Transcript Campaigns and Elections

Election Campaigns
An Introduction to Information
Manipulation
I. Overview of Polling
A. Origins of Polls and Paid
Advertisements (1924-1948)
1.
Literary Digest poll
a.
b.
c.
d.
Begun as publicity stunt in 1920, proves remarkably
accurate (within 1% in 1932)
Fails miserably in 1936: Predicts landslide for
Landon (55 to 41) when real outcome is landslide for
Roosevelt (61 to 37) – 20% error!
Why did it fail? Non-representative sample
(automobile registrations and telephone books) and
voluntary response (2.3 million out of 10 million)
Why did it work for so long? Remarkable consensus
and stability in electorate…
2. Gallup and Scientific Polling
a.
b.
c.
d.
Gallup predicts Roosevelt victory with smaller sample
(about 2000 vs. 2.3 million)
Gallup also correctly predicts the Literary Digest
prediction before the postcards are counted!
Method = quota polling (trying to ensure sample
matches proportions in population)
Major failure in 1948: Quota polling replaced with
random sampling (still used today)
B. Polling
1.
Interpreting Polls
a.
b.
c.
Sample size – Generally less important than
random selection/representativeness. Larger
sample = smaller…
Margin of error – Given laws of probability
and assumptions about respondents (normal
distribution), likely range of true value
Confidence level – Typically 95% confidence
that true value is within margin of error.
Example: Obama Job
Approval
Example: Bush job approval
2. Which polls can be trusted?
Error vs. Bias:
Compare Clinton
Fox over-estimated
Bush popularity,
Zogby underestimated
Bush popularity
 Was this political
bias? Estimates of
Clinton popularity 

3. Tracking Polls


Same question asked many times, often with overlapping
samples.
Generally considered less reliable (smaller samples, high
volatility)
4. Push Polls: “Polls” in Name
Only
Method: Voter gets a call, ostensibly from a
polling company, asking which candidate
the voter supports. If the voter supports the
“wrong” candidate, then the pollster asks
whether voter would still support candidate
if they knew… (insert rumor or allegation
here)
 Response irrelevant: Voter exposed to
charges

5. Using Polls
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Account for “House
Effects”
Look at sample selection
(random vs. selfselection)
Look at question
wording
Use “polls of polls”
where available
Examine stability from
prior polls
C. Issue Ownership
1.
Parties or candidates often “own”
particular issues – i.e. debating the issue
only benefits them by increasing its
salience
2. Commonly “Owned” Issues

Republicans:
–
–
–

Democrats:
–
–
–

Crime
Defense / National Security
Taxes
Environment
Unemployment
Social Security
Most economic issues owned by incumbent
in good times, challenger in bad times
II. Modern Campaign Strategy
A. Strategy =
Overall plan for
victory.
Determines:
–
–
–
–
Who: the voters you
need to win
Why: the reasons
they will vote for
you
What: the unifying
message to address
them
How: acquiring
resources to
campaign
1. Who? District Analysis
a.
b.
c.
Demographics: see film, keeping in mind
all of the work we did on party ID/political
behavior
Party Lean: Often based on previous
elections, since polls of districts can be
scarce.
Polling: Used to identify winnable
areas/groups (cross-tabulations key)
2. Why and What: The
Message
a. The Message (from the film). One to a few words –
simplicity enables repetition in many different forms.
Reinforce your message and construct a negative one
about your opponent.
b. Four dueling messages (if both advertise and both
“go negative”). Potential application to 2012:
–
–
–
–
A’s message about A (Obama on Obama: “Forward”)
A’s message about B (Obama on Romney: “Job Killer”)
B’s message about B (Romney on Romney: “Believe in
America”)
B’s message about A (Romney on Obama: “Failure”)
c. Targeting the Message
i.
ii.
iii.
Microtargeting: Communicating different
messages to different voters. Hillygus and
Shields link this to pre-TV campaigns and argue
it made a resurgence in the 1990s with direct
mail.
Question: Has the Internet made this harder
(because message can be retransmitted by
others) or easier (because users self-select into
narrow forums)?
Method: Personal visits matter more than ads
(H&S)
3. Fundraising: It’s hard for a
beginner
1.
2.
3.
4.
Major donor approach: Need to establish
credibility; hard money goes to winners
Issue organizations: Need credibility AND
compatible policy positions (danger of extremism
compared to electorate)
Direct mail and Telemarketing: Administrative
costs eat up much of the money
Grassroots: Takes a great deal of candidate time
and attention. Possible selling point in ads.
04
06
08
10
B. Putting It All Together:
Political Consultants
1948: Truman hires PR firm to manage his
flagging campaign. Combination of ads,
whistle-stop campaign, publicity stunts (TV
coverage), and consistent message (“donothing Congress”) lead to victory
 Other campaigns emulate Truman’s
success, adding more sophisticated
techniques over time

