.
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
17 JAN 68
The NVA occupied the undefended
Hill 881North, which overlooked the
base. The Marines attacked and took
the hill on 20 Jan but were ordered to
withdraw and return to Khe Sanh –
Intelligence now indicated
that an attack was imminent. 6
20/21 JAN 68
Just after midnight, 300 NVA with
sappers breached the defences on
Hill 861 and captured the chopper
pad. A swift counter-attack while
still dark recaptured the pad and
repulsed the attack.
The first attack heralded the start of
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
what would be a 77-day siege.
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
21 JAN 68
At 0530, hundreds of rockets and
shells pounded Khe Sanh, directed
from Hill 881North. An early rocket hit
was the main ammo dump. 1500 tons
of bombs, shells, grenades and bullets
lit up. Choppers parked nearby were
blown away. Secondary explosions
continued for 48 hours as the
munitions “cooked off”.
7
21 JAN 68
As the base was being shelled, a ground
attack was placed on the village of Khe
Sanh and its ARVN garrison.
Despite stiff defence, and after renewed
attacks in the afternoon, the ARVN forces
evacuated the town and withdrew to
the nearby FSBs.
30 JAN
Tet starts.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
5 FEB 68
Attacks on Hill 861A
were repulsed.
7 FEB 68
The Lang Vei base was attacked and
over-run, the defenders scattering to
other nearby bases.
8 FEB 68
Attacks on the main base approached
but did not breach the wire. 8
10 FEB 68
The base was under constant shelling
by 130mm and 152mm artillery based
in Laos and the DMZ. After several
days of bombardment, a C-130
resupply aircraft was destroyed on the
airstrip. Over the following week,
more aircraft were hit. It was decided
to stop resupply by landing aircraft.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
An average of 2500 rounds were
landing on and around the base
per week and, on 23 Feb alone,
1307 rounds were counted. The
base, already dug in, moved
further underground. Days were
spent in deep bunkers with
sentries posted on the perimeter.
9
FEB 68
With aircraft losses too high to sustain,
resupply of the base moved to more
innovative methods. One method was
by parachute drop…..
(shades of Dien Bien Phu!)
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
…or by Low Altitude Parachute Extraction
System (LAPES), where the plane flies low
over the airstrip with it’s loading ramp
lowered. A parachute attached to the cargo
is opened. The parachute then drags the
cargo onto the ground.
This reduced but did not eliminate aircraft
losses. Chinook CH-46’s also delivered
resupplies, but 17 of these choppers were
lost over the two months.
10
FEB – MAR 68
As time went by, the base and its
outlaying hilltop positions developed a
complete network of trenches and
bunkers.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT
© daily routine became repairing the
The
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
damage from the previous and overnight
shelling before the fog cleared in the morning,
then retreat into the bunkers to survive the
day’s shelling, only coming out for necessary
tasks – like the retrieval of resupplies.
Despite the presence of some 20,000 NVA
troops, no major attack eventuated. There
were many small hilltop attacks as the NVA
struggled to dominate the heights, but the
Marines never lost a position.
11
MARCH 68
As the Siege continued, the Marines were kept
supplied with food & ammo and the casualties
were taken out by daring “Dustoff” missions.
As the weather started to clear in later March,
the threat of NVA attacks reduced.
Many of the attacks that were made on the
base and hilltop positions were
with
THISstopped
SLIDE AND
PRESENTATION
air and artillery fire alone rather than
combat.
WAS
PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
EARLY APRIL 68
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
The airstrip was cleared and C-130s
were able to land again. The base
was as strong as ever.
Surplus troops were flown out and
fresh troops brought in. While the
land link had not been established,
the danger to the existence of the
Khe Sanh base had disappeared.
12
LATE MAR – EARLY APR 68
With the base no longer tightly sieged,
an Operation (“Pegasus”) was
launched to re-create a land link. The
US 1st Cavalry Division cleared the
road to Khe Sanh…..
On 8 APR, the two forces met…..
THIS SLIDE
PRESENTATION
…..the siege
had AND
ended.
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
13
14 APRIL 68
(Easter Sunday) The Marines
re-occupied Hill 881North.
The opposition at Khe Sanh
had finished.
In JUNE 68
Khe Sanh was evacuated.
The Marines destroyed
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
everything they could before
WAS PREPARED BY
they left.
DAVE SABBEN
After Tet 68, the war was not
the same. Political imperative
overlaid military tactics and
even military strategy.
The outcome of individual
battles became virtually
irrelevant.
The Media controlled the
public perception of all military
activities – including the public
perception of the soldiers
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
14
13 JAN – 8 APR 68
In the period of the siege – 77 days – 24,000
tactical airstrikes were called, using USAF and
Marine aircraft.
