Transcript Interagency Issues

DSB Summer Study
on
Special Operations and Joint Forces in
Support of Countering Terrorism
Friday
August 16, 2002
Final Outbrief
[Excerpt]
For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute
Sponsors
USD(AT&L)/Commander JFCOM
Special Operations & Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism
Dr. Ted Gold
Mr. Don Latham
Prior CT Insights
MG Bob Scales
Dr. Wick Murray
Advanced CT Technologies &
Systems
Dr. Mim John
Dr. Ron Kerber
Future Force Capabilities
GEN Bill Hartzog
VADM Dave Frost
We drew on past DSB studies
Enduring Freedom
Intel Panel
Dr. Joe Markowitz
ADM Bill Studeman
Psyops
Managed Information
Dissemination
We leveraged current
DSB Studies
Unconventional Use of
Nuclear Weapons Against
U.S.
Dr. Rich Wagner
Dr. Bill Graham
Precision Targeting
Defensive Information
Operations
Others
Biological Warfare
Dr. Anna Skalka
Mr. Larry Lynn
Discriminant Use of Force
Dr. Ted Gold
Dr. Josh Lederberg
2
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Real War,
A New Type of Adversary
•
Committed, resourceful, globally dispersed adversary with
strategic reach
•
A long, at times violent, and borderless war
•
Requires new strategies, postures, and organization
This study only scratches the surface of what will eventually be needed
7/16/2015 3:00 PM
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3
Elements of a National Strategy: Orchestrate All
Instruments of National Power in a Global Campaign
•
Preemption/proaction/interdiction/disruption/quick-response capabilities
•
Be proactive in securing partners and help from allies, friends, and others
•
Hold states/sub-state actors accountable
•
Foster information sharing
•
Fight forward
•
Focus particular attention on WMD
•
Sophisticated, aggressive public diplomacy
All the above in parallel with consequence management and
protecting the homeland and DoD’s missions and forces
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4
Guidance From Our Terms of Reference
•
Focus is overseas military operations
– Military instrument is only part of the necessary capabilities
– Examined the role of intelligence in some detail
•
Did not address homeland defense explicitly
– But difficult to segment theaters in this war
– We did consider threats to US military force projection from the US
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5
The Toughest Challenge: Identify and Find Terrorist Networks
•
Very small “signals” hidden in massive clutter and noise
•
Some similarities with Cold War anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts
•
Extensive differences as well
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6
Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring Terrorists
OEF demonstrated substantial progress toward desired force capabilities
• From
– Air, land, sea, space
•
To
–
–
–
–
–
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Robust connectivity
Horizontally integrated, pervasive ISR
Agile ground forces able to operate dispersed
Effective remote fires
Adaptive joint command and control
Assured access and supply (expeditionary mindset)
These emerging capabilities will be critical for
an effective military role in GWOT
7/16/2015 3:00 PM
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7
Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will Persist
•
A more central role for SOF and specialized capabilities
•
Joint integration at very low levels
•
Discriminant use of force
•
Interagency partners play major roles
•
Creative operational arrangements with coalition partners
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8
Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT
•
Expanded Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and Land Information Warfare
Activity (LIWA) initiatives
– Interagency
•
Operational net assessment (ONA) capabilities at Combatant Commands
– JFCOM
•
– CENTCOM
•
•
•
•
•
•
– NORTHCOM
New Campaign Support Group at Ft. Bragg
– Multi-agency
•
– Link analysis
– Joint
– Global perspective
– New analysis tools
– Multi-option analysis
Joint Program Office – Special Technology Countermeasures: Mission Assurance
Analysis
Counter-terrorism Technology Support Office – Technical Support Working Group
Physical Security Equipment Action Group
Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center
J8 Chem/Bio Warfare Requirements Section
DoD Support to DEA Special Intelligence
JFCOM Initiatives
– Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Joint Interagency Coordination Group
– Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System - Near Term
– Enhanced C4ISR Homeland Operations Center – Joint National Training Capability
•
•
•
USN Deep Blue (Navy Operations Group)
USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group Proof of Concept
USMC/SOCOM Integration Initiatives
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Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT
•
DARPA projects, e.g.:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
•
Genoa
Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery
Translingual Information Detection, Extraction, and Summarization
Babylon
Human Identification at a Distance
Modern Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors
Foliage Penetration Radar (SAR and GMT I)
Standoff Precision Identification from 3D Data
Digital Radio Frequency Tags
Advanced ISR Management
ACTDs:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
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High-Altitude Airship
Pathfinder
Active Denial System
Thermobaric
Adaptive Joint C4ISR Mode
Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness
Language and Speech Exploitation Resources
Cave and Urban Assault
Urban Reconnaissance
Hyperspectral Collection and Analysis System (HyCAS)
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Major Concerns
•
DoD should take the terrorist threat as seriously as it takes the
likelihood and consequences of major theater war
•
DoD still struggling to get joint C4 right
•
Pentagon processes overly focused on materiel
• Defense and Intelligence processes and cultures remain inputrather than product-oriented
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11
Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
“Tools” to handle
tough environments and
difficult targets
Understanding
adversaries and
providing “actionable”
intelligence
Adaptive and
responsive
national-level
decision making
Tailoring forces for
more SOF-centric
operations
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12
Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
“Tools” to handle
tough environments and