C. Building the Machine
1.
2.
3.
4.
Campaign manager (scheduling, coordination)
Consultants (strategy, polling and research)
Media relations
Foot Soldiers: Mass of employees or
volunteers to spread the message, create signs,
make phone calls, solicit donations, etc.
III. Campaign Tactics
A.
Opposition research
1.
2.
3.
Small campaigns: Read through minutes
or Congressional record, news
appearances, public records (FOIA)
Large campaigns: Permanent
surveillance, interviews with past
acquaintances
Most important skill: Convincing the
media to use the information
B. Media Relations
1.
Spin Control –
Instantaneous
response to attacks
(before uncontested
attack gets on the air).
Slow response = no
response since story
fades from view over
time.
2. Debates
a.
b.
Debating acknowledges equality –
Leading candidates usually refuse
Debates are rarely debates – candidates
write the rules, fear off-script moments
Do Debates
Matter?
Not to partisans
or people with
strong opinions
 Nonpartisans and
less-informed
voters are
affected

3. Public Events



Key to successful speeches
is media coverage
Incumbents have edge
because they can issue
policy changes
Candidates now filter
crowds (i.e. only Bush
supporters allowed to attend
his speeches)
4. Investigative Journalism:
Don’t Count On It
a.
b.
Most notable investigative
reports are “seeded” by
campaigns (e.g. Dukakis
undermines Biden in 1988
primaries)
Media focus: Horse-Race
stories
i.
ii.
iii.
45% of campaign news stories
focus on horse-race/strategy
29% focus on campaign issues
Less than 1% analyze and
critique campaign ads
5. “Oppo” and Manipulating
the Media
Most opposition research done prior to
campaign: need for steady dribble of
damage (so scandals don’t crowd each other
out – each piece of information must get
full airing in media)
 If tide turns in media, respond with new
leak before public realizes old one was false
(causes old one – including any corrections
-- to leave front page)

D. Advertising
1.
Central goal: Reinforce the message about
the candidate and the opponent
2. Secondary Goals
a.
b.
Name recognition – Very important for all
except general election for President
Alter issue salience – Prime voters to
think about a particular issue controlled by
one side
Issue Salience: California 1994
2. Secondary Goals
a.
b.
c.
d.
Name recognition – Very important for all
except general election for President
Alter issue salience – Prime voters to
think about a particular issue controlled by
one side
Mobilization – Make supporters think that
getting to the polls matters.
Suppression – Make likely opponents
think that no candidate represents them
3. Tools of the Trade
a.
b.
c.
Repetition – Within ads as well as
between them
Syntax – Long sentences for nuance,
fragments for blunt messages
“Loaded Words” – See handout
5. Targeting Ads: Match
Voters to Issues
a.
b.
c.
d.
Local Issues: Emphasize “us vs. them” mentality.
Examples: Sub Base in Connecticut and Coal in West
Virginia.
Language: Target linguistic minorities. Examples:
Spanish, Cantonese
Prospective Voters: Evaluate candidates based upon
expected future behavior. Target with hope/fear.
Retrospective voters: Reward/punish candidates based
on past performance. Target with evidence of
success/failure (no alternative necessary).
E. Get out the Vote (GOTV)
1.
2.
Most important in midterm elections and primaries
Still important in Presidential elections –
Republican GOTV efforts probably won Ohio in
2004
3. GOTV Strategies
RNC strategy (used since 2002): 72-hour program
a.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
Phone calls, polling data and personal visits identify
would-be GOP voters and their top issues early in the
cycle.
Information is then fed into a database, allowing party
leaders to flood them with pro-Republican messages
through e-mail, regular mail and local volunteers.
On Election Day, they receive a phone call or a visit to
remind them to vote.
Post-election interviews with targets to evaluate
performance
Key difference with earlier efforts = national database of
likely Republican voters. Allows much better targeting
and more efficient spending.
b. Democratic Strategies
i.
ii.
iii.
The DNC’s 50-State Strategy: Spread resources
throughout entire country to rebuild party in
Red states.
DCCC Plan: Target swing states by mobilizing
single-issue groups and unions.
Democratic efforts generally less successful in
2004 and California special election in 2006.
Little coordination or information-sharing
between efforts.
F. Primaries: Same tactics,
different voting groups
Unique feature: Incentive to interfere in other
party’s primary  cause disunion or simply
support weaker candidate (must be secret)
Example: Muskie in 1972
Just before New Hampshire primary, conservative
paper’s editorial accuses Democratic front-runner
Muskie of using an ethnic slur against FrenchAmericans, a large voting bloc in NH. Evidence =
letter from a Florida man (actually a hoax planted
by Nixon White House). Muskie reacts
emotionally (tears or melted snow?), and is
defeated by ultra-liberal McGovern.
IV. Do Campaigns Matter?
A.
Hillygus and Shields say yes – but
1.
2.
B.
Surveys can be misleading – how well do pre-election
commitments reflect actual voting?
My conclusion – H&S are far better at explaining why
campaigns adopt certain strategies than proving that
these strategies substantially alter the outcome of the
election. Size of effects is the key unknown.
Can we predict election outcomes without knowing
anything about the campaigns? Need to try in
order to establish maximum size of campaign
effects.