Market Efficiency (Evidence?)
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Transcript Market Efficiency (Evidence?)
1
Early
1970’s, Fama & MacBeth did a famous
study testing the CAPM.
They
found weak evidence that portfolios of
stocks with higher betas had higher returns,
and found an intercept slightly higher than
zero. (CAPM Assumes Alpha = 0)
2
Return
Beta
3
Early
evidence basically supported both the
weak and the semi-strong form Efficient
Markets’ Hypothesis (EMH).
4
Positive Serial Correlation:
+ returns follow + returns for a given stock or
- returns follow - returns for a given stock
Called
“momentum” or “inertia”
5
Negative Serial Correlation:
+ returns follow - returns for a given stock or
- returns follow + returns for a given stock.
Called
“reversals”
6
If
we find (+) or (-) serial correlation, this is
evidence against the weak-form EMH as it
implies that past prices can be used to
predict future prices.
(Technical analysis)
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In 1960s, studies indicated that:
1. Stock Prices followed a random walk
2. No evidence of serial correlation. The
price of a stock is just as likely to rise
after a previous day’s increase as after a
previous day’s decline.
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Event
studies in the 1960s & 1970s looked at
stock prices around the release of new
information to the public. This was an effort
to see if the market quickly incorporated
new information into the prices of stocks.
One famous event study (1981) looked at
CARs of takeover firms around the
announcement date.
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10
1980s & 1990s:
Empirical evidence began to accumulate that
provided evidence first against the semistrong EMH and later against the weak form
EMH
Initially
any evidence against EMH was called
an anomaly.
11
Are
abnormal risk-adjusted returns possible if
you trade after information is made public?
(fundamental analysts)
General
Equation for Abnormal (Excess)
Returns:
Actual Rit – Predicted Ri,t
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Without a risk adjustment:
Actual Rit – Actual Rm,t
With a risk adjustment:
Actual Rit – [ai + Bi[Actual Rm,t]
Or,
Actual Rit – [Actual Rmatch,t]
13
Difficult to measure risk-adjusted returns
a) Is beta the proper measure of risk?
b) CAPM is forward looking and you are using
historic data.
c) Is your matched firm the best match?
14
(Quarterly
EPS Released –
Forecasted Quarterly EPS)
Measure
the abnormal risk-adjusted
return after an earnings surprise.
Measure
CAR: Actual Rit – Predicted Ri,t
(Using CAPM for the predicted return)
15
Rank
from highest to lowest by magnitude of
earnings surprises and place stocks into decile
portfolios.
See
if trading on earnings surprises results in
subsequent abnormal returns.
(Cumulative
Abnormal Returns (CARs) are the
daily abnormal returns summed up over time)
16
For positive earnings surprises:
The larger the earnings surprise the higher
the positive abnormal return.
The
upward drift in the stock price continues
a couple of months after the earning
announcement!
17
For negative earnings surprises:
The larger the negative earnings surprise the
larger the loss as measured by the abnormal
return.
The
downward drift in the stock price
continues a couple of months after the
earning announcement!
18
Markets are efficient. The evidence of
abnormal risk-adjusted returns is due to
various Measurement Errors when using
the CAPM. Perhaps the betas are wrong.
19
Markets
are efficient. The evidence of
abnormal risk-adjusted returns (evidence
against market inefficiency) is
inconclusive as the CAPM may not be the
proper risk adjustment model.
[Joint or Dual Hypothesis Problem!]
If
the CAPM is wrong, then abnormal riskadjusted returns using this model are
wrong.
20
Markets are Not Efficient
Behavioral Finance: Psychological and
behavioral elements lead to predictable
biases.
21
After
share repurchase announcements
(Ikenberry)
After dividend initiations and omissions
(Michaely)
After stock splits
(Ikenberry)
After seasoned equity offerings & after
IPOs
(Loughran and Ritter)
22
Portfolios of small cap stocks earn positive
abnormal risk-adjusted returns (+ alphas):
Grossman/Stiglitz: Professionals move prices to
efficiency. Don’t buy at the small cap end of the
market much due to limits on portfolio positions.
23
Returns
in January are significantly higher
than returns in any other month of the
year.
Primarily due to returns in the first two
weeks of January
Primarily due to returns for small firms
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Possible sources of risk for small caps
Neglected by analysts and institutional
investors, so is less information, which
implies higher risk.
Less Liquidity: Higher trading costs as bidask spreads are wider, and broker
commissions are larger.
28
Over
the years, returns on Mondays have
been consistently lower than returns on
other days of the week.
The bulk of the negative returns come from
the diference between Friday’s closing prices
and Monday’s opening prices. The interday
returns on Monday are not unusual
The Weekend Effect is worse for small stocks
There is no difference between two and
three-day weekends
No apparent effect following holidays
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30
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32
Return
Beta
33
In
1992, Fama & French re-examined the
earlier tests of the CAPM forming size decile
portfolios.
