Transcript No Slide Title

IRISK: DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED
TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT RISK
METHODOLOGY FOR CHEMICAL
INSTALLATIONS
O. N. Aneziris
PRISM SEMINAR
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
27 May 2004
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
SLOVAKIA
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
EC Contract No: ENVA-CT96-0243
I-RISK
DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTEGRATED TECHNICAL AND
MANAGEMENT RISK CONTROL AND MONITORING
METHODOLOGY FOR MANAGING AND QUANTIFYING ON-SITE
AND OFF-SITE RISKS
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW), The Netherlands (Coordinator)
Four Elements Ltd, UK (Secretariat)
Health and Safety Executive, UK
Ministry of Environment (VROM), The Netherlands
NCSR Demokritos, Greece
National Institute for Health and Environment (RIVM), The Netherlands
Norsk Hydro, Norway
Safety Science Group, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands
SAVE Consulting Scientists, The Netherlands
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OUTLINE
Introduction
Technical model
Management model
Modification of Loss Of Containment
frequency, according to the Safety
Management System
Case studies
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I-RISK
TECHNICAL
MODEL
PARAMETERS
MANAGEMENT
MODEL
(λ, μ,T, fM, TM,QM1)
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
MODELLING OF ACCIDENTS
ACCIDENT SEQUENCES
PLANT DAMAGE STATES
FREQUENCY
ESTIMATION
CONSEQUENCE
ASSESSMNET
RISK INTEGRATION
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TECHNICAL MODEL
 MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM
 EVENT TREE - FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
 RISK INTEGRATION
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MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM (MLD)
 MLD FORMS THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL
MODEL
 MLD IS NOT A FAULT TREE
 MLD PROVIDES THE STARTING POINT FOR
DEVELOPING PLANT-SPECIFIC MODELS
 MLD IDENTIFIES INITIATING EVENTS
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MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM FOR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
CORROSION
LOSS OF
BOUNDARY
CONTAINMENT
BYPASS
ERROSION
OVERPRESS
URE
HIGH
TEMPER
ATURE
INTERNAL
PRESSURE
INCREASE
ROLL OVER
PRESSURE
SHOCH IN
HOSE
DIRECT
PRESSURE
INCREASE
FROM GAS
COOLING
MALFUNCT
ION
EXCESS
HEAT
OVRFILLING
INTERNAL
EXTERNAL
RUN AWAY
REACTION
COMBUSTI
ON
CHEMICAL
INCOMPATI
BLE
MATERIAL
EXCESS
TEMPERAT
URE
UNDERPRES
SURE
LOW
LEVEL
VIBRATI
ON
LOW
TEMPERAT
URE
SNOW, ICE
EXTERNAL
LOADING
CONTAIN
MENT
OPENED
NATURAL
PHENOMENA
SUPPORTS
FAIL
SEISMIC
FLOODING
CONTAIN
MENT
OPENS
EXTRA
LOADS
HIGH
WINDS
EVENT TREE - FAULT TREE EVENTS
 A) INITIATING EVENTS (fi, λ, fHi)
 B) COMPONENT - BASIC EVENTS

PERIODICALLY TESTED STANDBY COMPONENT

NONTESTED

REPAIRABLE ON LINE COMPONENT

NON REPAIRABLE
 C) HUMAN ACTIONS
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AVERAGE UNAVAILABILITY FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMPONENTS
PERIODICALLY TESTED COMPONENTS
i) Unavailability owing to hardware failure
between tests
l:failure rate
T: mean time between tests
ιι) Unavailability owing to repair of detected
failures
λ: failure rate
TR: duration of the repair
T: mean time between tests
ιιi)Unavailability owing to routine
maintenance
fM: frequency of maintenance
TM: duration of the maintenance
ιv)Unavailability owing to maintenance
QM1: prob. of commiting an error
QM2: prob. of not detecting an error
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U1 
1
lT
2
U2 
1
lT  lTR
2
U3  U2  fmTm
U4  U3  Q M1Q M 2
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
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PARAMETERS OF TECHNICAL MODEL
 fi
FREQUENCY OF INITIATING EVENTS
 λs FAILURE RATE IN STANDBY MODE
 T
PERIOD OF TESTING
 TR DURATION OF REPAIR
 QM1 ERROR IN TEST AND REPAIR
 QM2 FAILURE TO DETECT PREVIOUS ERROR
 fM
FREQUENCY OF ROUTINE MAINTENANCE
 TM DURATION (MEAN) OF ROUTINE MAINTENANCE