2700 “Arc Light” B52 missions were flown.
100,000 tons of bombs & napalm were dropped.
150,000 artillery rounds were fired.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPAREDUS
BY casualties were 200 to 500 depending on
how the count is taken, with 852 wounded.
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT
© suffered 1600 dead by bodycount.
The NVA
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
Thousands were killed in the bombing and
shelling – conservative estimates indicate
something in the order of 10,000.
15
TODAY
The old airstrip is now being developed into the main road
of an industrial estate. The red earth and stunted
undergrowth seem to tell of hard struggles in times past.
Australian eucalypts have been planted as little else will
grow. The surrounding hills show no scars of their past.
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
16
WHAT HAPPENED AS A RESULT?
2121
Jan.
The Battle
Battle for
forKhe
KheSanh
Sanhstarted
started
Jan.
Tet
Press
took
Tet started
started30
30Jan.
Jan.The
TheWestern
Western
Press
take Khe
Khe Sanh
Sanhas
asaamajor
majorand
andperhaps
take
fright
and reacted
negatively
to the to
took fright
and reacted
negatively
perhapsbattle
decisive
battle
to end the US
decisive
to end
the US
whole
war, war,
yet the
did notdid not
the whole
yetNorth
the North
involvementininthe
thewar.
war.Collecting
Collecting
involvement
understand
happened
– they
understandwhat
whathad
had
happened
–
20,000 men
men to
to aa set-piece
set-piecebattle
battlewould
recognised
Tetfor
forthe
the disaster
disaster itit was.
they saw Tet
was.
would indicate
this intention.
indicate
this intention.
forfor
By 10 Feb,
Feb, all
all of
ofTet
Tetwas
wasover
overexcept
except
This was
wastimed
timedtotocoincide
coincide
with
1968,
This
with
TetTet
1968,
the capture
captureofofHue
HueCitadel.
Citadel.Ongoing
Ongoing
whichitself
itselfwas
wassupposed
supposed
trigger
which
to to
trigger
a aPRESENTATION
Press at
the negativity
Press
at Hue
Hue established
set the negativity
of the
THIS
SLIDE
AND
massive“uprising”
“uprising”
in the
South
-PREPARED
a
massive
in the
South
- a series
of the civilian
perception
overseas.
perception
overseas.
WAS
BY civilian
series
of city victories
in the
South
of
city victories
in the South
would
win
By 24 Feb,
Feb, Hue
Hue Citadel
Citadelhad
hadbeen
beenretaken.
DAVE
SABBEN
would
the North.
war for the North.
the
warwin
for the
The NVA massacre
was exposed,
retaken.
The NVA massacre
waswhich
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
stung the North.
exposed,
which stung the North.
failureofofTet
Tettototrigger
trigger
ANY
The failure
ANY
uprising,
or CONTENT
ON
CREATIVE
By 29 March,
March, the
theNVA
NVAwas
waswithdrawing
withdrawing
uprising,
or and
evenretain
to take
and
retain
even
to take
ANY
single
from Khe
only
now
realising
from
KheSanh
Sanh,and
only
now
realising
ANY single
objective
proved
objective
proved
that the
North that
was the
not
that the
them
that
the Press
Presswas
wasoffering
offering
them
North was
notwar
fighting
a civil
war in
that
fighting
a civil
that was
popular
“victory” from
thethe
jaws
of defeat.
“victory”
from
jaws
of defeat.
wasSouth.
popular in the South.
the
to to
“talk”.
On 3 April,
April,the
theNorth
Northoffered
offered
“talk”.
The failure
failureand
andthe
theloss
loss
of
life
at
Khe
of life at Khe Sanh
began
in in
By 11 May,
May, formal
formalnegotiations
negotiations
began
Sanh proved
NVAnot
could
proved
that thethat
NVAthe
could
meetnot
the
Paris between
Nam
Paris
betweenUSA
USAand
andNorth
NorthViet
Viet
meet
the US face-to-face
US
face-to-face
in battle. in battle.
representatives.
Nam
representatives.
The NVA never
never again
againtried
triedtotoengage
engage
USUS
Between Khe
was
Between
KheSanh
Sanhand
andTet,
Tet,the
theNorth
North
forces
inaamajor
majorset-piece
set-piece
battle.
forces in
battle.
17
brought
to theto
Peace
talks. talks.
was
brought
the Peace
WHAT MADE KHE SANH “DECISIVE”?
.The evidence
evidenceisisthat
thatthe
theNVA
NVA
wanted
wanted
to to
THE
12 DECISIVE BATTLES
OF THE
THREE INDO-CHINA WARS
THIS SLIDE AND PRESENTATION
WAS PREPARED BY
DAVE SABBEN
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT ©
ON CREATIVE CONTENT
presented by
DAVE SABBEN MG
06 – Khe Sanh
Questions?