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Small cap stocks
Return
Large cap stocks
Beta
35
See
that small cap stocks have higher betas
than large cap stocks. Fama and French
concluded that size is driving the relationship
between beta and return not beta!
Also see that within the small cap groupings,
portfolios of stocks with lower betas have
higher returns! The same is true within the
large cap groupings.
Fama, once a strong proponent of the CAPM
now claimed that beta was dead. Beta was a
rough proxy for size in his earlier tests!!
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Average Monthly Returns (in Percent)
All
Low-β
β-2
β-3
β-4
β-5
β-6
β-7
β-8
β-9
High-β
All
1.25
1.34
1.29
1.36
1.31
1.33
1.28
1.24
1.21
1.25
1.14
Small - ME
1.52
1.71
1.57
1.79
1.61
1.50
1.50
1.37
1.63
1.50
1.42
ME-2
1.29
1.25
1.42
1.36
1.39
1.65
1.61
1.37
1.31
1.34
1.11
ME-3
1.24
1.12
1.31
1.17
1.70
1.29
1.10
1.31
1.36
1.26
0.76
ME-4
1.25
1.27
1.13
1.54
1.06
1.34
1.06
1.41
1.17
1.35
0.98
ME-5
1.29
1.34
1.42
1.39
1.48
1.42
1.18
1.13
1.27
1.18
1.08
ME-6
1.17
1.08
1.53
1.27
1.15
1.20
1.21
1.18
1.04
1.07
1.02
ME-7
1.07
0.95
1.21
1.26
1.09
1.18
1.11
1.24
0.62
1.32
0.76
ME-8
1.10
1.09
1.05
1.37
1.20
1.27
0.98
1.18
1.02
1.01
0.94
ME-9
0.95
0.98
0.88
1.02
1.14
1.07
1.23
0.94
0.82
0.88
0.59
Large - ME
0.89
1.01
0.93
1.10
0.94
0.93
0.89
1.03
0.71
0.74
0.56
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Within
each size group, the higher the beta
the lower the return.
Additionally,
after controling for size, Fama
and French found that value stocks (those
with a high B/M ratio outperformed growth
stocks (those with a low B/M ratio).
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Book-to-Market Portfolios
All
Low
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
High
All
1.23
0.64
0.98
1.06
1.17
1.24
1.26
1.39
1.40
1.50
1.63
Small - ME
1.47
0.70
1.14
1.20
1.43
1.56
1.51
1.70
1.72
1.82
1.92
ME-2
1.22
0.43
1.05
0.96
1.19
1.33
1.19
1.58
1.28
1.43
1.79
ME-3
1.22
0.56
0.88
1.23
0.95
1.36
1.30
1.30
1.40
1.54
1.60
ME-4
1.19
0.39
0.72
1.06
1.36
1.13
1.21
1.34
1.59
1.51
1.47
ME-5
1.24
0.88
0.65
1.08
1.47
1.13
1.43
1.44
1.26
1.52
1.49
ME-6
1.15
0.70
0.98
1.14
1.23
0.94
1.27
1.19
1.19
1.24
1.50
ME-7
1.07
0.95
1.00
0.99
0.83
0.99
1.13
0.99
1.16
1.10
1.47
ME-8
1.08
0.66
1.13
0.91
0.95
0.99
1.01
1.15
1.05
1.29
1.55
ME-9
0.95
0.44
0.89
0.92
1.00
1.05
0.93
0.82
1.11
1.04
1.22
Large - ME
0.89
0.93
0.88
0.84
0.71
0.79
0.83
0.81
0.96
0.97
1.18
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Beta
does not explain returns.
Small
cap stocks have higher returns. Small
cap stocks have higher betas, but it is size
not beta driving higher returns.
Low
P/E or high Book-to-Market of equity
stocks have higher returns.
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The Market is Semi-Strong Efficient:
Small cap stocks and low P/E (high B/M) stocks
generate higher returns because they are riskier.
However, this risk is not captured by Beta!
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Lack
of a theoretical model to explain why
size and style (value vs growth) are
important risk factors. The CAPM had an
elegant, logical theory underlying it, this has
none!
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The Market Not Semi-Strong Form Efficient:
You can make abnormal returns using public
information regarding market capitalization and
P/E or B/M ratio.
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(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishney)
These professors offer a different
interpretation. Markets are inefficient.
People overreact with a lag. Overprice firms
with good recent returns (growth) and
underprice firms with poor recent returns
(value).
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DeBondt and Thaler (1985):
Create
Loser and Winner portfolios based on
past 36 months of CARs. Top decile are
Winners, bottom decile are Losers.
Examine
CAR’s for next 36 months.