 λO FAILURE RATE OF ON-LINE COMPONENTS
 μ
REPAIR RATE OF ON-LINE COMPONENT
 QO1 PROBABILITY OF NOT PERFORMING ACTION
 QO2 PROB. OF NOT DETECTING/ RECOVERING ERROR
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FREQUENCY OF LOSS OF CONTAINMENT
fLOC=g(b)
b=u(q)
b: vector of basic events
q: vector of technical parameters
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MODIFICATION OF THE FREQUENCY
OF LOC ACCORDING TO THE SMS
10
ln fj=ln fl + (ln fu-ln fl) mj/10
fj modified value of the jth technical parameter
ln fl
0
fl lower value of each parameter, for the installation with the poorest SMS in the industry
fl upper value of each parameter, for the instal-
lation with the best SMS in the industry
mj modification factor of the jth technical parameter
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ln fu
MANAGEMENT MODEL
 “Major hazard” safety management
 systematic control and monitoring of the possible failure
events (as modelled in the Technical Model) leading to
Loss Of Containment of hazardous substances
 Integrated management system model
 major hazard management is usually part of an
integrated SHE system
 Management system model structure
 Control and Monitoring (feedback and learning) cycles
 8 management subsystems: “Delivery systems”
 delivering criteria and resources for control of major
hazards
 Primary business processes considered:
 Operations; Inspection, Testing and Maintenance;
Emergencies
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OVERALL STRUCTURE OF
MANAGEMENT MODEL
POLICY, ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE
MAJOR HAZARD RISK CONTROL & MONITORING
SYSTEM (RCMS)
FEEDBACK &
LEARNING LOOP
(management
review)
DESIGN/MODIFICATION
INSPECTION/TEST, including
maintenance concept
MAINTENANCE
OPERATIONS including
emergency
8 Delivery Systems per primary business function
DESIGN &
MODIFICATIONS
INSPECTION/TEST
MAINTENANCE
OPERATIONS & EMERGENCY
ACTIVITIES & TASKS
PRIMARY BUSINESS
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FEEDBACK &
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Outputs to Technical Model
ACTIVITIES
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS
 Availability of personnel
 Commitment and motivation to carry out the work
safely
 Internal communication and coordination of people
 Competence of personnel
 Resolution of conflicting pressures antagonistic to
safety
 Plant Interface
 Plans and procedures
 Delivery of correct spares for repairs
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS - Personnel
Competence: the knowledge, skills and abilities in the form of first-line and/or back-up
personnel who have been selected and trained for the safe execution of the critical primary
business functions and activities in the organisation. This system covers the selection and
training function of the company, which delivers competent staff for overall manpower
planning.
Availability: allocating the necessary time (or numbers) of competent people to the safety-
critical primary business tasks, which have to be carried out. This factor emphasises timecriticality, i.e. people available at the moment (or within the time frame) when the tasks should
be carried out. This delivery system singles out the manpower planning aspects, which can
include the planning of work of contractors during major shutdowns and the availability of
staff for repair work on critical equipment outside normal work hours, including coverage for
absence and holidays.
Commitment: the incentives and motivation, which personnel have to carry out their tasks
and activities, with suitable care and alertness, and according to the appropriate safety
criteria and procedures specified for the activities by the organisation. This delivery system
is fairly closely related to the conflict resolution system, in that it deals with the incentives
of individuals carrying out the primary business activities not to choose other criteria above
safety, such as ease of working, time saving, social approval, etc. Organisational aspects of
conflicts are dealt with there and, more personal aspects, such as violation of procedures
here.
