Transcript Comparative political economics

Political economics
Comparative Politics and the Welfare State
Lectures 2-3
AY 2009-2010
Paolo Graziano
Transition and democratic
consolidation
• Democratic transition is complete (consolidation)
when:
– agreement about policial procedures to produce an
elected government is reached
– government in power is a direct result of a free and
popular vote
– government has de facto the authority to generate new
policies
– division of powers (executive, legislative, judiciary)
Democracy and its arenas
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civil society
political society
economic society
rule of law
state apparatus
Civil society
• arena of the polity where self-organizing
groups, movements (women’s groups,
associations, etc.) and individuals, relatively
autonomous from the state, are free to …
• ...articulate values, create solidarities and
associations and advance their interests.
• collective and private groups (individuals)
Political society
• arena in which the polity specifically arranges
itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise
control over public power and the state
apparatus
• parties, elections, electoral rules, political
leadership, interparty alliances, and
legislatures are the instruments by which
society selects and monitors democratic
government
Economic society
• arena where a set of socio-politically crafted
and socio-politically accepted norms,
institutions, and regulations are present
• no democracy in a command economy
• no democracy in a pure market economy
Rule of law
• need for strong consensus over the
constitution and a commitment fo ‘selfbinding’ procedures of governance that
require exceptional majorities to change
• clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an
independent judicial system and supported
by a strong legal culture in civil society
• all actors must respect and uphold the rule
of law
State apparatus (bureaucracy)
• since citizens have rights that have to be
guaranteed and protected…
• …the democratic government needs to be able to
exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of
the legitimate use of force in the territory
through…
• … a functioning state bureaucracy considered
usable (by democratic governments)
Patterns of democracy I
• Who decides?
- majority
- “as many people as possible”
• Majority: majoritarian model of democracy
• “As many people as possible”: consensus
model of democracy
Analytical dimensions
• Executive-parties: arrangement of
executive power, party and electoral
systems, interests groups
• Federal-unitary: territorial organisation of
the state
Executive-parties
• concentration vs. power-sharing
• executive predominance vs. executivelegislative balance of power
• two-party vs. multiparty systems
• majoritarian and disproportional electoral
systems vs. proportional representation
• pluralist vs. ‘corporatist’ interest group
systems
Federal vs. unitary state organisation
• unitary and centralized vs. federal and
decentralized government
• concentration of legislative power in a
unicameral legislature vs. division between
two equally strong houses
• flexible vs. rigid constitutions
• reduced vs. extensive role of constitutional
courts
• dependent vs. independent central banks
The Westminster model of
democracy
• Majority principle
• British parliamentary and governmental
institutions
• Need for alternation that prevents ‘elective
dictatorship’
• Prerequisite: homogeneous societies
• UK, Canada…
• … Australia, New Zealand …
• … Barbados.
The case of UK I
• bare-majority cabinets (large minority is excluded from
power) – exception with minority cabinets in the ’70s
• cabinet dominance vis-à-vis Parliament (but possible –
although rare - vote of no confidence)
• two-party system: Conservative and Labour party (but
recently increase of the Liberal Democrats)
• majoritarian (single-member districts and ‘first past the
post’) and disproportional (votes vs. seats) electoral
system.
• interest group pluralism
The case of the UK II
• unitary and centralized government
• concentration of legislative power in asymmetrical
bicameral legislature: House of the Commons and
House of the Lords
• flexible (“unwritten”) Constitution
• absence of judicial review: Parliament is the
sovereign authority (except for EU control…)
• central bank controlled by the executive (1997:
power to set interest rates)
The consensus model of democracy
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more usable for ‘plural’ societies
it contributes to conflict reduction…
…guaranteeing strong minorities…
…limiting the power of majorities.
Switzerland, Belgium …
… and the European Union.
The cases of Switzerland/Belgium I
• executive power-sharing in broad coalition
cabinets
• executive-legislative balance of power (possible
government instability)
• multiparty system (religious, socioeconomic and
linguistic cleavages)
• proportional representation
• interest group corporatism (agreements reached
among few strong political and social actors)
The cases of Switzerland/Belgium II
• federal and decentralized government
• strong bicameralism (with the partial
exception of Belgium)
• constitutional rigidity: need of
‘supermajorities’ in order to change
• judicial review (but not in Switzerland)
• central bank independence
A supranational case of CD: the EU I
• executive power-sharing in broad coalition
cabinets
• executive-legislative balance of power
• multiparty system
• proportional representation
• interest group corporatism
A supranational case of CD: the EU II
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federal and decentralized government
strong bicameralism
constitutional rigidity
judicial review
central bank independence