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE THIS SLIDE
THE FINE PRINT
THE “COMMERCIAL”
This Powerpoint show is copyright to Dave Sabben but is freely
available for any non-profit use. It may be downloaded free
from Dave’s website: www.sabben.com
As at 2011, Dave Sabben leads one tour per year (second half of
October) to visit some of the areas of Australian/ANZAC
operations of 1966-1971. The highlight of these tours is to walk
the Long Tan battlefield with Dave (a platoon Commander in that
battle). The walk takes about 4 hours – about the time of the
battle – so the group goes to all the key locations of the battle
and hears about what happened pretty much in “real time”.
It was prepared for presentation to those who join his Decisive
Battlefields and Long Tan Trek Tours of Viet Nam (see other
panel for the “commercial”) as introductions for the various
battles.
For further enquiry into these tours, please visit:
http://www.sabben.com/longtantrek/
Because the shows are live presentations, much more is in the
and
select
VN%20Long%20Tan%20Trek%20Tours.html
or
narrative than is included in the textTHIS
on theSLIDE
slides. AND PRESENTATION
VN%20Decisive%20Battlefields%20Tours.html
The shows are intended to be introductions and overviews –
WAS
PREPARED
BY
not detailed expositions or analyses. Views and conclusions
An optional extension to the Long Tan Trek Tour takes in the
are the author’s and are not offered as the only possible
main US battles of northern South Viet Nam including Da Nang,
or even as fully comprehensive views.
Hue, ©
the DMZ (including Khe Sanh) and the A Shau Valley
WHO RETAINS COPYRIGHT
(Hamburger Hill), then visits both Hanoi (‘Hanoi Hilton’, War
Where possible, permissions have been obtained to use maps
ON
CREATIVE
CONTENT
Museum) and the Dien Bien Phu valley (both Viet Minh and
or photos but some have been used without specific
French positions).
permission. Copyright holders who want their material either
DAVE SABBEN
not used or credited, please contact Dave Sabben at
http://www.sabben.com/contact%20us.html
Anyone wishing to make an anonymous donation towards the cost
and time of putting this show together is invited to make a donation
of any amount to (Australian) Westpac bank account BSB# 733 000,
Account# 853 546 (branch = 360 Collins St, Melbourne), or
(Australian) CBA bank account BSB# 063 550, Account# 1024 7640
(branch = Hampton, Victoria), either account in the name of David
Sabben.
If passing this slide show to others,
please don’t remove this slide .
As well as the once –a-year-in-October tours, Dave can arrange
a similar tour at any time of year for a group of 20 or more.
Dates, durations, standards of accommodation, inclusions etc will
be all your call. Please contact Dave (with numbers and
preferences) at
http://www.sabben.com/contact%20us.html
Note that these are “battlefield-oriented” tours – they do NOT go to the
popular tourist sites. “Tourist” tours can be added before or after.
If passing this slide show to others,
please don’t remove this slide .
THE NVA VIEW DEVELOPED LATER – SPOT THE “ODDETIES”
Khe Sanh was the biggest ruse of the war. General William Westmoreland
was convinced that the Vietnamese Communists would attempt another Dien
Bien Phu against the garrison of six thousand Marines he had placed as bait
at this forlorn spot in the far northwest corner of South Vietnam. When they
did, he was going to squash them in triumph. But, as explained by General
Hoang Phuong, the Vietnamese chief of military history, whom I met in Hanoi
after the war, "General Westmoreland fell into a strategic ambush."
The Vietnamese gave every appearance of threatening Khe Sanh,
surrounding the place with thousands of troops and shelling the base
relentlessly. No serious attempt to seize the Marine base ever occurred.
The Vietnamese purpose was to distract Westmoreland's attention from their
preparations for the real Dien Bien Phu of the American war, the surprise
nationwide offensive at Tet, the lunar New Year holiday, in January 1968,
which broke the will of the Johnson administration and of the American
public to continue to prosecute the conflict. The ruse succeeded
completely. On the first morning of the Tet offensive, Westmoreland
announced that the panorama of attacks across South Vietnam, including an
assault on the U.S. embassy in the middle of Saigon, was merely a diversion
from an intended main thrust at Khe Sanh and across the demilitarized zone.
Yet the credulity of the commanding general cannot detract from the
staunchness of the Marines who held Khe Sanh, at the cost of 205 of their
comrades, and the gallantry of the aviators who kept them supplied with food
and ammunition.
Not remote
No such thing
Effort for
return?
Tried & failed
Declare peace
& attack…
Was US
reaction
planned?
Look at
timings
19