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS - Hardware
Interface: The ergonomics of all aspects of the plant, which are used/operated
by operations, inspection or maintenance. This covers design and layout of control
rooms and manually operated equipment, location and design of inspection and test
facilities, the maintenance-friendliness of equipment and the ergonomics of the
tools used to maintain it. This delivery system covers both the appropriateness of
the interface for the activity and the user-friendliness needed to carry out the
activities.
Spares: These are the equipment and spares, which are installed during
maintenance. This delivery system covers both the correctness of the spares for
their use (like with like), and the availability of spares when and where needed to
carry out the activities.
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DELIVERY SYSTEMS - Organizational
Internal communication and coordination: Internal communications are communications
which occur implicitly, or explicitly within any primary business activity, i.e. within one task or
activity linking to a parameter of the technical model, in order to ensure that the tasks are
coordinated and carried out according to the relevant criteria.
Conflict resolution: The mechanisms (such as supervision, monitoring, procedures, learning,
group discussion) by which potential and actual conflicts between safety and other criteria
(such as productivity) in the allocation and use of personnel, hardware and other resources are
recognised, avoided or resolved if they occur. This delivery system is closely related to the
one concerned with commitment, which covers the issues of violations within tasks at an
individual level. The conflict resolution system covers the organisational mechanisms for
resolving conflicts across tasks, between people at operational level and at management level.
Procedures, Output goals and Plans: Rules and procedures are specific performance
criteria which specify in detail, usually in written form, a formalised “normative” behaviour or
method for carrying out an activity (checklist, task list, action steps, plan, instruction manual,
fault-finding heuristic, form to be completed, etc.). Output goals are performance measures
for an activity which specify what the result of the activity should be, but not how the results
should be achieved. They are objectives, goals or outputs (e.g. accident/incident targets or
trends, exposure of risk levels, ALARA, “safe”, numbers of activities carried out, etc.). It is
also convenient to regard definitions and criteria for choosing one course of action over
another as output criteria. Plans refer to explicit planning of activities in time, either how
frequently tasks should be done, or when and by whom they will be done within a particular
time period (month, shutdown period, etc.). They include the maintenance regime, maintenance
scheduling (including shutdown planning) and testing and inspection activities, which need to
link to the parameters of maintenance frequency, test interval and time for maintenance and
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MANAGEMENT TASKS
Deliver the appropriate control or
resource to the appropriate primary
business activity at the appropriate
time
Learn and improve on that delivery
process over time
These tasks are modelled as processes
(boxes) linked by inputs, outputs and
influences (arrows) in loops
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Management tasks
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
Overall management & Organization (1)
Company Risk Control & Monitoring System (2)
(RCMS)
Evaluate and Propose Chances in RCMS (12)
Company System for managing and Monitoring
System (3)
Control System (Use Delivery System to control
tasks) (4)
Evaluate and propose changing delivery system (10)
Record and analyze performance of delivery system
(9)
Evaluate and propose changing use of the delivery
system (11)
Correct on-line performance (8)
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SYSTEM CLIMATE WITHIN WHICH THE SITE OPERATES
Company Risk Control
and Monitoring System
MANAGEMENT
1
INTEGRATED (PROBABLY)
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM,
COMMON TO ALL LOOPS
Overall management &
organisation
policy/system + adapt
to system climate
12
2
Evaluate & propose
changing overall
management &/or
RCS system/policy
Analyse risks + design the
control and monitoring
system + adapt to system climate
TASKS MODEL
3
Company system
for managing
and
3
monitoring delivery
system + adapt to
system climate
MANAGEMENT
SUB-SYSTEMS
Control
system
4
Use delivery system
to control tasks
Monitoring
system
11
Evaluate & propose
changing delivery
system
10
Evaluate and
propose changing
the way the delivery
system is used
Quality of
management
evaluated by
AUDIT
9
Record and analyse
performance,
deviations, incidents
etc.
