Transcript CHAPTER 10. ORKER MOBILITY: MIGRATION, IMMIGRATION, …

CHAPTER 10. WORKER MOBILITY:
MIGRATION, IMMIGRATION, AND TURNOVER
• In 1996-97,
– over 3 million workers moved between states
– 70 to 85 percent of movers cited economic reasons
for the move.
• About one-half of all interstate moves are
associated with a change in employment.
• Probability of an interstate move falls with age
but rises with education.
• More educated people are more likely to make
long distance moves.
Economic model of worker mobility
PV of Net Benefits =
T

t 1
B jt  Bot
(1  r )
t
C
where
Bjt = $ from new job (j) in year t (mea
Bot = $ from old job (0) in year t.
T = number of years one expects to work at job j.
C = the utility lost in the move itself (“moving costs”)
r = discount rate
Predictions from model
• A worker is more likely to move if:
– young
• more years to collect benefits
• “psychic” costs are lower
• peak years for mobility are ages 20-24 (12% move
across state border each year)
• by age 47, mobility rate drops to 4 percent.
– costs of move are low
• single versus family
• effect of second earner in family
Predictions from model
• Net “out-migration” from an area will occur if wages fall in
that area relative to other areas.
• Short distance moves are more likely than long distance
moves (C larger because of transportation costs and
increasing cost of gathering information).
– How will the growth of job information on the internet affect
migration?
• If one country has a higher return to education than
another, more educated workers will tend to move to the
country with the higher return.
U.S. IMMIGRATION HISTORY
• Prior to 1920, U.S. had essentially unrestricted immigration.
• 1921, Quota Law passed.
– set annual quotas based on nationality.
– reduced immigration from eastern and southern Europe.
• 1965: Immigration and Nationality Act
– abolished the quota system based on national origin.
– 1990 amendments allow:
•
•
•
•
675,000 people per year.
480,000 reserved for family reunification
140,000 reserved for immigrants with exceptional skills
55,000 reserved for “diversity” immigrants (immigrants from countries that
have not recently provided many immigrants)
• political refugees are permitted without limit.
• Officially recorded immigration in 1996: 916,000
• Illegal immigration estimated at 275,000 per year and 5 million in
1996.
LPR=legal
permanent
resident
Source:http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/publications/USLegalPermEst_5.pdf
CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
Domestic Labor Supply
Total Labor Supply
w1
w2
n3
n1
n2
Immigrants reduce wages, increase total employment, but reduce employment
of natives.
CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
Other considerations for labor market effects
•elasticity of labor supply
•elasticity of labor demand
• What if immigrants are gross complements to skilled labor?
•Immigrants may increase labor demand through increased product
demand.
Evaluating immigration policy:
• labor market effects
• cost of goods and services.
• tax revenues versus government services
• evidence that those with above a high school education
contribute more in taxes than they receive in government
services; reverse for those with less than a high school
education)
• should immigration policy be driven more by “skills”, family
reunification, diversity?
CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION
Borjas (2003 NBER):
“immigration lowers the wage of competing workers: a 10 percent
increase in supply reduces wages by 3 to 4 percent.”
David Card (2005 NBER):
“Overall, evidence that immigrants have harmed the opportunities
of less educated natives is scant.”
“On the question of assimilation, the success of the U.S.-born
children of immigrants is a key yardstick. By this metric, post-1965
immigrants are doing reasonably well: second generation sons
and daughters have higher education and wages than the children
of natives. Even children of the least- educated immigrant origin
groups have closed most of the education gap with the children of
natives.”
JOB MOBILITY
Determinants of job mobility:
• compensation package
– deferred pay
– “efficiency” wages
– Non-compete clauses
• what causes firms to offer a package that reduces
quits?
–
–
–
–
•
specific training
large hiring/screening costs
high monitoring costs (more on this later)
Trade secrets
men vs. women
– men tend to receive more specific training and compensation
packages that reduce turnover.
JOB MOBILITY
• large vs. small firms
– large firms tend to invest more in training and have
higher screening costs: monitoring problems.
– much of the reason large firms have lower turnover is
that their pensions are designed to penalize quitters.
•
rural vs. urban areas.
– easier to search in densely populated areas.
MOBILITY COSTS AND MONOPSONY
ME b
ME
LS
wa
LS
b
a
a
wb
Na
Nb
•For any given level of employment (Na + Nb), the firm will equate
ME for each type of labor.
•The more inelastic is labor supply, the greater is the difference
between ME and W.
•The more inelastic is labor supply, the lower the wage rate paid.
•LESS MOBILE WORKERS ARE PAID LESS.
MOBILITY COSTS AND MONOPSONY
• Applications of monopsony model
– Married versus single
– Urban versus rural
– With vs. without children
– Majority versus minority workers.