Transcript World Bank’s “Turbulent Future”

The World Bank’s
“Turbulent Water Future”
(In fact Turbulent Water Past and also Turbulent Water Present, but that, as they say, is another story)
South Asia Network on Dams,
Rivers & People
Welcome Analysis
• All Water issues are local issues (p 25)
• Wishful thinking that supply side options will solve
everything
• Enormous backlog of deferred maintenance
• Lack of accountability
• Endemic Corruption
• More big dams is zero sum game in increasing
number of basins
• Atmosphere of dangerous complacency based on
wrong assumptions about environmental impacts, GW
availability & financial implications
• Insufficient revenue even for O & M
• Budgets spent on personnel, not maintenance
• Rivers have turned into fetid sewers
• Industries & cities need to massively invest in sewers
& treatment plants; use water efficiently
Missing links in the Analysis
• State of India’s water storages
• Need to protect existence of Rivers as provider of water for
largest number of people
• Performance of India’s water storages
• Options for water storages exist
• No credible figure for storages through small systems: No such
figure for any river basin
• Usable storage space in underground aquifers
• Performance of large hydro
• Option of using existing hydro capacity for greater peaking
output
• Option of adding small hydro capacities: Even less explored
than the large hydro potential: Useful for taking power to the
unreached
• Potential of achieving economy through techniques like System
of Rice Intensification
• Potential of increasing irrigation efficiencies
• No mention of RIGHT to water: Rights are not tradable
• Lack of democracy in Water Sector: No role for people
Important Imperatives listed
• Empower Users: Give clear, enforceable
entitlements (and RIGHTS)
• Participatory regulation of services & resources
• Making the environment a high priority
• Making local people the 1st beneficiaries
• Bring GW abstractions in line with recharge
• Demands will have to be brought down to
match sustainable supply in many parts
• Develop transparent information and decision
support systems
• WHEN CAN WE EXPECT ACTION ON
THESE?
Some Wrong imperatives pushed
• Uncritical advocacy of more LARGE storages
• Uncritical advocacy of Large Hydro
• Uncritical advocacy for new infrastructure “of all
scales” (for surface water and wastewater treatment):
You cannot do all scales at any one place: You have to
prioritise and have clearly defined decision making
process
• No credible analysis of lessons of TVA/ DVC while
advocating the model for Brahmaputra Valley
• (Uncritical, repeated push for) Privatisation,
competition, market
• (WB’s Uncritical, non transparent study on
Brahmaputra on the lines of TVA)
A very important Omission:
• Recommendations of the World
Commission on Dams: The report was
a result of an exercise in which majority of
commissioners were supporters of
large projects. This was the first ever
and most transparent, open, inclusive
process to assess the development
effectiveness of large dams and it came
out with a unanimous report in November 2000. The Report offers
a framework for decision making process on Large projects and
options.
• The World Bank and the Govt. of India participated in the
process right from the beginning
• There can be many ways for a better future, status quo is not
one of them…..
Important Imperatives missing
• Top Priority to O & M and getting optimum
performance from existing infrastructure
• Limit abstraction of GW in line with recharge
• Make the abstractor responsible for recharge
• Make the polluter REALLY pay for the pollution
(Why should state pay for the pollution created
by industries?)
• Pick low hanging fruits first: small water
systems, small hydro, use of existing hydro for
peaking FIRST
• Lessons from past experiences
Water Storages are silting up fast
• As per the report of NCIWRD, about 1.4 BCM
of existing storage capacity is getting silted up
every year.
• At today’s rates creation of 1.4 BCM storage
capacity would cost Rs 1448 crores.
• That means that on an average, each day we
are losing Rs 4 crores worth of storage capacity
through siltation.
• And there is little serious attempt to stop this.
• The required Catchment Area Treatment for
even Bhakra was not done. Same for other
projects
Idle Reservoir Capacity during 1994-2005
Sr No
Year (Country wide
monsoon rainfall)
No of reservoirs
monitored
Monitored
capacity
Capacity filled up
Idle Capacity
1
1994 (110%)
63
125.14
112.63
12.51
2
1995 (100%)
63
125.14
98.44
26.7
3
1996 (103%)
63
125.14
89.53
35.61
4
1997 (102%)
68
129.4
101.2
28.2
5
1998 (105%)
70
130.6
106.1
24.5
6
1999 (96%)
70
130.6
97.6
33.0
7
2000 (92%)
70
130.6
82.66
47.94
8
2001 (91%)
70
130.6
87.49
43.11
9
2002 (81%)
70
130.6
69.25
61.35
10
2003 (105%)
71
131.28
78.76
52.52
11
2004 (87%)
71
131.28
85.1
46.18
12
2005 (100%)
76
133.021
109.695
23.326
Implications of empty storage capacity
• On an average, each year about 36.25 BCM
(equivalent of 6.5 Sardar Sarovar Projects) of storage
capacity out of only the monitored storage capacity is
not filled up for the last 12 years.