8
Correct on line
performance of tasks
Performance (8 delivery systems x number of common
mode management subsystems)
7
INTERFACE
Technical
6
Modified value of
Weighted delivery system
Modified
Calibration models
&
model
x parameters matrix
for converting
task performance
values of
TECHNICAL
parameters
performance score to
per base event per
base event
failure data
MODEL
from Base
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parameters
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MANAGEMENT MODEL
OUTPUT from
Process 12
becomes INPUT for
Process 1
1
INTEGRATED (PROBABLY)
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM,
COMMON TO ALL
DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Company Risk Control
and Monitoring System
2
Overall
management &
organisation
policy/system +
adapt
to system
climate
KEY
12
Output from one box
becomes input for
processing by the next
Evaluate &
Influences from one box
propose
which can change the
changing
overall
processing
quality of the other
management
&/or
Data collected from
equipment,
tasks, and other sources
RCM system
MANAGEMENT
PROCESSES
Analyse risks + design
the control and
monitoring
system + adapt to
system climate
The current QUALITY of
each MANAGEMENT
PROCESS is assessed in
an
AUDIT on
a 0-10 scale
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INFLUENCES from
one Process can
change the quality
of another. This
change takes time:
TIME MODEL
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An INPUT to a Process is
the OUTPUT of a previous
one. The quality on 0-10
scale: result of
CALCULATION MODEL
application
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3
Company system for
managing
and
3
monitoring delivery
system + adapt to
system climate
MANAGEMENT
SUB-SYSTEMS
for each
DELIVERY SYSTEM
Monitoring
system
Control System
4
Use delivery
system to control
tasks
AUDIT the
‘BOXES’
Assess
process
quality for
each of the
8 Delivery
Systems
Quality on 0-10 scale of 8
Delivery System outputs
determined from
CALCULATION MODEL
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10
Evaluate and
propose
changing the
way the delivery
system is used
8
Corrections to on
line performance of
tasks at the
workface
11
Evaluate &
propose changing
delivery system
9
Record and analyse
performance,
deviations,
incidents etc.
Data collected from
equipment, tasks, and
other sources (not delivery
specific)
7
Weighted Delivery
System x
Parameters Matrix
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Quality of “Procedures” is function
of
•audited quality of 8 (AUDIT)
•calculated quality of input from 4
•weightings of their relative effects
on output quality
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
SYSTEM CLIMATE WITHIN WHICH THE SITE OPERATES
Company Risk Control
and Monitoring System
MANAGEMENT
1
INTEGRATED (PROBABLY)
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM,
COMMON TO ALL LOOPS
Overall management &
organisation
policy/system + adapt
to system climate
12
2
Evaluate & propose
changing overall
management &/or
RCS system/policy
Analyse risks + design the
control and monitoring
system + adapt to system climate
TASKS MODEL
3
Company system
for managing
and
3
monitoring delivery
system + adapt to
system climate
MANAGEMENT
SUB-SYSTEMS
Control
system
4
Use delivery system
to control tasks
Monitoring
system
11
Evaluate & propose
changing delivery
system
10
Evaluate and
propose changing
the way the delivery
system is used
9
Record and analyse
performance,
deviations, incidents
etc.
8
Correct on line
performance of tasks
Performance (8 delivery systems x number of common
mode management subsystems)
7
INTERFACE
Technical
6
Modified value of
Weighted delivery system
Modified
Calibration models
&
model
x parameters matrix
for converting
task performance
values of
TECHNICAL
parameters
performance score to
per base event per
base event
failure data
MODEL
from Base
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parameter
parameters
Events RESEARCH
table
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Audit Objectives
 Integrated assessment
 Major hazards as focus for