difficult targets
Understanding
adversaries and
providing “actionable”
intelligence
Adaptive and
responsive
national-level
decision making
Tailoring forces for
more SOF-centric
operations
7/16/2015 3:00 PM
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Not the focus of our
study
13
Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
“Tools” to handle
tough environments and
difficult targets
2
1
Understanding
adversaries and
providing “actionable”
intelligence
A much more
responsive, flexible,
and effective military
capability
3
4
7/16/2015 3:00 PM
Adaptive and
responsive
national-level
decision making
Tailoring forces for
more SOF-centric
operations
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
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14
Discussion Outline
•
Organization, context, and themes
•
Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence
•
“Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and
understand our vulnerabilities
•
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
•
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
•
Recap
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15
A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability
1.
Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable”
intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking
the terrorists and their networks
2.
“Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and
understand our vulnerabilities
3.
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
4.
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
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16
Understanding New Adversaries and Providing “Actionable” Intelligence:
Deep Penetration - Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the
Terrorists and Their Networks
- Key Initiatives –
• Transformation of HUMINT (and human-technical)
operations
• Aggressive, proactive, preemptive, operations
• Intelligence surge/unsurge capability
• Expanded analytical capabilities and throughput against
asymmetrical adversaries
• Understand adversaries as complex adaptive systems
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Transformation of HUMINT Operations
•
SecDef (working with DCI) expand overall Directorate of HUMINT
Services (DHS)/Service roles and explore SOF opportunities
•
Increase HUMINT forward/operational presence
•
Work with DCI to deploy new DoD clandestine technical capabilities
•
NSA/Combatant Commanders/Services pay more attention to support
of DoD HUMINT in the field
•
SOF continue to work Advance Force Operations (AFO)
•
Define HUMINT role in “Proactive” Ops; ensure Covert Action (CA) and
IW/IO connections
•
Explore development of USAF/Navy HUMINT capabilities (beyond
current compartmented programs)
•
A major covert HUMINT program needs to be made joint
•
Explore new and more varied HUMINT modes – described on next
chart
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18
Transformation of HUMINT Operations
Classified HUMINT Chart
Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG)
CLASSIFIED
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20
Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations
•
Creation of a Proactive Preemptive Operating Group (P2OG) of creative
subject matter operational experts such as:
– IW/IO – Covert Action – Diplomacy – Cover & Deception
– Intelligence Operations – PSYOPS – HUMINT – SIGINT – SOF
•
Improves information collection by stimulating reactions
•
Enhance operational preparation of the battlespace to support
preemptive options and actions
•
Signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk
•
Vest responsibility and accountability for the P2OG to a “Special
Operations Executive” in the NSC* who shall:
–
–
–
–
Define the national strategy
Coordinate action
Enunciate policy
Execute to a plan coordinated with the SecDef and DCI and others as appropriate
* The position exists in the NSC and is called: “National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating
Terrorism”, NSPD-8, Oct. 24, 2001
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21
7/16/2015 3:00 PM
Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability
•
Maintain a robust global cadre of retirees, reservists, and others who are
trained and qualified to serve on short notice, including expatriates
– Make investments now
– Exercise and engage (through gaming) at least annually
– Maintain a database of individuals and skills
– Focus on Tier 4 countries where CT operations may be necessary
– Contracted roles for industry, universities, and think tanks
•
Focus on analytic expertise and capabilities, CA/SOF issues, scientists
and engineers, linguists/area experts, and personnel recovery skills
•
Work with DoD and Congress on “unsurge” issues, particularly related
to callups
•
Develop innovative “data surge” capabilities
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22
Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput
•
Create a new and larger analytic workforce with skills and innovative tools
focused on counterterrorism (CT)
•
Focus on “actionable intelligence,” improved situational awareness, targeting
and reachback support and “connecting the dots” using JWAC-like analysis
approaches
•
Full-time collaborative connections between all the critical centers working CT
intelligence and support
•
Analysis components of national intelligence organizations physically or
virtually collocated to improve all-source multi-INT “analysis” collaboration
and production
•
Support for intelligence collection-related “target development”
•
Develop new security/sanitization concepts to aid analysts in protecting new
sources and methods
•
Identify roles for analysts in operational net assessment process/joint
experimentation, vulnerability analysis/Red Teaming, and CT-related gaming
and simulation
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23
Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence
Counterterrorism Information
•
SecDef/DCI establish a group to define a future path to achieve a truly
joint interoperable CT Common Operating Picture (COP)
•
Improve chat windows and secure collaborative means/directories for
direct access to relevant analysts and related data environments
•
Converge large e-gov programs currently underway in SIGINT and
IMINT for improved customer access to intelligence data/collaboration
•
Pursue an integrated family of “small terminal programs” for
field/small unit access to intelligence data (data, imagery, etc.)—smart
push and pull
•
DCI/SecDef provide portals, tools and pointers for access to
unclassified open sources data bases, commercial sources etc.