“Loser’s
outperform “winners” Is an
overreaction followed by a correction.
45
Evidence
is due to market risk premiums
varying over time. It is not overshooting &
correction, but instead a rational response to
changes in the discount rate.
46
Lo
and MacKinlay (1988) test to see if there
is serial correlation of weekly stock returns
for NYSE stocks.
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Stock Price
+ momentum
reversal
reversal
- momentum
1
2
Period
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If
momentum is present, the variance of
returns should increase as the number of
periods used is increased.
If
there is no momentum, gains or losses will
tend to reverse, keeping the variance of
returns from becoming wider.
49
Lo
and Mackinlay (1988) find positive serial
correlation of weekly stock returns for NYSE
stocks as the variance of returns increases as
the return interval is lengthened. Implies
there is inertia in the short run.
The effect is the strongest in the small cap
stocks.
Not clear if abnormal returns are possible by
exploiting this information.
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Other
studies of weekly returns found
different results
Lehman and Jegadeesh (1990) found
evidence of negative serial correlation over
short horizons
Gutierrez and Kelley (2006) find both:
negaitve serial correlation followed by
positive serial correlation
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52
Study by Jegadeesh and Titman.
1.Measure stock rates of return over the past 6
months.
2.Rank the stocks from highest to lowest past 6
month return and then divide the sample into
deciles. “Losers” are the bottom decile and
“winners” are the top decile
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3. For the next 36 months, every time one
of the winners or losers reports quarterly
earnings, record 3-day returns starting 2
days before the earnings announcement
and ending the day of the announcement.
4.Observe the difference in 3-day returns
between the winners and losers reporting
earnings in each month.
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For
the 1st 7 months, the market is
pleasantly surprised by the earnings
announcements of the winners and
disappointed by the earnings announcements
of the losers.
(momentum in the intermediate term)
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From
months 9 - 36, the market is
pleasantly surprised by the earnings
announcements of the losers and
disappointed by the earnings
announcements of the winners.
(Reversals in the longer term)
If
the stock market is efficient, it should
be able to anticipate the good or bad
reports in advance.
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Abnormal
profit opportunities.
Reversion to the mean.
The market overreacts with a lag. Consistent
with “Representativeness and Conservatism.”
Intermediate
Run: Inertia
Long Run: Reversals
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If
the stock market is not weak or semistrong form efficient, then professional
portfolio managers should be able to achieve
abnormal risk-adjusted returns!
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WSJ
Article, “Stock Funds Just Don’t Measure
Up”. Oct. 5, 1999
After
adjusting for size and survivorship bias,
funds trailed the S&P 500 by 1.4% per year
which is on average what they charge for
annual expenses.
Other studies: 1970’s – 1990’s: After expenses &
commissions, only 1/3 beat the market on a riskadjusted basis.
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Are
abnormal risk-adjusted returns possible if
you trade using private information?
Corporate insiders are required to report
their transactions to the SEC.
They are not supposed to trade when in the
possession of “material” information.
Even with regulation, they achieve positive
risk-adjusted abnormal returns.
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23% Drop in One Day??
No
large release of news
Efficient
Market explanation: Due to
chance. Are outliers in the distribution.
Just an outlier observation in a random
process.
Panic
& Crowd Psychology (behavioral
finance explanation)
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Some
companies saw their stock price go up
just by adding dotcom to their names
When
3-Com spun off Palm Pilot, but kept
95% of the shares, The 95% of Palm owned by
3-Com were worth more than the market cap
of 3-Com. Implies negative value for the rest
of 3-Com!
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It
is obvious now that the 1998-March 2000
tech run-up was a bubble, but was this
market inefficiency, or merely poor
valuations?
How do you know a bubble when you are in
it?
Should you try to short a bubble if you don’t
know when it will burst?
“The market can remain irrational longer
than you can remain solvent”
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Just
because you know something is
overvalued or undervalued, doesn’t
necessarily mean you can make money off it
Classic Example: We know that someday the
sun will explode, but you can’t short the
Earth
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Most
arbitrage is not carried out by small
investors, but by large money managers.
They usually manage OPM (other people’s
money)
Most arbitrage in the real world is actually
“risk arbitrage” and requires capital
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If
money managers observe a price
discrepancy and commit capital to an
arbitrage position based on convergence, the
initial movement may be away from
convergence, but that merely means there is
a greater opportunity for profit, and more
capital should be committed.
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But
that is exactly when investors are most
likely to pull out.
Investors invest based on PBA (Performance
Based Arbitrage) rather than expected
returns
This lack of capital prevents arbitrage from
taking place
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This
is often given as an explanation for the
collapse of LTCM (Long-Term Capital
Management).
Amazingly, the Shleifer and Vishny paper
came out about a year prior to the LTCM
collapse
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