articulation of management system
 Modification at technical parameter
 Sensitivity analysis for significant
corrosion factors in management
system
 Use a microcosm to study the whole
major hazard management system
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Audit Procedure
 Preparation:
 Construct technical model: completeness of scenarios
 Group basic & initiating events into clusters with same
management
 Link initiating events to management system: expert judgement
 Map company SMS onto I RISK model: who to interview / tailoring
 Conduct:
 Auditor expertise: process + management + benchmarking of
industry
 Focus on scenarios
 Prompt lists and recording forms
 Verification across interviews and with checks in practice
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Audit Evaluation
Assessment per box:
Scale of 1-10 compared to industry average:
anchoring, baseline
Interrater reliability: refinery, av. 0.74, range 0.1-0.8
ammonia, av 0.73,range 0.49-0.96
Discussion or blind re-rating: av. 0.85
Relative weighting of delivery systems
per task/parameter
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MODELING OF THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
yi =fi(xi,y1,…,yj,…yI)
yi output of box i
fi function of box i
xi state of box i
yj(j i) input of box i
yi =kiixi+(1-kii)Σcijyj
y=Kx+(I-K)Cy
y=[I-(I-K)C]-1Kx
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Management –Technical Interface Model
Management
Processes for
common mode
A
Event
Parameters:
Base
Events:
11
12
14
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13
15
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16
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MODIFICATION OF THE FREQUENCY
OF LOC ACCORDING TO THE SMS
8
mj=Σy8iwij
i =1
mj modification factor of the jth technical parameter
y8i output of the ith delivery system (box 8)
wij weighting factor assessing the relative importance of the ith
management delivery system on the influence of the jth
technical parameter
j index running over the basic events of the kth group
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WEIGHTING FACTORS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Qo1
0.06
0.15
0.07
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.18
0
Qo2
0.05
0.14
0.05
0.21
0.21
0.2
0.14
0
QM1
0.08
0.19
0.06
0.14
0.14
0.08
0.17
0.14
QM2
0.05
0.13
0.05
0.22
0.18
0.18
0.15
0.04
fi
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0
0.4
0
λ
0.08
0.12
0.12
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.16
0.28
Τ
0.05
0.24
0.14
0
0.28
0.05
0.19
0.05
fm
0.05
0.21
0.16
0
0.32
0.05
0.16
0.05
TR
0.12
0.07
0.21
0.09
0.1
0.19
0.1
0.2
TM
0.12
0.08
0.21
0.08
0.12
0.17
0.08
0.14
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DYNAMIC MODELING
x =Ax+By
(1)
A=[aij] influence of state of box j on rate of change of state of
box i
B=[bij] influence of output of box j on rate of change of state of
box i
y=[I-(I-K)C]-1Kx
(1),(2)
(2)
-1K]x
=[A+B[I-(I-K)C]

x

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RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
DYNAMIC MODELING
x i=[Σaijxj+Σbijyj]fi(xi)
fi(xi): state specific resistance
-1K]x
=F(x)[A+B[I-(I-K)C]
x
NATIONAL CENTER
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“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
CASE STUDY: AMMONIA STORAGE TANK
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INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
EVENT TREE
LOSS OF
REFRIGERATION
(STORAGE)
FLARE
SAFETY
VALVES
(1)
(2)
8
17
128
(3)
EVENT TREES
FAULT TREES
BASIC EVENTS
NATIONAL CENTER
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“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
GENERIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS
QUALITY
1. OVERALL MANAGEMENT
5.0
2. COMPANY RCMS
6.0
3. EVALUATE RCMS
2.13
AVAILABILITY
4. COMPANY SYSTEM
5.33
5. CONTROL SYSTEM
4.6
6. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE
4.75
7. RECORD &ANALYSE ON LINE
PERFORMANCE
8. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE CHANGING
THE WAY IT IS USED
2.75
9. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE CHANGING