• That means that on an average an investment of Rs
37793 crores has remained idle in each of the last 12
years.
• This happens when in 7 of the 12 years the rainfall
was average or above. (See the figures in brackets in
col. 2.)
• Should we not be trying to understand why this is
happening? How we can make the existing storage
capacity play the useful role it is supposed to, in stead
of pushing for more storages?
Note: This analysis needs to be done storage wise and
river basin wise for all large storages. We could not do
it as we could not get the required information.
Uncritical advocacy for large hydro
• There is strong push for
large hydro projects today,
as if large hydro projects
are good in themselves.
Little attempt is to do a
credible assessment of
performance of large hydro
projects.
• In fact installed capacity of
large hydro has increased
at a compound growth rate
of 4.35% per annum during
1991-2005, HIGHER than
all other power sectors.
What is the performance,
however?
31000
30000
29000
28000
27000
26000
25000
24000
23000
22000
21000
20000
19000
18000
Installed Capacity
Generation-MU/MW
3.69
3
2.395
2.8
2.6
2.74
2.957
3.2
2.551
3.4
2.893
3.168
3.6
3.404
3.46
3.8
3.383
4
2004-05
2003-04
2002-03
2001-02
2000-01
1999-00
1998-99
1997-98
1996-97
1995-96
2.4
1994-95
• As can be seen from the
chart, the Million Units
energy generated from
large hydro projects has
been almost
continuously falling over
the last eleven years.
And the fall is huge 31%.
There are many reasons
for this, use of large
hydro to provide peaking
capacity is not one of
them to the best of our
information.
3.97
Diminishing Returns from Large Hydro
Largest infrastructure, poorest performance?
• India has the largest Irrigation Infrastructure in the
world but it is performing far below its capacity.
• Finance Minister Chidambaram said in his budget
speech in Feb 2005, “Water-use efficiency in the
Indian agriculture is one of the lowest in the world”.
• The mid term appraisal of 9th 5 Year Plan had noted,
“With a 10% increase in the present level of water use
efficiency, it is estimated, an additional 14 m ha can be
brought under irrigation from existing irrigation
facilities”.
• The 14 m ha of additional irrigation is an agenda for
over a decade at current rate of additional irrigation
being created.
• Why is there no serious attempt to make amends in
this situation?
Some Water Sector implications of SRI
• Irrigation takes away over 80% of all water use
• Paddy occupies the largest area under
irrigation, about 24 M Ha
• SRI can reduce water use by over 50%
• SRI can increase yield by over 50%
• Other inputs (seed, chemicals) also goes down
• Tested in over 20 countries
• Tested by hundreds of farmers in AP, TN, W
Bengal, Chhattisgarh
• GOI also (though very feeble heartedly)
supports SRI
•
•
•
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•
•
•
•
•
•
Legacy of criminal neglect of
Environment is catching up, FAST
Nathpa Jhakri
Baglihar
Sardar Sarovar
Indira Sagar
Lower Subansiri
Maheshwar
Tehri
Dulhasti
Middle Siang
Polavaram
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Dhauliganga
Chamera
Parbati
Dumbur
Athirapally
Loharinag Pala
Allain Duhangan
Karcham Wangtoo
Rampur
Questions on Large Hydro
• As we saw earlier, the performance is diminishing. There has not
been credible review of their performance, which needs to be
done.
• There is a significant scope of improving the performance of these
projects and reducing siltation.
• We need to keep in mind that not all large hydro provide peaking
power. Run of the River projects are operated round the clock at
least in monsoon (as long as there is sufficient water in the river)
and some on snow fed rivers in summer too when there is
increased flow of water. Even storage dams, once filled up in
monsoon are operated round the clock, so they do not provide
peaking power at such times.
• It is possible to get more peaking power output from existing
projects by operating them optimally.
• There is also need to manage the peaks. As the WB report says,
supply side solutions for all demands is no longer going to be
possible.
• For significant portion o the vast majority of people who do not
have access to electricity and whom govt. wants to reach fast,
decentralised generation including small hydro is the best option.
Some Gross Errors
• Bhakra does not irrigated 7 m ha as claimed on page
16, only 1.3 m ha as mentioned in “Impacts of Bhakra
Nangal Project”, CBIP, 2005
• Bhakra installed capacity is not 2800 MW mentioned
on page 16, but 1480 MW as mentioned in the same
CBIP publication, including Bhakra left bank, right
bank, Kotla and Ganguwal HEPs.
And Some Gross Misleading statements
• It is well known that irrigation brings multiple benefits,
but that is true for all forms of irrigation, not just major
projects
• Do not paint a toxic future, look into the toxic
implications of the projects too
THANK YOU
• [email protected]
• October 5, 2005