Transcript Foreign Material Management

Foreign Material Management
Bill Corcoran,
Nuclear Safety Review Concepts
Corporaton
© 2003 Bill Corcoran , all rights reserved
Foreign Material Management
It’s a lot more than just foreign
material exclusion (FME)
Foreign Material
Any material that by:
 Quantity or nature, and
 Location
Was not accommodated in the design
Programmatic Involvement In
Consequential Nuclear Power Events
 Reactivity
management (Chernobyl,
SL-1, Windscale)
 Foreign material management (FMM)
Famous FMM Events
 TMI-2
~ LOCA (water
in an air system)
 Salem-2 ~ destructive
turbine overspeed
(particulates in control
oil)
 Salem-2 ~ anticipated
transient without scram
(wrong lubricant
hardened and froze
RTB)
 Cook
~ regulatory
shutdown (fibrous
material in
containment)
 LaSalle service water
(injection of sealant in
service water tunnel)
 Fermi-1 ~ core
damage (component
adrift in reactor)
Famous FMM Events
 Point
Beach (frazile
ice)
 Salem (river grass)
 Davis-Besse (did not
find source of FM in
containment)
 St.
Lucie (jellyfish)
 Columbia (foam
fragments were FM)
Other FMM Events
Concorde
 Titanic
 Surgical Items left in patients
(thousands)
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Trojan Horse
 Davis-Besse Sump Screens
Other FMM Experiences
Station
FM Event
Consequences
Beaver Valley
Leak sealant injected into a
primary system
Inoperable Reactor
Head Vent System
Turkey Point
Rag in a lube oil sump triggered a
search for generic implications
Delayed start-up
Cook
Snow and ice plugged a tank
goose neck vent
Tank implosion
Doel,
Debris created by machining
Haddam Neck operations
Widespread core
damage
Peach Bottom Rigging in Core Spray System
(Trojan Horse FM event!)
Core Spray inop,
major cleanup and
test
Other FM Experiences (cont.)
Station
FM Event
Consequences
Maine Yankee Machine oil contained a forbidden
substance
Delayed sleeving
project
Salem
$500,000 civil
penalty
Management of a foreign material
intrusion
Susquehanna Sand blast grit ingested by a diesel Unavailability and
engine
re-overhaul of
diesel
Calvert Cliffs
Uncontrolled FMM measures
Imploded a large
tank
Cook
Assorted FM in Ice Condenser
Part of $500, 000
civil penalty
FM Events
 FM
Damage
 FM Near Misses (Intrusions +)
 FMM Compromises
 FMM Infractions and Deviations
The Foreign Material Management
Occurrence Pyramid
Lesser
seriousness
points to
process
issues
FMM Damage~1
FMM Near Misses~10
FMM Compromises~100
Higher seriousness
points to
command
accountability
issues
FMMInfractions/Deviations~1000
Intrusions are near misses
© 2003, William R. Corcoran, NSRC Corp., 860-285-8779, [email protected]
FMM Damage
FMM Damage
FM Damage
FME Device
Damage
FME Damage
FME Device
Damage
Implosions
Cooling
Other Damage from
FME Devices
Lubrication
Other?
Collapsed Demineralized Water
Storage Tank at Calvert Cliffs
FMM Damage
Some Debris Collected From Ice
Condenser at Cook Nuclear Plant
Non-nuclear FM Events
 Bhopal
(water in MIC tank)
 Herald of Free Enterprise (water)
 ValuJet 592 (oxygen generators)
 “Chunnel” Fire (burning cargo)
 “Concorde” (loss of aircraft)
 9-11-01 (box cutters)?
Your favorite FMM snafus...
Here
 Elsewhere

Foreign Material ~ A Little Bit
Goes A Long Way
 Procedures
can only
prevent the
repetition of the
types of FMM
events that have
occurred
 FMM education is
necessary to
prevent new types
of FMM events
Foreign Material Management
 Not
just a signs and
tags...
 A way of doing
business
Foreign Material
Exclusion Area
Foreign
Material
Exclusion
Area
FMM Includes
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Control of FM production
Control of FM access to buffer areas
In FM buffer areas and danger areas:
 FM inventory control
 FM physical control
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FM removal before closeout
FM exclusion
Controlling the adverse side effects of
FME measures
FMM Includes (cont.)
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Detecting FM compromises
Detecting FM intrusions
Control of intruded FM
Removal of intruded FM
Analyzing potential future effects of
intruded FM
Disposition of intruded FM
Configuration tracking of intruded FM
Foreign Material Exclusion (FME)
FME
An important
part of FMM
FMM Success
FMM
Success
Prevention
Control
of Adverse
Effects of
Countermeasures
Removal
Mitigation
Detection
Limitation
FM Prevention
FM
Prevention
Control of
FM
Production
Buffer
Areas
Danger
Areas
FM
Control
Inventory
Control
Buffer
Areas
Danger
Areas
Detecting
Compromises
Buffer
Areas
Danger
Areas
FM
Cleanup
Buffer
Areas
Danger
Areas
FME
from Danger
Areas
Control of Adverse Effects
of Countermeasures
Control of Adverse Effects
of Countermeasures
Assessment
of
Potential
Effects
Control of
Conditions
During
Use
Assurance
of
Removal
FMM C/M are facility changes that must be controlled.
Response to Detected FM
Response to
Detected FM
Stopping
More FM
Limitation
of Transport
Limitation
of FM Effects
Removal
Assessment
of Effects
Documentation
of FM
Configuration
FMM ~ Design Factors
 Good
design may
help filter out foreign
material… or
mitigate the
consequences of a
FMM event
 But, don’t rely on
design factors alone
to identify & prevent
FMM problems
Some Places Where FMM
Considerations Apply:
 Work
planning
 Purchase orders
 Design engineering
 Chemistry controls
 Radiation protection
 ALARA
 Pre-job briefings
 Post-job walkdowns
 Performance
indicators
 QC
inspections
 Receipt inspections
 Alarm response
instructions
 Operator training
 Management &
tech. staff training
 QA audit program
 Severe weather
walkdowns
Where FMM Does Not Apply
FMM Program Organization
Oversight
FMM Infrastructure
Involvement
Manager (Senior technical person)
Owner (Maintenance Dept. Head)
Sponsor (Director, Site VP or Plant Manager)
Where Is Our Foreign Material
Management Program?
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Is it narrowly focused on FME?
Is it owned by a senior
“FMM Zealot”?
Does it include
education as well as procedures?
Do key managers support our FMM
program as if their careers depend on it?
Where Is Our Foreign Material
Management Program? (cont.)
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Does Operations support our FMM
program as if the health and safety of
the public depends on it?
Can our corrective action database give
a good picture of the status and
adequacy of our FMM program
performance?
Are our senior managers good FMM
role models? Do they “walk the talk”?
Where Is Our Foreign Material
Management Program? (cont.)
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Does our Plant Operations Review
Committee give our FMM program the
attention it deserves?
Has our executive level nuclear safety
committee held a review of our FMM
program performance?
Has our independent oversight
organization audited the status and
adequacy of our FMM program
performance?
Find Any Pockets of FMM
Program Non-participation?
 Clean
them out!
Questions?