3.33
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
3.67
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
MODIFICATION FACTORS
TECHNICAL
PARAMETER
Qo1
MODIFICATION
FACTOR
3.6
Qo2
3.76
QM1
3.93
QM2
3.86
fi
3.66
λ
3.97
Τ
3.46
fm
3.97
TR
3.65
TM
3.70
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
Lower and upper values of technical parameters
EQUIPMENT
PARAMETER
1
Safety valves, remote control valves
Tr, Tm (hr)
2
All equipment
3
Lower
Upper
24
8760
T
Plant data x 0.9
Plant data x 100
Safety valves, remote control valves
λ
1.71x10-6
3.15 x10-5
4
All equipment
Qm1
1.00 x10-4
0.5
5
All equipment
Qm2
5.00x10-2
1
6
Safety valves fail in open position
λ
8.50 x10-7
3.40 x10-5
7
Manual valves
λ
2.74 x10-7
5.04 x10-6
8
Manual valves
Tr, Tm, T (hr)
Plant data x 0.9
Plant data x 100
9
Flow instruments
λ
8.30 x10-7
5.59 x10-6
10
Flow instruments
Tr, Tm (hr)
24
336
11
Instruments where equipment has to be
taken apart for repair
Tr, Tm (hr)
24
8760
12
Level instrument
λ
2.50 x10-6
1.10 x10-5
13
Pressure instrument
λ
2.50 x10-7
2.94 x10-6
14
Temperature instrument
λ
3.00 x10-8
2.97 x10-5
15
Process pump
λ
4.50 x10-5
2.28 x10-4
16
Process pump
Tr, Tm (hr)
24
8760
17
Human Error
Qo1
1.00 x10-4
5.00 x10-1
18
NATIONAL
Human
Error CENTER
Qo2
5.00 x10-2
1.00
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
CURRENT, BEST AND WORST CASE
FREQUENCIES
OVERPRESS OVERPRESS
URE
URE
STORAGE
LOADING
UNDERPR PIPEBRE
ESSURE
AK
CURRENT
STATE
1.1 10-5
2.2 10-6
1.2 10-6
1.4 10-4
WORST
CASE
6.1 10-3
8.7 10-2
5.5 10-4
5.0 10-2
4.3 10-10
1.9 10-10 5.5 10-6
BEST CASE 2.9 10-10
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
IMPORTANCE ANALYSIS
fLOC=g(b)
b=u(q)
q=w(q*)
q*=My8=MHx
IMPORTANCE MEASURE :
f LOC
xi
fLOC : frequency of Loss of Containment
b
: vector of basic events
q
: vector of technical parameters
x
: vector of state of manegerial tasks
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
GENERIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS
QUALITY IMPORTANCE
1. OVERALL MANAGEMENT
5.0
0
2. COMPANY RCMS
6.0
0
3. EVALUATE RCMS
2.13
0
4. COMPANY SYSTEM
5.33
0
5. CONTROL SYSTEM
4.6
5.29 x 10-7
6. CORRECT ON LINE
PERFORMANCE
4.75
13.21 x 10-7
7. RECORD &ANALYSE ON LINE
PERFORMANCE
2.75
2.11x10-7
AVAILABILITY
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
MOST IMPORTANT TASKS
QUALITY
IMPORTANCE
48. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE OF SPARES
5.0
29.34 x10-7
42. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES
3.2
27.80 x10-7
12. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE OF COMMITMENT
3.00
24.36 x10-7
30. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
4.0
22.70 x10-7
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
QUALITY OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS
VERSUS TIME
RELATIVE QUALITY
0.7
AVAILABILITY
0.6
COMMITMENT
0.5
COMMUNICATION
0.4
0.3
COMPETENCE
0.2
CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
INTERFACE
0.1
0
0
5
10
15
TIME
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“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
20
PROCEDURES
SPARES & TOOLS
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
RELATIVE QUALITY
PERFORMANCE SCORE VERSUS TIME
0.6
0.5
Qo1
λ
T
Tr
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0
5
10
15
20
TIME
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
FREQUENCY OF FAILURE OF LOC
VERSUS TIME
FREQUENCY (/hr)
1.E-03
Tank
Overpressure
storage
Tank
Overpressure
loading
Tank
underpressure
1.E-04
1.E-05
1.E-06
pipebreak
1.E-07
0
5
10
15
20
TIME
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
CASE STUDY: LPG SCRUBBER
LPG
H2O
T6656
H2O
NAOH
T6655
NAOH
MEA
MEA
T6654
LPG
NATIONAL CENTER
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INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
DIRECT CAUSES OF LOC
 TOWER FAILURE FROM OVERPRESSURE CAUSED BY
HEAT FLUX FROM EXTERNAL SOURCE
 TOWER FAILURE FROM OVERPRESSURE, OWING TO
OVERFILLING
 TOWER FAILURE OWING TO AGING
 TOWER FAILURE OWING TO FREEZING
 EXTRA LOADS OWING TO A ROAD ACCIDENT
NATIONAL CENTER
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INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