•
Develop advanced visualization concepts for conveying intelligence
and situational information
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24
Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems
•
Further expand and enhance Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)-like
capabilities
– Expand the number of countries/actors as well as the factors considered
– Address non-physical as well as physical dimensions
– Address money flow, cronies, family, intra-military, other
• The capabilities must be coupled closer to campaign planning and
execution (effects-based operations):
– To influence as well as respond
– Support information/influence ops in peace/crisis/war as well as more traditional
maneuver/fires
• These capabilities are also needed to:
– Focus information collection efforts
– Provide context to better understand collected data
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25
Recommendation: Proactive Operations
Recommendation
•
Lead Responsibility
Develop an entirely new capability to
proactively, preemptively evoke
responses from adversary/terrorist
groups
– Form a new elite Counter-terrorism
Proactive Preemptive Operations
Group (P2OG) at the NSC level
– Highly specialized people with unique
technical and intelligence skills such as
information operations, PSYOP,
network attack, covert activities,
SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence
warfare/deception operations
– Reports to NSC principal level
7/16/2015 3:00 PM
• NSC lead with DCI,
SecDef, State, Justice
participation
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“Cost”
• 100 “new” people
• $100M/yr for
operations and
support
26
Recommendation: Improve Intelligence
Recommendation
•
•
Develop new capabilities, sources, and
methods to enable deep penetration of
adversaries
– DO/DHS develop new modes and
methods for covert operations – See
classified chart on HUMINT
– Increase emphasis on CT CA to gain
close target access
– Develop new clandestine technical
capabilities
Create a surge capability in intelligence
to preempt and deal with rapidly
emerging crises in the GWOT
– Maintain a robust cadre of retirees
reservists and specialists, qualified to
serve on short notice
– Contract roles for industry universities
and think tanks
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“Cost”
Lead Responsibility
• DCI Lead SecDef/CJCS
• $1.7 Billion/FY
beginning in FY-04
and continuing
Supports CIA DO/DDS&T initiatives
• ASD(C3I) and DCI
Community
Management Staff
(CMS)
• DCI/DoD co-shared
lead
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• $100M/yr for
exercises,
engagement in the
form of gaming,
and real operations
27
Recommendation: Improve Intelligence (cont.)
Recommendation
•
Lead Responsibility
Expand counter terrorism and
asymmetric adversary analytical
capabilities and throughput
– Increase Service and intelligence
agency analytic specialties, unique to
CT challenges, by 500 people over the
next 18 months to add depth of
expertise
– Focus on understanding effects of
globalization, radicalism, cultures,
religions, economics, etc., to better
characterize potential adversaries
– More virtual collaboration architecture
for analyst support and customers
interaction
7/16/2015 3:00 PM
• CMS shared lead with
ASD(C3I)
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“Cost”
• $800M/yr for technical
capabilities
development and 500
new staff
28
Recommendation: Gain Deeper Understanding of Terrorist Organizations
and Their Supporters as Complex Adaptive Systems
Recommendation
Lead Responsibility
•
Establish additional “centers” of
• JFCOM
excellence to handle the greatly
increased work load and to augment
JWAC to support “targeting” (in the
broadest sense) of terrorist organizations
and their supporting infrastructure—
these activities will draw upon
intelligence feeds, Red Teaming, and a
great variety of subject matter experts
(regional, cultural, psychological, soft
and hard sensors)
•
Pursue and expand JFCOM’s operational
net assessment activity employed in
millennium challenge
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“Cost”
• Add to existing
initiatives up to $100M
per FY as appropriate
• $100M initiative at
JFCOM, CENTCOM,
NORTHCOM, and
DARPA
29
[remainder of briefing deleted here]