INITIATING EVENTS
 EXTERNAL FIRE
 HIGH INLET OF MEA OWING TO VALVE FAILURE
 NO OUTLET OF MEA
 HIGH INLET OF CAUSTIC
 NO OUTLET OF CAUSTIC
 HIGH INLET OF WATER OWING TO VALVE FAILURE
 NO OUTLET OF WATER
 HIGH INLET OF LPG
 NO OUTLET OF LPG
 OPERATING CONDITIONS OFF SPECIFICATIONS
NATIONAL CENTER
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“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
SAFETY SYSTEMS
 PRESSURE DETECTION SYSTEM
 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
 PRESSURE SAFETY VALVES
 LOW LEVEL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN TOWERS T6654,
T6655, T6656
 HIGH LEVEL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN TOWER T6654,
T6655, T6656
 TOWER INTEGRITY
NATIONAL CENTER
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INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
EVENT TREE
HIGH INLET OF
MEA
OUTLET FULLY
OPEN
PSV
(1)
(2)
(3)
10 EVENT TREES
9 FAULT TREES
41 BASIC EVENTS
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
GENERIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS
QUALITY
1. OVERALL MANAGEMENT
9.3
2. COMPANY RCMS
9.0
3. EVALUATE RCMS
7.0
AVAILABILITY
4. COMPANY SYSTEM
8.9
5. CONTROL SYSTEM
9.8
6. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE
9.9
7. RECORD &ANALYSE ON LINE
PERFORMANCE
8. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE CHANGING
THE WAY IT IS USED
8
9. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE CHANGING
7
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
8.9
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
MODIFICATION FACTORS
TECHNICAL
PARAMETER
Qo1
MODIFICATION
FACTOR
9.1
Qo2
9.0
QM1
9.3
QM2
9.0
fi
9.5
λ
9.3
Τ
9.4
fm
9.3
TR
9.1
TM
9.2
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
FAILURE FREQUENCY
CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF TOWER T6654
PLANT AS ASSESSED
4.7 x 10-10/hr
BEST POSSIBLE CASE
1.1 x 10-10/hr
WORST POSSIBLE CASE
1.2 x 10-4/hr
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
EXTREME PHENOMENA FOLLOWING
PLANT DAMAGE STATES
CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF TOWER T6654 (2700 Kg LPG)
1. BLEVE
2. FLASH FIRE
3. EXPLOSION
NATIONAL CENTER
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“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
RISK INTEGRATION
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
Specific
case
1.0E-03
1.0E-04
Worst case
1.0E-05
1.0E-06
Best case
1.0E-07
1.0E-08
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
AREA (Km2) WHERE INDIVIDUAL RISK IS ABOVE CERTAIN
LEVELS (10-1 - 10-8 /yr)
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
FREQUENCY OF FAILURE VERSUS TIME
2.50E-09
2.00E-09
1.50E-09
1.00E-09
5.00E-10
0.00E+00
0
20
40
60
"TOWER T6655"
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
80
100
120
"TOWER T6654"
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
140
160
180
200
"TOWER T6656"
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
GENERIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS
QUALITY
IMPORTANCE
1. OVERALL MANAGEMENT
9.3
0
2. COMPANY RCMS
9.0
0
3. EVALUATE RCMS
7.0
0
4. COMPANY SYSTEM
8.9
0
5. CONTROL SYSTEM
9.8
1.8 x 10
-11
6. CORRECT ON LINE
PERFORMANCE
9.9
4.4 x 10
-11
7. RECORD &ANALYSE ON LINE
PERFORMANCE
8
7.1x10-12
8. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE
CHANGING THE WAY IT IS USED
8.9
4.7x10-12
9. EVALUATE AND PROPOSE
CHANGING
7
0
AVAILABILITY
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
MOST IMPORTANT TASKS
QUALITY
IMPORTANCE
48. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE OF SPARES
9.6
9.6x10
-10
12. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE OF COMMITMENT
9.8
1.4x10
-10
30. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
9.1
1.4x10
-10
42. CORRECT ON LINE PERFORMANCE OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES
9.8
1.3x10
-10
NATIONAL CENTER
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
“DEMOKRITOS”
INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR TECH.
RADIATION PROTECTION
LAB. OF SYSTEMS RELIABILITY
AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY